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“Palomar s’è distratto, non strappa più le erbacce, 
 non pensa più al prato: pensa all’universo.  
Sta provando ad applicare all’universo 
 tutto quello che ha pensato del prato. 
L’universo come cosmo regolare e ordinato  
o come proliferazione caotica.  
L’universo forse finito ma innumerabile, 
 instabile nei suoi confini,  
che apre entro di sé altri universi.  
L’universo, insieme di corpi celesti, nebulose,  
pulviscolo, campi di forze, intersezioni di campi,  
insiemi di insiemi.”1 
 
Italo Calvino 
 
 
 
 
“Temprano, ya en la época de la “invención de América”,  
[…] una vieja sospecha volvía a levantarse,  
- ahora sobre datos cada vez más confiables -:  
que la escasez non constituye la “maldición sine qua non”  
de la realidad humana; que el modelo bélico  
que ha inspirado todo proyecto de existencia histórica  
del Hombre, convirtiéndolo en una estrategia  
que condiciona la supervivencia propia  
a la aniquilación de lo Otro (de la Naturaleza,  
humana o extrahumana), no es lo único posible;  
que es imaginable, sin ser ilusión, un modelo diferente,  
donde el desafió dirigido a lo Otro siga más bien  
el modelo del eros.”2 
 
Bolívar Echeverría 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “Mr. Palomar’s mind has wandered, he has stopped pulling up weeds. He no longer thinks of the 
lawn: he thinks of the universe. He is trying to apply to the universe everything he has though about the 
lawn. The universe as regular and ordered cosmos or as chaotic proliferation. The universe perhaps 
finite but countless, unstable within its borders, which discloses other universes within itself. The 
universe, collection of celestial bodies, nebulas, fine dust, force fields, intersections of fields, 
collections of collections…”. 
2 As early as during the “invention of America”, […] raised the age-old suspicion again, no won the 
strength of much more trustworthy data: if scarcity was not, in fact, the “curse sine qua non” of human 
reality. The Pólemos model, which has inspired every Project of the historical existence of man, by 
making it a war strategy that conditions survival in terms of the annihilation or exploitation of the 
Other (of the human other, of Nature), is not the only possibility; one might, without it being an 
illusion, imagine a different one, in which the Other is called following the model of Éros” 

	   9 
AGRADECIMIENTOS 
 
El trabajo que aquí se presenta ha sido el resultado de un viaje de cinco años. 
Como en todo viaje, en este también se han alternado momentos distintos. Ha habido 
tiempo para el encanto y el desencanto, la inspiración y la frustración, la curiosidad y 
el tedio, la exaltación y el desanimo. Han sido cinco años privilegiados, en los que he 
podido desarrollar con total libertad un proyecto de investigación original y 
significativo para mi propia persona.  
La realización de este trabajo pudo contar con el generoso aporte de la Beca FPU 
del Ministerio de Educación del Reino de España. 
La ayuda, el soporte y las palabras de muchas personas han sido fundamentales 
para la realización de este trabajo.  
Ante todo quiero agradecer a todos los migrantes y las migrantes que participaron 
en esta investigación en Ámsterdam y Madrid. La amabilidad y generosidad con la 
que decidieron ayudarme ha sido para mi un regalo y un ejemplo. En particular quiero 
agradecer a Sylvana Cabezas a Ramiro Palacios y su familia. Ellos me abrieron la 
puerta al mundo de los ecuatorianos en Ámsterdam y me acogieron como a un hijo. 
Sin su ayuda esta investigación no hubiera sido posible. Quiero agradecer también a 
Lulu Cabezas a Malki, Ñusta y Ñaupac por haberme hospedado en su casa que, en 
medio del trajín, fue un hogar. 
Un gracias particular a mis directores de tesis, el Prof. Joaquín Arango y el Prof. 
Giuseppe Sciortino. Su apoyo incondicional, orientación y sugerencias han sido la 
piedra angular sobre la que se construyó este trabajo. 
Deseo agradecer al Prof. Godfried Engbersen por haberme acogido como uno más 
del grupo en el Departamento de Sociología de la Erasmus University de Rotterdam 
durante mi estancia de investigación en los Países Bajos. Sus sugerencias, criticas y 
alientos han sido fundamentales. Gracias también a Willem Schinkel, Arjen Leerkes, 
Dennis Broeders y a todos los miembros del Departamento por su ayuda y 
sugerencias. Un gracias especial a Masja Van Meeteren. 
Toda mi gratitud a los dos reviewers que con grande competencia y amabilidad se 
tomaron el tiempo de leer mi trabajo y de sugerirme ideas y apuntes para mejorarlo.  
He tenido el privilegio de poder discutir partes de este trabajo con muchos 
investigadores e investigadoras. Un gracias especial a Claudia Finotelli, Paolo 
	   10 
Boccagni, Sandro Mezzadra, Sébastien Chauvin, Nicholas De Genova, MariaCaterina 
La Barbera, Sarah Spencer, Refugio Chávez, Rosa Aparicio.  
Gran parte de los penas y de las alegrías vividas a lo largo de este viaje han sido 
compartidas con mis compañeros y compañeras de doctorado. Gracias a Adriana, 
Aurelis, Carolina, Elisabeth, Inara, Damián y Joaquín. Un gracias especial a Elena 
con la que más de cerca compartimos el día a día de la ideación y escritura de 
nuestros trabajos. 
Este trabajo no hubiera sido posible sin la ayuda experta y generosa de Irene 
Diamond. Su revisión atenta y escrupulosa de cada una de las palabras de esta tesis 
han hecho posible que la misma se escriba en ingles. A ella la mayor gratitud. 
Gracias a los muchos amigos y amigas que estuvieron a mi lado en estos años. Un 
gracias especial a Andrea Betti por haber leído muchas de las paginas de este trabajo, 
por las infinitas horas de discusión y por su soporte indefectible.  
Durante la realización de esta investigación fallecieron tres personas que tuvieron 
una influencia fundamental en mi vida y en las ideas que aquí se discuten. Un 
recuerdo emocionado a mi abuelo Bolívar Echeverría Paredes, a mi tío Bolívar 
Echeverría Andrade y a Gabriele Viliani.   
No es necesario más que por el gusto de hacerlo mencionar la gratitud hacia mis 
queridas familias en Ecuador e Italia, por su cariño y apoyo incondicional. Un gracias 
especial a mis padres. Si es cierto que para tener una vida grata los más importante es 
elegir bien a los viejos, me reconozco el merito de haberlo echo de la mejor manera. 
A mis hermanos y hermanas, Maria Chiara, Francisca y Tomás, el más grande cariño, 
con ellos a lado voy de bajada. Gracias infinitas a Adriano y Natalia.  
 
Este trabajo, culminación de una etapa y semilla de las que vendrán, esta dedicado 
a Dafne. “La tua voce come il coro delle sirene di Ulisse m' incatena, ed è bellissimo 
perdersi in quest' incantesimo”. 
   
	   11 
SUMMARY 
Topic, research questions and structure of the study 
Two driving forces have sustained and fostered this research work: the curiosity 
about the phenomenon of irregular migration, that is emblematic of the contradictions 
and complexities of the age of globalization and then, the dissatisfaction with most of 
the available explanations. 
My curiosity was not so much aroused by the scenes of the overcrowded boats 
trying to cross the Mediterranean or of the people jumping over the fences in Tijuana, 
in order to achieve their “American dream”. After all, a great deal of human history 
has been about people trying to overcome barriers, no matter whether they are 
geographical or political, in order to improve their living conditions. What really 
intrigued me was on the other side of those barriers. Why were the rich states that 
cried against the “invasion”, with all their armies, resources and technologies, still 
unable to stop these hordes of miserable people? Was it possible that after four 
centuries of adjustments and rethinking, the epitome of modern politics had not yet 
been able to solve the most elemental problem, that of populations coming and going? 
How could irregular migrants live, work and fulfil their dreams within societies that, 
at least in principle, refused their presence? Irregular migration appeared to me as a 
captivating phenomenon because it evidenced the incongruence between the idea of 
states as the all-embracing, all-mighty controllers of socio-political interactions, and a 
much more complex and thriving reality made up of conflicts, ambivalences and 
uncertainty. Reflecting and researching on irregular migration, from this point of 
view, seems to me not simply a way to elucidate the particular aspects of a specific 
social phenomenon, but rather to reveal a viewpoint from which to observe the 
structure and dynamics of contemporary society as a whole. 
A preliminary review of the literature on irregular migration provided me with a 
large number of different, often contrasting, answers. Depending on the point of view, 
scholars and researchers had explained the phenomenon as the results of disparate 
causes, such as: the weaknesses of states, the ability of migrants, the interests of 
capitalists, the support of criminal networks, etc. As I proceeded in the exploration, I 
found myself in the paradoxical situation of becoming more and more fascinated by 
the new approach I found, and, at the same time, more frustrated by the incongruence 
of the complex puzzle that was emerging. Furthermore, it appeared that each 
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theorization effort usually emerged from the analysis of a particular national case. 
Thus, for instance, if in a certain place, the role of efficient smuggler networks had 
been crucial, irregular migration had to be explained everywhere as the result of 
smuggler networks. Besides, since the studied cases were rather limited, these mono-
causal, undifferentiated explanations were proposed without a solid empirical control 
base. What seemed to be missing, then, was a broader and more systematic work of 
comparison, in other words, one that made it possible to assess similarities and 
differences between different cases and therefore to offer material for the 
development of a more general and sophisticated understanding of irregular 
migration. 
On the basis of these initial reflections, I decided to start this work with two very 
broad and general research questions in mind: What is irregular migration? How can 
it be explained? A twofold strategy was formulated in order to add a grain of sand to 
the building of a better understanding of irregular migration.  
Firstly, a theoretical study was developed. The objective of this study was to 
critically analyse the different theories that have been proposed to explain irregular 
migration and to prepare an alternative theoretical framework. Building on the 
critiques to the principal theoretical explanations of irregular migration, the study 
focused on the theoretical work of Luhmann in order to search for a better theoretical 
framework. This approach helped to overcome a number of theoretical difficulties that 
have characterized this field of research. For instance, it was possible to go beyond a 
dichotomist understanding of the relation between agency/structure and to retrieve a 
social perspective where a statist one had been clearly dominant. The result was the 
elaboration of an analytical framework that linked the social characteristics of the 
irregular migration phenomenon to the structural features of the considered contexts. 
Then an empirical study was developed. The objective of this study was to 
compare the experience of irregular migrants in two different receiving contexts, to 
discover similarities and differences and to assess the possible effects on such 
experiences of the structural characteristics of each context. The chosen case was that 
of Ecuadorian irregular migrants in the cities of Amsterdam and Madrid. The contexts 
were researched mainly through secondary literature and the available statistical data. 
The fieldwork combined ethnography and the collection of 30 in-depth interviews 
with irregular migrants in each context. 
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Although these two studies can be considered as separate entities and each has a 
certain degree of autonomy, they were actually developed together and imagined as 
complementary parts of a single research project. Following the methodology 
proposed by Derek Layder, which he called “adaptive theory” (Layder, 1998), we 
avoided a purely inductive or a purely deductive approach. Instead, we tried to 
establish a permanent dialogue between the theoretical and empirical parts of this 
study. The results that gradually emerged from the empirical work influenced the 
theoretical reflections while, at the same time, the concepts and ideas emerging from 
the theoretical worked helped to orient and recalibrate the empirical work. 
 
Results 
The result of the theoretical study was the elaboration of a systemic analytical 
framework, that, on the basis of a radically differentialist understanding of the 
phenomenon, linked the social characteristics of the irregular migration phenomenon 
to the structural features of the considered contexts.  
Irregular migration has usually been interpreted either through the lenses of states 
or through the lenses of migrants. This has generated two main perspectives of the 
phenomenon: the first interprets it as a problem that may signal an erosion of states’ 
prerogatives; the second understands it as a form of exploitation, which signals states’ 
enduring capacity to seek their goals. Although they contrast with each other, both 
perspectives are based on a similar, problematic, conception of society, social actors 
and social relations. This conception, based on the semantics of modern states, 
interprets society as subsumed within the concept of the state. The latter is 
conceptualized as a predominant actor that is able to control (or lose control over) the 
former. Social actors are intended as monolithic, single-minded, and time-stable 
players. Finally, social relations are interpreted through an input/output model that, 
accordingly, presupposes the possibility to establish clear-cut, cause/effect 
interactions. Irregularity, from this standpoint, is understood as a rather 
undifferentiated phenomenon that, depending on the case, signals either a state 
effective strategy or failure. 
Luhmann’s theory of social systems proposes a radical critique of the semantics 
of modern states. Society, from this viewpoint, regains a central, all-embracing role. 
The political system and the state, although important, are considered as only two 
among the numerous systems and organizations constituting the complex galaxy of 
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social relations. On the basis of this notion, irregular migration should be understood 
as a complex, differentiated, structural phenomenon of modern world society. The 
development of this phenomenon is related to the existing structural mismatch 
between the dominant form of social differentiation (functional) and the specific form 
of internal differentiation (segmentary) into territorial states of the political system. 
This creates a fundamental conflict between two logics: on the one hand, the all-
inclusive logic of most social systems (economic, legal, educational, familial, etc.) 
that fosters human mobility across geographic space; on the other, the exclusive logic 
of states that insists on regulating human mobility on the basis of a membership 
principle. Against this backdrop, irregular migration emerges as an adaptive solution 
to the mismatch existing between the high demand for entry into certain states and the 
limited number of legal entry slots available. 
If, in abstract and theoretical terms, irregular migration is explained as a 
structural feature of world society, the concrete, sociological manifestations embodied 
by the phenomenon within each context cannot be theoretically deduced. To 
understand how an irregular migration phenomenon initiates and develops, which 
resources it mobilizes and what structures and interactions it establishes, it is 
necessary to consider the dynamic interplay not only between states and migrants, but 
also between these and all the other social systems. Each actor needs to be considered 
as internally differentiated, autopoietic, self-referential and, yet, deeply interrelated 
with its environment through irritation/resonance relations. The main consequence of 
this radically differential perspective is that the particular phenomenology of each 
“irregular migration reality” must be empirically researched. In this sense, whereas in 
legal terms it may be possible to talk about irregular migration as a single category, 
from a sociological perspective, it is more accurate to talk about irregularities. In 
each context, the systemic interactions among states, migrants and the other social 
systems set the conditions for the emergence and evolution of differentiated irregular 
migration realities. 
The results of the empirical study showed that both the two structural contexts in 
Amsterdam and Madrid and the experience of Ecuadorian irregular migrants in the 
two cities were radically different. The diverse combination of possibilities, 
limitations, opportunities, resources, etc., present in the different spheres of social life 
in the two cities determined a set of very different conditions for irregular migrants to 
develop their lives and fulfil their objectives. This result confirmed the hypothesis that 
	   15 
had emerged in the theoretical part of this study: the existence of different “irregular 
migration realities”. While in legal terms, the lack of a residence permit generates in 
principle a similar condition, the “social translation” of this condition sharply differs 
depending on where such translation takes place. 
In Amsterdam, the irregular status appeared as a long-term condition for the 
majority of migrants since no regularization channels are available. The fieldwork 
revealed also how the working opportunities for irregular migrants have continually 
diminished in the last decades as a consequence of stricter labour market policies. 
Another important result of the changed political attitude towards, was the exclusion 
of irregular migrants from most social services and in particular from healthcare. 
In Madrid, the irregular status appeared as a short-term condition for the majority 
of irregular migrants, since a number of regularization channels have been available. 
Before the beginning of the economic crisis, this status did not determined important 
limitations in what regards the possibility to access the labour market. In many sectors 
there were substantial opportunities and good conditions for irregular work. This 
scenario radically changed after 2008. Concerning the access to social services, for 
instance healthcare, until 2012, this has not represented a problem for irregular 
migrants. They could easily and freely access the public universal system. 
The important differences emerged from the two cases show how irregular 
migration not only is different for the migrants but also for the states. In the 
Netherlands, the phenomenon can be interpreted as limited, residual and effectively 
controlled by the public policies. In Spain, instead, this appears as massive, transitory 
and managed by public policies as a tool of selective inclusion that allows to regulate 
the access to the labour market. 
The dialectic between the results of the theoretical study and the empirical study 
allowed a process of evaluation and recalibration of the theoretical framework. On the 
basis of this work, in the conclusions, a typology of irregular migration phenomena 
was presented. This scheme put in relation the structural characteristics of the 
receiving contexts and the main features that the irregular migration realities develop 
within them.  
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RESUMEN 
Tema, interrogantes y estructura del estudio  
Dos han sido las fuerzas que han inspirado y sostenido este trabajo de 
investigación. Por una lado, la curiosidad por un fenómeno, la inmigración irregular, 
que es emblemático de las contradicciones y complejidades de la actual época de 
globalización; por otro lado, la insatisfacción con la mayor parte de las explicaciones 
del fenómeno que han sido avanzadas. 
La curiosidad no fue despertada tanto por las escenas de barcos abarrotados de 
gente intentado cruzar el Mediterráneo o por aquellas de gente intentado superar las 
barreras en Tijuana buscando alcanzar su “sueño americano”. Después de todo, gran 
parte de la historia de la humanidad ha tenido que ver con pueblos intentado superar 
barreras, tanto geográficas como políticas, en el intento de mejorar sus condiciones de 
vida. Lo que realmente resultó intrigante se encontraba al otro lado de esas barreras. 
¿Por qué los estados ricos que clamaban en contra de la “invasión”, con todos sus 
ejércitos, recursos y tecnologías, eran incapaces de frenar a las hordas de gente 
empobrecida intentado alcanzar sus territorios? ¿Cómo era posible que después de 
siglos de ajustes y perfeccionamientos, el producto más sofisticado de la política 
moderna, el estado, fuera todavía incapaz de resolver el problema más elemental, 
aquel de las gentes moviéndose por el mundo? ¿Cómo era posible que los migrantes 
irregulares pudieran vivir, trabajar y alcanzar sus sueños dentro de sociedades que, al 
menos en principio, refutaban su presencia? La migración irregular me parecía un 
fenómeno cautivante porque evidenciaba la incongruencia entre la idea de los estados 
como instituciones omniabarcadoras, capaces de controlar todas las interacciones 
socio-políticas y una realidad mucho más compleja y desafiante hecha de conflictos y 
ambivalencias. Reflexionar e investigar sobre la inmigración irregular desde esta 
perspectiva, me pareció no solo una manera de profundizar el conocimiento sobre un 
fenómeno social especifico, sino la manera de encontrar un punto de vista 
privilegiado desde el cual observar las estructuras y dinámicas de la sociedad 
contemporánea en la actual época de globalización. 
Un análisis preliminar de la literatura acerca de la inmigración irregular ofreció 
un amplio abanico de diferentes, a menudo contrastantes, interpretaciones. 
Dependiendo del punto de vista, el fenómeno ha sido explicado como el resultado de 
diversas causas: la debilidad de los estados, la habilidad de los migrantes, los intereses 
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del capital, el papel de las redes criminales, etc. Avanzando en la exploración, me 
encontré en la situación paradójica de que cada nueva teoría o hipótesis con la que me 
encontraba resultaba a la vez fascinante y frustrante. Si por un lado, se abrían nuevas 
posibilidades de interpretación, por otro, juntando todas las piezas, el cuadro general 
resultaba cada vez más incongruente. Asimismo, se evidenció el hecho de que los 
diferentes análisis, por lo general, provenían del estudio de un caso nacional 
específico. Por ello, si por ejemplo en un cierto contexto el papel de las redes 
criminales había sido preponderante, la inmigración irregular debía explicarse en todo 
lado como resultado de la misma causa. El escaso número de estudios, además, 
condujo a que a menudo estas explicaciones mono-causales indiferenciadas se 
generalicen sin que exista una sólida base empírica de control. Lo que aparecía 
ineludible, entonces, era un trabajo de comparación sistemática que permitiese valorar 
las diferencias y similitudes entre casos diversos y de esta manera ofreciese material 
para el desarrollo de un entendimiento más general y sofisticado de la inmigración 
irregular. 
Tomando en cuenta estas reflexiones, decidí emprender este trabajo de 
investigación a partir de dos interrogantes generales: ¿Qué es la inmigración 
irregular? ¿Cómo podemos explicarla? Para añadir un grano de arena al intento de 
mejorar nuestro entendimiento del fenómeno, se diseñó una doble estrategia. 
En primer lugar, un estudio teórico. El objetivo de esta aproximación fue analizar 
críticamente las diferentes teorías que han sido propuestas para explicar el fenómeno 
de la inmigración irregular y proponer un esquema alternativo. Las principales 
preguntas de investigación de este estudio fueron: ¿Qué conocemos acerca del 
fenómeno migratorio irregular? ¿Cuáles han sido las principales teorías desarrolladas 
para explicarlo? ¿Qué fortalezas y debilidades tienen estas teorías? ¿Es posible 
encontrar un marco teórico que permita combinar las fortalezas y superar las 
debilidades? Partiendo de las críticas a las principales aproximaciones ofrecidas por la 
literatura especializada, el estudio se centró en el trabajo teórico de Niklas Luhmann. 
Esta opción permitió superar una serie de impases teóricos y paradojas que habían 
caracterizado este campo de estudio. Por ejemplo, fue posible superar un 
entendimiento dicotómico de la relación entre agencia y estructura o la recuperación 
de la centralidad del concepto de sociedad en un ámbito en el que había predominado 
el estudio del Estado. El resultado de este trabajo fue la elaboración de un marco 
teórico que posibilita analizar la relación entre las características sociológicas del 
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fenómeno migratorio irregular y las características estructurales de los contextos 
donde éste emerge, a la vez que un entendimiento de la inmigración irregular como un 
fenómeno sistémico y diferenciado. 
En segundo lugar, desarrollamos un estudio empírico. El objetivo de este estudio 
fue el de comparar la experiencia de migrantes irregulares en dos contextos de llegada 
diferentes y de evaluar las similitudes y diferencias entre los dos casos. De esta 
manera se apuntó a ofrecer material de control para la reflexión teórica. El caso 
elegido fue aquel de migrantes irregulares ecuatorianos en las ciudades de Ámsterdam 
y Madrid. Por un lado, se llevó a cabo un estudio de los dos contextos estructurales, 
por otro, un trabajo de campo que combinó métodos etnográficos y la recolección de 
30 entrevistas en profundidad en cada ciudad. La principales preguntas de 
investigación de esta estudio fueron: ¿cuáles son las principales características 
estructurales que afectan a la migración en los dos contextos (historia migratoria, 
régimen migratorio, economía, tipología del estado de bienestar, opinión publica y 
política)? ¿Cuál ha sido la experiencia de los migrantes irregulares ecuatorianos en los 
dos contextos? ¿Cuales han sido las principales similitudes y diferencias? En 
particular: ¿Cuáles has sido las principales trayectorias legales desarrolladas por los 
migrantes? ¿Cuál ha sido su experiencia en relación al ámbito de trabajo (sectores, 
condiciones, controles)? ¿Qué experiencia han tenido en relación a los controles por 
parte de los estados? ¿Cuál ha sido su experiencia en relación a aspectos vitales como 
el acceso a la vivienda y el acceso a la sanidad? 
Si bien los dos estudios pueden ser considerados como entidades distintas y cada 
uno posee cierto grado de autonomía, fueron desarrollados conjuntamente e 
imaginados como partes complementarias de un mismo proyecto. Siguiendo la 
metodología propuesta por Derek Layder, denominada adaptive theory, evitamos la 
elección entre una aproximación puramente inductiva o deductiva. Al contrario, 
intentamos establecer un diálogo permanente entre la parte teórica y empírica de esta 
investigación. De esta manera, los resultados que emergían del estudio empírico 
influenciaron la reflexión teórica a la vez que los conceptos e ideas que surgían del 
estudio teórico ayudaron a orientar y recalibrar el estudio empírico. 
En las parte final de la elaboración, volvimos a la pregunta inicial y fundamental 
de este trabajo: ¿Qué es la migración irregular? ¿Cómo podemos explicarla? 
Combinando los resultados del estudio teórico y del estudio empírico, intentamos 
establecer posibles relaciones entre las características estructurales de los contextos 
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analizados y las diferentes realidades de inmigración irregular que allí se observan. 
Finalmente, sobre la base de este análisis y a través de un proceso de abstracción 
propusimos una tipología teórica de realidades de migración irregular respecto de las 
diferentes posibles características estructurales de los contextos donde estas aparecen.   
 
Resultados 
Los resultados del estudio teórico permitieron elaborar un marco de análisis de la 
inmigración irregular basado en una concepción diferencialista del mismo. La teoría 
de los sistemas sociales de Luhmann propone una crítica radical de la semántica del 
estado moderno. La sociedad, desde esta perspectiva, retoma un papel central y 
omniabarcador. El sistema político y el estado, si bien fundamentales, son 
considerados como dos entre los muchos sistemas sociales y organizaciones que 
participan de la compleja galaxia de las relaciones sociales. A partir de este 
planteamiento, la inmigración es entendida como un producto estructural, complejo y 
diferenciado de la sociedad mundo. El desarrollo de este fenómeno tiene que ver con 
la existencia de desajustes estructurales entre la forma dominante de diferenciación 
social (funcional) y la forma especifica de diferenciación interna (segmentada) en 
estados territoriales del sistema político. Esto crea un conflicto fundamental entre dos 
lógicas: por un lado, la inclusividad de la mayoría de sistemas sociales (economía, 
regulaciones legales, educación, familia, etc.) que favorece la movilidad geográfica de 
las personas; por otro, la exclusividad de los estados y su deseo de regular la 
circulación de personas sobre la base del principio de membresía. La inmigración 
irregular aparece entonces como una solución adaptativa al desacuerdo entre una alta 
demanda de entrada a ciertos países y el limitado número de accesos legales 
permitidos. Si en términos abstractos, la migración irregular puede ser entendida 
como una característica estructural de la sociedad mundo, las manifestaciones 
sociológicas concretas que el fenómeno asume dentro de cada contexto no pueden ser 
teóricamente deducidas. Por el contrario, las “realidades de inmigración irregular” 
deben ser investigadas empíricamente y entendidas como el resultado de las 
particulares interacciones que en cada contexto se producen entre: A. los sistemas 
sociales funcionales; B. los estados; C. los migrantes. Como sugiere la teoría de los 
sistemas sociales, cada uno de estos actores debe ser considerado como autopoiético, 
auto-referente e internamente diferenciado; las interacciones sociales por su parte 
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deben ser entendidas a través del modelo irritación/resonancia en lugar del modelo 
input/output. 
Los resultados del estudio empírico mostraron en primer lugar que la experiencia 
de los migrantes irregulares ecuatorianos en las ciudades de Ámsterdam y Madrid 
presentó importantes diferencias. De la misma manera, los dos contextos también 
difirieron bajo numerosos aspectos. La diferente combinación de posibilidades, 
limitaciones, oportunidades, recursos, etc. presentes en cada una de las esferas de la 
vida social en las dos ciudades, generó condiciones muy diferentes para que los 
migrantes irregulares puedan desarrollar sus vidas y alcanzar sus objetivos. Este 
resultado confirmó la hipótesis planteada por el estudio teórico: la existencia de 
diferentes “realidades de inmigración irregular”.  Sin bien en términos legales, la falta 
de permiso de residencia genera en principio una condición similar, la “traducción 
social” de esta condición, se diferencia radicalmente dependiendo dónde esta 
traducción tiene lugar. 
En Ámsterdam, la irregularidad se presenta como una condición a largo plazo 
para la mayoría de migrantes puesto que no existen canales de regularización. A esto 
se suma la limitada presencia de oportunidades de trabajo e importantes restricciones 
en lo que refiere al acceso a los principales derechos sociales. En Madrid, la 
irregularidad se presenta como una condición de corto plazo, puesto que existen 
diferentes canales de regularización. Antes del inicio de la crisis económica, el estatus 
de irregularidad no representó un límite en lo que refiere al acceso al mercado de 
trabajo en muchos sectores. Por otra parte, hasta el 2012, este no implicó restricción 
alguna en lo que refiere al acceso a los derechos sociales. 
Estas importantes diferencias muestran que la inmigración irregular se configura 
de manera disimilar no solo para los migrantes, sino también para los estados. En los 
Países Bajos, el fenómeno puede ser interpretado como limitado, residual y 
efectivamente reducido por las políticas públicas. En España, en cambio, este aparece 
como masivo, transitorio y gestionado por las políticas públicas como un instrumento 
de entrada selectivo, que permite al estado de regular las puertas del mercado de 
trabajo. La dialéctica entre los resultados del estudio teórico y del estudio empírico 
permitieron un interesante proceso de evaluación y sucesiva re-elaboración del marco 
teórico. A partir de este trabajo, en la parte conclusiva se propone una tipología de 
migraciones irregulares que pone en relación las características estructurales de los 
contexto de recepción y las principales del fenómeno.	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INTRODUCTION 
 
Irregularity is a juridical status that describes the social relation between a 
migrant and one or more states. As a social phenomenon, it does not derive from the 
migrations themselves, rather, it is the result “of the existence of a structural tension 
between the social preconditions and the political preconditions” that support them 
(Sciortino, 2007). The social space, following this interpretation, is the scenario where 
two different and opposed logics interact. On the one hand, there is the logic of free 
movement of people and goods that is favoured by socio-economic forces like the 
market-economy, globalization or transnationalism. On the other hand, there is the 
logic of the states, political-juridical constructions, historically and ideologically 
differentiated, that claim the power to delimit the space and to regulate the movement 
of factors across it. Irregularity would then be the result of the clash between these 
two logics that determine a numerical difference between the migrants that move 
across the geographical space, established by the first logic, and the migrants who are 
allowed to do that, established by the second logic. 
The divergence between these two logics has become particularly relevant in the 
present age of globalization. In the previous historical phase, the “social space”, 
understood as the space within which the majority of social transactions take place, 
tended to better overlap with the “political space”, understood as the space where 
those transactions are regulated by a sovereign power. In that context, the main social 
interactions occurred within the boundaries of the states and those that crossed 
frontiers were rather limited and then more easily controllable. Human mobility, 
which is, of course, not a novelty of the current historical moment, took place 
massively before globalization, but it largely occurred through channels established 
by the states and often under their own auspice. 
The growing liberalization in the exchange of goods, capital and information, as 
well as the drastic reduction in the costs of, and time needed for, the exchanges, in 
other words, globalization, have determined a dramatic change in the previous 
patterns of mobility. Indeed, the fast and worldwide development of interconnections 
between individuals and societies has led to an inversion in that overlapping tendency 
between the “social space” and the “political space”. This process has uncovered, 
once more, the possible conflict between the inner logic of the each space. In a certain 
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sense, it could be said that globalization is determining a spill-over of the “social 
space” beyond the boundaries of the “political space” as was prefigured by the 
modern national state. Faced by these phenomena, states have reacted in a 
differentiated way. On the one hand, they seem to be ceding sovereignty as regards 
the circulation of goods, capital and information. On the other, however, they seem to 
be widely opposed to the free circulation of people. The contradiction between these 
two tendencies has been successfully summarized by James Hollifield´s image of a 
clash between markets and states (Hollifield, 2000). Focusing on the effects of this 
conflict over migrations, Douglas Massey highlighted the existence of a “postmodern 
paradox” because we can see at work at the same time “global forces” and “restrictive 
policies” (Massey, 1999). 
It is within the frame of this paradox that irregularity can be better understood. 
Social forces seem to be pushing for a greater mobility of peoples across the globe, 
while political forces try to regulate or stop such movement. The mismatch between 
the fluxes generated by the former and those accorded and legitimated by the latter 
determines that a consistent number of migrants move, reside and work irregularly. 
If, in an abstract manner, irregularity can be explained as the result of the 
described conflict between the logic of global social processes and the logic of states, 
reality, as always happens, provides a more complex scenario where a number of 
different factors have to be considered and where the role of the actors (e.g. states, 
migrants, capital, etc.) is more ambiguous and less decisive than it may appear at first 
sight. 
The growing impact of irregular migration in receiving countries in the last few 
decades, in spite of the efforts against it taken by the states, has fostered anxieties in 
the public opinion of the latter and attracted the attention of the scientific community 
(Arango, 2013; Broeders, 2009). From the mid-seventies in the United States and the 
early nineties in Europe, the study of irregularity and control policies by the states, 
has produced a great variety of interpretations and analyses. These, from a diversity of 
perspectives, have tried to answer four fundamental questions: A. How can irregular 
migration be explained? B. What determines the failure or low efficacy of the control 
policies? C. What are the main impacts of irregular migration on the receiving 
societies? D. How do irregular migrants manage to live in a supposedly hostile 
environment? What strategies do they develop? What abuses do they suffer?  
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Answers, as highlighted by many authors, have been in general partial, if not 
inadequate, in their explicative capacity. This was often the consequence of over-
simplistic analyses and mono-causal argumentations. The criticism has discovered 
that the reasons for this problems lie both in the lack of theoretical ambition and in the 
scarcity of empirical evidence (Baldwin-Edwards, 2008; Bommes, 2012a; Cvajner & 
Sciortino, 2010b; Düvell, 2006). The two different perspectives, moreover, have often 
operated without establishing an effective dialogue with one another. 
This research project has started precisely from the two elements that have 
emerged from this brief discussion. On the one hand, irregular migration represents an 
extremely interesting phenomenon, one that particularly reveals the dynamics, 
conflicts and contradictions of our age. As pointed out by McNevin: “perhaps more 
than any other cross-border flow, irregular migration captures the symbolism of 
borders under siege in an age of globalization” (McNevin, 2009, p. 168). On the other 
hand, the comprehension of irregular migration still presents a number of limitations. 
Yet, the research on irregular migration does not aim at being simply a way to 
elucidate the particular aspects of a specific social phenomenon, but rather to provide 
a viewpoint from which to observe the structure and dynamics of contemporary 
society as a whole. In this sense, through the study of irregular migration, this work 
aspirates to contribute, with the highest humility, to the greatest task for every 
generation of researchers, the comprehension of “the spirit of their time”. 
 
Research questions and design 
There have been two driving forces that have sustained and fostered this research 
work: firstly, the curiosity for a phenomenon, irregular migration, that is emblematic 
of the contradictions and complexities of the age of globalization and then the 
dissatisfaction with most of the available explanations. 
My curiosity was not so much aroused by the scenes of the overcrowded boats 
trying to cross the Mediterranean or of the people jumping over the fences in Tijuana, 
in order to achieve their “American dream”. After all, a great deal of human history 
has been about people trying to overcome barriers, no matter whether they are 
geographical or political, in order to improve their living conditions. What really 
intrigued me was on the other side of those barriers. Why were the rich states that 
cried against the “invasion”, with all their armies, resources and technologies, still 
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unable to stop these hordes of miserable people? Was it possible that after four 
centuries of adjustments and rethinking, the epitome of modern politics had not yet 
been able to solve the most elemental problem, that of populations coming and going? 
How could irregular migrants live, work and fulfil their dreams within societies that, 
at least in principle, refused their presence? Irregular migration appeared to me as a 
captivating phenomenon because it evidenced the incongruence between the idea of 
states as the all-embracing, all-mighty controllers of socio-political interactions, and a 
much more complex and thriving reality made up of conflicts, ambivalences and 
uncertainty. Reflecting and researching on irregular migration, from this point of 
view, seems to me not simply a way to elucidate the particular aspects of a specific 
social phenomenon, but rather to provide a viewpoint from which to observe the 
structure and dynamics of contemporary society as a whole in the current age of 
globalization.  
A preliminary review of the literature on irregular migration provided me with a 
large number of different, often contrasting, answers. Depending on the point of view, 
scholars and researchers had explained the phenomenon as the results of disparate 
causes, such as: the weaknesses of states, the ability of migrants, the interests of 
capitalists, the support of criminal networks, etc. As I proceeded in the exploration, I 
found myself in the paradoxical situation of becoming more and more fascinated by 
the new approach I found, and, at the same time, more frustrated by the incongruence 
of the complex puzzle that was emerging. Furthermore, it appeared that each 
theorization effort usually emerged from the analysis of a particular national case. 
Thus, for instance, if in a certain place, the role of efficient smuggler networks had 
been crucial, irregular migration had to be explained everywhere as the result of 
smuggler networks. Besides, since the studied cases were rather limited, these mono-
causal, undifferentiated explanations were generalized without a solid empirical 
control base. What seemed to be missing, then, was a broader and more systematic 
work of comparison, in other words, one that made it possible to assess similarities 
and differences between different cases and therefore to offer material for the 
development of a more general and sophisticated understanding of irregular 
migration. 
On the basis of these initial reflections, I decided to start this work with two very 
broad and general research questions in mind: What is irregular migration? How can 
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it be explained? A twofold strategy was formulated in order to add a grain of sand to 
the building of a better understanding of irregular migration.  
Firstly, a theoretical study was developed. The objective of this study was to 
critically analyse the different theories that have been proposed to explain irregular 
migration and to prepare an alternative theoretical framework. The main research 
questions of this study were: what do we know about irregular migration? What have 
been the main theoretical explanations of the phenomenon? What are the strengths 
and weaknesses of such explanations? Is it possible to find an alternative theoretical 
framework that is able to reconcile the strengths and overcome the weaknesses of the 
other theories? Building on the critiques to the principal theoretical explanations of 
irregular migration, the study focused on the theoretical work of Luhmann in order to 
search for a better theoretical framework. This approach helped to overcome a 
number of theoretical difficulties that have characterized this field of research. For 
instance, it was possible to go beyond a dichotomist understanding of the relation 
between agency/structure and to retrieve a social perspective where a statist one had 
been clearly dominant. The result was the elaboration of an analytical framework that 
enabled the possibility of linking the social characteristics of the irregular migration 
phenomenon to the structural features of the considered contexts, as well as the 
understanding of irregular migration as a systemic and differentiated phenomenon. 
Then an empirical study was developed. The objective of this study was to 
compare the experience of irregular migrants in two receiving contexts and to assess 
the differences and similarities that characterized the two cases. The aim was to offer 
empirical material for the theoretical reflection. The chosen case was that of 
Ecuadorian irregular migrants in the cities of Amsterdam and Madrid. This choice 
responded to two main explanations. On the one hand, the Ecuadorian migration 
phenomenon, because of its relatively time circumscribed characteristics and its 
economical motivations, appeared particularly appropriate for a “at destination” 
comparative research. Migrants in the two receiving contexts could be considered 
reasonably similar. On the one hand, the two cities, while having enough elements in 
common to avoid the risk of comparing “oranges and apples”, were at the same time 
very different. This allowed for a “most different cases” research strategy, which 
appeared particular stimulating for theory testing and possible extension.  
The empirical study consists of two parts. Firstly, it was developed a context 
study, which comparatively analysed the main structural characteristics of the two 
	   28 
cities. Secondly, a fieldwork that combined ethnography and the collection of 30 in-
depth interviews with irregular migrants in each context was developed. The main 
research questions of that drove this study were: what have been the main structural 
characteristics affecting migration in the two contexts (migration history, migration 
regime, economics, welfare state typology, public and political opinion)? What has 
been the experience of Ecuadorian irregular migrants within the two different 
contexts? What have been the most important differences and similarities? In 
particular: what have been the main legal trajectories developed by the migrants 
within the two contexts? What has been their experience regarding the work sphere 
(sectors, conditions, controls)? What has been their experience of states’ controls? 
Finally, what was their experience regarding basic life facets such as housing and 
healthcare access? Combining the results of the contextual study and the fieldwork we 
made an attempt to establish possible relations between the structural characteristics 
of the two contexts and the different irregular migration realties that emerged within 
them. 
Although the theoretical and the empirical studies can be considered as separate 
entities and each has a certain degree of autonomy, they were actually developed 
together and imagined as complementary parts of a single research project. Following 
the methodology proposed by Derek Layder, which he called “adaptive theory” 
(Layder, 1998), we avoided a purely inductive or a purely deductive approach. 
Instead, we tried to establish a permanent dialogue between the theoretical and 
empirical parts of this study. 
“Adaptive theory focuses on the construction of novel theory by utilizing 
elements of prior theory (general and substantive) in conjunction with theory that 
emerges from data collection and analysis. It is the interchange and dialogue 
between prior theory (models, concepts, conceptual clustering) and emergent 
theory that forms the dynamic of adaptive theory” (Layder, 1998, p. 27). 
 
The results that gradually emerged from the empirical work influenced the 
theoretical reflections while, at the same time, the concepts and ideas emerging from 
the theoretical work helped to orient and recalibrate the empirical work. 
In the conclusion, then, we returned to the initial and more general research 
questions: what is irregular migration? How can we explain it? Combining the results 
of the theoretical and empirical study, and through a process of abstraction, we 
proposed a preliminary theoretical typology of irregular migration realities in relation 
to the structural characteristics of the contexts. 
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Structure of the study 
The study is divided into two main parts. In the first part, the bibliographical and 
theoretical research is developed. The first chapter reviews the existing literature on 
irregular migration, identifying the main topics, lines of inquiry and scientific debates. 
The second chapter critically analyses the different theoretical approaches that have 
been developed to the understanding of irregular migration. The third chapter 
proposes an alternative framework for the theoretical understanding of irregular 
migration based on the works of Niklas Luhmann. 
In the second part, we present the results of the empirical study. The fourth 
chapter discusses the empirical research design and methodology. The fifth chapter 
presents a comparative analysis of the main structural characteristics of the cities of 
Amsterdam and Madrid. The sixth chapter elaborates and discusses the results of the 
fieldwork. The seventh chapter proposes a conjunct analysis of the results of the two 
previous chapters and in particular provides an attempt to assess possible relations 
between the characteristics of the contexts and the irregular migration realities 
emerged in the fieldwork. 
Finally, in the conclusions, we review the results of the two main parts of the 
research work and on the basis of the combined discussion of them we propose a 
hypothetical framework in order to understand irregular migration.  
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PART I – THEORETICAL STUDY 
 
TOWARDS A SYSTEMIC THEORY OF 
IRREGULAR MIGRATION  
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1. THE STUDY OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION 
 
The study of irregular migration as a specific social phenomenon took off during 
the 70s in the US. Since then the academic interest has continually grown and spread, 
first to Europe and, in the last few years, to other regions worldwide. This interest can 
certainly be related to the increasing attention paid to the study of migrations more in 
general (Castles & Miller, 1993).The trend can be linked to those broad and complex 
social and economic changes, often subsumed under the concept of globalization. The 
specific focus on irregular migration, though gaining momentum throughout the 
1980s, reached preeminent attention in the 1990s. On both sides of the Atlantic, the 
explosion of the so-called “migration crisis” (Zolberg & Benda, 2001) and the 
emergence of irregular migration as a widespread social fact raised the attention of 
public opinion and academics alike. Moreover, in recent years, what seemed at first to 
be an issue concerning only the high-income regions of the planet, now involves also 
medium and low-income ones, making irregular migration a truly global structural 
phenomenon (Cvajner & Sciortino, 2010a; Düvell, 2006). 
Accordingly, after a lapse of two decades, a topic that for a long time had been 
relatively marginal (Bridget Anderson & Ruhs, 2010; Bloch & Chimienti, 2011) 
became the object of numerous studies and of a consistent and diversified literature. 
Given the complexity of the phenomenon, its multiple dimensions, and levels of 
social interaction, its study has inevitably taken a multidisciplinary path. The 
literature has rapidly expanded in many directions and, today, irregular migration 
constitutes an important subfield within migration studies.  
This chapter will present a general overview of the main directions and 
developments that the research on irregular migration has taken. Even if some 
scholars have lamented a limited cumulative effort, many studies are available and it 
is now possible to refer to them as a solid starting point for our analysis. To avoid 
getting trapped in difficult and sometimes redundant disciplinary distinctions, this 
overview will focus on the key issues that have been researched from different 
perspectives. In this, respect it seems possible to identify six main general thematic 
fields. 
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1.1. Definitions and Taxonomies 
Since migration is a complex and multifaceted social phenomenon, an important 
and on-going debate has focused on terminology issues. Many terms and definitions 
have been proposed: irregular, illegal, undocumented, clandestine, unauthorized, 
informal, unregistered, sans papier, etc. (Baldwin-Edwards & Kraler, 2009; Düvell, 
2006; Jordan & Düvell, 2002; Triandafyllidou, 2009; Vasta, 2011). Each of these has 
a different focus or emphasis, as well as some advantages and problems. 
As pointed out by Nicholas De Genova, the choice of a term does not occur in a 
social vacuum and it is not politically neutral, for this reason, it should therefore not 
be taken uncritically (De Genova, 2002a). In fact, within a field that has become 
increasingly politicized, it is not surprising that the selection of terms has assumed a 
contested nature (Bridget Anderson & Ruhs, 2010). Researchers have had to deal not 
only with classic epistemological problems of definition and perspective but also with 
the social meaning and connotations that the different terms have in specific contexts. 
Especially in the last decade, this issue has become increasingly problematic. A 
number of negative social myths and stereotypical images, usually associated with 
crime (Castles, 2010a; Coutin, 2005b; Dal Lago, 2004; Koser, 2010), have been 
connected to irregular migration in the public debate and media (Van Der Leun, 2003; 
Van Meeteren, 2010). Perhaps the most heated dispute has surrounded the use of the 
term “illegal migration”. On the one hand, some scholars have considered that the use 
of this term contributes to the negative social myths (Koser, 2010; Schrover, Van Der 
Leun, Lucassen, & Quispel, 2008) and has a criminalizing effect (Düvell, 2006). In a 
similar fashion, others have stated that its use is simply incorrect since an act can be 
illegal, whereas a person cannot be so (Castles, 2010; Schinkel 2005 in Engbersen & 
Broeders, 2009). On the other hand, some scholars have alleged that the term must be 
used, but in a critical way. From this perspective, it is precisely the process of social 
and political construction of “illegality” and its consequences that needs to be 
researched, in particular, the way in which migrants become “illegal migrants” (De 
Genova, 2004; Willen, 2007). 
Behind this terminological debate, there is hidden a related, more substantial one, 
which is conceptual. Whatever term is adopted, two questions need to be addressed: 
a) to what phenomenon does it refer?; b) from whose perspective? 
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A certain but far from unanimous consensus has been reached about the fact that 
the term should refer to the relations between a migrant and a set of rules established 
by the state, and not to a migrant him/herself (De Genova, 2002a). Irregular migration 
would then be the outcome of the interaction between human mobility across social 
spaces and the enactment of policies within those very same spaces. In this sense, “the 
adjective, irregular, does not belong to the domain of description of the migration 
flows, but only to their interactions with political regulations” (Sciortino, 2004b, p. 
21). The complexity of the first question becomes evident once it is recognized that 
there are many possible types, degrees and dimensions of irregularity (Baldwin-
Edwards & Kraler, 2009; Broeders & Engbersen, 2007a; Düvell, 2011c; İçduygu, 
2007; Triandafyllidou, 2009; Williams & Windebank, 1998). 
The term, in fact, can refer to migrants’ non-compliance with the rules of entry, 
residence, employment or a combination of these (Van Der Leun, 2003; Van 
Meeteren, 2010); to a number of legal statuses implying very different social and 
economic conditions (Chavez, 1991; Massey et al., 1998; Van Nieuwenhuyze, 2009); 
and to different forms of social stratification and hierarchy (Castles, 2004; Cvajner & 
Sciortino, 2010b; López Sala, 2005; Sciortino, 2013; Vasta, 2011). Status, moreover, 
is not as clear-cut as one might expect, and there is room for forms of legal 
ambivalence, semi-legality, legal illegality, and formal informality (Düvell, 2011b). 
Furthermore, “behind the notion of irregular migration there is today a set of 
interpretative frames, stereotypes, folk wisdom, icons and slogans that makes it a part 
of a complex symbolic discourse” (Cvajner & Sciortino, 2010b, p. 390). Finally, “the 
meaning of irregularity shifts across time and space, it is a fluid construction” 
(Schrover et al., 2008, p. 10); “It is not an “on-off” condition, but rather a bundle of 
statuses variously significant in different contexts” (Ruhs & Anderson 2006 in 
Bommes & Sciortino, 2011, p. 219). Depending on where migrants are, they can 
move in and out of irregularity (Reyneri, 1998), in different ways (Van Der Leun, 
2003), for longer or shorter periods. States, on their side, can turn irregular migrants 
into legal foreign residents, or the other way around “with the single stroke of a pen” 
(Sciortino, 2013). 
In an attempt to organize this diversity of possibilities, once the aspiration for a 
clear-cut, yes or no, all-embracing definition was abandoned, two main paths have 
been followed. The first has aimed to develop more flexible definitions, in order to 
see irregularity not as a fixed status but as a process (Bloch & Chimienti, 2011; 
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Castles, 2010a; Jordan & Düvell, 2002). From this perspective, it has been proposed 
to go beyond the illegal/legal divide and, instead, to understand irregularity as a 
particular set of conditions within a continuum between two ideal types. On the one 
hand, there is the “total irregular” (entry, residence, work, illegal practices) and, on 
the other, “the perfect citizen”, somewhere in between all the different cases of “semi-
compliant” migrants (Bridget Anderson & Ruhs, 2010). In a similar fashion, 
irregularity has been defined as an “in-between state among regularisability and 
deportability” (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012). 
The second path has been to develop taxonomies of different types of irregularity 
(Bloch & Chimienti, 2011; Haidinger, 2007). Many criteria have been used: ways into 
irregularity (irregular border-crossing, visa overstaying, refused asylum-demand, 
violation of the obligation to leave the territory, ineffective deportation, bureaucratic 
failure/befallen irregularity, birth from irregular parents); duration of stay (limited-, 
circular- or settlement-irregular migration); types of law violation (irregular entry, 
residence or work); channels and motivations (smuggled, trafficked, voluntary or 
forced irregular migrations); irregular migration composition (family, refugees or 
labour irregular migrations) (Düvell, 2011b; Koser, 2010; Sciortino, 2004b; Vogel & 
Cyrus, 2008). Regarding the different ways in and out of irregularity and, in order to 
capture the diversity of possibilities, what has recently been proposed is the 
distinction among geographical or migration flows, demographic flows and status-
related flows (Kraler & Reichel, 2011). 
The choice of a certain term implies also the adoption of a specific point of view 
and of a certain “subjective” perspective. Though this is inevitable, it is important to 
bear it in mind at every stage. From this perspective, we can distinguish between both 
taxonomies, from above (i.e. the state’s point of view) and from below (i.e. the 
migrant’s point of view) (Bloch & Chimienti, 2011). Many scholars have discussed 
how the term illegal migration entails the adoption of the point of view of the state, 
which tends to interpret the phenomenon as problematic and challenging (Frank 2008 
in Anderson & Ruhs, 2010). This point echoes a more general epistemological and 
methodological critique of what has been defined as “methodological nationalism” 
(Castles, 2010a; Mezzadra, 2011; Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2003). The uncritical 
adoption of a terminology developed within a statist paradigm, it is argued, leads to 
distorted representations and to the misperception of a “constructed reality” as if it 
were the natural one. In this regard, it is important not to forget that much of the 
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terminology used to address issues relating to migration has been developed by state 
administrations in order to deal with these very issues. Van der Leun, recalling the 
work of Scott, has warned against those “state simplifications” that are produced and 
continuously refined to classify migrants (Scott, 1998; Van Der Leun, 2003). 
An interesting distinction that the term illegal is unable to capture is the one 
between what is considered legitimate by the state (“legal”) and what is legitimate for 
people (“licit”). Many trans-border movements of people are illegal because they defy 
authority, but they are quite acceptable, “licit”, in the eyes of participants. Since the 
state controls those who occupy, use or cross its territory, individuals who contest or 
bypass controls are bringing into discussion the legitimacy of the state, by questioning 
its ability to control its territory (Schrover et al., 2008). This example shows the 
possible conflict between the legal and the political terminologies. Furthermore, if we 
consider that, in every national context, different legal and political cultures, ideas of 
national identity, and perceptions of migration are at work (Boswell & D’Amato, 
2012; Düvell, 2011b; Kraler & Rogoz, 2011), we get a full picture of the complexity 
surrounding the definition and social meaning of irregular migration. 
The term that has been chosen for this study is irregular migration. Even if this 
term is not free from possible critiques, its extensive use, especially in the European 
literature, its flexibility and its relatively neutral perspective make it a suitable tool.  
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1.2. Irregular migration from an historical perspective 
Even if the interest surrounding irregular migration was only aroused in the 
1970s, the phenomenon certainly did not appear then. An important line of research 
has investigated the historic origins and evolution of irregular migration. This task has 
produced two main types of research. On the one hand, there have been more general 
accounts on the origin, evolution and trends of irregular migration (Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2012; Hollifield, 2004; Schrover et al., 2008; Sciortino, 2004b; Torpey, 
1998). On the other, there have been more specific, case-centred studies that enquired 
into the reasons, ways and moments in which irregular migration appeared in different 
regions or countries throughout the world. These efforts led to the development of 
specific national studies and, to a lesser extent, in recent years, to a number of 
international comparative studies. 
If irregular migration is the result of the interaction between migrations and state 
enforcement of controls over migrants, the history of irregular migration “coincides 
with the history of attempts by states to gain control over the composition of their 
population” (Sciortino, 2013). It was the attempt by states to “monopolize the 
legitimate means of movement” (Torpey, 1998) that made irregular migration emerge 
as a correlated by-product. Yet, if it is true that, as Sciortino citing Paul of Tarsus has 
pointed out, “where there is no law, there is no violation” (Sciortino, 2013) it is also 
true that the existence of a law does not automatically imply its violation. In this 
sense, the history of irregular migration is not simply the story of migration controls 
and their implementation, but the story of the interplay of the latter with actual 
migrants. From this perspective, although the conflict between controls and 
migrations occurred in a differentiated manner throughout history and geography, and 
even today there is not one single picture, four broad historical phases seem to be 
discernible. 
The first phase goes from the moment in which nation-states started to coalesce 
as the main form of political organization, in the 16th century, to World War I. This 
period was mostly marked by weak controls and unrestricted migrations. The old 
forms of political, territorial and population control were slowly transformed into 
new, statist ones. National borders became more important than other territorial 
boundaries, such as the municipal ones (Fahremeir 2007 in Schrover et al., 2008). The 
process was driven by the diffusion of nationalist ideologies and the idea that a 
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specific population corresponds to each state. Along these lines, states started to 
develop both legal and administrative mechanisms to register and control their 
populations, to regulate their borders, and to manage foreign populations (Torpey, 
1998). Although instruments to control the movement of vagrants, poor foreigners or 
unwanted populations (for ethnic, racial or religious reasons) had previously existed at 
a local level in many contexts (Schrover et al., 2008; Sciortino, 2013; Zolberg, 2003), 
“the idea that spatial movements should be considered primarily in terms of their 
having complied, or failed to comply, with a certain set of generalized, abstract 
regulations” emerged only at this time (Sciortino, 2013). 
Nevertheless, the effective ability to enforce this idea was slowly and unevenly 
accomplished (Torpey, 1998). For a long time, the ability of state to “effectively 
control the legitimate means of movement” was still in an embryonic phase. At the 
same time, although its characterization as a laissez-faire era is certainly overstated, 
this period can still be considered one of relative openness. The point is not that there 
were no controls or restrictions at all, but that, since there was a certain equilibrium 
between the need of migrants in certain societies and overpopulation in others 
(Hollifield, 2004; Torpey, 2000), migrations were habitually welcomed. The 
combination of these two circumstances, the embryonic condition of immigration 
controls and the welcoming character of immigration fluxes made irregular migration 
quite a marginal if not negligible phenomenon (Hollifield, 2004). 
The second phase corresponds approximately to the interwar period. This phase 
can be regarded as one of increased controls and limited unwanted migrations. States 
came close to realizing “the bureaucratic fantasy of achieving total control over 
society” (Ronsenberg 2006, p. 7 in Schrover et al., 2008). Both their ability and 
aspiration to control populations were prompted by a number of factors. On the one 
hand, the material possibilities of states increased thanks to the technological and 
economic improvements brought by scientific and industrial revolutions. This led to 
the creation of large and effective bureaucracies capable of regulating and 
conditioning most social transactions (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012).The identification 
and registration of populations were seen as the first steps in order to be able to “read” 
societies, “embrace” them and make surveillance effective (Broeders, 2009; Scott, 
1998; Torpey, 1998). By the 1920s, “the legal and administrative apparatus able to 
distinguish between citizens and foreigners and, within the latter category, between 
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lawful and unlawful residents” (Sciortino, 2013) had become widespread. In this 
sense, “the urge to control became the ability to control” (Schrover et al., 2008, p. 16). 
On the other hand, this period was characterized by the strong affirmation of 
nationalism, often conflated with racist and xenophobic ideas (Brubaker, 1992; 
Hobsbawm, 2012). The main consequence was a restrictive turn against migrations 
that was firstly enacted by the US (Ngai, 2014) and then by most of the other 
receiving countries (Baldwin-Edwards, 2008; J. Lucassen & Lucassen, 2005; 
Schrover et al., 2008). This second period saw the concomitant rise of controls and a 
decrease in international migration. Whereas the two factors are certainly related, the 
reduction of international fluxes also had other explanations, mostly related to the 
changed conditions in the sending countries. In this context of increased control-
competency and diminished migratory pressures, irregular migration remained a 
minor phenomenon. 
The third period goes from the end of World War II to the 1970s. This phase can 
be characterized by a further increase in the control capacity of states, accompanied, 
however, by a high demand for foreigners. In the aftermath of the war, the demand for 
workers rapidly increased in Northern European countries and in the US. As pointed 
out by Baldwin-Edwards, the types of migration varied according to historical, 
cultural and geographical parameters. The classic immigration settler societies chose 
permanent immigration over labour migration; postcolonial countries opted for 
inflows of their colonial citizens; other countries, like Germany, Austria, Switzerland 
and Belgium, relied on temporary labour schemes (Baldwin-Edwards, 2008). While 
this categorization describes preponderant patterns, most countries combined 
strategies and shared the illusion of “migration management” (Garcés-Mascareñas, 
2012; Ngai, 2014). Since the priority was to fulfil the demands of a booming 
economy, those migrants that were able to enter the countries irregularly and found 
employment were usually and tacitly regularized. Thus, irregular migration was not 
considered a major problem but rather a transitional phase in the path of migrants. 
“Expulsion, albeit formally a generalized sanction for irregularity, was mainly 
interpreted factually as a selective measure to deal with foreign misfits and 
troublemakers” (Sciortino, 2013). 
The fourth period goes from the 1970s to our days. Increasingly conflictive 
relations between receiving states and migratory pressures have characterized this 
phase. The combination of powerful control systems and masses of migrants willing 
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to travel and, finally, able to do so, set the conditions for irregular migration to 
become a widespread and sizable phenomenon in unprecedented terms. This explains 
the vast attention that this period has received and the production of an extensive 
literature. Scholars have widely discussed the complex structural changes that have 
occurred in industrialized countries since the mid-1970s. These changes, often 
referred to as “the end of Fordism”, “the rise of the post-industrial economy”, or “the 
economic restructuring” have greatly affected the productive organization, the labour-
market structure, and labour relations in the receiving societies (McNevin, 2009; 
Mezzadra, 2011; Morokvasic, 1993; Piore, 1980; Sassen, 1996; Schierup, Hansen, & 
Castles, 2006; Wallerstein, 2004). 
The impact of these changes has had a long-term effect on the approach to 
migration and on its management. The turning point was the 1973 oil crisis which 
implied the abrupt end of the recruitment programmes and the setback of the tolerant 
and flexible attitude towards irregularity (Engbersen & Van Der Leun, 2001; Zolberg, 
2003). It was at this point that the unintended effects of migration policy became 
manifest, with migration increasingly dealt with as a problem rather than as a resource 
(Arango, 2005a; Broeders, 2009; Sciortino, 2000; Van Meeteren, 2010). The idea that 
migrants could be used as a commodity in the productive process proved false. 
Migrants had no intention to return to their countries of origin. Moreover, they had 
acquired a full set of rights that entitled them to benefit from welfare state provisions, 
to reunify their families, and to eventually become citizens. Besides, they had 
developed their own businesses and networks. All this implied that, once started, 
migrations displayed a self-sustaining dynamic, largely independent from political 
decisions (Massey, 1999). “The response to this perceived threat has been a building 
up of visible and invisible walls” (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012, p. 23). The goal was not 
only to prevent new entries but also to shelter the welfare state and make access to 
rights increasingly complicated. As mentioned, the idea that states had lost control 
over migration became popular both among politicians and the public opinion and 
started to produce long-lasting effects. Consequently, despite the economic recovery 
and the renewed demand for migrant labour in the years to follow, the restrictive 
attitude was maintained. 
The 1970s’ economic crisis did not only affect the so-called developed societies.  
Its causes and effects have also been seen as part of broader processes of economic 
and political change that have had a global reach. It is precisely in these processes that 
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researchers have found the roots of globalization and, regarding the international flux 
of people, the beginning of the “age of migrations” (Castles & Miller, 1993). A 
number of socio-economic transformations have been analysed from different 
perspectives: the economic restructuring of peripheral economies and the imposition 
of a neoliberal agenda by the FMI (McNevin, 2009; Mezzadra, 2011; Sassen, 1998a; 
Schierup et al., 2006); the geopolitical shift after the end of the Cold War and the fall 
of exit barriers in most countries (Massey, 1999; McNevin, 2009); the out-burst of 
ethno-national conflicts (Zolberg, 2006); the emergence of transnationalism (Glick-
Schiller, Basch, & Blanc-Szanton, 1992); the flexibilization, delocalization and 
internationalization of productive processes (Schierup et al., 2006); and the 
development of transportation and communication technologies (Castles & Miller, 
1993). As a matter of fact, one of the most significant effects of these complex 
transformations was the great incentive towards international migrations.  
The combination of restrictive policies and sustained demand for labour on the 
one hand, and of a potentially unlimited supply of migrants on the other, set the 
conditions for what has been called the “migration crisis” of the 1990s (Castles, 
2004). Since these two forces could not match by using the legal channels established 
by states, alternative strategies quickly developed. Irregular crossing of borders, visa 
overstaying, the improper use of asylum policy, just to name the most important, 
became widely used channels to circumvent the states’ barriers. Thus, irregular 
migration emerged as a structural characteristic of current migration processes.  
This “unexpected” outcome sharply increased concerns in receiving societies, 
paving the way for widespread social attention, the anxiety of public opinion and a 
rapid politicization (Castles, 2004; Vollmer, 2011; Zolberg, 2006). Governments 
reacted by prioritizing migration policies in their agendas and the main target was 
precisely irregularity. The result was a multiplication of policies, mechanisms, and 
investments both at national and international levels, in an attempt to regain control 
over migration. These extraordinary efforts, nevertheless, have been largely wiped out  
by counterstrategies enacted by migrants and by those interested in the continuation of 
the fluxes. These dynamics between states and migrants have been compared to an 
arms race in which action provokes reaction (Broeders & Engbersen, 2007a). The 
most notable effect of these dynamics has been the diversification of the 
characteristics and modes of irregularity (Bloch & Chimienti, 2011).	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1.3. Numbers 
One of the most difficult tasks regarding the study of irregular migration has been 
assessing the magnitude of the phenomenon. It is precisely its irregular character that 
provides the reasons for such difficulties. If a certain elusiveness of their objects is an 
inevitable problem for social sciences, this issue becomes even more complex when 
the object in question is defined as “irregular”. Contrary to what occurs with the 
majority of other social phenomena, with irregular migration it is not possible to count 
on official statistics. The ways in and out of irregularity are many and available data 
are limited to only a part of these fluxes. 
At the same time, the politicization and social anxieties that have surrounded 
irregular migration have been a powerful reason for both administrations and public 
opinion to ask for numbers. After all, in order to assess the extent of a threat, it is 
firstly necessary to know its magnitude. This has implied the proliferation of analyses, 
journalistic reports, and official and unofficial estimations. The sensitive aspect of the 
topic, especially for states that, on the basis of those numbers, could be publically 
judged as either efficient or inadequate, entailed an inevitable tendency to 
manipulation (Dal Lago, 2004; Vollmer, 2011). Numbers have often been 
exaggerated, minimized, hidden or dramatized, depending on the political goal behind 
their use. In this respect, Vollmer has underlined the relevance of “number games” in 
the construction of political discourses about irregular migration (Vollmer, 2011). 
The complexities related to the estimations of irregular migration and to their use 
have raised an interesting scientific debate as to their utility. Some scholars have 
argued against the proliferation of statistics, by stressing the methodological pitfalls 
and the political misuse of numbers (Koser, 2010; Triandafyllidou, 2012). Others, on 
the contrary, have emphasized the necessity for the collection of valuable data 
(Düvell, 2011b; Koser, 2010). More specific debates have developed around the 
methodological (Espenshade, 1995; Jandl, 2011; Koser, 2010; Triandafyllidou, 2009) 
and ethical problems related to the use of statistics (Düvell, Triandafyllidou, & 
Vollmer, 2010; Triandafyllidou, 2009). 
Kraler and Reichel have recently stressed that irregular migration estimations and 
numeric analysis “can be useful for assessing broad trends regarding the dynamics, 
patterns, as well as structure of irregular migration” (Kraler & Reichel, 2011, p. 
121).While it is true that precise numbers are not attainable and that their use is 
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permanently at risk of political mistreatment, the recent proliferation of estimations of 
the irregular population in different national contexts is certainly welcomed. For a 
discussion on general trends and the numerical relevance of irregular migration see, 
for instance: (Castles, 2010a; Düvell, 2011c; Kraler & Reichel, 2011; Triandafyllidou, 
2009; Vogel, Kovacheva, & Prescott, 2011). For specific reports by country, see: 
(Passel, Cohn, & Gonzalez-Barrera, 2013; Triandafyllidou, 2009). 
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1.4. State policies and irregular migration 
As a by-product of the interaction between states and migrations, one important 
strand of research has focused on the study of those policies that directly or indirectly 
affect irregular migration. The attention to policies is relatively recent and can be 
linked to the inability of scholars to fully explain the migration crisis at the end of the 
20th century, using their classic tools. The combination of push-pull theories, agent’s 
microeconomic theories and network theories had been fairly successful in describing 
migration mechanisms, at least as they occurred in accordance to state will. After the 
oil crisis of the 1970s, and increasingly throughout the 1980s, theoretical efforts were 
made to interpret the new setting (Massey et al., 1998). Only in the 1990s, however, 
did the study of the role of the state become central for migration studies (Massey, 
1999; Zolberg, 2000). Since then, a vast and diverse literature has emerged. Most of 
this work has either implicitly or explicitly dealt with irregular migration. Irregularity, 
being a sort of nemesis of state policies, has been one of the main targets and 
somehow the measure of the failure and success of theses policies. The consolidation 
of irregularity as a structural phenomenon in all receiving societies, exactly at a time 
when major efforts were being made to control migration, raised a number of 
questions. Were states losing control of their borders and populations? Were there 
hidden interests that secretly favoured undocumented migration? How could policies 
be improved in order to successfully deter unwanted migrants? In relation to these 
questions, the study of policies and their evolution appeared as a crucial step in order 
to understand the opportunity structure within which irregular migration emerges and 
develops as a social phenomenon.  
The research on policies has dealt with four main questions: a) how and by whom 
are policies decided?; b) What are the main types?; c) How are they implemented? d) 
Why do they fail? This chapter will analyse the debate around the first three 
questions; the fourth will be one of the main topics of the second chapter. 
 
1.4.1. Policy formation 
A first important issue scholars had to deal with concerned the production of 
migration policies. Two questions appeared critical: how are policies decided and in 
which arenas? What actors, forces and interests concur to their configuration? These 
questions are extremely relevant to the discussion on irregular migration. In order to 
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understand to what extent irregularity is the result of a deliberate policy or not, it 
becomes crucial to identify what interests have favoured its formulation. 
Regarding the relevant actors and ideas, a variety of hypotheses have been 
proposed. The discussion has generally followed general sociological- and political-
science theories on policy formation. Some scholars have emphasized the role of 
domestic political factors, such as: national identities and cultures (Düvell, 2011b; 
Freeman, 1995; Jordan, Stråth, & Triandafyllidou, 2003), conception of 
citizenship(Brubaker, 1992), and migratory history (Arango, 2003; Massey et al., 
1998; Zolberg, 2006). Others have focused on the role of domestic actors, for 
instance: employers, labour unions, interest groups, courts, ethnic groups, trade 
unions, law and order bureaucracies, police and security agencies, local actors and 
street-level bureaucrats, and private actors (Abella, 2004; Freeman, 1995; Lahav & 
Guiraudon, 2006; Piore, 1980; Portes, 1978). In this respect, Czaika and de Haas have 
stressed that, since migration policy is typically the result of a compromise between 
multiple potentially-competing interests, it can be useful to pay attention to the 
“discursive coalitions” that may form (Czaika & De Haas, 2013). Another important 
branch of research has underlined the relevance of legal frameworks, political 
institutions and their functioning in establishing the procedures and limits of the 
bargaining around migration policy (Freeman, 1995; Hollifield, 1992; Christian 
Joppke, 1998c; Lahav & Guiraudon, 2006; Money, 1999; Shughart, William, 
Tollison, & Kimenyi, 1986). Another has focused on the interests of states as 
sovereign and self-preserving actors (Rudolph, 2005). Finally, many scholars have 
focused their attention on the role of forces external to states. Within this line of 
enquiry, what has been emphasized is the role of the global economy (Sassen, 1998a; 
Wallerstein, 2004), of human rights regimes (Jacobson, 1996; Soysal, 1994), and of 
international legal frameworks and institutions (for instance the EU) (Geddes, 2001, 
2003). For a more detailed analysis of these traditions, a number of review essays on 
immigration policies provide a wide analytical panorama of them (Meyers, 2000; 
Money, 2010). 
Once the existence of a variety of actors and of frequently-irreconcilable interests 
has been recognized, attention has shifted to the decision process. In relation to this, 
different positions have emerged on the role of the state. Garcés-Mascareñas has 
highlighted two main perspectives: theories that consider states mainly as brokers of 
civil-society demands (Freeman, 1995) and theories that consider states and their 
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interests as the main force behind migration decisions (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012; 
Rudolph, 2005). Within this debate, attempts to produce more complex accounts of 
state imperatives and functioning have been advanced (Boswell, 2007; Lahav & 
Guiraudon, 2006; Sciortino, 2000). These efforts will be discussed in detail in the 
third chapter. 
 
1.4.2. Policies that affect irregular migration  
The study of the policies that affect irregular migration has gone hand in hand 
with their development. After the oil crisis of 1973, most receiving countries observed 
a proliferation of policies, mechanisms, administrative structures, and legal 
frameworks dedicated to dealing with the control of international migrations. The real 
or perceived sense of failure signalled by the migration crisis of the 1990s intensified 
the development and implementation of newer and increasingly-sophisticated 
policies. This perpetual escalation of control measures, on the one hand, and 
migrants’ countermeasures on the other, is far from being concluded in our days. The 
main consequence for research has been a corresponding proliferation of studies, 
taxonomies and classifications in the attempt to analyse a constantly evolving 
landscape. The remainder of this section proposes a classification and a brief 
description of the main policies that affect irregular migration. It is important to 
mention that, although the hypothesis of an on-going convergence among state 
practices has been advanced (Cornelius, Martin, & Hollifield, 1994; Doomernik & 
Jandl, 2008), national approaches still present important differences. Therefore, each 
state displays a different combination of policies and a peculiar trend of 
implementation (Castles & Miller, 1993; Düvell, 2011b; Freeman, 2006; Lahav & 
Guiraudon, 2006). 
A first important distinction in classifying migration policies is the one proposed 
by Hammar (1985) between immigration policy and immigrant policy (Hammar, 
1985). Immigration policies include those directed at controlling and selecting or 
deterring migration fluxes. Within this broad group, two main sub-groups can be 
distinguished: external control policies and internal control policies (Brochmann & 
Hammar, 1999; Broeders & Engbersen, 2007a; Cornelius, 2005a; Cornelius et al., 
1994; Doomernik & Jandl, 2008; Van Meeteren, 2010). The first group includes: 
border enforcement policies (Cornelius & Salehyan, 2007); remote control policies, 
such as carrier sanctions, international and bilateral agreements, visa regimes and 
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entry policies (Finotelli, 2009; Finotelli & Sciortino, 2013; Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012; 
Guiraudon & Joppke, 2001; Triandafyllidou, 2009; Zolberg, 2000, 2006); and policies 
aimed at reducing push factors in sending countries (for instance, funds for 
development) (Hollifield, 2004). The second group includes three main sub-groups: a) 
policies directed at making irregular residence difficult and costly through labour 
market controls, for example, employer sanctions, employers’ deputation to check for 
identities, labour site inspections) (Brochmann & Hammar, 1999; Broeders, 2009; 
Broeders & Engbersen, 2007a; Cornelius, 2005a) and policies aimed at the exclusion 
of irregular migrants from public services (identification checks in order to use 
services) (Broeders, 2009; Van Der Leun, 2003; Van Meeteren, 2010). b) Policies 
directed towards the identification, detention and expulsion of irregular migrants 
(identification and surveillance systems, random checks in public spaces, 
administrative detention, readmission agreements) (Broeders, 2009; Engbersen & 
Broeders, 2009; Schinkel, 2009; Schrover et al., 2008; Van Meeteren, 2010). c) 
Policies directed at the regularization of irregular migrants (collective and individual 
regularization, de jure and de facto regularizations) (Baldwin-Edwards & Kraler, 
2009; Boswell & D’Amato, 2012; Engbersen & Broeders, 2009; Finotelli, 2006; 
Papademetriou, 2005; Schrover et al., 2008). 
In a different way, immigrant policies address the management of the immigrant 
populations, their integration, and the improvement of their living standards (Van Der 
Leun, 2003). Though usually not explicitly directed towards irregular migrants, these 
policies can have a tremendous impact on their lives. A first important policy within 
this group is the one that establishes the limits, rights, conditions and progression of 
migrants’ status towards obtaining citizenship (Chavez, 2007; Garcés-Mascareñas, 
2012; Isin, 2009; C. Joppke, 2010; Mezzadra, 2011; Ngai, 2014; Ong, 2005). While 
the classic distinction among citizens, denizens and aliens (Hammar, 1990) is 
fundamental, many scholars have shown that a greater variety of statuses and, hence, 
of hierarchies subsist within those categories (Broeders, 2009; Castles, 2004; Cvajner 
& Sciortino, 2010b; Finotelli & Sciortino, 2013; López Sala, 2005; Sciortino, 2013; 
Vasta, 2011). Probably the most relevant aspect of this policy concerns the 
establishment of the conditions for denizens to keep a regular status and the period of 
time before eventually becoming citizens. While an open, limitedly-conditioned 
policy may lead to an efficient progression along statuses, a closed, strongly-
conditioned policy may imply drawbacks, slow advance and the possibility of cases of 
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befallen irregularity. A policy within this cluster, that has a direct influence on 
irregular migrants, is the one that establishes the rights to which they are entitled. In 
this respect, a variety of arrangements can be discerned, ranging from the absolute 
exclusion and negation of rights in the Gulf Countries to the full entitlement to social 
services in countries, like Spain (Arango, 2005a; Massey, 1999). For a schematic 
view of all the main policies affecting irregular migrants, see Table No.1. 
Table No.1 - Policies that directly affect irregular migration  
IMMIGRATION 
POLICIES 
External 
Control 
Border enforcement 
• Border patrolling 
• Surveillance-technology 
implementation 
• Construction of barriers 
Remote control 
policies 
• Carrier sanctions 
• International and bilateral 
agreements 
• Visa regime and entry 
policies 
• Asylum and Refugee Policy 
Policies to reduce push 
factors 
• International cooperation to 
reduce emigration 
 
Internal 
Control 
Dissuasion policies 
• Labour-market controls 
• Employers’ sanctions 
• Employers’ deputation to 
check documents 
• Exclusion from social 
services 
• Assisted return policies  
Identification, 
detention and 
expulsion 
• Identification systems 
• Random checks in public 
spaces 
• Administrative detention 
• Expulsion 
• Readmission agreements  
Regularization Policies 
• Individual regularization 
• Collective regularizations 
• De jure regularizations 
• De facto regularization 
IMMIGRANT 
POLICIES 
Residence 
and 
Citizenship 
Policies 
• Permit conditions, requisites and time-length 
• Permit renewal condition and requisites 
• Conditions, requisites and timing to acquire citizenship 
Migrants’ 
Rights 
• Migrants’ entitlements and rights 
• Irregular migrants’ entitlements and rights 
 
1.4.3. Policy implementation 
The efforts to identify, classify and comparatively analyse migration policies in 
order to understand more fully irregular migration, have proved inadequate. Since the 
early 1990s, many scholars have highlighted the existence of a gap between the laws 
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and policies stated on paper and what they effectively achieved in “reality” (Cornelius 
et al., 1994). This awareness stimulated an intense debate over the need for a more 
comprehensive understanding of policies and their interaction with social life. Within 
this debate, a group of scholars underlined the necessity to shift the focus from policy 
formation or policy classification to policy implementation (Castles, 2004; Guiraudon 
& Lahav, 2000; Van Der Leun, 2003). Whereas many studies existed on laws, explicit 
regulation, policy documents and decision-making processes, scarce attention had 
been given to their implementation as well as to the resilience of lower-level 
counterforces (Lahav & Guiraudon, 2006; Van Der Leun, 2003). As pointed by Van 
del Leun, a large body of literature not directly concerned with the study of 
migrations, had already “warned against straightforward ideas about the process of 
implementation of public policies” (Van Der Leun, 2003, p. 28). 
The shift of attention to implementation dramatically increased the complexity of 
the picture. This has posed a number of methodological and epistemological 
problems. As long as the focus was on laws and regulations, researchers could refer to 
the official documents and statements by politicians and administrators. Enquiring 
into implementation, instead, forced them to get out of the libraries and adopt 
qualitative strategies to find and recompose the pieces of the puzzle. The information 
gathered in interviews with politicians, bureaucrats, migrants and many other social 
actors offered a prism of different perspectives that were rarely coincident. Moreover, 
because of the sensitive character of the information requested, the probability of 
getting embellished answers or no answers at all was high. 
Notwithstanding these difficulties and the relatively recent attention given to 
implementation, the efforts made in the last two decades have produced significant 
results. 
On the one hand, theoretical attempts have been made to develop frameworks of 
analysis. Since every national context produces distinctive practices of 
implementation, two questions have been raised: a) what determines the specific 
mode of implementation? b) How is it possible to explain differences? Four aspects 
have been suggested as crucial in order to understand different practices: the peculiar 
national regulatory styles and traditions; the organizational culture of bureaucracies 
and the degree of discretionality; the grade of isolation of bureaucracies from external 
pressures; the social attitude and toleration towards informality (Guiraudon & Lahav, 
2000; Jordan et al., 2003; Lahav & Guiraudon, 2006; Van Der Leun, 2003). This 
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approach also implied an extension of the actors to be taken in consideration: not only 
politicians and legislators, but also bureaucrats, policemen, civil servants, teachers, 
healthcare servants, etc. The focus had to be given to those  “street level bureaucrats” 
that, at the end of the command chain, really enforce policies (Heyman & Smart, 
1999; Scott, 1998). 
On the other hand, researchers have analysed policy implementation in different 
countries with the purpose of detecting possible common trends. Lahav and 
Guiraudon have indicated an on-going shift of focus in the implementation of 
policies. While before the migration crisis of the 1990s, controls were limited to 
border enforcement and were implemented exclusively by states’ central institutions, 
after that, controls have been moving “away from the border and outside of the state” 
(Guiraudon & Lahav, 2000). This process has followed a threefold strategy: a shift 
outwards, with the adoption of remote control policies; a shift upwards, with the 
development of international frameworks for control; a shift downwards, with the 
delegation of control duties to the local institutional level. In 2008, Doomenrik and 
Jandl proposed another interpretation of this process. They suggested that states’ 
controls are expanding: forwards, externalizing implementation outside the borders; 
backwards, adopting internal controls and checks in public places and workplaces; 
and inwards, with an expansion of the requirements placed on migrants (Doomernik 
& Jandl, 2008). 
Another group of scholars have observed a slow but constant shift in the logic of 
policy implementation (Broeders, 2009; Broeders & Engbersen, 2007a; Engbersen, 
2001). Broeders characterized this shift as the alternation between two contradictory 
logics of exclusion: exclusion from documentation/registration and exclusion through 
documentation/registration (Broeders, 2009). The first logic intended to exclude 
irregular migrants, denying them the possibility to acquire the documents necessary to 
access public services. While it may have been effective in fencing migrants’ access 
to welfare, this logic did not prevent the growth of irregular migration and was 
ineffective in expelling them. The main objective of the second logic was precisely to 
make expulsions effective. The correct identification of migrants was the main 
condition that origin states asked for, in order to accept their citizens back, once they 
were expelled. While this process has occurred principally in Northern European 
countries, the second logic has been central to the European Union common policy 
and seems to be gaining importance in the rest of receiving counties. More in general, 
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many authors have underlined the growing importance for the implementation of 
migration policies of identification technologies and surveillance systems (Engbersen 
& Broeders, 2009; Leerkes, 2009). 
Finally, a number of scholars have suggested the need to look beyond policies 
closely related to immigration control in order to fully grasp migration management 
(Finotelli, 2009; Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012). In a recent article, Czaika and de Haas 
(2011) have written:  
“Many policies affect migration such as labour market, macro-economic, welfare, 
trade and foreign policies. Because they affect fundamental economic migration 
drivers, their influence might actually be larger than specific migration policies, 
which perhaps have a greater effect on the specific patterns and selection of 
migrants rather than on overall magnitude and long-term trends, which seem to 
be more driven by structural political and economic factors in origin and 
destination countries” (Czaika & De Haas, 2013, p. 5).  
 
It seems possible to conclude that only the joint analysis of the interaction and the 
implementation of migration and refugee policies, labour market policies and welfare 
policies allows for a full picture of the framework within which irregular migration 
emerges and evolves. 
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1.5. Irregular migrants lived experience 
From a very different standpoint, a whole bunch of studies on irregular migration 
has devoted its attention to enquiring into migrants’ lived experiences. These studies, 
more from a sociological and anthropological perspective, have researched into a 
number of different issues, producing a vast and differentiated literature. The 
emphasis was on the agency of migrants, on their interaction with the structures of the 
receiving society and on the consequences of such  interaction on their lives. The 
leading questions have been the following: a) How do irregular migrants manage to 
live in a society that does not recognize them as legitimate members? b) What 
strategies do they implement to be able to work? c) How do public opinion and civil 
societies react in hosting countries?  
For a more schematic analysis of this literature, it was chosen to consider four 
main broad thematic groups. 
 
1.5.1. Life, adaptation and social interactions 
The shift of focus from policies to migrants’ experiences and social interactions 
raised important methodological questions and produced a number of different 
perspectives. Different analytical tools have been proposed to make sense of a 
complex and dynamic phenomenon in which both structures and individuals’ agency 
need to be considered. The concept of strategy is the one that has been prevalently 
used in the literature (Engbersen, 2001). Van Nieuwenhuyze has recently used the 
concept of trajectory. Her aim was “to gain an insight into the transitions and choices 
made by immigrants, and to explore their decisions and motivations within a specific 
economic and political opportunity structure”(Van Nieuwenhuyze, 2009, p. 19). 
Cvajner and Sciortino adopted the concept of career, intended as “a sequence of steps, 
marked by events defined as significant within the structure of actors’ narratives and 
publicly recognized as such by various audiences”(Cvajner & Sciortino, 2010a, p. 2). 
The different emphasis given to either structures or agency has fostered an 
interesting and on-going discussion on the appropriate understanding of irregular 
migrants’ conditions. Should they be considered as victims that passively undergo the 
consequences of an unfair destiny or as active agents that consciously choose 
irregularity as a life strategy (Bloch & Chimienti, 2011)? Are they “modern-day 
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slaves” or “villains” that break the law for their own interests (Bridget Anderson & 
Ruhs, 2010)?  
The accounts that have adopted the first perspective have underscored the 
difficulties experienced by irregular migrants. On the one hand, many scholars have 
researched on their working and social conditions. A propensity towards precarious 
work, social immobility, poor housing and limited access to healthcare has been 
widely registered (Bloch, Sigona, & Zetter, 2009; Chavez, 1991; Goldring & Landolt, 
2011; Mahler, 1995; Van Der Leun, 2003; Van Nieuwenhuyze, 2009). Studies on the 
US case have reached milder conclusions (Chavez, 1991, 1994; Massey & Espinosa, 
1997). The extensive analysis of the Dutch case has led Engbersen and his colleagues 
to propose the marginalization thesis. The main idea is that the enforcement of 
internal control policies and the augmented pressure on irregular migrants have 
increasingly deteriorated their social conditions. The impossibility to access social 
services and get employed have pushed them “further underground”, forcing them to 
accept exploitative conditions or even to turn to crime (Engbersen, Van Der Leun, & 
Leerkes, 2004; Leerkes, Van Der Leun, & Engbersen, 2012). 
On the other hand, the personal feelings, attitudes and identity negotiations that 
irregular migrants develop in relation to their status have been investigated (Coutin, 
2005a; De Genova, 2002a; Engbersen, 2001; Vasta, 2011; Willen, 2007). Engbersen 
has argued that the illegal status is a master status, “a dominant social characteristic 
overshadowing all other personal characteristics” (Engbersen, 2001, p. 240). In this 
sense, illegal status influences the establishment of all social relations and migrants 
need to learn to live as irregular migrants. De Genova underlined how the “palpable 
sense of deportability” and not deportation itself, has a concrete effect on the 
existence of migrants. “The spatialized condition of “illegality” reproduces the 
physical borders of nation-states in the everyday life of innumerable places 
throughout the interiors of the migrant-receiving states” (De Genova, 2002a, p. 439). 
This way, “a spatialized and typically racialized social condition”, that becomes 
functional to the exploitation of migrants, is produced. Willen has studied how the 
condition of irregularity and the permanent possibility of being detected translate into 
observable behaviours and “somatic modes attention” on the part of irregular 
migrants. “Migrant illegality affect not only the external structure of migrants’ 
worlds, but can also extend their reach quite literally into illegal migrants’ “in-ward 
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parts” by profoundly shaping their subjective experiences of time, space, 
embodiment, sociality, and self” (Willen, 2007, p. 10). 
After a critical review of this literature, Van Meeteren has argued that the 
survival perspective has become a widespread convention. The main limit has been an 
excessive emphasis on structure over agency and, therefore, a limited ability to 
acknowledge phenomena like irregular migrants’ upward mobility; the inability to 
distinguish different irregular trajectories and outcomes; a tendency to underestimate 
the role of migrants’ strategies, aspirations and skills. Building on this critique and 
trying to understand more in depth the incorporation of irregular migrants, Van 
Meeteren developed a model of analysis based on irregular migrants’ aspirations. 
From this perspective, contexts do not mechanically constrain or construct irregular 
migrants’ actions. Instead, they create a certain window of opportunities and migrants, 
on the basis of their own personal characteristics, may take advantage and react to it. 
This implies that, within the same structural context, irregular migrants with different 
aspirations may attain different grades of incorporation (Van Meeteren, 2010, pp. 31–
32). 
Although the passive perspective has unquestionably been preponderant, a 
noteworthy group of scholars have been adopting a different perspective. The 
acknowledgment that very few irregular migrants live an underground life and that, 
on the contrary, they generally live in the midst of host societies, has forced some 
initial persuasions to be reconsidered (Düvell, 2011b).Analyses moved away from 
dichotomies, like included/excluded or victims/villains. The focus was placed on 
migrants’ individual characteristics and social skills, in the search for variables that 
could help or deter their incorporation. In this regard, many factors have been 
discussed, for instance: the role of networks and ethnic communities (Cvajner & 
Sciortino, 2010b; Mahler, 1995; Van Meeteren, 2010); the role of social, economic 
and cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986); the role of time (Cvajner & Sciortino, 2010b); 
and the role of transnational networks (Portes, 2003a; Van Meeteren, 2010). The 
multiplication of variables in the framework of analysis inevitably leads to a much 
more complex scenario regarding outcomes. Not only do different contexts set 
different windows of opportunities but, within each context, different migrants are 
more or less capable of seizing those opportunities. 
On the basis of these developments, in the last few years, efforts have been made 
in the direction of a diversified understanding of irregular migration (Cvajner & 
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Sciortino, 2010a; Van Meeteren, 2010; Van Nieuwenhuyze, 2009). In this respect, 
while the most promising tool to advance in this direction is the development of 
comparative analyses of irregular migrants, in different contexts the available studies 
are still limited (Van Meeteren, 2010).   
 
1.5.2. Work and subsistence 
Probably the aspect that has received most attention regarding the lived 
experience of irregular migrants has been related to their economic integration. Also 
within this debate, a shift from a survival to a more nuanced perspective has been 
recorded. A number of issues have been researched. First of all, the employment 
sectors (Baldwin-Edwards & Kraler, 2009; Düvell, 2011b; Kraler & Rogoz, 2011; 
Vogel et al., 2011). Even if important geographical and contextual differences exist, 
irregular migrants are usually employed in similar sectors, in particular: agriculture, 
construction, textile industry, domestic- and care-work, service sector, and 
prostitution (Düvell, 2011b). 
This particular pattern of employment has been widely analysed in connection 
with the process of restructuring in the economies of the receiving countries. The 
work of Piore has been path-breaking in signalling the emergence of dual-labour 
markets (Piore, 1980): on the one hand, highly-skilled, well-paid, secure jobs; on the 
other, increasingly precarious, insecure, low-skilled jobs. Whereas the segmentation 
of labour markets was initially considered a pattern affecting only post-industrial 
economies, the works of Sassen have convincingly shown that it is a feature affecting 
most of the global economy (Sassen, 1998a). Many other scholars have advanced 
similar analyses and have proposed different concepts to describe this process: 
flexibilization, informalization, precarization, etc. (Castles, 2010a; Goldring & 
Landolt, 2011; Kloosterman & Rath, 2002; Sassen, 1998a; Schierup et al., 2006). A 
whole sub-category of studies has focused on the relation between the informal 
economy and irregular migration (Kraler & Rogoz, 2011; Papademetriou, O’Neil, & 
Jachimowicz, 2004; Reyneri, 2004; Samers, 2004; Sassen, 1998a; Triandafyllidou, 
2009). 
Another group of scholars have studied the employment strategies of irregular 
migrants. Many tactics have been discovered: informal employment; self-
employment; use of fraudulent papers; and renting of authentic papers (Coutin, 2003; 
Van Meeteren, 2010). As an answer to the increased controls on the labour market, 
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the recurrence to middlemen and sub-contracting has been a widespread strategy 
(Broeders & Engbersen, 2007a; Massey, 1999; Schierup et al., 2006; Sciortino, 
2004a). Engbersen and his colleagues have argued that the fight against informal 
employment may push irregular migrants to constantly change their sector of 
employment or even to turn to minor criminal activities as the only option to get an 
income (Broeders & Engbersen, 2007a; Engbersen, 2001; Engbersen & Broeders, 
2009; Engbersen et al., 2004; Leerkes et al., 2012). 
 
1.5.3. Irregular migrants’ counterstrategies 
As just mentioned, an important strand of research on irregular migration has 
concentrated on the strategies that migrants develop in order to bypass state controls. 
From this perspective, migrants are all but passive victims of state action. Indeed, they 
observe, analyse, share information, develop counterstrategies, and adapt to new 
conditions (Cornelius & Salehyan, 2007). As noted by Düvell, irregular migrants are 
often individualist and entrepreneurial, highly responsive to labour-market needs and 
more mobile than indigenous populations (Düvell, 2006, 2011b). To act like this, they 
can usually count on extensive networks of friends, relatives, co-nationals and co-
ethnics. 
 Various concepts have been proposed to address this complex web of actions, 
tactics, informal networks, etc. Scott has proposed the concepts of “weapons of the 
weak” and “shadow institutions” to acknowledge those everyday forms of resistance 
that are put in place by the less favoured in contexts of social inequality (Scott, 1998, 
2008). A similar idea lies behind Hughes’s concept of “bastard institutions” (Hughes, 
1994 in Leerkes, 2009). Engbersen has suggested the notion of “residence strategies” 
to refer to those “strategies aimed at prolonging residence and avoid deportation” 
(Engbersen, 2001, p. 223). More recently, Bommes and his colleagues have used the 
concept of “foggy social structures” to highlight those “social structures that emerge 
from efforts by individuals and organizations to avoid the production of knowledge 
about their activities by making them either unobservable or indeterminable” 
(Bommes & Kolb, 2002, p. 5 in Engbersen & Broeders, 2009, p. 868; Bommes & 
Sciortino, 2011;). 
 As regards the specific tactics developed by irregular migrants, a diversified 
picture has been sketched. Engbersen has identified six tactics: mobilization of social 
capital, bogus marriages, manipulation of identity, operating strategically in the public 
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space, legal action, and crime (Engbersen, 2001). Vasta has focused her attention on 
the functioning of the paper market. She has shown how irregular migrants engage in 
a dialectic process with the structures and control mechanisms of receiving societies. 
Buying, renting, and borrowing someone else’s papers are part of a productive 
process by which they permanently construct and re-construct their subjectivity 
(Vasta, 2011). Van der Leun, working on the Dutch case, has shown how irregular 
migrants are able to find and actively exploit the loopholes existing in the legislation 
and in the implementation of control policies (Van Der Leun, 2003). On the one hand, 
the complexity of legislation, the different dimension and sectors of application and 
the existence of various and often-uncoordinated levels of governance determine the 
presence of legal ambiguities, contradictions and voids. On the other, irregular 
migrants and their networks, often with the help of lawyers, NGO’s and even street-
level bureaucrats, successfully learn to take advantage of them.  
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1.6. The consequences of irregular migration 
To conclude, an important group of studies has enquired into the effects of 
irregular migration on receiving societies. These have been analysed from a number 
of perspectives and have usually given way to heated debates. In particular, three 
questions have been crucial: a) what are the effects of irregular migration on the 
economies of the receiving countries? b) What are political effects? c) What are the 
social effects? 
 
1.6.1. Economic consequences 
From an economic point of view, many questions have been raised, for instance, 
the effects of irregular migration on: production, consumption, fiscal outcome, wages 
distribution, segmentation of the markets, etc. (Düvell, 2006; Espenshade, 1995; 
Hanson, 2007; Koser, 2010; Portes, 1978). As pointed out by Hanson, in receiving 
societies, there is a widespread belief that irregular migration negatively affects the 
economy. Nevertheless, these ideas are rarely rooted in comprehensive economic 
analyses and derive more often from politicized opinions or simple prejudices. A 
more objective approach needs to acknowledge both the benefits (the increased 
availability of workers, the better use of resources, the boost on tax revenues) and 
costs (the use of public services and infrastructures, the lowering effect on some 
wages) of irregularity. Moreover, it needs to consider that these effects are not 
uniformly distributed and that, while some parts of society may benefit, some others 
may lose. On the whole, Hanson concludes that irregular migration has a limited 
impact. In the case where it persists, it is because a strong economic rationale subsists, 
at least on the part of the productive structure. In particular, for those businesses that 
are subject to market fluctuations, irregular migration represents a much more 
efficient and flexible solution than legal migration (Hanson, 2007). 
Another well-established idea about irregular migration hypothesizes a 
substitution effect between irregular migrants and native workers. Research has 
shown little evidence of this. On the contrary, a complementarity role has appeared 
more plausible (Düvell, 2011a, 2011b; Jordan & Düvell, 2002; Reyneri, 1998, 2004; 
Samers, 2004; Van Meeteren, 2010). As pointed out by Düvell, irregular migration 
may even create “new markets for jobs and allow indigenous populations to enter the 
labour market” (Young, 1999 in Düvell, 2011a, p. 64). In this respect, he presents an 
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example of how the availability of irregular workers can generate a positive economic 
cycle. Their low wages make it affordable for lower-income households to hire 
migrants as domestic workers. This, on the one hand, creates a new employment 
market. On the other, it “frees indigenous women from housework and allows them to 
re-enter the labour market”. Households’ incomes increase, state revenues rise and a 
new market of lower-priced goods and services is generated for low-wage workers 
(Düvell, 2011a, p. 64). 
Considerable attention has been focused on the impact of irregular migration on 
the welfare state (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004; Bommes & Geddes, 2000b; Düvell, 2006, 
2011a; Sciortino, 2004b) and, more in general, on the state budget. Bommes and 
Geddes have underlined that, since every national context is different, generalizations 
are problematic. Each state is based on a different historically-established concept of 
nation, a different mode of defining loyalty, a different immigration history, and a 
specific welfare regime. Each state, then, provides a distinct repertoire of public 
services by using different organizational infrastructures (Bommes & Geddes, 2000b; 
Esping-Andersen, 1990). This implies that the impact of irregular migration will be 
necessarily differentiated and that each case needs to be analysed autonomously. On 
the whole, however, as highlighted by Düvell, “in many countries irregular 
immigrants have no, or only limited, access to public services and avoid any 
interaction with statutory agencies; therefore, often there is almost no negative 
welfare aspect” (Düvell, 2006 in Düvell 2011a, p. 64) 
A number of other possible negative effects of irregular migration have been 
alleged: unfair labour competition, decrease in wages, displacing of indigenous 
workers, undermining of power relations between organised workers and employers, 
tax evasion, illegitimate claim for, or use of, social services, congestion of the housing 
market, undermining of the rule of law, and exploitation and emergence of criminal 
milieus. Nevertheless, these phenomena tend to occur on a small scale because 
numbers are very limited (Düvell, 2011a; Koser, 2010). 
 
1.6.2. Political consequences and social consequences 
Political and social consequences of irregular migration are another topic that has 
been extensively enquired. Also in this case, research has had to struggle against 
widespread preconceptions.  
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The idea of an on-going invasion, often fostered by the sensationalized use of 
images and titles in the media, raised doubts about the actual strength of states. In 
particular, irregular migration seemed to threaten their sovereignty and endanger their 
internal security (Broeders, 2009; Dal Lago, 2004; Koser, 2010). This second aspect 
gained relevance especially after the terrorist attacks in the early 2000s in the US and 
Europe (Huysmans, 2006). In a number of countries, right-wing parties emerged to 
mobilize and give voice to anti-immigrant opinions (Freeman, 1995). More in general, 
a phenomenon that had been until then essentially marginal, started to gain more and 
more attention and to become the object of public discourses (Kraler & Rogoz, 2011). 
Notwithstanding the real extent to which irregular migration challenged receiving 
states (for a thorough discussion see, chapter 2), the attention that the phenomenon 
reached in the public opinion and the fast politicization that followed, induced most 
governments to give top priority to the issue. The main result, as mentioned before, 
was a general trend towards restriction and a widespread implementation of policies 
and initiatives explicitly directed against irregular migrants. The change of paradigm 
was skilfully represented by the metaphors and slogans that were used: “zero 
migration policy”, “Fortress Europe”, “Panopticon Europe”, and “prevention through 
deterrence” (Broeders, 2009; Cornelius & Salehyan, 2007; Engbersen, 2001). These 
developments had a number of consequences. As regards migration, the financial and 
human costs of crossing the borders dramatically rose; previously circular or seasonal 
fluxes transformed into permanent settlement and the role of people smugglers and 
human traffickers increased (Broeders, 2009; Cornelius, 2005a). 
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1.7. Conclusion 
As shown in this chapter, irregular migration has received increasing attention in 
recent decades. This has resulted in a wide and diversified literature that has adopted a 
number of perspectives and has tried to provide answers to a number of questions. 
The attempt to briefly review this extensive literature was made not with the aim to 
exhaustively cover all that has been written. The aim, instead, was to offer an 
overview of the main issues that have arisen and the main approaches that have been 
adopted to provide possible answers. This overview has deliberately concentrated 
principally on the descriptive works or on the descriptive parts of the works that have 
been analysed. In the next chapter, the focus will shift to the theoretical explanations 
that have been put forward to explain irregular migration. 
 	   	  
	   63 
2. THEORIZING IRREGULAR MIGRATION 
 
Irregular migration is not a natural by-product of migrations themselves; it is, 
rather, the result of the existence of a structural tension between the social 
preconditions and the political preconditions that interact with them (Sciortino, 2007). 
The social space, following this interpretation, is the scenario where two different and 
opposed logics interact. On the one hand, there is the logic of free movement of 
people and goods that is favoured by socio-economic forces, like the market-
economy, globalization or transnationalism. On the other hand, there is the logic of 
states, political-juridical constructions, historically and ideologically differentiated, 
that claim the power to delimit the space and to regulate the movement of factors 
across it. Irregularity would then be the result of the clash between these two logics 
that determine a numerical difference between the migrants that move across the 
geographical space, established by the first logic, and the migrants who are allowed to 
do that, established by the second logic. The divergence between these two logics, has 
become particularly relevant in the present age. In previous historical phases, the 
“social space”, understood as the space within which the majority of social 
transactions take place, tended to overlap to a greater extent with the “political space”, 
understood as the space where those transactions are regulated by a sovereign power. 
In that context, the main social interactions occurred within the boundaries of the 
states, and those people who crossed frontiers were rather limited and more easily 
controllable. Human mobility, which is not a novelty of the current historical moment, 
took place in huge numbers in the past, but it largely occurred through channels 
established by states and often under their auspice. 
The growing liberalization in the exchange of goods, capital and information, as 
well as the drastic reduction in the costs and time needed for these exchanges, in one 
word, globalization, have determined a dramatic change in the patterns of mobility. 
The fast and worldwide development of interconnections between individuals and 
societies has led to an inversion in that overlapping movement between the “social 
space” and the “political space”, that has unveiled the possible conflict of their inner 
logics. In this sense, it could be said that globalization is determining a “spill over” of 
the “social space” beyond the boundaries of the “political space” as was prefigured by 
the modern state. Faced by these phenomena, states have reacted in differentiated 
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ways. On the one hand, they seem to be ceding sovereignty as regards the circulation 
of goods, capital and information. On the other, they seem to be fiercely opposing the 
free circulation of people. The contradiction between these two tendencies has been 
captured by Hollifield´s image of a clash between markets and states (Hollifield, 
1992) or in Massey’s concept of a “postmodern paradox” that sees at work 
simultaneously “global forces” and “restrictive policies” (Massey, 1999). It is within 
the frame of this paradox that irregularity has been interpreted as a characteristic 
phenomenon of the current historic phase. Social forces seem to be pushing for a 
greater mobility of peoples across the globe, while political forces try to regulate or 
stop such movement. The mismatch between the fluxes generated by the former, and 
those accorded and legitimized by the latter, determine that a consistent number of 
migrants move, reside and work irregularly. 
If, from an abstract perspective, irregularity can be explained as the result of the 
described conflict between the logic of global social processes and the logic of states, 
the concrete ways in which this actually occurs bring to light a complex scenario. 
Accordingly, a large number of different interpretations have been proposed, each one 
emphasizing the role of a specific actor (e.g. states, migrants, capital, smugglers, etc.) 
or focusing on the effects of a particular process (e.g. globalization, economic 
transformation, xenophobia, etc.). Notwithstanding the differences, all these efforts 
have shared a common focus on the relationship between migration and states. The 
different theories of irregular migration have, then, generally relied on the existing 
theories of migration to explain both migration supply and demand. Their specific 
effort has centred on explaining why, how, and to what extent, the intervention of 
states and politics has conditioned the encounter between these two forces and, hence, 
generated the phenomenon of irregular migration. 
While in the first chapter a general and introductory overview of the main 
research lines on irregular migration was presented, in this chapter the focus will 
centre on the theoretical explanations that have been proposed to explain irregular 
migration. The aim is to analyse how the main research question of our work – how 
can irregular migration be explained? – has been addressed and what have been the 
main theoretical hypotheses proposed so far. The chapter will be divided into three 
parts. In the first part, the so-called gap hypothesis and the debate that has surrounded 
it will be discussed. This debate is particularly relevant for the discussion because the 
arguments and positions that have emerged in that context have strongly influenced 
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the theoretical treatment of irregular migration. Since irregular migration was one of 
the main indicators of the existence of a gap between policy goals and outcomes, the 
explanations for the latter became an immediate way to understand the former. 
Irregular migration, from this perspective, was interpreted as the result of whether 
policy failure or policy implicit choice. As the debate evolved, interpretations become 
more varied and the two phenomena were more clearly distinguished. Nevertheless, 
the gap logic remained the dominant framework behind most theories of irregular 
migration. Accordingly, almost all these theories, although in different ways, have 
followed one of two basic arguments that have been offered to explain the gap 
hypotheses. In the second part of the chapter, we will present those theories that have 
followed the first argument, i.e. the idea of irregular migration as the result of states’ 
diminished control capacities. In the third part, we will discuss the theories influenced 
by the second argument, i.e. irregular migration intended as the outcome of states’ 
implicit or explicit choices.  Finally, in the last part, there will be a critical discussion 
of the strengths and weaknesses discernible in the current theoretical understanding of 
irregular migration. 
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2.1. The gap hypothesis debate 
In their 1994 book The ambivalent quest for immigration control, Cornelius, 
Martin and Hollifield (Cornelius et al., 1994), after having comparatively analysed the 
immigration policy and policy outcomes in nine industrialized democracies, proposed 
two interrelated theses. On the one hand, they suggested a “convergence hypothesis”. 
This stated that a growing similarity was observable among the states they had 
analysed, in particular concerning: the policy instruments adopted to control 
immigration; the results of immigration control measures; social integration policies; 
the public opinion reaction to immigration flows and governments efficacy. On the 
other hand, they suggested a “gap hypothesis”: “the gap between goals of national 
immigration policy (laws, regulation, executives actions, etc.) and the actual results of 
policies in this areas (policy outcomes)”, they wrote, “is wide and growing wider in 
all major industrialized democracies, thus provoking greater public hostility towards 
immigrants in general (regardless of legal status) and putting intense pressure on 
political parties and government official to adopt more restrictive policies” (Cornelius 
et al., 1994, p. 3). Irregular migration, from their perspective, was the result of “the 
administrative, political and economic difficulties that hinder the enforcement of laws 
and regulations against it in open and pluralistic societies” (Cornelius et al., 1994, p. 
4). These difficulties responded to various factors, but two seemed crucial: the 
strength of push and pull forces that strongly encouraged migrations, and the rise of 
rights-based politics that severely limited states’ capacities. 
The book was not the first to address these issues. Especially in the US, there had 
already been many contributions on irregular migration and control policies (Bean, 
Edmonston, & Passel, 1990; Chavez, 1991; Chiswick, 1988; Cornelius, 1982; 
Espenshade, 1995; Hollifield, 1992; Massey, 1987; Passel, 1986; Piore, 1980; Portes, 
1978; Portes & Bach, 1985). However, Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield’s work was 
able to reframe the debate around its theses and to orient much of the debate in the 
years that followed. As a demonstration of this, there exists a large number of books 
and articles that have explicitly referred to the gap hypothesis, either contesting it, 
supporting it or developing it (Castles, 2004; Cornelius & Rosenblum, 2005; 
Cornelius & Tsuda, 2004; Czaika & de Haas, 2011; Freeman, 1995; Guiraudon & 
Joppke, 2001; Guiraudon & Lahav, 2000; Christian Joppke, 1998a, 1998c; Lahav & 
Guiraudon, 2006; Sassen, 1996; Zolberg, 2000). In particular, two issues have 
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animated this debate: firstly, the actual existence and the possible “size” of the gap; 
secondly, the nature and origin of the gap. 
 
2.1.1. Is there a gap? 
Many contradictory positions have emerged regarding this question. A number of 
scholars have been critical of the very concept of a “gap hypothesis”. Joppke, for 
instance, has argued that the notion of an emergent gap between policy goals and 
policy outcomes may suggest that there has been a moment in which these two 
coincided. In particular, regarding migration, it may be that, at a certain point in 
history, states, on the basis of their absolute sovereign power, had been perfectly able 
to control the movements of populations. This notion, however, “is premised on a 
simplistic and static notion of sovereignty, thus denying its historical variability and 
chronic imperfection” (Christian Joppke, 1998c, p. 267). Building on this critique, 
Joppke suggested that the gap is an inevitable fact, and that what needs to be 
hypothesized is not its existence, but rather its magnitude and causes. Since 
sovereignty has rarely been absolute, the attention should centre on the degree to 
which states are able to implement rules and on the reasons that strengthen or weaken 
that capacity.  
The bulk of the debate has focused on the real extent to which states may or may 
not be losing control over migrations (for a review of this debate see: Czaika & de 
Haas, 2011; Schinkel, 2009). In this respect, two main positions have developed. On 
the one hand, there are those who believe that states have lost much of their power to 
control migrations and that policies have become largely ineffective (Castles & 
Miller, 1993; Cornelius et al., 1994; Cornelius & Tsuda, 2004; Jacobson, 1996; 
Sassen, 1996, 1998b). These positions have resonated with the broader idea, 
developed by globalization theorists, that states are slowly losing their prerogatives 
and becoming a “zombie-category” (Schinkel, 2009). On the other hand, there are 
those who contest this hypotheses and believe, instead, that the power of states and 
their efficacy have actually increased (Brochmann & Hammar, 1999; Freeman, 1995; 
Guiraudon & Lahav, 2000; Christian Joppke, 1998c). From this perspective, the gap 
between goals and outcomes in migration management has not to do with a 
diminished capacity, but with states’ choices or states’ self-limitation.  
In a recent article, Czaika and de Haas have extensively analysed how this debate 
has evolved through the 2000s (Czaika & de Haas, 2011). Whereas the two positions 
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had initially been mainly theoretical, as time passed, the arguments have been 
strengthened on the basis of empirical researches. The increased availability of data 
and of case studies, however, has not been sufficient to solve the dispute. In fact, the 
divide has expanded as the results obtained through quantitative analysis (policies are 
effective) and those obtained through qualitative ones (policies are not effective) have 
delivered contrasting responses. “How” then “can we explain that various migration 
policy instruments turn out to be significantly effective, and that, nevertheless, 
migration policies are often perceived as not reaching their stated and intended 
objectives?” ask Czaika and de Haas (Czaika & de Haas, 2011, p. 4). In the authors’ 
opinion, this seemingly unsolvable incongruence has to do with the conceptual 
confusion and the lack of precision that have generally characterized the theoretical 
debate. In particular, the authors have underlined three critical aspects. Firstly, they 
have argued that there has been ambiguity behind the concept of policy effectiveness. 
Does it refer to, and does it have to be measured in relation to, the desired effect or to 
the actual effect of policies? Secondly, there has been little attention paid to 
distinguishing the different time-scales and levels of aggregation within which 
policies act. “The empirical literature on policy effects generally focuses on the 
effects of specific measures on specific (primarily legally defined) categories of 
migration over relatively limited time periods, the qualitative literature on migration 
policy effects tends to address the effects of overall levels of policy restrictiveness on 
overall (gross) and long-term volumes, trends and patterns of international migration” 
(Czaika & de Haas, 2011, p. 4). Finally, there has been a problem regarding the 
difference between what is stated in policy discourses or even in laws and what is 
effectively implemented. 
 
2.1.2.  What gaps? 
The points proposed by Czaika and de Haas, actually resume a line of criticism 
that emerged after the gap hypothesis was proposed. Many scholars, in fact, departing 
from marked evidence that policy discourses could not be taken as policy enactments, 
started to analyse the different dimensions that the gap hypothesis included within its 
main idea. Not only was it possible to recognize a gap between policy goals and 
policy outcomes, but one could also be observed between policy discourses and 
policy implementation. Along this path of enquiry, a number of other gaps have been 
identified which have been particularly interesting in relation to the interpretation of 
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irregular migration (Cornelius & Tsuda, 2004; De Genova, 2004; Lahav & 
Guiraudon, 2006). The main gaps that have been identified will be discussed, 
following the threefold scheme proposed by Czaika and de Haas (Czaika & de Haas, 
2011, pp. 18–23), and a fourth gap will be added, which they have not considered.  
The first gap is the so-called discursive gap. This gap deals with the distance that 
is always discernible, in all political contexts, between what is stated in political 
discourses and what is then actually put into effect in laws, measures and regulations. 
Accordingly, it would be a mistake to measure policy effectiveness in relation to 
policy discourses. A much more accountable benchmark for a realistic evaluation 
would be to consider what is actually written in the executive dispositions. This issue, 
as many scholars have underlined, has become particularly relevant since the 
migration crisis of the 1990s. In fact, the widespread anxieties about migration and 
the strong politicization that followed in many countries determined an escalation of 
the anti-immigrant rhetoric by both politicians and administrators. While this has 
certainly implied a change in the discourses and the promise of many and widely-
publicized super-restrictive initiatives, a closer analysis of the actual decisions may 
suggest a milder reality. As a matter of fact, an objective evaluation of policies has 
become increasingly difficult. Within this context, moreover, various scholars have 
detected the spread of what has been called “symbolic policies”, i.e., policies focused 
more on publically suggesting severity rather than on actually achieving it (Andreas, 
1998; Castles, 2004; De Genova, 2004; Freeman, 1995; Massey et al., 1998). A 
number of factors have been put forward in relation to the discursive gap: the 
existence of hidden agendas; the role of populist politics; the diversified social 
interests; the complexity of the policy-bargaining once television cameras are 
switched off; the various political, legal, economic domestic and international 
constraints; the fact that migration discourses are general and migration policies are 
specific (Castles, 2004; Cornelius & Tsuda, 2004; Czaika & de Haas, 2011). 
The second gap is the so-called implementation gap. Here the problem is related 
to the distance existing between what is written in the papers regarding laws, 
measures and regulations, and what is actually implemented by the administrations at 
their various levels. From this perspective, it would be equally misleading to evaluate 
policy effectiveness in relation to what is stated in the official documents. In fact, a 
crucial and decisive element regarding migration policies concerns how they are 
effectively implemented. Also in this case, various causes may determine a greater or 
	   70 
smaller implementation gap: the peculiar national regulatory styles and traditions; the 
organizational culture of bureaucracies and the degree of discretionality; the grade of 
insulation of bureaucracies from external pressures; possible intra-administration 
conflicts or scarce coordination, the social attitude towards and toleration of 
informality; budgetary constraints; corruption (Cornelius & Tsuda, 2004; Czaika & de 
Haas, 2011; Guiraudon & Lahav, 2000; Jordan et al., 2003; Lahav & Guiraudon, 
2006; Van Der Leun, 2003). The implementation gap not only poses conceptual 
difficulties but also methodological ones. It is self-evident that researching on the 
daily work of thousands of street-level bureaucrats or quantitatively measuring 
implementation could prove to be a prohibitive task. 
Czaika and De Haas have referred to the third gap as the efficacy gap, meaning: 
“the extent to which a change in an effectively implemented policy has the capacity to 
produce an effect” (Czaika & de Haas, 2011, p. 22). The point here is that even a 
meticulously written, grounded and implemented policy may reach different results 
from those expected. The measurement of the efficacy gap may vary from complete 
failure to a very close attainment of the desired effects. The variables that intervene at 
this level have to do with the fact that policies do not act in a social void; on the 
contrary, they interact with a complex and dynamic web of actors and forces that have 
their own goals and strategies. In this regard, a number of possible limitations to 
policy effectiveness need to be considered: unintended consequences, implementation 
failure, unexpected interactions with other policies and counterstrategies on the part of 
migrants. Moreover, a temporal factor needs to be taken into account. Whereas the 
effects of a policy may appear satisfactory in the short run, in the medium, long run 
they could become ineffective or even counterproductive. With respect to this, 
Freeman (1995) has explicitly talked about the “temporal illusion” of migration 
policy: “the effects of migration tend to be lagged; the short-term benefits oversold 
and the long-term costs denied or hidden to show up clearly only in the outyears” 
(Freeman, 1995). 
A fourth gap, very much related to the third, could be referred to as the 
knowledge or epistemological gap. This gap is concerned with the limits inherent to 
all processes of knowledge production that are the necessary preceding step for policy 
design and implementation (Bommes & Kolb, 2002; Engbersen & Broeders, 2009; 
Freeman, 1995; Scott, 1998). The simplest example of this gap may be found in the 
impossibility to precisely count irregular migrants. How could a policy be effective if 
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it is directed towards a phenomenon that is not even possible to quantify? Yet, 
limiting to the counting problem risks understating the magnitude of the issue. In fact, 
the problem lies not only in having to deal with the impossibility of using statistical 
tools or producing rigorous numerical figures, but it also lies in the complexity of 
social interactions and the impossibility of producing accurate, all-embracing 
descriptions of it. The “illusion of control”, that the discussed gaps have evidenced, 
has perhaps primarily to do with the “illusion of knowledge”. The knowledge gap 
calls attention to this point: every perspective is a partial, imperfect and inevitably 
biased viewpoint on reality. It, therefore, affects those who deliver policy discourses, 
those who write laws, regulations and measures, those who produce white papers, 
those who implement policies and, of course, those who study the effects of those 
policies. 
Considering the logic behind the four types of gaps, it seems possible to clearly 
distinguish two main explanations. The efficacy and knowledge gap explains the 
mismatch between policy goals and outcomes as the result of state failure, despite its 
efforts. The discursive and implementation gap, on the contrary, suggests a certain 
degree of complicity on the part of the state, and the mismatch as a somewhat 
intentional outcome. Although the theories advanced to explain irregular migration 
have offered a great variety of explanations, they all seem to generally follow one of 
these two rationalities. For this reason, as the attention will now shift to these theories, 
two main groups will be distinguished. 
 
Table No. 2 – The Gaps 
Discursive Gap Irregular migration as states’ choice Implementation Gap 
Efficacy Gap 
Irregular migration as states’ failure Knowledge	  Gap	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2.2. Irregular migration as states’ failure 
The focus of the discussion will now move to the theories and hypotheses that, 
implicitly or explicitly, have proposed an explanation for irregular migration. Rather 
than presenting the different approaches following the theses of single scholars, 
disciplinary distinctions, or chronological accounts, the choice has been to try to 
identify the main, broad explanatory lines that have emerged in literature. Obviously, 
this choice is arbitrary and offers both advantages and problems. The advantages of 
this strategy are that they not only allow one to overview an extensive literature in a 
limited space but it consents one to remain focused on the theoretical arguments, 
which are the main issue of this discussion. The problems are that this approach 
certainly implies the use of certain simplifications that cannot reflect the integrity of 
some arguments. To make explicit this strategy and its intentions may not solve the 
related problems, but it can draw attention to them and to the inherent limits of this 
approach. Then, if it is true that each of the theories that will be presented has a 
logical independence, and for this reason they will all be discussed separately, in 
many cases, they have been presented in various combinations. 
The group of theoretical explanations that will be discussed in this section shares 
a common perspective: the idea that irregular migration is the result of states’ 
increasing inability to control international migrations. While this general idea is 
common to all of them, different positions have emerged regarding its extent. The 
most radical accounts have certified that states have lost control over their 
populations; in contrast, more nuanced ones have considered states to be still in 
control but in the process of weakening. There have been three main explanatory 
hypotheses as regards irregular migration being the result of states’ ineffectiveness. A 
first approach has explained irregular migration as the result of the intrinsic and 
inevitable limitations of state mechanisms and policies. A second approach has 
focused on the role of those actors, forces and processes that, acting from outside the 
state, have been slowly eroding its prerogatives and control capacities. Finally, a third 
approach has concentrated on those actors, forces and processes that, acting from 
inside the state, have diminished its ability to manage migrant populations. 
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2.2.1. Intrinsic limitations of states and policies  
Various scholars have explained irregular migration as the result of the internal, 
inescapable limitations that states experience concerning their control abilities. These 
interpretations have focused on the concrete difficulties found by states in developing 
effective mechanisms, systems and procedures to control a complex social 
phenomenon like migration. While the self-narrative built by modern states had 
envisaged the myth of absolute control over the population, in reality, even the most 
powerful and pervasive states have reached, at maximum, a high degree of control, 
but never total (Broeders, 2009; Van Meeteren, 2010).  
As argued by Torpey: “in order to extract resources and implement policies, 
states must be in a position to locate and lay claim to people and goods” (Torpey, 
1998, p. 244). In order to do that, states need not only to penetrate societies but also to 
“embrace” them. This latter metaphor that Torpey uses, highlights the complexity of 
the task; indeed, it is not only a question of setting up a bureaucracy or monopolizing 
the legitimate means of violence, but it is a matter of successfully registering all 
members of society and the main transactions that take place. As was discussed in the 
first chapter, this effort by states to “enhance their grip on societies” (Broeders, 2009) 
has taken place in a very uneven way and has produced different results across history 
and geography. In this respect, Schrover and her colleagues have suggested that 
differences must be related to the particular processes of state formation in each case 
(Schrover et al., 2008). Other scholars have suggested that differences in the ability to 
control must be related to the different functioning and liberalness of the political 
system. However, in one of the first comparative analyses of irregular migration that 
includes non-western, non-liberal countries, Garcés-Mascareñas has concluded that 
also non-democratic administrations face important practical limitations to controlling 
their populations (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012). As a matter of fact, if down through the 
twentieth century, states increasingly believed in their ability, “time showed that 
governments misunderstood the mechanisms that govern migration and overestimated 
the extent to which they were able to influence it” (Doomernik & Jandl, 2008, p. 20). 
Even after the migration crisis of the 1990s and the prioritization of migration control 
in the policy agendas, certain limitations have proved resilient. As a confirmation of 
this, the work of Broeders, for instance, after analysing the recent efforts made by 
Germany and the Netherlands, two among the most advanced and committed 
countries in the fight against irregular migration, concluded that those countries have 
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not been “without setbacks and limitation” (Broeders, 2009, p. 193). Notwithstanding 
the huge investments, the implementation of the latest technologies and the 
diversification of policies (external and internal controls), in both cases it is still 
possible to identify what Broeders calls “white spots”. This metaphor refers to those 
sectors of society and the economy that states, despite their efforts, cannot chart 
(Broeders, 2009, p. 194). 
A number of specific reasons have been indicated to explain these limitations. 
Firstly, there are problems related to knowledge production and policy design; these 
imply a limited predictive ability, administrative loopholes, unintended consequences 
and policy failure (Bommes & Kolb, 2002; Freeman, 1995; Scott, 1998, 2008).  
Secondly, there are problems related to policy implementation, administrative 
competence and budgetary constraints (Broeders, 2009; Doomernik & Jandl, 2008; 
Massey, 1999; Scott, 1998; Van Der Leun, 2003). Just to give one example of this 
capacity problem, in the Netherlands, to reach the target of 10% of companies 
checked by labour inspectors to avoid irregular work, would require an increase in 
staff from the current 180 to 930 inspectors (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2007 
in Broeders, 2009). 
From the perspective of these theories, irregular migration must be understood as 
an inevitable “fact of life” (Van Meeteren, 2010, p. 1), “a corollary of large-scale 
movements of people across national borders and governments’ [imperfect] attempts 
to regulate migration” (Van Der Leun, 2003, p. 9). The merit of these approaches has 
been to relativize the myth of full control that characterized modern-state ideology 
and to show the limitation of state policies. They also called for a detailed and 
differentiated analysis of the administrative culture, methodologies and capacities of 
each state.  
Although these are crucial aspects for the understanding of irregular migration, 
on their own, they have a limited explicative capacity. In particular, two issues remain 
beyond their grasp. Firstly, there exists the problem of policy intentionality: to 
acknowledge that control policies are imperfect and often fail, does not problematize 
the real aim of those policies or the possible conflict with other policies. It can be, for 
instance, that a certain degree of control failure and, thus, of irregular migration is the 
desired result or an acceptable compromise among multiple objectives. Secondly, the 
approach overstates the capacity of policies and does not consider other factors. For 
instance, policy limitations can help to explain why, under heavy migratory pressures, 
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controls may fail, but they do not say much about the reasons for, and the variability 
of, those pressures; the same state with identical control policies in a certain historical 
moment may experience high levels of irregular migration and in others very low 
levels. 
 
2.2.2. External constraints of states and irregular migration  
The theoretical arguments that will be discussed in this section concentrate on a 
number of factors and processes, mainly external to states, which have contributed to 
the erosion of their ability to control populations. These have been interpreted as the 
main cause of irregular migration. 
  
A. The effects of globalization: economy, politics and society. 
An extensive literature has linked the increased relevance of irregular migration 
with the effects of globalization. In particular, many interpretations have found in the 
complex and multileveled transformations brought by globalization the reason for 
states’ increasing weakness and ineffectiveness in controlling international migration. 
The argument here has been that the particular characteristics of the current age are 
undermining states’ capacities and that irregular migration is only but one of the signs 
of this process. The use of the concept of globalization and the problem of a definition 
could open a way to a very interesting, but probably endless, debate. As for this 
discussion, a very broad and general definition will be used: “globalization can be 
defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant 
localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many 
miles away and vice-versa” (Giddens, 1990, p. 64). While in literature it is possible to 
find many different approaches that correlate irregular migration and globalization, 
three main general arguments seem distinguishable.  
 
Economic globalization and irregular migration 
Many scholars have linked the current trend of irregular migrations to the far-
reaching economic transformations that have affected both migration-sending 
societies and receiving ones in the last decades. These transformations would appear 
to have determined a sharp increase in the number of potential migrants in the former 
case and a substantial rise of the demand for migrant labour in the latter one. The 
combination of these two circumstances, in other words the simultaneous 
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intensification of push and pull factors, would seem to have determined a powerful 
support for international migration. Overwhelmed by the dynamics of these economic 
forces, states’ attempts to limit migrations have proved ineffective: when they tried to 
close regular entry channels, migrants shifted to the irregular ones. 
Research on these processes has followed two key lines. A first group of scholars 
has focused on the systemic, international transformation of the global economy. 
Different approaches and theories, with various degrees of politicization, have 
emerged on this. The general argument has been that the rapid and worldwide 
diffusion of the free market principles has determined a sharp transformation in the 
functioning of the economy. Whereas, up until the 1970s, states, using monetary, 
commercial and other regulatory policies had been able to control and govern the 
main economic transactions, since then, an increasingly more integrated and 
autonomous global market has been developing. Various concepts and historical 
labels have been used to describe this process, for instance, deregulation, 
flexibilization, Washington consensus, neoliberal globalization, etc. The impact of 
these wide-ranging transformations has been twofold: on the one hand, the rapid 
dismantling of traditional economies in non-industrialized countries; on the other, the 
restructuring of the Fordist economy and social model in industrialized ones. The 
joint effect has been an enormous increase of global interdependence and a 
continuous rise in the exchange of goods, capital and information. The leading force 
is now the law of demand and supply and the means of production has had to follow 
profit opportunities rather than states’ desires or plans. This process of deregulation 
and increasing economic interconnectedness has had an inevitable corollary, a strong 
reinforcement of population movements (Broeders & Engbersen, 2007b; Castles, 
2010a; Cornelius et al., 1994; Massey, 1999; Massey et al., 1998; Sassen, 1998b, 
1998b; Schierup et al., 2006). From a purely economic point of view, in fact, labour is 
a means of production, just like capital, raw materials or machinery; if globalization 
implies the free movement of capital, raw materials and machinery in search of the 
most profitable production conditions, the same must work also for labour. The 
conditions for irregular migration to emerge as a structural phenomenon of 
globalization would be located in the paradoxical fact that, while states have largely 
accepted economic interconnection and the free flow of other means of production, 
they have fiercely opposed the free flow of workers (Cornelius et al., 1994; Cornelius 
& Tsuda, 2004; Guiraudon & Joppke, 2001; Hollifield, 1992, 2004). In a context of 
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growing interdependence, powerful mobility forces, but limited regulatory capacities, 
states find it increasingly difficult to maintain their control stance and to avoid 
irregular entries. 
A second group of scholars has focused more on the effects of globalization in 
the receiving-country economies. In particular, they have stressed that the process of 
economic restructuring that followed the economic crisis of the 1970s has radically 
transformed both the production structures and the labour conditions in industrialized 
countries. While up until then, a largely protected economy was the basis for a unified 
labour market, widespread labour rights and stable, unionized employment relations, 
the erosion of the Fordist model and the opening up of the national economy to 
international fluxes had a disrupting effect. A number of processes have been 
analysed: the development of dual-labour markets (Piore, 1980; Portes, 1978; Sassen, 
1998b); the flexibilization, deregulation and informalization of many sectors of the 
economy (Castles & Miller, 1993; Sassen, 1998b; Schierup et al., 2006); the decline 
of many industries and the process of delocalization (Portes, 1978; Sassen, 1998b; 
Schierup et al., 2006); the drop in unionized labour (Castles, 2004); the development 
of subcontracting (Baldwin-Edwards & Kraler, 2009; Broeders & Engbersen, 2007b; 
Martin & Miller, 2000); the rise of specific urban informal economies (Sassen, 1998b; 
Van Der Leun, 2003). On the whole, these processes have determined an increasing 
demand for a cheap, unqualified and flexible work force. Since native workers have 
generally not been willing to accept the new working conditions, this demand turned 
to migrant workers. As discussed above, the combination of a high demand for 
migrants and a political reluctance to accept them, made irregular migration a 
somehow “natural” solution to the mismatch. Moreover, as many scholars have 
underlined, irregular migrants, because of their precarious conditions, have fulfilled in 
an optimal way the demand of many sectors of the economy. They are a cheap, hyper-
flexible, unprotected and extremely mobile resource (Castles, 2010a; Sassen, 1998b). 
As stated by Hanson: “illegal immigration is a persistent phenomenon […] because it 
has a strong economic rationale” (Hanson, 2007, p. 32).  
 
Political/Legal globalization and irregular migration 
Another strand of research has concentrated on the political effects of 
globalization that have affected states’ capacity to control and deter international 
migration. Here the lines of research have followed two main paths. On the one hand, 
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from a more theoretical point of view, it has been stressed how “globalization 
transcends the territorial borders of states and, as a consequence, profoundly affects 
the nature and functions of state of governance in the world political economy, 
including of course, the governance of migration” (İçduygu, 2007, p. 145). Many 
different processes have been studied: the increasing international anomie (İçduygu, 
2007); the fluidity and openness of contemporary societies (Urry, 2007); the process 
of de-territorialisation that implies a weakening of state borders and sovereignty 
(Friese & Mezzadra, 2010); the interconnectedness and interdependence of the world 
system (Wallerstein, 2004). From this perspective, irregular migration is one of the 
phenomena that indicates more clearly how globalization is determining the erosion 
of states’ prerogatives and, in particular, their sovereignty. What is at stake is not only 
the economic functioning of the international order, but the political one. While states 
and borders had been the cornerstone of the Westphalian system, the uncontrolled 
global fluxes of the contemporary era are the concrete evidence of its decline.  
On the other hand, many scholars have discussed how the development of an 
international human-rights regime (Cornelius et al., 1994; Guiraudon & Lahav, 2000; 
Jacobson, 1996; Sassen, 1998b; Soysal, 1994) and of an international framework of 
institutions (Cornelius & Tsuda, 2004; Geddes, 2001) have strongly limited, from the 
outside, the ability of states to control and govern their populations. From this 
perspective, the obligation for states to compel to a number of international 
agreements and treaties that protect the rights of migrants both as they move across 
borders and once they arrive inside hosting societies, has greatly constrained states’ 
restrictive power. Moreover, the increasing importance and influence of international 
institutions and the development of agencies specifically focused on migration, like 
IOM and UNHCR, have also concurred on the limitation of states’ arbitrariness and 
on the creation of a shared system of safeguards for migrants. Within this context, the 
ability of the latter to bypass, circumvent and evade state controls has grown 
enormously. For instance, the widespread guarantee of asylum rights, the non-
refoulement principle, the right to appeal asylum rejection and expulsion orders, the 
possibility for origin countries to refuse the re-admission of non-identified migrants, 
not only have empowered migrants vis-à-vis states but, through their misuse, have 
offered a number of opportunities for irregular migration. 
Social globalization and irregular migration 
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Finally, a number of scholars have focused on the social implications of 
globalization and their impact on migration trends and on state control capacities. 
These analyses have highlighted how globalization has concurred to strengthen the 
social dynamics of migration. As pointed out by Castles, globalization has offered the 
technological and cultural basis for mobility to increase and involve all regions of the 
planet (Castles, 2010a). Although networks, cumulative causation, social capital, and 
chain theories have always had an important role in explaining migrations (Castles & 
Miller, 1993; Massey et al., 1998), in the context of globalization, these approaches 
gained particular relevance. The improvements in communication and transport 
systems, from this perspective, have greatly reinforced the self-perpetuating 
characteristics of migration and, therefore, one of the crucial elements particularly of 
irregular migration (Castles, 2004; López Sala, 2005; Massey, Goldring, & Durand, 
1994). As discussed by Lopez Sala, the impossibility for irregular migrants to count 
on formal channels and the increased difficulty of their migratory process make their 
reliance on networks and social capital an indispensable asset for their success (López 
Sala, 2005). From this viewpoint, the transformations brought about by globalization 
have offered migrants new and more sophisticated tools that enable them to share 
information, develop strategies and effectively contrast state controls.  
A similar argument, but with a stronger theoretical ambition, has been developed, 
especially since the mid-1990s, through studies on migrant transnationalism (Faist, 
2000; Glick-Schiller et al., 1992; Glick-Schiller, Basch, & Szanton-Blanc, 1995; 
Portes, 2001, 2003b; Portes, Guarnizo, & Landolt, 1999). The idea is that the 
development of migrant networks in the context of globalization is not merely easing 
migration processes, but is actually leading to the development of real transnational 
communities. These, in their turn, are increasingly capable of transcending state 
borders and challenging principles, such as, membership, citizenship, and sovereignty 
(Castles, 2004). Within this context, irregular migration appears as a correlated 
phenomenon that clearly exemplifies the contradiction between the old statist 
organization of space and populations, and the new, emergent, transnational one. 
The main virtue of all these theoretical explanations has been to pinpoint those 
broad and far-reaching transformations brought about by globalization that are 
affecting states’ capacity to control international migration. From this viewpoint, 
irregular migration is essentially the result of a structural conflict between global 
forces pushing for an ever-greater interconnection and flux of information, goods, 
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capital and people, and states. While these theories offer a framework to understand 
the current general trends of irregular migration, when it comes to the interpretation of 
specific irregular fluxes and populations they are less useful. How can they explain 
the highly differentiated picture? This difficulty is probably related to the fact that 
they have too easily dismissed the role of states. As a matter of fact, while it is true 
that irregular migration has become a widespread phenomenon, important disparities 
exist between different national contexts. In this sense, the question to be answered 
would be: how are globalization processes interacting with the different social, 
political and economic contexts and how do different forms of irregular migration 
emerge from these particular interactions? 
 
B. The irregular migration industry 
A number of scholars have linked the increased inefficiency of state policies and 
the increasing prominence of irregular migration to the emergence of the so-called 
“migration industry” (Andersson, 2014; Castles, 2004, 2010a; Castles & Miller, 1993; 
Koser, 2010; Kyle & Koslowski, 2011; Zolberg, 2006). As put by Castles and Miller, 
the term: “embraces the many people who earn their livelihood by organizing 
migratory movements” (Castles & Miller, 1993, p. 114). These “people” include a 
wide variety of actors that range from migrant community members, to small informal 
entrepreneurs, to actual criminals often connected to international mafias (Kyle & 
Koslowski, 2011). They support, back up and often exploit migrants along their 
journey in exchange for money. The services provided include for instance: lawyers 
who advise on how to circumvent laws and controls, human smugglers that help 
migrants to cross the borders, false document providers, labour and housing providers, 
credit providers and usurers, etc.  
From this perspective, the services offered by this background support network 
have become crucial to circumvent controls and thus to make irregular migration 
possible. This has become especially true since control efforts by states dramatically 
increased in the aftermath of the so-called migration crisis of the 1990s. Whereas in 
the previous phase, many relatively easy entry channels existed for irregular migrants 
and the use of personal networks was often enough for success, the efforts made by 
states to enforce borders and close the main legal loopholes changed the scenario. In 
the new context, spontaneous irregular migration turned increasingly ineffective and 
the recurrence to “professional” services became indispensable. This, in turn, created 
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a whole new range of entrepreneurial opportunities and raised the related profit 
margins, generating the development of a truly global “migration industry” 
(Andersson, 2014). Today, the enormous economic interests involved and the 
extension and relevance of this industry can hardly be underestimated and it certainly 
provides a powerful explanation for the difficulties experienced by states in 
controlling migratory movements. As expressed by Harris, this has become “a vast 
unseen international network underpinning a global labour market; a horde of 
termites… boring the national fortification against migration, and changing whole 
societies” (in Castles & Miller, 1993, p. 115). 
The uncovering of the importance of the migration industry has provided another 
important explanation of irregular migration. The difficulties experienced by states in 
effectively controlling their borders and curtailing irregular fluxes has depended not 
only upon the individual efforts made by migrants, or upon their turning to networks 
and personal contacts, but also, and increasingly so, upon a powerful industry that has 
supported and encouraged migrants’ efforts. While this claim is unquestionably 
important and has been supported by relevant evidence, two critical aspects may be 
raised. To begin with, caution must be used regarding the arrival at conclusions 
derived from it. While it is true that states have had difficulties in controlling irregular 
migration and this can be related to the migration industry, the fact that the 
phenomenon is, nevertheless, limited shows that states have not lost control. 
Furthermore, while the role of the migration industry is an important piece of the 
irregular migration puzzle, on its own, it does not provide much explanation. The 
dissimilar social and numerical relevance of the irregular migration phenomenon in 
different countries shows that the effects of the migration industry are not the same. 
Why is this happening? Why, for instance, are certain states more effective than 
others against human smugglers? Or why does the same country experience different 
levels of irregular entries at different times? These critiques seem to point to the fact 
that the migration industry plays a crucial role as a catalyst for irregular migration 
fluxes once they have started.  
 
2.2.3.  Internal constraints of states and irregular migration  
In this section, we will discuss the theoretical arguments that have concentrated 
on those factors and processes, acting mainly inside state territories, that have 
contributed to incrementing the demand for migrants, to the erosion of state capacities 
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to control population movements and, hence, to the development of irregular 
migration. 
 
A. The role of the informal economy 
Though a number of links between the current economic trends and irregular 
migration have already been addressed, the relevance given in literature to the role of 
the informal economy demands for a separate discussion. In this section, the focus 
will be placed on those approaches that understand the informal economy as a sign of 
current erosion of state prerogatives. Irregular migration, from this perspective, would 
then be a consequence of those forces that, from the inside, limit the regulatory 
capacities of states. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the idea that the world’s economies were on an 
ineluctable path to “modernization” and, thus, to “formalization” appeared 
increasingly questionable. Even in the most advanced countries, where for some 
decades the “formalization theses” (Williams & Windebank, 1998) seemed to apply, 
signs of an opposite movement were increasing. “What is new in the current context 
is that the informal sector grows, even in highly institutionalized economies, at the 
expense of already formalized relationships” Castell and Portes 1989, p.13 in 
(Samers, 2004, p. 2003). This development was linked to various factors: the 
necessity for employers to reduce costs and increase flexibility; the “care deficit” 
created by native female employment; the transformation of urban economies and the 
emergence of ethnically-specialized sectors (Samers, 2004). More in general, as 
argued by Sassen, informalization must be seen in the context of the economic 
restructuring that has contributed to the decline of the manufacturing-dominated 
industrial complex of the post-war era and the rise of a new, service-dominated 
economic complex (Sassen, 1998b). Many scholars have pointed to this process of 
informalization as an explanation of the rising significance of irregular migration in 
receiving countries. From this standpoint, the informal economy works as a magnet 
for irregular migrants, as it offers them the possibility to find employment (Baldwin-
Edwards, 2008; Düvell, 2006; Quassoli, 1999; Reyneri, 1998, 2004). As pointed out 
by Sassen (1998), immigrants “may be in a favourable position to seize the 
opportunities presented by informalization, […] but they do not necessarily create 
such opportunities. Instead, the opportunities may well be a structured outcome of the 
composition of advanced economies” (Sassen, 1998b, p. 154). 
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The theories that have focused on the role of the informal economy have offered 
a convincing argument to explain the demand for irregular migration. The main 
advantage of this approach has been that it directly links the phenomenon to the 
particular social and economic configuration of each national context. In this sense, it 
calls for a differentiated analysis of the structural conditions that may favour irregular 
migration or not. This perspective, nevertheless, has not been free from flaws. On the 
one hand, the relation between irregular migration and the informal economy cannot 
be linearly interpreted and does not necessarily indicate state failure. In many 
countries the informal economy had been an internal characteristic long before the 
arrival of migrants. Moreover, a number of national studies have shown that states do 
not always put all their efforts into controlling the informal economy but display, 
instead, tolerant attitudes (Jordan et al., 2003; Reyneri, 1998; Triandafyllidou, 2009). 
In this sense, the informal economy alone cannot explain irregular migration and it 
does not necessarily imply the erosion of state prerogatives. On the other hand, 
studies in many countries have shown that irregular migrants do not necessarily rely 
on the informal economy. A notable case concerns the US that has one of the smallest 
informal economies in the world (Schneider, Buehn, & Montenegro, 2010), but a 
sizable number of irregular migrants (Passel et al., 2013). This is possible because 
there is a limited enforcement of labour controls and, therefore, a tacit tolerance of the 
regular work of irregular migrants. These examples show that, given the great variety 
around the world of economic arrangements, ways and degrees of law enforcement, 
and levels of toleration of informality, the explanation of irregular migration requires 
differentiated and customized analysis.  
 
B. The role of migrants’ agency 
Departing from a critique of the structuralist explanations of irregular migration, 
an important line of research has focused on the role of migrants’ agency. From this 
perspective, the excessive emphasis laid on state policies or on the economic 
dynamics has neglected the crucial importance of migrants’ actions and strategies. 
Migrants are not passive recipients of policy measures or victims of capitalist logics; 
on the contrary, they are active players who are perfectly capable of analysing the 
opportunity structure they encounter, of developing strategies and of circumventing 
restrictions. From this viewpoint, irregular migration has been explained as the result 
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of these capacities and of the ability of migrants to exploit the loopholes and 
weaknesses that characterize state controls. 
The theoretical explanations that have centred their attention on the role of 
migrants have provided different accounts on the extent to which they are able to 
confront and challenge social structures. For some scholars, migrants’ agency has 
mainly a reactive and, on the whole, a limited capacity to defy structural forces. The 
attention has focused on the concrete strategies that enable an irregular migrant to 
“survive” within a very limited range of possibilities. For other scholars, migrants’ 
agency is a much more powerful force that is able to transgress, contest and even 
modify social structures. Here, importance has been given to the strategies developed 
by irregular migrants, to their political activism, and to the social and political 
transformations they are backing. 
Focusing on the first group, there have been many approaches and findings. 
Espenshade has suggested that irregular migrants see policy barriers as one of the 
obstacles of the equation they face once they decide to migrate (Espenshade, 1995). In 
this sense, they have a very pragmatic approach: they estimate difficulties, consider 
alternative options, share information and take decisions. To do so, they extensively 
count on the use of formal and informal networks, which in their case play a 
fundamental role (Broeders & Engbersen, 2007b; Engbersen, 2001; Engbersen & 
Broeders, 2009; Portes, 1978, 1996). Paradoxically, it may happen that irregularity is 
an advantage over regular migration (Bommes & Sciortino, 2011a; Schrover et al., 
2008). Indeed, in certain contexts, being irregular offers better economic opportunities 
or more flexibility and the possibility to elude state controls (Garcés-Mascareñas, 
2012). As regards the specific strategies developed by irregular migrants, a diversified 
picture has been sketched. Engbersen has identified six strategies: the mobilization of 
social capital, bogus marriages, manipulation of identity, strategic operations in the 
public space, legal action, and crime (Engbersen, 2001). As for the manipulation of 
identity, there are three main tactics: false identity adoption, destruction of 
documents, and concealment of irregular status (Engbersen, 2001). Vasta has 
concentrated on the functioning of the paper market. She has shown how irregular 
migrants engage in a dialectic process with the structures and control mechanisms of 
receiving societies. Buying, renting, or borrowing someone else’s papers is part of a 
productive process by which migrants permanently construct and re-construct their 
subjectivity (Vasta, 2011). Van der Leun, working on the Dutch case, has shown how 
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irregular migrants are able to find and actively exploit the loopholes that characterize 
the legislation and the implementation of control policies (Van Der Leun, 2003). On 
the one hand, the complexity of legislation, the different dimensions and sectors of 
application, and the existence of various and often uncoordinated levels of governance 
determine the presence of legal ambiguities, contradictions and voids. On the other, 
irregular migrants and their networks, often with the help of lawyers, NGOs and even 
street-level bureaucrats, successfully learn to take advantage of these pitfalls. Another 
type of strategy is to resort to sectorial shifts or even to criminality to avoid labour 
enforcement (Engbersen & Van Der Leun, 2001). De Haas (2011) has identified four 
main substitution effects that limit the effectiveness of restrictions: spatial substitution 
(moving to other regions or other countries in search of better opportunities); 
categorical substitution (reorientation towards other legal or illegal sectors to avoid 
controls); inter-temporal substitution (modifying the timing and length of migration); 
reverse flow substitution (the adoption of return migration when restrictions decrease) 
(de Haas, 2011). 
Regarding the second group of studies, a number of concepts have been proposed 
to capture the broader social significance of irregular migrants’ networks and 
strategies. The intention of these approaches has been to underline the social and 
processual character of irregular migration (Castles, 2010a). Hughes, for instance, has 
proposed the notion of “bastard institutions” (Hughes 1951/1994 in Leerkes, 2009), 
and Mahler that of a “parallel institution” (Mahler, 1995). More recently, Bommes 
and his colleagues have used the concept of “foggy social structures” to indicate those 
“social structures that emerge from efforts by individuals and organizations to avoid 
the production of knowledge about their activities by making them either 
unobservable or indeterminable” (Bommes & Kolb, 2002, p. 5; Bommes & Sciortino, 
2011a; Engbersen & Broeders, 2009, p. 868). 
Following this orientation, in a recent work, Van Meeteren has enquired into how 
the different aspirations of individual irregular migrants determine differentiated 
patterns of insertion in the host societies (Van Meeteren, 2010). From her perspective, 
the concrete experience of irregular migrants cannot be understood only on the basis 
of the structural conditions they encounter. Indeed, she states: “contexts do not 
mechanically constrain or construct irregular migrants’ actions. Instead, they take 
advantage and react to the window of opportunity in different ways” (Van Meeteren, 
2010, p. 31). To fully grasp their experience, it is necessary to include in the analysis 
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migrants’ agency and, in particular, the role of aspirations. Researching on the case of 
irregular migrants of different nationalities in the Low Countries, she identified three 
main types of aspirations: settlement (the goal is to settle in the host society), 
investment (the goal is to save money in order to return to the origin country), and 
legalization (the goal is to regularize the status in order to start a new life). The 
different aspirations not only translate into diverse strategies and ways of interaction 
with the host society on the part of migrants, but also into very different outcomes in 
terms of living standards, degrees of incorporation and social relations. The study 
shows how, within the same structural context, the three different types of aspiration 
transform into clearly distinguishable forms of incorporation both in its functional 
(housing, work, sources of income) and its social dimension (leisure time and social 
contacts). “Investment migrants” concentrate on working hard, saving money and 
planning the return home. Accordingly, they: work as much as they can, accepting 
bad jobs rejected by natives since they see them as temporary; are usually alone and 
spend as little money as possible, living in bad conditions and in degraded districts; 
do not value leisure time and when not on duty, stay at home; have very small 
networks of social contacts and maintain many connections with the origin country. 
“Settlement migrants”, instead, assume that the receiving society is their new home. 
Hence, they: prefer stable, non-seasonal work with free time often in native 
households; have families with them and are willing to spend more on better housing 
in residential suburbs; travel around, spend on leisure and maintain an intense social 
life; have large social networks in the host country and limited contacts back home. 
Finally, “legalization migrants”, whose main objective is to regularize their status, 
lead a very particular life. They: work as little as possible due to the risks of 
compromising their aspirations; rely on natives and organizations rather than on their 
communities to get support, since they do not work; have a lot of free time that they 
spend elaborating their strategies to legalize their situation (marriage strategy, 
legalization strategy); have limited contacts with their origin countries and do not 
remit. This analysis leads Van Meeteren to conclude that “overemphasizing structure 
in the analysis obscures understanding of how migrants act differently under similar 
circumstances because they have different aspirations” (Van Meeteren, 2010, p. 135).  
Another interesting standpoint within this line of enquiry has been advanced by a 
number of scholars who, in recent years, have developed the “autonomy of migration” 
perspective (Mezzadra, 2011; Papadopoulos, Stephenson, & Tsianos, 2008; 
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Papadopoulos & Tsianos, 2007). Their approach does not consider migration in 
isolation from social, cultural and economic structures; in fact, they consider that  “the 
opposite is true: migration is understood as a creative force within these structures” 
(Papadopoulos et al., 2008, p. 202). The main objective of these scholars, as pointed 
out by Mezzadra, has been that of: 
“..looking at migratory movements and conflicts in terms that prioritize the 
subjective practices, the desires, the expectations, and the behaviours of migrants 
themselves. […] It allows for an analysis of the production of irregularity not as a 
unilateral process of exclusion and domination managed by state and law, but as a 
tense and conflict-driven process, in which subjective movements and struggles 
of migration are an active and fundamental factor. […] The autonomy of 
migration looks at the fact that some migrants, both regular and irregular, act as 
citizens and insist that they are already citizens (Mezzadra, 2011, p. 121). 
 
For these authors, the agency of irregular migrants does not simply allow them to 
solve their basic problems or to cross borders. Instead it should be read as a force that 
is able to challenge the legal frameworks and institutions built by states and, in so 
doing, concurs with their transformation. In this regard, particular attention has been 
given to the relationship between irregularity and citizenship. Whereas the latter has 
been usually interpreted as a unilateral concession by the state and, thus, as a tool of 
domination and control from above, the autonomy of migration perspective, recalling 
the work of scholars, like Balibar, Isin or Honig, has proposed a more dynamic and 
dialectic understanding of it. Citizenship must be considered as an ‘institution in flux’ 
(Isin, 2009), as a political/legal arrangement that is permanently contested and 
modified by the interplay of old and newly-emergent social forces (Balibar, 2001; 
Honig, 2009; Isin, 2009; Mezzadra, 2011). 
The main contribution of the theories presented in this section has been the shift 
of focus away from the structural contexts to illuminate the crucial role of migrants’ 
agency. In particular, the theories have warned against the tendency to uncritically 
accept the narratives that postulate the state as the main and undisputed actor within 
society, and migrants as passive victims of its dispositions. Irregular migration, from 
this perspective, is precisely one of those phenomena that reveal the limits of politics 
in deciding and controlling social life. The different accounts have shown how the 
individual and cooperative actions of migrants have been able to challenge state 
decisions, barriers and goals. The extent to which this has been made possible was 
interpreted in different ways, ranging from those authors who acknowledged a 
limited, mainly adaptive capacity to those who described a significant and potentially 
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transformative one. Though the contribution of these approaches has been crucial to 
obtaining a more comprehensive understanding of irregular migration, a number of 
critical points can be identified. On the one hand, there has been a problem with the 
emphasis given to the agency argument. The necessity to amend the excessive 
attention given in literature to structural explanations has often turned into excess in 
the opposite direction. The focus on migrants’ strategies, networks and aspirations in 
many cases has led to downplaying the role of structures, especially of politics and 
economics. In particular, the accounts that have ascribed a wide-ranging 
transformative ability to irregular migration and have described the state as a zombie 
category appeared to be unrealistic (Schinkel, 2009). If it is indeed true that irregular 
migration reveals the limits of controls and the relevance of individuals’ choices and 
actions, this cannot be linearly interpreted as the failure or the irrelevance of politics. 
Both the confined character of the phenomenon and the generally harsh conditions 
that irregular migrants experience indicate that the role of the state is far from 
marginal. Moreover, as will be shown, the hypothesis of states’ fierce antagonism 
towards irregular migration cannot be uncritically accepted, since state ambiguities 
have been widely documented. On the other hand, the tendency to detach the analysis 
from the structural contexts has frequently generated broad conceptualizations of 
irregular migration as a general and undifferentiated phenomenon. The empirical 
research, however, has consistently shown that irregular migration assumes different 
shapes and characteristics within the different contexts. Moreover, even within a 
single context, a change in the structural conditions has been shown to determine 
changes in the strategies enacted by migrants or even in their aspirations (Van 
Meeteren, 2010). These examples show that only a dynamic and interactive 
understanding of the relationship between structures and agency can offer an adequate 
framework to conceptualize irregular migration.  
 
C. Internal social constraints 
Finally, another important line of reasoning has emphasized how a variety of 
actions, decisions and initiatives taken by actors internal to the hosting society have 
concurred to the ineffectiveness of control policies and, therefore, to the irregular 
migration phenomenon. 
A number of scholars have focused on the ways in which the policies are actually 
implemented at the lowest levels of the administration (Ellermann, 2010; Jordan et al., 
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2003; Lahav & Guiraudon, 2006; Scott, 1998; Van Der Leun, 2003). Their researches 
have enquired into the activity of police officers, public service employees, social 
workers, healthcare and education workers, etc. Their analyses have generally 
revealed the existence of important margins of discretion in the application of written 
laws and of “a pluralistic and multi-layered system of actors who have their own 
deliberations and professional considerations” (Van Der Leun, 2003, p. 173). Many 
reasons have been proposed to explain this phenomenon. Van der Leun, writing on 
the behaviour of street-level bureaucrats vis-à-vis irregular migrants in the Dutch 
case, has evidenced five: A) the professional morale and degree of discretion (for 
instance, doctors may give priority to saving a life rather than to the application of a 
restrictive law); B) the degree of face-to-face contacts with clients (a more personal 
contact generally leads to higher degrees of lenience); C) the availability of 
alternatives on the market (in the sector of social housing and adult education for 
instance, irregular migrants can easily be referred to private landlords or to 
community centres); D) the costs (the higher the costs of the services provided will 
probably mean more restrictive decisions); E) the interference with other policies and 
duties (for instance, a police officer may have to prioritize arresting criminals rather 
than irregular migrants) (Van Der Leun, 2003). Jordan, Stråth and Triandafyllidou 
have shown how different organizational cultures may determine a different 
mediation between the top-down pressures from politics and the bottom-up pressures 
from migrants themselves, local employers and communities, and from non-
government organizations (Jordan et al., 2003). In a similar vein, Cornelius and Tsuda 
have stressed the importance of the national political culture in determining different 
efficiency standards in policy implementation (Cornelius & Tsuda, 2004). All these 
contribution have highlighted the importance of the local social context in 
determining the conditions and opportunities for irregular migration to exist. As stated 
by Van der Leun:  “the very reason that illegal immigrants can circumvent or bypass 
legal limits, is that loopholes come into existence when local actors have, at least 
partly, different considerations than proponents of full exclusion or restriction” (Van 
Der Leun, 2003, p. 174). 
Enquiring into the internal limitation to migration controls, another strand of 
research has focused on the different types of support that irregular migrants find 
within the host society. Considering what has been referred to as “the ecology of 
illegal residence” (Leerkes, 2009), two main types of support seem to be clearly 
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distinguishable. On the one hand, there are the services provided on a lucrative basis 
by what can be considered the internal counterpart of the migration industry. On the 
other hand, there are the services provided on a free basis by civil society institutions, 
NGOs, charity organizations, etc. In the first group, research has focused not only on 
the role of informal employers, as was discussed regarding the role of the informal 
economy, but also on a whole galaxy of actors that offer their services to irregular 
migrants in exchange for money. These include: fake document suppliers, housing 
providers, doctors, teachers, lawyers, bogus marriage arrangers, etc. Within this 
group, criminal networks may also play a part. As shown by Engbersen and his 
colleagues, when the other channels and opportunities are closed, irregular migrants 
may be forced to turn to criminality in order to find the means to survive (Broeders & 
Engbersen, 2007b; Engbersen, 2001; Engbersen & Broeders, 2009; Engbersen & Van 
Der Leun, 2001; Leerkes et al., 2012). Within the other group, research has likewise 
evidenced the existence of a great variety of actors and institution within the so-called 
civil society that help irregular migrants in many ways. Within these, some have been 
more concerned with offering material support like shelter, food, legal assistance, etc.; 
others have adopted a more political stance, focusing on helping irregular migrants to 
organize protests, present instances, claim their rights, etc. In this respect, however, it 
has been underlined that the attitudes towards irregular migration, and therefore the 
support, may sharply differ from one social context to the other. Not only may this be 
the case, but, as stressed by Düvell, within each society it is possible to find members 
that support, tolerate or ignore the irregulars. In this sense, one should consider that 
often “the moral of the community differs from the law” (Düvell, 2011a, p. 63). Both 
these types of support have concurred, though in different ways, to make the 
residence of irregular migrants possible in their hosting societies, especially where 
highly restrictive and excluding policies have been enacted.  
The discussion on the internal constraints to migration control has underlined 
how a number of factors determine a state’s impossibility to fully and thoroughly 
control all social transactions. This has been the result of both the difficulties and 
inconsistencies of policy implementation, and the independence and unconformity of 
many social actors from the legal and moral stances of states. For irregular migrants, 
this has transformed into a number of opportunities and sources to rely on, for making 
a living even within very restrictive contexts. The main contribution of these 
approaches to the theoretical understanding of irregular migration has been twofold. It 
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has evidenced the complex functioning of the political processes and the fragmented, 
multi-levelled character of the state. From this perspective, an adequate understanding 
of irregular migration requires going beyond a legalistic approach and demands for an 
analysis of the actual implementation of the laws. It has also emphasized the social 
character of the phenomenon, which implies that policies do not act within an empty 
space, but within a complex web of actors, institutions and interactions that display 
contrasting interests. The way in which the irregular migration phenomenon 
configures is not the straightforward result of policies, but, instead, of the interaction 
of them with the rest of society. The critical aspects of these arguments concern the 
extent to which they are used to sustain the idea of states’ diminished capacity to 
control migrations. Although both the main arguments presented certainly raise 
attention to the difficulties experienced by states in making their goals effective, this 
does not mean they are powerless or have lost control over their populations.  
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2.3. Irregular migration as choice of states 
The second group of theories that will be discussed departs from a reverse 
evaluation of policy efficacy and state capacity to control international migration. 
Policies are effective and states are really capable of governing migration fluxes and 
populations (Brochmann & Hammar, 1999; Caplan & Torpey, 2001; Freeman, 1995; 
Guiraudon & Lahav, 2000; Christian Joppke, 1998c). While this position was central, 
especially in Marxist interpretations of irregular migration since the 1970s, it re-
emerged with new strength in the second half of the 1990s to contrast the chorus of 
voices that had sentenced the state to death too early. Rather than losing control or 
being a zombie category, states have been perceived as successfully adapting to 
internal and external pressures through the development of new strategies and 
increasingly-effective control mechanisms. If irregular migration exists, this does not 
indicate a failure on the part of the state but, rather, an explicit or implicit choice in 
this direction. In this interpretation, the whole conceptualization of irregular migration 
radically shifts: the question is no longer why migration control fails but, why states 
decide to allow or not to allow certain levels of irregular migration. 
A variety of theoretical explanations and perspectives have emerged. Among 
these, it seems possible to identify two very different perspectives. The first has 
understood irregular migration as a by-product of the particular configuration and 
functioning of modern states. The focus has been placed on the analysis of the 
different functional imperatives of the state and on the ways these are fulfilled. The 
second group, instead, considering the state mainly as a broker, has concentrated on 
the different interests connected to irregular migration present in society and on the 
ways they are articulated to become relevant for politics. Irregular migration, from 
this point of view, is “produced” or “allowed” by the state, depending on the 
viewpoint, in order to respond to the ever-changing equilibrium among the different 
social demands. 
 
2.3.1. State imperatives and irregular migration  
The interest in the internal structures and functioning of states and in the way 
these have an influence on irregular migration has followed a number of different 
paths. In particular, there have been three main arguments proposed in literature. The 
first has centred on the analysis of the concept and functioning of sovereignty and has 
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found in this fundamental institution of modern states the main explanation of 
irregular migration. The second has directed its attention towards the relationship 
between the state and populations and the different techniques developed by the 
former in order to control the latter. The third has focused on the particular 
institutional configuration and functioning of liberal-democracies and has explained 
irregular migration in relation to the self-restraint of the state as regards control 
policies. 
    
A. State sovereignty and irregular migration 
The relation between sovereignty and control of populations has always been a 
central issue both in migration and political-theory literature. However, the topic 
received renewed interest in connection with the debates around globalization and the 
migration crisis of the 1990s.  
The works of Agamben have offered a particular interpretation of this relation that 
proved to be particularly influential in the subsequent decade (Biswas & Nair, 2009; 
Broeders, 2009; De Genova, 2002b, 2010; Ellermann, 2010; Schinkel, 2009, 2010). 
His starting point was precisely that of contesting the widespread idea that modern 
states had a naturally-granted and unproblematic authority to control their territories 
and populations. Rather than an intrinsic and inalienable property or a 
transcendentally-derived authority, Agamben sees sovereignty as a power that must 
always be reaffirmed and which is, then, always at risk (Agamben, 1998, 2003). 
Reflecting on the work of Carl Schmitt, who defined the sovereign as the actor “who 
decides on the exception” (Schmitt, 2008), Agamben identifies in the “state of 
exception” the fulcrum on which the whole structure of sovereignty, and thus of state 
power, is built. Accordingly, if sovereign power is the ability to establish what is 
exceptional to an order, sovereignty is the logic by which such an order comes into 
being (Biswas & Nair, 2009, p. 5). However, instead of understanding these concepts 
in an abstract, juridical perspective, Agamben argues that it is possible to observe the 
logic of sovereignty at work in multiple sites at any time. In his works, he has 
scrutinized history in search of paradigmatic cases of “states of exception”. In his 
view, the Nazi camps or the Guantanamo prison are perfect examples of the sovereign 
power deciding to suspend the common order in order to reaffirm its power. 
(Baldwin-Edwards, 2008; Balibar, 2010; Caplan & Torpey, 2001; Cornelius et al., 
1994; Torpey, 1998), 
	   94 
In Homo Sacer. Sovereign power and bare life, his attention focuses on the 
distinction made in ancient Greek between the concepts of zoe and bios. Though both 
terms generally mean life, the former refers to it as the basic, biologic, “bare” 
existence shared by all living creatures, while the latter refers to the politically- 
qualified, characteristic existence of a specific people within a certain order. For 
Agamben, the production of bios and its distinction from zoe is the “original activity 
of sovereignty”. Only the banning and the exclusion of zoe from the political 
community enables the distinction from bios and, therefore, justifies the existence of 
the sovereign. Yet, since the sovereign power is constituted by the exclusion of zoe, 
the complete alienation of this would eliminate the reason for being of such power. 
That is why zoe, in order for the sovereign power to hold its significance, must be 
included in the sovereign realm as excluded “bare life”. In this sense, “the banishment 
of bare life by sovereign power, which excludes it from all political life and denies it 
any juridical validity”, still implicates “a continuous relationship” (Agamben, 1998; 
De Genova, 2010, p. 37). The irregular migrant is the figure that best incarnates the 
concept of zoe as opposed to the one of bios, the citizen. He or she represents the 
“bare life” whose exclusion enables the existence of the citizen, and so legitimizes the 
role of the state. In the words of Agamben: “It is the exclusion of bare life on which 
the polis rests” (Agamben, 2002: 13). The detention centres for migrants are proof 
that “the camp” is not a historical anomaly, but the “hidden matrix of our time”, “the 
nomos of the political space in which we still live” (Agamben, 2002). If every migrant 
would in-mediately (hence, without mediation) become a citizen and hold the same 
rights as a citizen, the very power that “mediates” and gives meaning to the 
distinction would become powerless and, therefore, meaningless. The irregular 
migrant is then the fundamental antagonist of sovereignty but, at the same time and 
for the same reason, its most necessary counterpart.  
In a similar fashion, Schinkel has pointed out that “the so-called ‘problem of 
illegality’ is but one expression of a problem of self-maintenance of the 
society/nation-state dichotomy in times of globalization and system integration” 
(Schinkel, 2009, p. 790). In his view, the state, defied by the forces of globalization, 
and, in particular, by the declining relevance of space, is trying to redefine itself in 
order to survive. Recalling Agamben’s concept of the camp, Auge’s concept of non-
places and Foucault’s concept of heterotopia, he emphasizes precisely the spatial 
component of this redefinition. Through the incarceration of irregular migrants in 
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detention centres and their eventual expulsion, the state is able to reintroduce and re-
legitimize a distinction between inside and outside, which for most of the other social 
transactions has lost any value. Hence, the traditional concept of the nation-state is 
reaffirmed and, through it, “a consistent self-definition of the state in times of 
globalization is forged” (Schinkel, 2009, p. 792). Schinkel, nevertheless, raises a 
crucial question: will this treatment of the problem of irregular migration prove 
effective, in the long run, in providing the state with new raisons d’être? What 
remains clear is that “Nation-states will not easily allot cosmopolitan rights 
(Habermas, 1993; Linklater, 1998), post-national (Soysal, 1994) or global citizenship 
(Dower, 2000) to irregular migrants, since precisely the creation of universal 
citizenship would entail providing the normative dimension of universal human rights 
with a legal dimension that necessarily compromises the traditional notion of the 
state” (Schinkel, 2009, p. 800).  
The interdependence between the legal and the illegal, the regular and the 
irregular has been emphasized also in the works of Coutin. In her ethnography on 
Salvadorian irregular migrants, she has described their experience in terms of a 
permanent contradiction between presence and absence (Coutin, 2005a). Indeed, they 
are legally absent, since the authorities do not recognize them, yet, at the same time, 
they are physically present. In this sense, they perfectly embody Ngai’s concept of 
“impossible subjects” (Ngai, 2014). As pointed out by Coutin: “although they ‘cannot 
be’, migrants continue to occupy the physical space. Their bodies therefore become a 
sort of absent space or vacancy, surrounded by law. The vacancies created by illegal 
presence make it possible for jurisdictions to remain whole” (Coutin, 2005a, p. 199). 
While the most common approaches explain irregular migration as a result of 
ineffective and powerless law, this perspective suggests an opposite understanding. 
“The law is not a force that bars illegal entry and sojourn; rather it is a process that 
defines who and what is illegal” (Coutin, 1996, p. 11; Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012, p. 
31). In this sense, the construction of illegality is understood as a way for the state to 
establish and maintain the legal space against the illegal and “the regular nation”, 
against “the irregular people”. 
These analyses offer indubitably interesting theoretical and conceptual 
understandings of irregular migration. The structural relationship between sovereignty 
and the exception that is proposed by Agamben sheds light on a similar 
interdependence between the state and the irregular migrant. To be sovereign, the 
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state needs to decide on the exception, on what and who is inside or outside of the 
order that it creates. The irregular migrant is indeed the exception, the “bare life” 
against which the “political life” of the citizen acquires its significance. In this sense, 
her/his existence is vital to the existence of the very state. As put by Schinkel: “In the 
case of irregular migrants and their detention as ‘illegal aliens’ […] the state tries to 
preserve a precarious balance between inclusion and exclusion, between bios and zoe” 
(Schinkel, 2009, p. 787). Nevertheless, while these conceptualizations can be helpful 
to understand the logic of sovereignty and its relation to the irregular migrant in 
abstract terms, it offers little explanation of the phenomenon in its concrete, 
sociological terms. On the one hand, the characterization of the irregular migrant as 
“bare life” or as an “impossible subject” and hence, as a completely excluded and 
subjugated victim of the state, is not matched by reality. Irregular migrants in many 
cases have rights and lead relatively normal lives. On the other, these interpretations 
do not offer clues to why the phenomenon assumes different forms and dimension 
within each national context. 
 
B. Governmentality techniques and irregular migration 
An important strand of research, often inspired by the works of Michel Foucault, 
has interpreted irregular migration as a result of governmentality techniques enacted 
by states to better control their populations. From this perspective, the toleration of a 
certain degree of irregular migration, or the deliberate production of it by the state 
cannot be interpreted simply as a sovereignty imperative; instead, it needs to be 
considered as a “technology of power”, as a legal and political construct aimed at 
effectively disciplining and managing populations (see for instance: Broeders, 2009; 
Chauvin & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012; Chavez, 2007; Coutin, 2005; De Genova, 2002; 
Engbersen, 2001; Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012; Inda, 2006; Mezzadra, 2011; Morris, 
2002; Rose & Miller, 1992; Thomas & Galemba, 2013; Vasta, 2011). 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality suggested a new understanding of power, 
one that surpassed the classic, top-down, coercive conception of it (Foucault, 1979, 
2007, 2008). From his perspective, in order to be more effective, states have 
elaborated strategies to induce individuals to follow rules on the basis of their own 
will. This has been obtained through the development and use of a variety of new 
“technologies of power” that were meant to operate throughout the whole body of 
society. Schools, hospitals, psychiatric and penitentiary institutions, production sites 
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and markets were the new sites where the state enacted its programmes and applied its 
strategies. The emergence of these new forms of power signalled exactly the switch 
from government to governmentality. The aim was no longer that of correcting single 
individuals through coercion, but of governing and disciplining the population as a 
whole through the induction of appropriate mentalities.  
Within these new governmentality strategies, a crucial role was played by 
identification and surveillance technologies. In order for the modern states to apply 
their programmes, it was firstly necessary to build up administrative systems capable 
of identifying and classifying their populations. Yet, for Foucault, this step was not 
simply a functional requirement to accomplish other goals, but it was already a 
fundamental instrument of the new strategy. In Discipline and punish: the birth of the 
prison, he used Bentham’s Panopticon as a metaphor to describe the functioning of 
the surveillance technique. In the disciplinary institution imagined by the English 
philosopher, prisoners could be seen at all times by guards who were invisible to 
them. The idea of being permanently observed induced them to behave according to 
the rules without the necessity to directly coerce them into doing so. According to 
Foucault, the effect of the Panopticon was:  
“..to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that 
assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the 
surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; 
that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; 
that this architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a 
power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the 
inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves 
the bearers” (Foucault, 1979, p. 201). 
 
The extension of this strategy to the society as a whole was precisely the 
objective of the governmentality techniques:  
“on the whole, therefore, one can speak of the formation of a disciplinary society 
in this movement that stretches from the enclosed disciplines, a sort of social 
'quarantine', to an indefinitely generalizable mechanism of ‘panopticism’” 
(Foucault, 1979, p. 216). 
 
It is within the context of this conception of society as a disciplinary system that 
the Foucauldian perspective has been related to management of migrant populations. 
The creation of different categories of migrants, to which different rights, duties, and 
limitations are assigned, would be a perfect example of a governmentality technique 
(Chavez, 2007; Inda, 2006; Vasta, 2011). The necessity to pass though the different 
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categories and statuses before obtaining full citizenship would work as a “system of 
dams” (Mezzadra, 2011) that allows the selection of the appropriate candidates. The 
combination of this system of “civic stratification” (Morris, 2002) together with a 
powerful surveillance apparatus would induce migrants to enter a process of self-
discipline, enabling power to work without having to exercise it. Each migrant knows 
that he/she is being observed, that by following the rules and fulfilling the 
requirements would take them ahead, while any fault or misconduct would take them 
back. 
Within this system, the irregular migrant category plays a crucial role. 
Irregularity, rather than being a problem to be eliminated, has become for the state a 
fundamental component of the governmentality strategy. As put by Freise and 
Mezzadra:  
“Increasing mobility shapes the regimes of governmentality of the sovereign 
modern state and the ways in which power is distributed and enacted. Whereas 
historically state sovereignty was exercised through the control and surveillance 
of territory and subjects, governing no longer involves a delimited territory with 
spatially fixed and sedentary populations, but the control of highly mobile 
vagrant subjects and populations “menacing” the order and the security of states” 
(Friese & Mezzadra, 2010). 
 
Within this context: 
“The goal […] is not that of hermetically sealing off the borders of ‘rich 
countries’, but that of establishing a system of dams, of ultimately producing ‘an 
active process of inclusion of migrant labour through its illegalization’ (De 
Genova, 2002b, p. 439). This entails a process of differential inclusion (Mezzadra 
and Neilson 2010), in which irregularity emerges both as a produced condition 
and as a political stake in the politics of mobility” (Mezzadra, 2011, p. 229). 
 
In a similar fashion, Garcés-Mascareñas has emphasized how the conception of 
irregular migration as an independent phenomenon from state policies and 
programmes is misleading: 
“While immigrant flows are indeed motivated by the importance of the 
structurally embedded demand for foreign workers in different receiving societies 
and of cross-national economic disparities and transnational economic, social and 
historical ties, these factors alone do not explain why a significant part of these 
flows take place illegally. The option (or the opportunity) to migrate legally or 
illegally cannot be understood without taking into account the obvious facto of 
the state and its migration policies. This is not only because it is the state that 
defines who may or may not enter, but because the state itself produces the 
migrants’ illegality” (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012, p. 205). 
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From her perspective, more effective policies do not mean less irregular 
migration but more differentiated categories of migrants. In this sense, illegality does 
not function as an absolute marker of illegitimacy, but rather as a handicap within a 
continuum of “probatory citizenship” (Chauvin & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012). The 
goal is not to completely exclude migrants but to make their inclusion more difficult.  
The understanding of irregular migration as part of governmentality techniques 
employed by the state has evidenced another of its fundamental imperatives, i.e. that 
of managing populations. The role played by the law in establishing the conditions for 
formal inclusion and the related power to differentially (and conditionally) 
incorporate migrants into the host society certainly throws light on important aspects 
of the irregular migration phenomenon. In particular, they highlight the crucial role of 
the state in constructing the very category of the irregular migrant and the possible use 
of this power as part of its strategies to govern. However, these theories present a 
number of critical aspects. Whereas the status of irregularity is indubitably produced 
by the state and its creation may be in a way functional to the fulfilment of its 
interests, the phenomenon of irregularity, as regards its sociological dimensions, 
cannot be understood as a state product. The magnitude, characteristics and 
significance of irregular migration within a society can only be partly influenced by 
the state. In this sense, the concept of “production” is misleading, because it implies 
the producer’s mastery over the process and the results that does not exist in this case. 
The distinction between the legal and sociological significance of a phenomenon 
becomes crucial. Even if the illegalization (or legalization) of a certain phenomenon is 
in the hands of the state, the social consequences of this are not. In this regard, the 
discussed theories tend to offer an image of the state, or more in general, of power, as 
rational, coherent, almighty forces that is not matched by reality. A state’s action is 
fragmented, multi-levelled, sometimes contradictory and does not develop in a social 
void. Hence, the heterogeneity of forms, dimensions and characteristics that the 
irregular migration phenomenon displays in the different contexts in which it 
develops, can hardly be explained only as a governmentality strategy or as a technique 
of power. These power forces certainly exist and are employed by states but within a 
complex scenario of social actors and interactions.  
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C. Self-restraint of states and irregular migration  
As previously discussed, many scholars have interpreted irregular migration and 
the ineffectiveness of control policies as the result of a constraint over state capacities. 
This could be the result of external factors, as for instance, in the case of the effects of 
the international human rights regime, or of internal factors, as in the case of civil- 
society protests. Despite the different views on the causes of the constraints, these 
explanations have shared the idea of the state as a sort of “victim” or a passive 
recipient of them. In this section, the focus will move to the theories that have 
understood state limitations and, hence, phenomena such as irregular migration, not as 
the result of external restraints, but as the result of self-restraints. 
The work of scholars, like Hollifield, Joppke and Guiraudon has focused on those 
internal characteristics of the contemporary states, and in particular, of the liberal-
democratic ones, that determine a self-restraint in their ability to arbitrarily manage 
populations (Guiraudon, 2000; Guiraudon & Joppke, 2001; Guiraudon & Lahav, 
2000; Hollifield, 1992, 2000, 2004; Christian Joppke, 1998b, 1998c). For Hollifield, 
in order to fully comprehend the current difficulties of many states with regard to 
controlling migration, it is not enough to consider external economic, political or 
social factors. Instead, it is crucial to consider the role of endogenous political factors 
(Hollifield, 1992). In his analysis, the rise of rights-based politics in the US and 
Europe, after World War II, had a tremendous impact on state management of 
migration. This analysis did not underestimate the existence of a variety of influential 
actors and institutions demanding for more liberal policies towards migration, but 
argued that the extent and the ways in which their influence was possible depended on 
the inner structure and functioning of states. In liberal-democracies in particular, 
features such as constitutional charters, division of powers, judicial review of laws, 
and democratic representation were pinpointed as determinants in limiting the 
restrictive capacity of the system and in guaranteeing basic rights to everyone. The 
crucial point of the argument is that these features must not be considered as external 
and thus, somehow, as antagonists of the state. On the contrary, they should be 
considered as internal and thus consistent with the state’s purpose. In this regard, 
Joppke has clearly stated:  
“..constitutional politics better explain the generosity and expansiveness of 
Western states towards immigrants than the vague reference to a global economy 
and an international human rights regime. The sovereignty of states regarding 
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immigration control is more internally than externally restricted” (Christian 
Joppke, 1998b, p. 20).  
 
In a similar fashion, Guriaudon and Lahav have underlined:  
“Rather than global processes constraining domestic action, what we observe in 
the case of aliens’ rights is a legally driven process of self-limited sovereignty. 
[…] This means that the state has self-limited its capacity to dispose of aliens at 
will, once they have been admitted” (Guiraudon & Lahav, 2000, p. 189). 
 
These analyses have offered another plausible explanation for the development of 
irregular migration. The phenomenon would appear not to be the result of states’ 
failure or incapacity, but rather of states’ application of rights-based liberalism. This 
form of self-restraint would seem to have severely limited the capacity of states to 
effectively deal with irregular migrants. For instance, practices, such as, mass 
expulsions, random identity checks or unjustified detention, just to mention the most 
important, that had been common features of migrant management, have become 
increasingly problematic. In addition, the existence of rights charters applicable to 
everyone and not just to citizens, and of an independent judiciary system has 
substantially empowered irregular migrants vis-à-vis states, allowing them to contest 
and, therefore, circumvent or delay the effects of their decisions and actions. 
Two main critical considerations may be made about this claim. On the one hand, 
as shown for instance by Garcés-Mascareñas, also in non-democratic, non-liberal 
countries, where states have fewer limits to their restrictive capacities, irregular 
migration can be a sizable phenomenon (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012). This fact 
evidences that, while internal political factors may certainly condition and make its 
development more difficult, irregular migration cannot be solely explained on the 
basis of these limits them. In this respect, one may say that there are aspects of this 
phenomenon that escape political control (be they authoritarian or liberal), that exceed 
its capacities, and which are beyond its reach. On the other hand, this explanation 
seems to rely on the supposition that states are resolute in their opposition to irregular 
migration but that their internal functioning limits this determination. Many of the 
theories previously discussed have shown that this idea should at least be nuanced by 
considering that states may be interested in allowing certain levels of irregular 
migration. 	  
 
 
	   102 
2.3.2. States and social demands 
An important set of theoretical explanations of irregular migration has departed 
from a very different concept of the role of states. Also in these approaches, it is the 
state that chooses to allow a certain level of irregular migration. The difference is that 
this choice does not respond to the state’s own interests or imperatives, but to the 
demands coming from society.  
 
A. Economic interests and irregular migration 
The explanation of irregular migration as a state product to fulfil the demands 
coming from the economic system has encountered enormous success in literature. 
The hypothesis is that “irregular migration serves to create and sustain a legally 
vulnerable, thus tractable and cheap, reserve of labour” (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012, p. 
29). This position has been developed in an impressive number of variants (Bach, 
1978; Calavita, 1992; Castles, 2004; Castles & Kosack, 1973; Chavez, 1991, 2007; 
Cornelius & Rosenblum, 2005, 2005; Coutin, 2005a; De Genova, 2002b, 2004, 2010; 
Goldring & Landolt, 2011; Köppe, 2003; Mezzadra, 2011; Piore, 1980; Portes, 1978; 
Portes & Bach, 1985; Samers, 2004; Sassen, 1988, 1996, 1998b). Among these, it is 
possible to recognize different degrees of radicalism in the interpretation of the role of 
the state. Some accounts describe the state as a sort of puppet of capital; others offer a 
more nuanced view. Given the extent of this literature, the following discussion will 
be limited to a number of representative interpretations. 
Marxist and segmented labour market theories provided a first interpretation that 
pictured states’ ambiguity towards irregular migration as a strategy to meet the 
demand for cheap labour in industrialized countries (Bach, 1978; Castles & Kosack, 
1973; Piore, 1980; Portes, 1978). In this view, the deep transformations that affected 
industrial economies during the 1960s and 1970s shaped a process of increasing 
segmentation of the labour markets. While native-workers, attracted by high-skilled, 
well-paid jobs, filled the upper part of the market, the lower part, consisting of 
precarious, unskilled and low-paid jobs, faced endemic shortages. States, then, 
combining labour and migration policies, were able to provide a stream of irregular 
foreign-workers. Their precarious status signified a flexibility and exploitability that 
was functional to the demands of the market. 
Sassen has argued that deregulation and other policies furthering economic 
globalization cannot simply be considered as an instance of a declining significance of 
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the state. On the contrary, deregulation and flexibilization must be considered as 
channels through which a growing number of states are furthering economic 
globalization and guaranteeing the right to global capital. Within this context, they 
continue to play a crucial role in the production of legality around new forms of 
economic activity. Moreover, with regard to the workforce, states are still decisive in 
generating the conditions for it to be available in the places, numbers and conditions 
required by producers. In this regard, the management of migration as a tool to 
differentially and conditionally include foreign workers, has become fundamental. 
This strategy is no longer simply a way to provide a “reserve army to overcome the 
periodical crisis of capitalism” (Castles & Kosack, 1973; Sassen, 1988); in fact, it has 
become a permanent structural mechanism within the new configuration of 
capitalism. These dynamic forces are particularly visible in global cities where, not 
just by chance, a “great concentration of corporate power and large concentration of 
‘others’” are discernible (Sassen, 1998b). In a similar vein, Schierup, Hansen and 
Castles have underlined that: 	   
“Socially marginal migrants is not an imported phenomenon but rather ‘part and 
parcel’ of advanced capitalist strategies of deregulation, for the enhancement of 
‘flexibility’ in terms of a networked economy and society, and a fragmented 
labour market” (Schierup et al., 2006, p. 299). 
 
Departing from an analysis of historical and contemporary migration from 
Mexico to the Unites States, the works of De Genova, have argued against the 
tendency to “naturalize” migrants’ “illegality” (De Genova, 2002b, 2004, 2009, 
2010), to treat it “as a mere fact of life, the presumably transparent consequence of 
unauthorized border crossing or some other violation of immigration law” (De 
Genova, 2004, p. 161). In his perspective: 
“..migrant ‘illegality’ signals a specifically spatialized socio-political condition. 
‘Illegality’ is lived through a palpable sense of deportability – the possibility of 
deportation, which is to say, the possibility of being removed from the space of 
the US nation-state. The legal production of “illegality” provides an apparatus for 
sustaining Mexican migrants’ vulnerability and tractability – as workers – whose 
labour-power, inasmuch as it is deportable, becomes an eminently disposable 
commodity. Deportability is decisive in the legal production of Mexican/migrant 
‘illegality’ and the militarized policing of the US-Mexico border, however, only 
insofar as some are deported in order that most may ultimately remain (un-
deported) – as workers, whose particular migrant status has been rendered 
‘illegal’” (De Genova, 2004, p. 161). 
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The idea of a legal production of irregular migration on the part of states, which 
was previously discussed as part of a governmentality strategy, acquires here a more 
economic orientation. Migrants’ vulnerability and tractability are created to provide 
the economic system with the docile and exploitable workforce it needs.  
The main strength of these approaches has been to reveal the economic relevance 
of irregular migration in many contexts and to enquire into the political consequences 
of this. States, in these accounts, have been benevolent in according policies with the 
effect of generating important fluxes of irregular migrants, the kind of unskilled, 
flexible and exploitable workforce demanded by employers. While the question rose, 
namely the nexus between economy, politics and migration, is of great importance, 
the conclusion that states produce irregular migration to satisfy the demands of capital 
appears problematic. Firstly, this hypothesis does not explain why certain states are 
more resolute and efficient in fighting irregular migration than others (unless we think 
that in the first states capitalists have a higher morale), or why some decide to 
periodically regularize large numbers of migrants. More in general, it fails to account 
for the very differentiated picture of control policies and irregular migration realities, 
worldwide. Secondly, it presupposes that if states were not lenient to economic 
interests, they would be able to completely control irregular migration and this is quite 
unrealistic. Thirdly, it tends to downplay the existence of other interests, including 
those of the states themselves, which affect the formulation of policies. In this sense, 
the idea of the state as a weapon of capital is not convincing. 
	  
B. The state as a broker of social demands: pragmatic solutions, symbolic 
policies 
While the theories presented in the previous section relied on the hypothesis of 
the state being sensitive almost exclusively to economic interests, here we will focus 
on the approaches that understand the state as a broker between a much wider set of 
social actors and interests. From this perspective, the magnitude and treatment of 
irregular migration within a certain context can be understood as the result of the 
pragmatic and, not always, transparent balances found by states between the different 
social demands and instances. 
A very influential version of this interpretation has been proposed in the works of 
Freeman (Freeman, 1994, 1995, 2004, 2006). His political-economy model of policy- 
making aimed at explaining why in liberal-democracies, notwithstanding the 
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widespread restrictionist rhetoric against migrations, the actual policies had been 
“broadly expansionist and inclusive” (Freeman, 1995). While the analysis 
acknowledged important differences within the analysed countries, basically related to 
the timing of their first experience of mass immigration and the extent to which 
migration policies are institutionalized, Freeman argued that the common tendency to 
expansive migration policies could be explained by the liberal and democratic 
characteristics of their political systems. The particular functioning of these systems 
implies that policies are the result of the interaction among three main players: a) 
individual voters; b) organized groups; c) state actors. Nevertheless, when it comes to 
migration policies, what is Freeman’s main argument is that the organized public 
dominates the bargaining. This is because immigration tends to produce concentrated 
benefits and diffuse costs, giving those who benefit from immigration greater 
incentives to organize than people who bear its costs. Hence, in this case, those who 
benefit, for instance, employers in labour-intensive industries and dependent on an 
unskilled workforce, businesses that profit from population growth (real estate, 
construction, etc.), and the family and ethnic relations of immigrants, have many more 
resources and capacities to make their voices heard than those who may be negatively 
affected by migration, namely the populations competing with immigrants for scarce 
jobs, housing, schools and government services. Since state actors are assumed to be 
vote-maximizers, they will respond to the organized pressure of groups favourable 
towards immigration, ignoring the widespread, but poorly articulated, opposition of 
the general public. The interactions will take place largely out of public view and with 
little outside interference. For these reasons, Freeman concludes that “[t]he typical 
mode of immigration politics is client politics” and client politics is strongly oriented 
towards expansive immigration policies. If this seems to be the general, long-term 
tendency, however, the politics of immigration in liberal democracies fluctuates and 
exhibits a tendency to go through predictable cycles. There is a 'good times/bad times' 
movement, in which migration is tolerated or encouraged during expansionary phases, 
but becomes the focus of anxieties when unemployment rises. While, in his works, 
Freeman has not explicitly intended irregular migration as a pragmatic solution to the 
conflict between the expansionary bias supported by organized groups, and the 
restrictive one supported at times by right-wing parties or portions of the public 
opinion, the idea has been undoubtedly suggested. For instance, in the conclusions of 
his article Can Liberal States control Unwanted Migration?, talking about how states 
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deal with migration problems, he affirms that “states allow migration problems to 
accumulate and migration control policies to flounder until rising public pressure or 
some crisis makes action unavoidable” (Freeman, 1994, p. 30).  
Zolberg has proposed the formula “wanted but not welcome” (Zolberg, 2000) to 
describe the existing tension in the majority of receiving societies:  
“..between two sets of concerns, represented as orthogonally related axes - the 
one representing economic interests, the other cultural and social interests, with a 
focus on ‘identity’. Although migrants are highly prized on economic grounds, 
the massive internal migration or outright immigration of culturally distinct 
labour-market competitors triggers considerable uneasiness among the receivers 
on ‘identitarian grounds’. […] Because indigenous workers seldom have the 
power to prevent the immigration, it does take place; but the foreign workers are 
usually maintained in a state of segregation by way of an internal boundary. This 
facilitates their economic exploitation while minimizing their cultural impact 
(Zolberg, 2006, p. 225). 
 
The internal boundary to which Zolberg refers has historically acquired many 
different forms and degrees of impermeability. During the colonial era, for instance, 
this was constructed on racial grounds and put into effect in the slavery system. In 
contemporary societies, the internal boundaries are constructed in more subtle ways 
through the use of citizenship and identity policies. The case of irregular migration is 
precisely one where wanted migrants are kept from crossing the boundary on political 
bases. 
The necessity on the part of states to reconcile the contrasting demands from 
society and the resort to pragmatic, often contradictory, solutions has led scholars to 
propose concepts such as “non-policy as a policy” or “symbolic policies” (Andreas, 
1998; Broeders & Engbersen, 2007b; Castles, 2004; Castles & Miller, 1993; 
Cornelius, 2005a; Cornelius & Rosenblum, 2005; De Genova, 2004; Guiraudon & 
Joppke, 2001; McNevin, 2009; Schrover et al., 2008; Triandafyllidou, 2012). From 
this perspective, the combination of restrictive rhetoric and highly visible, but largely 
ineffective, policies is a pragmatic solution that allows states to show toughness and 
resolution against irregular migration without defrauding employers. 
Cornelius, discussing the United States’ migration policy, has spoken of a  
“manufactured” illegality. In his analysis, this results from a highly contradictory 
policy that combines border enforcing and legal-entry restrictions with weak internal 
controls. This “supply-side only” strategy cannot work. The “unrealistically low 
quotas for low-skilled foreign workers, quotas that are set so low for political rather 
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than market-based reasons” (Cornelius, 2005b, p. 789) implies a huge demand for 
irregular migrants. The enormous investments made by the government to reinforce 
the southern frontier, can only be interpreted as part of the “political calculus that 
heavy-handed, highly visible border enforcement remains useful in convincing the 
general public that politicians have not lost control over immigration” (Cornelius, 
2005b, p. 789). 
Castles has explained the contradictions and apparent malfunctioning of 
migration policies, as the result of governments’ difficulties in openly favouring one 
interest group and ignoring another. Therefore, a possible solution is the adoption of 
hidden agendas, i.e. “policies which purport to follow certain objectives, while 
actually doing the opposite”. In particular, this regards migration policies, whose aim 
would be “to provide anti-immigration rhetoric while actually pursuing polices that 
lead to more immigration” (Castles, 2004, p. 214). Accordingly, Castles has 
underlined why it is important to consider that the declared objectives of states are 
often misleading, for instance, precisely regarding irregular migration: 
“Policies that claim to exclude undocumented workers may often really be about 
allowing them in through side doors and back doors, so that they can be more 
readily exploited. This, in turn, could be seen as an attempt to create a 
transnational working class, stratified not only by skill and ethnicity, but also by 
legal status” (Castles, 2004, p. 223). 
 
More recently, he has suggested that the contrast to irregular migration is a 
consensus instrument, vis-à-vis a tacit permissiveness (Castles, 2010a).  
One of the strongest indications of the fictional character of the control efforts 
made by states has been found in their focalization on border controls. De Genova has 
spoken of the “border spectacle”: “the spectacle of the enforcement of law at the 
border renders the racialized Mexican/migrant “illegality” visible, a “natural fact”, 
whereas hides the production of that illegality” (De Genova, 2004, p. 177). 
Triandafyllidou has pointed out how fencing policies on their own, used without gate-
keeping policies, are not effective but only spectacular (Triandafyllidou, 2010a, 
2010b). Moreover, as shown by many scholars, while governments spend millions 
trying to stop irregular migrants from crossing their borders, the vast majority of them 
enter the countries legally with visas issued by the countries themselves (Finotelli, 
2009; Finotelli & Sciortino, 2013; Morawska, 2001; Schrover et al., 2008; Sciortino, 
2004a). To assess the effective functioning of control policies it is, therefore, 
necessary to look beyond the façade. As highlighted by Finotelli, the use of different 
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control policies that may produce “unwanted” phenomena, such as, irregular 
migration, circulatory migration systems or the misuse of refugee policy, can be in 
effect a way for states “to handle the paradox between state control, market demands 
and the embedded liberalism of modern nation states” (Finotelli, 2009, p. 899). 
The analysis of the different interests and social demands related to migration in 
each context to which states respond with particular pragmatic solutions, has led to 
questioning the idea of migration management as an undifferentiated practice 
worldwide. In fact, to get a better understanding of phenomena like irregular 
migration, it is necessary to consider: the social and political contexts within which 
they emerge (Finotelli, 2006, 2009), the different implementation cultures (Jordan et 
al., 2003), the relevance of the welfare provisions offered by states (Bommes & 
Geddes, 2000b; Bommes & Sciortino, 2011a; Castles, 2004; Esping-Andersen, 1990; 
Schierup et al., 2006; Sciortino, 2004b; Williams & Windebank, 1998), the existence 
of certain administrative traditions or path-dependent processes (Faist, Gerdes, & 
Rieple, 2004; Finotelli, 2006; Finotelli & Echeverría, 2011; Van Der Leun, 2003). 
The two main strengths of the theoretical approaches discussed in this section 
have been: a) to present a much more complex view of the interests and actors related 
to migration in society; b) to offer a differentiated picture of states’ possible reactions 
to the social demands that may include pragmatic solutions, such as, the use of 
symbolic policies. Hence, the explanation of irregular migration becomes less 
straightforward than in other accounts and demands for a detailed analysis of the 
contexts and combinations of policies enacted by states. This approach opens up the 
path to a differentiated understanding of irregular migration, one that considers the 
diverse forms and dimensions the phenomenon acquires in each context, as well as the 
different relevance and significance it assumes. The critical points concern two 
aspects. On the one hand, there is a tendency in these perspectives to downplay states’ 
own interests and picture them as more or less neutral brokers of the social interests. 
This tends to exclude the importance of the functional imperatives, such as, 
sovereignty or the control of populations, but also that of the administrative structures 
and of the different powers within the state. On the other, concepts like hidden 
agendas, symbolic policies or pragmatic solutions, at least in certain interpretations, 
seem to overstate both state capacity and rationality in governing migrations. 
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2.4. Critical discussion of the main theoretical explanations of 
irregular migration 
The different works and approaches that have been analysed in this chapter have 
offered a wide number of different theoretical explanations of irregular migration. 
Each of them has added an important piece to the complex puzzle represented by 
contemporary migrations and, in particular, by the phenomenon of our concern. 
Nevertheless, each of them has also presented elements of criticism. In Table No. 3, 
all the approaches discussed, their logic, and the possible counterarguments, are 
summarized. 
The conjunct analysis of these theories raises a striking problem. While, on their 
own, they provide persuasive elements to explain irregular migration, viewed together 
their claims are not always compatible and, in certain cases, are simply irreconcilable. 
Just to make one example, how can irregular migration be the result of a state strategy 
to control its population and, at the same time, the evidence that it has lost precisely 
that power? The problem, as many scholars have indicated, derives from a lack of 
theoretical ambition that has led to the production of case-specific, narrowly focused, 
unsystematic, hard to generalize explanations (Baldwin-Edwards, 2008; Bommes, 
2012b; Bommes & Sciortino, 2011a; Cvajner & Sciortino, 2010b). This has made the 
coexistence of contrasting hypotheses possible without the need to try to reconcile 
them. Therefore, we have reached the paradoxical situation of possessing a great 
number of theoretical explanations, each of which is able to illuminate a particular 
aspect of the phenomenon, but we lack a comprehensive theory capable of reconciling 
the many explanations and of offering a general interpretation. 
In this final section, an extensive discussion of the main critical aspects of the 
discussed theoretical explanations will be presented. This will lay the basis for the 
discussion of an alternative theoretical framework in the third chapter. 
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Table No.3 – Theoretical explanations of irregular migration  
Explanation logic: irregular migration as the result of… Counterarguments 
STATE 
FAILURE 
Inherent 
limitations 
and 
weaknesses 
of states 
Policy design 
• Knowledge production, policy 
design, predictive capacity 
limitations 
• States can be effective. If 
they are not it is because 
they do not want to. 
• Irregular migration is not 
only a function of 
policies; other factors… 
Policy 
implementation 
• Administrative, organizational 
and financial limitations 
External 
constraints 
and 
limitations  
Economic 
Globalization 
• The overwhelming force of the 
global economy  
• States have favoured 
Globalization and its 
dynamics. Irregular 
migration is not a sign of 
their decline but of their 
choices. 
• States have the power to 
control; if they do not, 
this indicates possible 
collusions and self 
interests.  
• Why do some countries 
control better than 
others? 
Political 
Globalization 
• The role of: embedded 
liberalism; international legal 
and human rights’ regimes; 
international institutions 
Social  
Globalization  
• Communications and transport 
technologies; information 
exchanges and cultural 
unification; transnational 
networks 
Migration 
Industry 
(External part) 
• The activity of informal and 
criminal networks; human 
smuggling and human 
trafficking 
• Why differences between 
states? 
• Why variation in the 
dynamics over time? 
Internal 
constraints 
and 
limitations 
The informal 
economy 
• Informal employment in many 
production sectors 
• The states do not want to 
control the informal 
economy. 
• No lineal relation 
informal economy – 
irregularity, the US case. 
• Informal economy before 
irregular migration 
Migrants’ 
agency 
• Individual strategies and 
counterstrategies to circumvent 
controls 
• Risk of overstating 
migrants’ power and 
downplaying the role of 
structures 
• Why aspirations change? 
Internal social 
constraints 
• Street-level bureaucrats and 
other agents’ discretionality 
• The role of civil society 
• Migration Industry (internal) 
• Policies are often 
effective. 
• Differences between 
countries. 
STATE 
CHOICE 
Internal 
political 
factors 
Sovereignty 
imperatives  
• State strategy to build its 
legitimacy and maintain 
sovereignty 
• Irregular migrants are 
not completely excluded. 
Sometimes they find it 
convenient to be 
irregular.  
• No differentiation. 
Governmentalit
y techniques 
• State strategy to control 
population 
State self-
restraint and 
rights-based 
liberalism 
• State self-constrained capacity 
to control populations 
• Irregular migration also 
exists in authoritarian 
states 
• Irregular migration could 
be useful to states. 
The state 
and social 
demands 
The state and 
capital 
• States produce irregular 
migrants to fulfil the demand of 
the labour market 
• States are not omnipotent  
• Why do some states 
regularize? 
• No differentiation 
The state as a 
broker between 
different social 
demands 
• Irregular migration as a 
pragmatic solution 
• Controls as symbolic policies 
• States’ own interests 
downplayed 
• States’ capacities and 
rationality overstated 
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2.4.1. Irregular migration as an undifferentiated, mono-causal phenomenon 
Within the discussion of the single theoretical explanations of irregular migration, 
a number of critical aspects and possible counterarguments were raised, but here we 
will focus on two main, wide-reaching problems that somehow drawn from all the 
others.  
Firstly, there has been a general tendency to theoretically treat irregular migration 
as an undifferentiated phenomenon. This has led to underestimating the several, 
important differences the phenomenon has displayed in the various contexts in which 
it appeared, for instance, regarding its magnitude, characteristics, implications, etc. 
Yet, and more problematically, it has led to miscalculating the different causes at 
work in each circumstance. The main consequence has been the incautious extension 
of the explicative logic that emerged for a specific case to other cases, or to “irregular 
migration” as an abstract concept. This problem, it was suggested, may have been 
related to a limited interchange between the empirical and the theoretical research on 
the field (Czaika & de Haas, 2011). While, since the 1990s, and especially down 
through the 2000s, a number of comparative analyses on irregular migration have 
increasingly evidenced the above-mentioned differentiated picture, their results rarely 
stimulated attempts to reconcile their implications and to produce a general theory. 
Secondly, there has been a general inclination to offer mono-causal explanations. 
Not only was irregular migration explained as if it was the same phenomenon 
everywhere, but it was also described as if its causes could be reduced to one. 
Therefore, it was explained, for instance, as: the last bastion of sovereignty, a 
consequence of the informal economy, a by-product of Globalization, related to 
states’ self-restraint, or the result of migrants’ agency, just to mention a few. This 
tendency materialized in a paradigmatic manner in the dichotomy between the two 
main, broad, competing mono-causal explanations: that it was either the result of state 
failure or the result of state choices. Moreover, this approach has created the 
conditions for a limited debate about the different perspectives. If the dominant logic 
is the “either/or” one, the possibility for the “both/and” one is excluded.  
These two problems can be related to a number of more specific and complex 
epistemological, conceptual and methodological ones. We will now discuss some 
important critiques that have been advanced in the study of contemporary migrations 
more in general and that are significantly pertinent to our discussion.  
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2.4.2. Epistemological problems and reductionisms 
The difficulties and contradictions that affect the interpretation of contemporary 
international migrations, which have become patent in our review, are probably an 
appendix to a more general difficulty in comprehending the epochal changes related 
to the so-called globalization. While these changes and the uncertainty they entail 
may be causing social concern, at least scientifically, they have favoured very 
interesting debates and critical analyses. In general, it may be stated that there has 
been a rising awareness of the complex challenges and questions posed by our time 
and of the necessity to improve our understanding. Many of these works offer 
important contributions to our discussion. 
 
A. The double-edged heritage of methodological nationalism 
While the concept of “methodological nationalism” had been used before (Smith, 
1983), it was successfully re-proposed within the globalization debate. Its success was 
probably related to the fact that it condensed into one concept the main critiques that 
had been moved to the so-called “mainstream literature”. Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 
defined it as “the assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural social and 
political form of the modern world” (Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2002, p. 302). For 
many scholars, this assumption was one of the most important limitations to an 
adequate understanding of contemporary migrations (see, for instance: Beck, 2003; 
Friese & Mezzadra, 2010; Isin, 2009; Mezzadra, 2011; Schinkel, 2010; Wimmer & 
Glick-Schiller, 2002, 2003). Their criticisms demanded for an epistemological, 
conceptual and methodological turn within migration research, one that reconsidered 
the role of the state vis-à-vis that of other actors and, in particular, of migrants 
themselves.  
Wimmer and Glick-Schiller identified three main variants of methodological 
nationalism: 
“1) Ignoring or disregarding the fundamental importance of nationalism for 
modern societies; this is often combined with 2) naturalization, i.e., taking for 
granted that the boundaries of the nation-state delimit and define the unit of 
analysis; 3) territorial limitation which confines the study of social processes to 
the political and geographic boundaries of a particular nation-state. The three 
variants may intersect and mutually reinforce each other, forming a coherent 
epistemic structure, a self-reinforcing way of looking at and describing the social 
world” (Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2003, pp. 577–578). 
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In the works of Beck, the concept has been further developed. He indicated seven 
main principles:  
“(a) The subordination of society to state, which implies b) that there is no 
singular, but only the plural of societies, and (c) a territorial notion of societies 
with state-constructed boundaries, i.e., the territorial state as a container of 
society. (d) There is a circular determination between state and society: the 
territorial nation-state is both the creator and guarantor of the individual 
citizenship rights and citizens organize themselves to influence and legitimate 
state actions. (e) Both states and societies are imagined and located within the 
dichotomy of national and international, which so far has been the foundation of 
the dominant ontology of politics and political theory. (f) The state as the 
guarantor of the social order provides the instrument and units for the collection 
of statistics about social and economic processes required by empirical social 
science. The categories of the state census are the main operational categories of 
empirical social science. […] (g) In membership and statistical representation, 
methodological national operates on the either-or principle, excluding the 
possibility of both-and. But these oppositions – either “us” or “them”, either “in” 
or “out” – do not capture the reality of blurring boundaries between political, 
moral and social communities…” (Beck, 2003, pp. 454–455) 
 
This perspective had the merit of questioning many well-established assumptions 
and of revealing the importance of phenomena, such as, transnationalism, migrants’ 
activism or the emergence of new forms of citizenship. In particular, regarding the 
first aspect, the critique of methodological nationalism demanded for a return to the 
concept of society as the main conceptual tool for interpreting human relations. The 
state and the inventory of correlated concepts, such as, national population, national 
territory, sovereignty, citizenship must be considered as particular, historical 
constructs that permanently interact with others and constantly change. 
As Wimmer and Glick-Schiller warned, however, an unbalanced criticism of 
methodological nationalism could entail its own risks: 
“..many who have attempted to escape the Charybdis of methodological 
nationalism are drifting towards the Scylla of methodological fluidism. It makes 
just as little sense to portray the immigrant as the marginal exception than it does 
to celebrate the transnational life of migrants as the prototype of human condition 
(Urry, 2000; Papastergiadis, 2000). Moreover, while it is important to push aside 
the blinders of methodological nationalism, it is just as important to remember 
the continued potency of nationalism” (Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2003, p. 600). 
 
This note of caution directly echoes back to our discussion of the already-
mentioned problem of mono-causal explanations for irregular migration. While the 
critique of methodological nationalism has been crucial for revealing both state 
limitations and the key role of other actors at different levels, such as, migrants, 
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global capitalism or international institutions, in many cases, this has led to a 
premature dismissal of any state relevance. 
 
B. Reductionisms: the state and society 
As social sciences “originated in a “culture medium”, politically and culturally 
framed by the nation state”, this has determined a number of reductionist problems 
(Castles, 2010b). By this, what is meant is a tendency to analyse complex phenomena 
with simple, sometimes prejudicial, frameworks (Boswell, 2007).  
A number of scholars, with arguments that often echo those opposing 
methodological nationalism, have further criticized the dominant conception of the 
state-society relation. Bommes has discussed the idea of the state as a “control unit of 
society” (Bommes, 2012b, p. 166). For him, recalling the works of Luhmann, this 
idea entails a “limited concept of social structure” (Bommes, 2012b, p. 20) that 
derives from the self-description of the state. He proposed considering nation-states, 
not as superposed, all-embracing containers of society, but as internal components of 
them. From this perspective, the analysis of irregular migration must, on the one hand, 
consider different capacities on the part of states, and on the other, their interaction 
with other actors within society. 
“Illegal migrations confront states with problems which draw attention to the 
necessities, possibilities and limitations of their migration policy.. […]. Nation-
states cannot renounce their right to control access to and residence in their 
territories. This right is implemented very differently in different states” 
(Bommes, 2012b, p. 166).  
 
In certain societies, “the intervention of the state is wide-ranging and penetrates 
numerous areas of society” (Bommes, 2012b, p. 166), while  in others, it is lighter and 
more limited. 
Hayman and Smart have warned against confusing “the legal” state and the 
“empirical” one (Heyman & Smart, 1999). While the former, the one envisaged in 
laws and in ideologies, denotes a solid, coherent, stable and socially-undisputed idea 
of it, the latter, the one emergent from reality, suggests a fragmented, complex, 
dynamic, wrangled actuality of it. In their analysis, it is precisely “illegal practices” 
that offer a privileged angle to disentangle the state-society equation and consider the 
relation as processual and conflictive.  
Broeders signalled a tendency to fully believe, even within social sciences, in 
clichés constructed from a statist perspective (Broeders, 2009). For instance, powerful 
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ideas, such as that of fortress or panopticon can be misleading, if not critically 
analysed. They “draw our attention to the power of the state and the enormous 
capacity it has built up in the ‘fight against illegal immigration’” (Broeders, 2009, p. 
37) but they may suggest that this power has become overwhelming or undisputed. 
While these ideas may well fulfil a social or political function or offer a clear, neat 
representation of social interactions, they may represent a problem for social sciences. 
Talking about surveillance and citing Bennett, Broeders pointed out: 
“Surveillance is, therefore, highly contingent. If social scientists are to get beyond 
totalizing metaphors and broad abstractions, it is absolutely necessary to 
understand these contingencies. Social and individual risk is governed by a 
complicated set of organizational, cultural, technological, political and legal 
factors” (Bennett, 2005, p. 133). 
 
Then he concludes by stating that, “This points to realities both inside and outside 
the power container of the state that are at odds with metaphoric clarity and lack of 
ambiguity” (Broeders, 2009, p. 37). 
Another source of reductionism has regarded the internal conception of states. 
Many scholars have criticized the understanding of states as monolithic, coherent, and 
thoroughly rational actors (Boswell, 2007; Leerkes, 2009; Mezzadra, 2011; Van Der 
Leun, 2003). As expressed by Leerkes: 
“The state is not a monolithic whole either. Conflicts and different approaches 
and interests may emerge. There is a territorial division: municipal, provincial. 
national governments and supra-national level (EU). There is power division: 
executive, judicial, legislative powers” (Leerkes, 2009, p. 29). 
 
Boswell has detected two main tendencies, both problematic, in current accounts 
of state functioning as regards migration management. In the first, states have been 
characterized essentially as brokers of the different social interests. “The state is 
assumed as passively reacting to different interests. Its role is confined to that of 
finding a utility-maximizing compromise between organized interests” (Boswell, 
2007, p. 79). In the second, states have been characterized as externally constrained in 
their ability to decide by: the other social actors, the liberal institution or the 
international society. From Boswell’s perspective, both these tendencies lack “some 
understanding of the state’s interests” and, in her opinion, the analysis of: 
“..its functional imperatives, must remain central to any political theory, 
especially one aiming to explain why under which conditions the state is 
constrained by liberal institutions. The state must remain central, since it 
continues to be the focus of expectation concerning the delivery of security, 
justice and prosperity” (Boswell, 2007, p. 88). 
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She proposes four main, broad functional imperatives that characterize every 
state, in particular, they have to: a) provide internal security for its subjects; b) 
generate the condition for the accumulation of wealth; c) provide a certain level of 
social “fairness”; d) maintain institutional legitimacy. All these imperatives may be 
related to the migration phenomenon and are usually difficult to accomplish 
simultaneously. The crucial point in her analysis is that these are not considered 
predominant and disconnected from the rest of society; state actions and choices, 
constantly “resonate”, in a mutually influencing relationship, with the rest of society. 
A final problem related to the conception of the state and the understanding of 
migration relates to the treatment of states as if they were undifferentiated units. Many 
scholars have underlined the necessity to consider not only: a) the particularities of 
each state as regards their historical, institutional and political configuration, but also 
b) the particular way in which they give shape to a state-society relation in each 
context. 
Concerning the first aspect, criticisms were made towards a simplistic distinction 
between liberal-democratic and authoritarian states that often led to dichotomous 
abstract conclusions. The relationship between the political regime and migration, 
from this perspective, needs to be problematized and differentially analysed. An 
attempt in this direction was proposed by Rush and Martin who suggested different 
degrees of openness towards migration in relation to what they see as a trade-off 
between numbers and rights. The fewer rights that are guaranteed to migrants, the 
more numbers will be accepted and vice-versa (Ruhs & Martin, 2008). Garcés-
Mascareñas’s ground-breaking research was one of the first attempts to compare the 
management of migration by a liberal state with that of an authoritarian one. Her work 
pointed out that the relations between the political system and management of 
migration cannot be linearly interpreted (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012). On the one hand, 
though it is certainly true that authoritarian states have fewer constraints in imposing 
their will over populations, this does not mean they are necessarily more effective in 
controlling migrant populations. On the other, the liberal-democratic character does 
not hold a state back from adopting ambiguous policies that, in many cases, more or 
less directly, entails the violation of its own constitutional principles. These results 
suggest the necessity for fully-fledged differential analyses that go beyond the labels 
and consider a number of factors, for instance: a) the internal structure and 
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functioning of each state; b) the political culture and tradition; c) the historical 
relation with migration; d) the administrative and budgetary capacity of each state; e) 
how policies are effectively implemented. 
As for the second aspect, the state-society relations, an important strand of 
research raised attention on the necessity to differentiate the various forms and 
configurations of the welfare state (Bommes & Geddes, 2000b; Bommes & Sciortino, 
2011a; Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1996a; Ferrera, 1996; Scharpf, 1996; Schierup et al., 
2006; Sciortino, 2004b). Since the seminal work of Esping-Andersen, the study of the 
welfare state must not be intended as the simple distinction between the different 
rights and provisions offered by the administration to its citizens in each context 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). Instead, his concept of welfare-state regimes pointed to the 
complex and dynamic interrelation between state activities, market characteristics and 
families’ role in social provision. This approach led him to identify three main ideal-
types of welfare regimes: the conservative/corporatist one, the liberal one and the 
social democratic one. Each regime implied the formation of a particular institutional 
framework and of a specific model of interaction with the other social structures. 
From this perspective, the role of the welfare-state regime becomes determinant in 
configuring, for instance, the employment structures and, thus, the new axes of social 
conflict and stratification. 
The analysis proposed by Esping-Anderson set the conditions for a differentiated 
and more complex understanding of the relationship between welfare states and 
migrations. Bommes and Geddes departed from his work to reflect on this particular 
issue. For them, as they have clearly stated, “differentiation and specificity of 
argumentation is paramount”:  
“Responses to immigration in national welfare states differed enormously with 
social inclusion and exclusion mediated by national historical, social and political 
contexts with a strong emphasis on territoriality and by diverse organizational 
and decisional infrastructures of different welfare state types. These are a major 
condition for the specific design of immigration and immigrant polices and have 
important consequences for the conditions of immigration, the status of migrants, 
and their social entitlements” (Bommes & Geddes, 2000c, p. 3).  
 
Therefore, they concluded that “it is the combination of specific national welfare 
types, their forms of inclusion and construction of the welfare community, their forms 
of immigration control and their ways of dealing with illegality” that finally shape the 
actual phenomenon of migration (Bommes & Geddes, 2000a, p. 253). 
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From a slightly different perspective, Devitt has underlined the necessity, in order 
to understand more fully contemporary migrations, to take into consideration the 
important differences existing among the “socio-economic regimes” in the receiving 
countries (Devitt, 2011). From her perspective, common explanations of migration 
determinants fail to account for the differentiated picture displayed, for instance, by 
European countries. Taking as a reference point, the attempts made in comparative 
capitalism literature (Deeg & Jackson, 2007; Jackson & Deeg, 2006) to cluster 
countries on the basis of the interlinking economic and industrial relations, 
employment, welfare, education and training regimes, she has proposed a “socio-
economic institutional explanation for immigration variation in Europe”. Her 
framework of analysis considers a number of variables and their direct or indirect 
effect on the demand for migrants. In particular, she has distinguished two main 
groups of variables, on the one hand, those specifically related to the job market: a) 
the wage-skill of the economic regime; b) the level of labour market regulation; c) the 
employment-standards monitoring and, on the other, those related to what she calls 
the “surrounding system”: a) the welfare systems; b) the education and training 
regimes; c) the social services in relation to the demand for migrant care-workers 
(Devitt, 2011, pp. 587–591). In addition, Devitt highlights the need to consider the 
effects of the economic cycle, which may help to understand the inter-temporal 
variation within a single regime. 
 
C. Reductionisms: social interactions 
Another source of different forms of reductionism has come from the way in 
which social interactions has been (or has not been) understood. By social 
interactions, we mean the way in which the different components of the social realm 
(actors, institutions, discourses, etc.) interact with each other and the effects that such 
interactions have. We will discuss two main critical and interrelated points that have 
been raised in this respect. 
Many scholars have mentioned, explicitly or implicitly, the agency-structure 
relation as a problematic aspect in the understanding of migrations (Boswell, 2007; 
Castles, 2010b; Van Meeteren, 2010; Van Nieuwenhuyze, 2009; Vasta, 2011). 
Boswell has referred to the debate concerning this issue in terms of a trade-off: 
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“..between a theory with a plausible account of agency but which neglects social 
structures and one allowing substantial causal weight to institutions but lacking a 
plausible theory of agency” (Boswell, 2007, p. 76). 
 
She has related this trade-off to another, the one between theoretical neatness and 
complexity of explanation of social phenomena. The solution, as we observed in the 
discussion of the different theories of irregular migration, has often been found in 
bypassing the problem and choosing to explain things, using either the structure prism 
or the agency one. The result has been a dichotomous tendency that has pictured 
irregular migrants either as “products” of structures (the state, the economy, the 
human rights’ regime) or as a sign of their irrelevance.  
More in general, structure and agency have been treated as alternatives, whereas 
the focus, as suggested by Vasta, should have been centred on their relation (Vasta, 
2011, p. 3). In this respect, Van Nieuwenhuyze, recalling Giddens’ structuration 
theory, has suggested:   
“Structure is not external to individual lives; structural properties are both the 
medium and the outcome of the practices they organize. Actions should be 
studied and analysed in their situated contexts, showing how they sustain and 
reproduce structural relations without falling into the functionalistic trap. There 
are no mechanical forces that guarantee the reproduction of a social system from 
day to day or from generation to generation, but all social life is generated in and 
through social praxis. In this sense, structure is internal, embodied; but it also 
stretches away in time and space, beyond the control of any individual actors. 
Through this approach, both structure and agency can be included in the analysis 
(Van Nieuwenhuyze, 2009, p. 16). 
 
A second problematic aspect regards the understanding of cause-effect relations 
in society (Czaika & de Haas, 2011; Luhmann, 2012; Moeller, 2013). This issue has 
emerged especially in the analysis of state policies but it affects all social interactions. 
The problem concerns the epistemic structure of the input-output model that is usually 
used. The model postulates a direct, straightforward, exclusive relation between one 
event (the input or cause) and another (the output or effect) (Luhmann, 2012). While 
this model indubitably offers the advantage of theoretical neatness, its linear, one-
dimensional structure generally fails to produce realistic accounts of social 
interactions. The model may work well for a simple laboratory experiment. There, it 
is possible to select a limited number of variables whose interaction needs to be 
studied (the internal variables) and to perfectly control them; other variables (the 
external ones) can be easily excluded. Furthermore, it is possible to delimit the length 
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of the experiment. All these characteristics usually allow one to establish clear-cut, 
cause-effect relations. However, applied to social reality, this model tends to produce 
reductionist accounts. The complexity that characterizes the functioning of society 
poses different problems: a) it is difficult to identify and control internal variables; b) 
it is impossible to isolate the analysis from external variables; c) it is not possible to 
temporally limit the interactions. The case of a new state policy offers a perfect 
example. The common understanding is that a certain action is enforced to obtain 
certain results, yet: a) it is not possible to perfectly control both how the action is 
designed and implemented, and how the receivers adapt and counteract; b) it is 
impossible to isolate external variables, for instance, the reaction of other social actors 
or the intervention of unconsidered factors; c) it is not possible to temporally limit the 
effects generated by the initial action (for a similar discussion, see: Czaika & de Haas, 
2011). Hence, it is very difficult to establish a straightforward cause-effect relation, at 
least in terms of the input-output model. The implication is not a negation of the 
existence of cause-effect relations, but the suggestion of an understanding of these as 
part of complex, multifactor, dynamic interactions.  
The analysis carried out of the different theories of irregular migration has clearly 
showed the implications of this crucial epistemic problem in a number of tendencies: 
a) the production of single-cause explanations; b) the overstatement of actors’ 
capabilities, rationality, vision; c) in connection with the foregoing, the treatment of 
actors’ actions or mis-actions (especially of institutional or system actors, e.g. “the 
state”, “the economy”, “society”) in terms of intentionality; d) the underestimation of 
external variables and other actors’ reactions and forms of adaptation; e) the 
understatement of the existence of short-term, medium-term and long-term effects. 
These tendencies have led to the construction of a straight cause-effect hypothesis 
about irregular migration. While these may have reached the goal of offering 
internally logical, clear-cut explanations, they have generally failed to offer 
comprehensive, generalizable theories capable of satisfactorily accounting for the 
complexity of the phenomenon. 
 
D. The sedentary bias  
The study of international migrations has also been affected by what has been 
defined as the sedentary bias (Bakewell, 2008; Castles, 2010b; Friese & Mezzadra, 
2010; Papastergiadis, 2010; Zolberg, 2006). This tendency, which can be linked to 
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methodological nationalism, interprets international migration as an exceptional 
phenomenon that perturbs the “normal” conditions of fixed national populations and 
limited cross-border fluxes. Since it frames them as exceptional, the adoption of this 
perspective treats migrations as a problem. As underlined by Zolberg: 
“Despite epochal changes, since nation-states emerged, they continue to adhere to 
the normative assumption that they consist of self-reproducing populations. In 
relation to this idea, emigration and immigration are constructed as disturbances” 
(Zolberg, 2006, p. 222). 
 
This perspective has oriented the scientific approach towards migrations in many 
ways, for instance: a) human mobility has been understood as a problematic novelty 
instead of a normal, historical feature (Urry, 2007); b) states and migrants have been 
interpreted as opposed, so the presence of the latter has then, somehow, indicated a 
failure of the former (Cornelius et al., 1994); c) the internal demand for migrants has 
been neglected, leading to the invasion paradigm (Zolberg, 2006); d) there has been a 
tendency to focus almost exclusively on the process of border trespassing, discarding, 
for example, the role of state visas (Bommes & Sciortino, 2011a); e) the state and its 
institutions, for instance, citizenship, have been considered as fixed and immutable, 
neglecting social interactions and change (Isin, 2009); f) migrants have been treated 
as either victims or villains (Anderson, 2008); g) the policy-oriented, problem-solving 
focus of research (Bommes & Sciortino, 2011a). Hence, it is not difficult to recognize 
many of this problems lying behind the main explanations of irregular migration that 
have been discussed. 
 
2.4.3. Summary: problematic aspects in the theorizing of irregular migration 
The analysis of the different theoretical explanations of irregular migration has 
revealed two main problems: the treatment of irregular migration as an 
undifferentiated phenomenon and the use of mono-causal explanations. These 
explanations, moreover, have been, at least in the way they have been proposed, 
difficult to reconcile, if not downright contradictory. The possibility for a more 
effective and comprehensive theory of irregular migration has been further limited by 
a number of theoretical problems and cul-de-sacs. To conclude, then, it seems 
possible to summarize a number of problematic points whose reformulation could 
help to develop a more adequate framework of analysis of irregular migration: 
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a) There has been a problematic understanding of society. This has generally been 
understood as subsumed to the concept of the state. From this perspective, states 
were imagined not only as the containers of societies, but also as their regulators. 
The first aspect has favoured an undifferentiated analysis of irregular migration 
because every state has been assumed as an equal unit with similar characteristics, 
capacities, and functions. The second aspect, presupposing the possibility of total 
control, has led to “gap hypothesis”-like, failure/choice explanations. If it is 
assumed that states control society, a phenomenon that escapes their eye can only 
be interpreted either as a choice or as a failure. 
b) There has been a problematic understanding of the different social actors and their 
interests. These have generally been presented as rational, coherent and time-
stable. The issue has been more glaring in the interpretation of institutional or 
systemic actors that possess a great degree of internal complexity, but it has also 
concerned the understanding of individuals. The tendency has been to paint them 
as single-minded, monolithic, steady actors, rather than as internally complex, 
often contradictory, interactive ones. In the explanations of irregular migration, the 
case of the state has been paradigmatic. Many approaches have proposed 
conceptualization, such as, state’s desires, state’s self-restraint or state’s hidden 
agendas, which tend to produce reductionist interpretations. The state, like all the 
other social actors, is internally articulated, possesses different and often 
conflicting interests, interacts and adapts to the environment’s stimulations. 
c) There has been a problematic understanding of social interactions. These have 
generally been understood in reductionist terms. On the one hand, this has 
determined a tendency to develop deterministic, direct cause-effect explanations of 
social interactions. Actors, policies, processes have been interpreted as perfectly 
capable of establishing and achieving their objectives, neglecting phenomena, such 
as, incoherence, ineffectiveness, or environmental reactions. On the other hand, 
there has been a tendency to produce dichotomous explanations, alternatively 
focused whether on the role of structures or of agency. Thus, irregular migration 
has been explained either as a phenomenon determined by the state, the economy 
or international law, or by the agency of actors, such as, migrants, smugglers or 
employers.  
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A theory that understands society as the main unit of analysis and the different actors, 
including the state, as internally complex, multifaceted, interactive ones, would 
probably offer the possibility for a more complex and differentiated theory of 
irregular migration. Moreover, it would allow the overcoming of the gap hypothesis 
conception. Once the idea is left behind that any actor or institution is internally 
monolithic and can control all social transactions, the whole focus changes. The query 
is no longer about actors’ real intentions or covert plans, failure or success, 
domination or irrelevance; instead, it is about actors’ decision processes and 
compromises, degrees of success or disappointment, complex and dynamic 
interactions. While this hermeneutic approach would certainly offer less deterministic 
and clear-cut accounts of irregular migration, its multi-causal and differentiated 
explanations would certainly attain the goal to be more congruous with social reality. 
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3. TOWARDS A SYSTEMIC THEORY OF IRREGULAR 
MIGRATION 
“The structural change of society is beyond the observation and description of its 
contemporaries. Only after it has been completed and when it becomes practically 
irreversible, semantics takes on the task to describe what now becomes visible”  
Niklas Luhmann 
 
The numerous problems and limitations that have affected the theoretical 
understanding of irregular migration cannot be simply related to a lack of empirical 
data or to the complexity of the phenomenon. Rather, they reveal important obstacles 
épistémologiques (Luhmann, 2007, p. 11) and conceptual problems that demand a 
reconsideration of many of the theoretical assumptions that have been generally used. 
Both the lack of differentiated analysis and the use of mono-causal explanations, 
which have been indicated as the most evident symptoms of theoretical 
ineffectiveness, have been linked to three broader and deeper causes. In particular: a) 
a limited and often misguiding conception of society, usually subsumed within the 
concept of state; b) the simplistic understanding of the different social actors and their 
interests; c) the deterministic, cause-effect interpretation of social interactions. The 
extent and complexity of these issues, that evidently surpass the confines of the so-
called migration studies, require a more general reflection on contemporary society 
and its functioning. From this perspective, international migration and, in our case, 
irregular migration, need to be considered as part and parcel, both products and 
determinants, of the broader social processes and structures. A satisfactory 
understanding of them can only be achieved in connection with a more general 
interpretation of contemporary society, one that critically reviews many important 
assumptions and preconceptions that have been imposed by the effects of 
methodological nationalism.  
A particularly interesting and stimulating way to interpret international 
migrations in connection  with the larger reflections of social theory has been 
attempted by a number of scholars who have applied Niklas Luhmann’s social 
systems theory to the study of migrations. Following these steps and directly dealing 
Luhmann’s work, in this chapter we will present some basic theoretical assumptions 
of his theory and see how they can offer alternative analytical tools to understand 
more adequately, irregular migration as a structural and differentiated phenomenon of 
contemporary society.	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3.1. The semantics of the modern state and society  
The extraordinary growth in the mobility of goods, capital, information and 
people, as well as the drastic reduction in the costs and time required for these 
exchanges, have shown the implausible character of the deeply-rooted understanding 
of society offered by the semantics of the modern state (Luhmann, 2009). In 
particular, globalization has helped to demonstrate the questionability of one of the 
central assumption of that semantics: the idea of politics as a preeminent, overarching 
force, capable of fully embracing and controlling society (Luhmann, 2009, p. 79). The 
analysis of the contradictions between that semantics and what emerges from the 
structural reality is, therefore, a fundamental step in order to develop an alternative 
understanding. 
An abstract representation of contemporary global society, one that does justice 
to the myriad of exchanges that take place worldwide, would probably appear as a 
complex web of lines and colours that mix in exceedingly intricate ways. The image 
would represent both the diversified communications that interact and connect in 
seemingly random and disparate ways in every corner of the world and the variety of 
population encounters, migrations, and contaminations that implicate all ethnic 
groups, cultures, religions and traditions. Clear demarcations, unique identities, 
original peoples, if they ever existed outside political discourses, would be impossible 
to locate. It is possible that a painting by Jackson Pollock could offer a good 
approximation of such a society. It would appear as a largely unified, global space of 
interaction. 
 
Jackson Pollock, Convergence (1952). 
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Yet, if we had to graphically imagine the conceptualization of society proposed 
by the semantics of modern politics, we would come up with a completely different 
picture. A painting by Piet Mondrian could probably offer an excellent 
approximation. Black neat lines would perfectly separate a number of internally- 
homogeneous areas, and the result would look somewhat similar to that of ordinary 
political maps. The “social space”, understood as the space where social transactions 
take place, would fall entirely within the “political space”, understood as the space 
where those transactions are regulated and legitimized by a sovereign power. 
Accordingly, society would not appear as one, but as many societies, each 
corresponding to a single state and its own well-demarcated territory. In this 
idealization, the political power, embodied by the state and its institutions, since it is 
able to regulate all social transactions, becomes, at the same time, the enforcer and 
“the guarantor of the social order” (Luhmann, 2009, p. 79). To make this possible, a 
crucial step is to define a particular population and to be able to effectively distinguish 
between those people considered insiders, the citizens, and the outsiders, the 
foreigners. The modern nation-state accomplishes this task precisely through the 
concept of “the nation” which establishes a natural, direct and unbreakable link 
between each individual (the population), the place of birth (the territory), and the 
political power over that territory (the state) (Luhmann, 2009, pp. 227–236; Schinkel, 
2010). As becomes evident, in this representation, the concept of society is subsumed 
into the one of the state: in order to participate in the former, it is necessary to be part 
of the latter; in order to participate in social transactions, it is necessary to be citizens.  
 
 
Piet Mondrian, Composition A (1923). 
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As one can observe, the two paintings offer a completely different interpretation 
of society. This implies that, while the semantics of modern politics has certainly 
dominated the modern understanding of society and politics, serving as the 
ideological pillar for the affirmation of the modern nation-state as the main form of 
political organization worldwide, its ideals have never been fully realized (Luhmann, 
2009, p. 85). This fact, which today is starting to appear self-evident, was not so 
obvious just some years ago. In the previous historical phase, thanks to the 
affirmations of modern politics, the “social space” tended to overlap more with the 
“political space”, giving the impression that the “Mondrian world” was plausible. 
With the rise and development of the nation-state, the majority of social interactions 
were increasingly restricted within the national boundaries and those that crossed 
frontiers were rather limited and closely controlled. This tendency also affected 
human mobility. Throughout the 19th century and especially after the First World 
War, migrations were heavily restricted and, when they did occur, they were done 
through the channels established by the states and often under their own auspice (see 
chapter one).  
However, even if this historical phase certainly favoured a growth in the political 
capacity to intervene and regulate social transactions, the world imagined by the 
semantics of the modern state never materialized. Even during the apex of the 
mercantilist ideas, the economic exchanges beyond the limits of the state continued to 
take place (Luhmann, 2009, p. 85). At the same time, notwithstanding the dream (or 
the nightmare) of a sedentary world (see chapter two), migrations never disappeared. 
After the Second World War, the development of interconnections between 
individuals and groups gained new strength, inverting that overlapping movement 
between the “social space” and the “political space”. In this sense, globalization has 
been determining a “spill over” of the “social space” beyond the boundaries of the 
“political space” as was prefigured by the modern state. As pointed out by Schinkel, 
in reference to migrations, if maybe: 
“for a brief (‘Marshallian’) period in the 20th century, citizenship sufficed as a 
guarantor of membership of both nation-state and the discursive domain of 
society in an age in which flows of migration have become permanent, that is no 
longer plausible. […] The moment society is entered by people not tied through 
nativity to the nation, the nation can no longer be seen to overlap relatively with 
society”  (Schinkel, 2010, p. 267). 
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For Luhmann, the incongruence between the two representations of society 
shows: 
“A typical case of lack of synchronization between the structure of society and 
semantics. While in other fields of society – for instance, in the intimacy relations 
– the ideological baggage of semantics produced transformations that profoundly 
affected social structures. In the field of politics what we observe instead is the 
maintenance of a conceptual framework that has been overwhelmed. The 
problem is […] that the semantics of politics takes surreptitiously the role that 
should correspond to the concept of society”3 (Luhmann, 2009, p. 79). 
 
This lack of synchronization between structures and semantics implies that, while 
the incongruences between the structural reality and semantics are becoming 
uncontestably evident, our method to interpret them is still deeply influenced by 
semantics and its conceptualizations. As was widely discussed in the second chapter, 
this produces a number of theoretical problems, which directly affect our ability to 
understand a phenomenon like irregular migration. In the next section, we will discuss 
how social systems theory, departing precisely from a reformulation of the concept of 
society that re-establishes its central position, can offer a theoretical framework 
capable of avoiding many of the problems mentioned.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The translation from Spanish is mine. 
	   130 
3.2. Elements of Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory 
Luhmann’s social systems theory is extremely complex and ambitious. The 
explicit attempt by the German sociologist was nothing less than to build a 
comprehensive “theory of society” (Luhmann, 2012). This project which was 
accomplished throughout a lifetime research, transformed into a monumental effort to 
analyse and re-define many consolidated conceptions and ideas. Given the complexity 
and the extension of his work, we will not even attempt to briefly summarize his 
theory. Vice versa, we will take some of its concepts and ideas and see how they can 
be useful to develop a better understanding of irregular migration.  
 
3.2.1. Systems 
The fundamental concept at the root of social systems theory is precisely the one 
of system. Luhmann proposes a very general and abstract definition: “a form with two 
sides”; a form that creates a difference, “a difference between system and 
environment” (Luhmann, 2006, p. 45, 2012). He considers three main kinds of 
systems: living systems (cells, organisms), psychic systems (minds) and social 
systems (function systems, organizations, interactions). All these systems share two 
crucial characteristics: they are autopoietic and operationally closed.  
With the first term, i.e. autopoiesis, mutated from biology, Luhmann means that 
every system creates itself as a chain of operations in a process of circular self-
production. 
“Autopoietic systems are systems that themselves produce not only their 
structures but also the elements of which they consist in the network of these 
same elements. The elements (which from a temporal point of view are 
operations) that constitute autopoietic systems have no independent existence. 
They do not simply come together. They are no simply connected. It is only in 
the systems that they are produced (on whatever energy and material basis) by 
being made use of as distinctions” (Luhmann, 2012, p. 32).  
 
The concept of autopoiesis implies that:  
“..all explanations start with the specific operations that reproduce a system”. In 
this sense the concept “says nothing about what specific structures develop in 
such system […]. Nor does it explain the historical states of the system from 
which further autopoiesis proceeds. […] Autopoiesis is therefore not to be 
understood as the production of a certain “gestalt” [form]. What is decisive is the 
production of a difference between system and environment” (Luhmann, 2012, 
pp. 32–33).  
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With the second term, i.e. operational closure, Luhmann defines the way in 
which systems relate to their environment. 
“There is no input of elements into the system and no outputs of elements from 
the system. The system is autonomous, not only at the structural level, but also at 
the operational level. This is what autopoiesis mean. The system can constitute 
operation of its own only further to operations of its own and in anticipation of 
further operations of the same system” (Luhmann, 2012, p. 33).“At the level of 
system’s own operations there is no ingress to the environment, and 
environmental systems are just as little able to take part in the autopoietic 
processes of an operationally closed system” (Luhmann, 2012, p. 49). 
  
In other words, the relation between a system and its environment cannot be 
interpreted with an input/output model. Elements or events become relevant for a 
system only as they transit through the channels and mechanisms built by the system 
to observe its environment. Through this process of filtering and re-assembling, 
systems construct their own “systemic reality”.  
As pointed out by Moeller, this conceptualization produces a radical shift from 
the common understandings of reality: 
“The theory of autopoiesis and operational closure […] breaks with the notion of 
a common reality that is somehow “represented” within all systems or elements 
that take part in reality. According to systems theory, systems exist by way of 
operational closure and this means that they each construct themselves and their 
own realities. How a system is real depends on its own self-production, and how 
it perceives the reality of its own environment also depends on its self-
production. By constructing itself as a system, a system also constructs its 
understanding of the environment. And thus a systemic world cannot suppose any 
singular, common environment for all systems that can somehow be 
“represented” within any system. Every system exists by differentiation and thus 
is different from other systems and has a different environment. Reality becomes 
a multitude of system-environment constructions that in each case are unique” 
(Moeller, 2013, p. 16). 
 
Autopoiesis and operative closure do not mean absolute closure. All systems 
relate to their environment and in this sense they are open, yet not operationally open. 
This means that the environment cannot directly affect the internal functioning of a 
system, i.e. its internal operations. The input/output model cannot be of help for 
understanding systemic relations, because it presupposes the possibility of an 
immediate contact of the environment with a system and of a system with the 
environment (and other systems). Social systems theory, instead, understands these 
relations as mediated by the ad hoc cognition structures and mechanisms that each 
system develops to relate with the outside. Elements, events, irritations present in the 
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environment become relevant for a system only if they are successfully translated into 
its internal language, becoming information. “Such information does not exist in the 
environment but only has correlates out there…[…]” (Luhmann, 2002, p. 122 in 
Moeller, 2013, p. 17). What a system sees through its mechanisms, what a system 
makes of the irritation it receives, is entirely dependent on its own structure (Moeller, 
2013, p. 17). This strategy allows systems to reduce the complexity present in their 
environment and, therefore, to be able to build up their own internal systemic 
complexity. Moeller provides illustrative examples: 
“A system cannot come into immediate contact with its environment by way of 
its own operations. The biological operations within a cell, for instance, are only 
connected to and in continuation with the other biological operation within it. The 
same is true for psychic operations within an individual mind and for 
communicational operations within a communication system. The biological 
operations of the brain are connected to and continued by other biological 
operations of the brain. Similarly, a thought or a feeling is connected to and 
continued by other thoughts or feelings. A mind cannot continue a thought with a 
brainwave. And a communication can, of course, only be continued with more 
communication. You cannot communicate with me with your mind or brain, you 
will have to perform another communicative operation such as writing or 
speaking” (Moeller, 2013, p. 17).   
 
While social systems theory excludes the possibility of direct interaction between 
systems, the concept of structural coupling captures the possibility of a strong 
interdependence. Two systems are structurally coupled whenever the presence of the 
other one in each environment is so “bulky” that the structures on which the 
autopoiesis rely become shared. The operative closure is preserved since the coupling 
“only affects the structures level and not that of self-reproduction: while systems’ 
independence remains intact in what refers to the construction of their own elements 
and the determination of their contacts, it is possible to observe a coordination 
between reciprocal structures” (Baraldi, Corsi, & Esposito, 1996, pp. 19–21). 
 
3.2.2. Social systems and society 
Social systems are a specific kind of system defined by their distinctive 
operation: communication (Luhmann, 2009, p. 91, 2012, p. 41). Biologic systems and 
psychic systems are the environment of social systems. Communication can be 
“made” by means of a wide variety of communicational elements, for instance: 
gestures, images, sounds, languages, money, etc. In order for one of these elements to 
become communication, and not simply be a body movement, a visual object, a noise, 
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a group of signs, or a piece of paper, it must be inserted into a sequence that makes it 
possible to overcome the double-contingency problem and therefore produce 
understanding (Luhmann, 2009, p. 645). The autopoietic development of different 
types of sequences that use different types of communication elements produces a 
wide variety of social systems. 
Society is defined by Luhmann as the “all-comprehensive social system” 
(Luhmann, 2012, p. 40). In their “Luhmann Glossary”, Baraldi, Corsi and Esposito 
effectively summarize the sociologist’s conceptualization:  
“Society is a special type of social system; the social system that includes all 
communications. As a consequence there is no communication outside society. 
[…] All differentiation of particular social systems occurs within society. Society, 
intended as system, is not made of individuals, their relations or roles, is made of 
communications. The boundaries of society are not the territorial ones, but those 
of communication. […] The distinctiveness of society as a social system relies on 
its complexity reduction achievement: society is the social system that 
institutionalizes the latest, most basic complexity reductions and, through this, 
creates the premises for the operations of the other social systems”4 (Baraldi et 
al., 1996, pp. 154–155). 
 
This complex all-embracing system is internally diversified into a wide variety of 
sub-systems. Each sub-system, which performs a specific type of communication, has 
its own autopoietic independence and is operationally closed. As pointed out by 
Moeller, this last point implies that every subsystem is the intra-social environment 
for the others. In this sense, each one “has its own social perspective and creates its 
own reality. […] Society looks different from the perspective of each subsystem and 
there is no perspective, or super-system that can “supervise” the subsystems” 
(Moeller, 2013, p. 24). 
As for systems in general, including social systems, operative closure determines 
an indirect, mediatory form of interaction with the environment and the other systems 
(both intra-social and extra-social). Luhmann uses the concepts of irritation and 
resonance to specify more clearly the ways in which this interaction takes place 
(Luhmann, 1990, p. 61, 2012, p. 67). If one social system, as part of its own 
autopoietic process and by means of its own structures, emits a communication to the 
environment, this communication has the effect of irritating the other systems. This 
external irritation is filtrated and translated by the observing structures of the 
receiving system into its internal operations. This may or may not produce a systemic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The translation from Spanish is mine. 
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resonance, understood as a reaction that is entirely dependent on the specific 
structures and characteristics of this system. To give one example, if the political 
system takes a political decision, for instance, to raise taxes, this has the effect of 
irritating the other systems in its environment. Each system perceives this irritation in 
a particular way and reacts or, rather, resonates according to its own internal logic. In 
this case, the economic system may resonate by raising prices, the mass-media system 
by airing protests, the legal system by signalling the unconstitutionality of the 
measure, etc. The crucial point is that no system can directly interfere with or 
determine the operations of the others or of the entire society. The irritation/resonance 
model bestows systemic independence on each system and understands interactions as 
processes of indirect, mutual influence. As pointed out by Moeller: 
“Through structural coupling, systems cannot steer other systems or directly 
interfere in their operation. They can, however, establish relatively stable links of 
irritation that force other systems to resonate with them. There are always two 
sides to structural coupling. A system that irritates another cannot, in turn, avoid 
being irritated” (Moeller, 2013, p. 39).  
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3.2.3. Social differentiation and modern society 
Society, the all-comprehensive social system, is internally differentiated 
(Luhmann, 2013, pp. 1–16).  In Luhmann’s opinion, systemic differentiation cannot 
be understood through the whole/parts scheme. 
“It is important to understand this process with the necessary precision. It does 
not involve the decomposition of a ‘whole’ into ‘parts’, in either the conceptual 
sense (divisio) or the sense of actual division (partition). The whole/part schema 
comes from the old European tradition, and if applied in this context would miss 
the decisive point. System differentiation does not mean that the whole is divided 
into parts and, seen on this level, then consists only of the parts and the ‘relation’ 
between the parts. It is rather that every subsystem reconstructs the 
comprehensive system to which it belongs and which it contributes to forming 
through its own (subsystem-specific) difference between system and 
environment. Through system differentiation, the system multiplies itself, so to 
speak, within itself through ever-new distinctions between systems and 
environment in the system. The differentiation process can set in spontaneously; 
it is a result of evolution, which can use opportunities to launch structural 
changes. It requires no coordination by the overall system such as the schema of 
the whole and its parts had suggested. […] The consequence is a differentiation 
of societal system and interaction systems that varies with the differentiation 
form of society” (Luhmann, 2013, p. 3). 
 
Luhmann sees the particular form of social differentiation as the result of social 
evolution (Luhmann, 2009, pp. 380–384). As pointed out by Baraldi et al.: 
“What evolutionarily varies and measures social evolution is the form of primary 
differentiation. This form establishes the structure of society: social evolution 
consists in mutation of the social structure. Society primarily differentiates into 
partial sub-systems that produce more restricted communications. […] These 
partial systems do not need to distinguish communication from what is not 
communication, since for that it is enough for them to be part of society. The 
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reduction of complexity performed by society, allows these systems to build up 
more specific forms of communication”5 (Baraldi et al., 1996, pp. 154–155).  
 
Luhmann identifies four main types of social differentiation throughout history 
(Luhmann, 2013, p. 12). In particular: A. segmentary differentiation (equality 
between the partial systems); B. centre/periphery differentiation (inequality between 
the partial systems, based on the proximity or distance from a centre); C. stratified 
differentiation (inequality of the partial systems based on their position in a rank); d. 
functional differentiation (equal inequality of the partial systems). 
 
 
The different types of social differentiation are not mutually exclusive; on the 
contrary, they often co-exist and compete with each other. Yet, it is possible to 
identify “a dominant differentiation form in every societal system..”, “the most 
important societal structure, which, if it can impose itself, determines the evolutionary 
possibilities of the system and influences the formation of norms, further 
differentiation, self-description of the system and so forth” (Luhmann, 2013, p. 11). 
The description of society that emerges from the theory of social systems is not based 
“on a unifying principle, a transcendental reference or a finalist purpose; society is 
described not on the basis of an underlying unity but on the basis of underlying 
difference” (Moeller, 2013, p. 40).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The translation from Spanish is mine. 
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As a result, the concept of modern society proposed by Luhmann derives from its 
form of differentiation. “We understand modern society as a functionally 
differentiated society” (Luhmann, 2013, p. 87). This type of differentiation became 
dominant between the sixteenth and eighteenth century and replaced stratified 
differentiation. Whereas, up until then, the main organizing principle of society had 
been the exclusive membership of a social strata (nobility, clergy, commoners) 
(Luhmann, 2013, p. 27): 
“..in a functionally differentiated society, the partial systems are unequal because 
they have their own specific function. All partial systems are different and are 
defined on the basis of the function they develop within society. The main 
functional systems are: the political system, the economic system, the scientific 
system, the educational system, the law system, families, the religion system, the 
healthcare system, the art system” (Baraldi et al., 1996, pp. 58–63). 
 
All functional subsystems have evolved in their own particular way developing 
“their own set of symbolic codes, leading values, operational programs and regulative 
means” (Cvajner & Sciortino, 2010b, p. 392). In relation to individuals, function 
systems are in principle all-inclusive. This means that they include or exclude 
individuals only on the basis of their particular functional code, since they are 
indifferent to all other possible characteristics. For instance, the economic system 
only distinguishes between a convenient or inconvenient economic transaction, and 
does not take into consideration whether the participants are Algerian or Bolivian, 
lawyers or butchers, aristocrats or clergymen; the scientific system considers a 
communication only on the basis of its scientific value, and it is not concerned about 
whether the proponent comes from Ghana or Chile, is rich or poor, lawfully residing 
or not, etc. The same logic applies to every function system. In modern society the 
“chances to become included in different social realms – the economy, law, politics, 
education, health and the family – are no longer based on descent, or belonging to a 
social strata, or to an ethnic or religious group” (Bommes, 2012d, p. 37), and in this 
sense, there is no unitary principle of inclusion or exclusion. 
“If society switches from stratification to functional differentiation, it also has to 
do without the demographic correlates of its internal differentiation pattern. It can 
then no longer distribute the people who contribute to communication among its 
subsystems as it had been able to do under stratification schema or centre-
periphery differentiation. People cannot be attributed to functional systems in 
such a way that each belongs to only one system – the law, the economy, politics, 
the education system. Consequently, it can no longer be claimed that society 
consists of people; for people are clearly to be accommodated in no subsystem of 
society, and hence nowhere in society” (Luhmann, 2013, p. 87). 
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Modern society is therefore “a complex multiplicity of a wide variety of system-
environment realties without a centre, an essential core or a hierarchy” (Moeller, 
2013, p. 24). Within its realm, no subsystem can claim to present the whole picture, 
but everyone produces an interpretation of the whole society. 
“Each functional system can fulfil only its own function. In an emergency, no 
system can step in for another even in a supportive or supplementary capacity. In 
the event of a government crisis, science cannot help out with truths. Politics has 
no capacity of its own to devise the success of the economy, however much it 
might depend on this success politically and however much it acts as if it could. 
The economy can involve science in conditioning money payments, but however 
much money it deploys, it cannot produce truths. With financial prospects you 
can entice, you can irritate, but you can prove nothing” (Luhmann, 2013, p. 99). 
 
 
3.2.4. Modern society as world society 
“With functional differentiation as its structural characteristic society is no longer 
primarily divided by regional borders, society is now a world-society” (Moeller, 2013, 
p. 52). As pointed out by Luhmann, with the rise of functional differentiation, there: 
“vanished those premises that enabled earlier social formations to include in the 
systems boundaries both the relation between systems and environment and those 
among different systems. Today we cannot expect that the differences between 
systems and environment and relation among different systems converge in one 
single system (the political) boundary” (Luhmann, 1982a, p. 239) In this sense, 
“As a general rule we can say that territorial borders no longer limit entire 
societies, but only political systems (with all that belongs to them: in particular 
jurisdiction). Territorial borders have the task of differentiating the world society 
into segmentary political functional systems: that is in equal states” (Luhmann, 
1982a, p. 240). 
 
To make this point clear, it is important to underline a crucial point in Luhmann’s 
theorization. While all the other function systems have a global reach, the political 
system, in order to better fulfil its function, namely, “the capacity to produce 
collectively binding decisions” (Luhmann, 2009, p. 143), is segmentally divided into 
territorial states. “The political authority of the nation-state ends at its borders” 
(Moeller, 2013, p. 53).  
“Basing itself on this form of functional differentiation, modern society has 
become a completely new type of system, building up an unprecedented degree 
of complexity. The boundaries of its subsystems can no longer be integrated by 
common territorial frontiers. Only the political subsystem continues to use such 
frontiers, because segmentation into “states” appears to be the best way to 
organize its own function. But other subsystems like science or the economy 
spread over the globe. It is therefore impossible to limit society as a whole by 
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territorial boundaries, and consequently it no longer makes sense to speak of 
“modern societies in the plural...” (Luhmann, 1982b, p. 178). 
 
This peculiar characteristic of the political system helps to explain the 
development of the nation-state semantics and its interpretation of the world as if it 
was divided into national societies (Luhmann, 2009, p. 217). Yet, the boundaries of 
the other subsystems, for instance, the economy, mass media, science, etc. cannot be 
integrated into territorial frontiers, as they transcend geography and politics. 
From the perspective of the theory of social systems, the concept of globalization 
refers to the world-society and to the global reach of its function systems. However, in 
Luhmann’s opinion, the idea of a unique society must not be confused with the idea of 
homogeneity. “Global society is a complex multiplicity of subsystems which are not 
integrated in an overarching global unity” (Moeller, 2013, p. 54). In this sense, while 
the effects of functional differentiation spread all over the globe, these effects 
“combine, reinforce and inhibit one another due to conditions that occur only 
regionally, and consequently generate widely differing patterns” (Luhmann, 2013, p. 
128).  
“These special local conditions may be structural couplings that promote a surge 
in modernization in the direction of functional differentiation. More typically, 
however, the autopoietic autonomy of functional systems is blocked or limited to 
sectors of its operational possibilities. It would at any rate be quite unrealistic to 
see the primacy of functional differentiation as self-realization secured by the 
principle. […] From this point of view, functional differentiation is not the 
condition of the possibility of system operations but rather the possibility of their 
conditioning. This also gives rise to a systemic dynamics that leads to extremely 
dissimilar developments within world society. The regions therefore find 
themselves far from any macrosocietal equilibrium, and precisely in this context 
are presented whit opportunities by a destiny of their own, which cannot be seen 
as a sort of micro-edition of the functional differentiation form principle” 
(Luhmann, 2013, p. 131).  
 
3.2.5. The state beyond modern state semantics  
Within society, it is possible to identify another type of systems: the 
organizations. These include, for instance, schools, associations, companies, political 
parties, etc. These systems are closely related to function-systems and share with them 
crucial characteristics such as autopoiesis and operational closure. However, they 
display an essential difference. While function systems are all-inclusive, meaning that 
nobody can be excluded from participating in them, and thus they have a global reach, 
organizations establish a clear member/non-member distinction, and so are smaller 
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and localized (Luhmann, 2009, p. 243). An example can be clarifying: whereas 
everybody can be educated, only a registered student can go to a particular school; 
while everybody can perform an economic transaction, only accredited brokers can 
buy and sell on the stock market.  
The advantage of organizations, and their usefulness, relies on their ability to 
coordinate more effectively the internal processes of a system in order to accomplish 
a specific function. Membership is an evolutionary development that helps the 
attainment of this objective. By establishing stable, regulated relations between 
members and the system, it allows complexity reduction and higher degrees of 
rationality. Every organization adopts its own codes, rules and programmes, 
establishes participation requirements and builds up internal structures to take binding 
decisions. At the same time, as a counterpart, it provides certain services and 
advantages that are reserved to its members. 
States are a specific type of organization, closely related to the functioning of the 
political system. Yet, the two cannot be confused (Luhmann, 2009, p. 254). The 
political system, as seen before, is a function system that, in order to fulfil its 
function, is internally differentiated into territorial segments. This strategy is a 
pragmatic, evolutionary solution to the problem of extremely diversified regional 
conditions. The great variance of cultures, populations, economic possibilities, and 
development stages, in the different parts of the world, would make it impossible to 
provide collectively-binding decisions from a unique political centre.  
“The seek for democratic consensus and the use of the minority/majority scheme, 
characteristic of the political decision process, could not be optimized from the 
heights of a global political system. In that case it would make no sense to 
participate to democracy, since the differences could not be properly represented. 
If votes would be quantitatively distributed, Hollanders would always be 
outnumbered by the Chinese, and the Portuguese by the Indian” (Luhmann, 2009, 
p. 239). 
 
Yet, given the complexity of the political function, the segmental division into 
territorial portions is not enough and a further step is required. The possibility to 
effectively communicate decisions that bind collectively has historically evolved into 
two main strategies: on the one hand, the capacity to force obedience when voluntary 
collaboration is excluded (the monopoly of the legitimate violence); on the other, the 
stimulation of voluntary collaboration through a quid pro quo logic (security, rights, 
welfare). Both strategies are obtainable only through organization.  
	   141 
A further important distinction in order to comprehend the functioning of the 
political system and the state, is in Luhmann’s opinion, the one among politics, 
administration and public (Luhmann, 2009, p. 263). This perspective “allows 
analysing the power relations and correcting the official representation that 
understands power as purely hierarchical” (Luhmann, 2009, p. 264). Also in this case, 
the relationship among the three should not be interpreted through an input/output 
model but through a circular irritation/resonance model. The concept of “operation 
power circle” (Luhmann, 2009, p. 265) does not allow one to identify an initial 
moment or a dominating actor. Politicians take decisions, which are implemented by 
the administration, which are judged by the public, which elects politicians, etc. This 
chain creates a complex interdependence among the three, in which each actor needs 
to fulfil its function but cannot forget its interdependencies. 
The state, then, is the organization that allows the political system to factually 
implement and “organize” a number of mechanisms to provide society with 
collectively-binding decisions. Citizenship, in turn, is the specific form of 
membership of this organization. Since it is the biggest and most complex social 
organization, it is not a monolithic unity (Boswell, 2007), but is internally 
differentiated into a myriad of smaller structures and institutions. The relationship 
among these structures follows the irritation/resonance model, which explains the 
impossibility to locate entirely coherent, all-embracing, top-down decisions.  
While closely entangled, the distinction between the concept of political system 
and that of state is fundamental for a number of reasons. A. Whereas the state is a 
specific, developmental, historical solution to the requirements of the political system 
to fulfil its function, the relationship between the two is neither exclusive, nor fixed 
and unalterable. The capacity of the state to produce collectively-binding decisions 
can be disputed and, in some cases, a new organization can emerge as an alternative 
and take up the political function. B. The state is an exclusive organization, and the 
benefits associated with membership usually apply only to its citizens; the political 
system is an all-inclusive function system and its communications apply to everyone 
within its territory. For this reason, for instance, although everybody can be arrested, 
only citizens can vote. C. The citizen/non-citizen distinction is an organizational 
strategy of the state that helps the functioning of the political system. This strategy, 
however, is neither able to completely monopolize the political communications nor is 
it able to control the other systems within society. Regarding the first aspect, to give 
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an example, if the state is not able to impose collectively-binding decisions on a group 
of non-citizens, or the application of certain rules, it may be forced to include those 
non-citizens or to change those rules. With regard to the second aspect, the state 
cannot completely limit the participation of non-citizens in other communications, 
such as, economic, scientific, artistic, etc. ones. D. It is important to remember, that 
the state is not the only organization that is part of the political system and that helps 
the fulfilment of its function. Other organizations, such as, political parties, 
associations, syndicates, etc. may play an important role. A particularly interesting 
case within this group is that of international organizations. The European Union, the 
UN, the WTO, etc., for instance, are organizations that, usually with the agreement of 
states, have been acquiring powers in a number of sectors. The increasing importance 
and capacity of these organizations to produce collectively-binding decisions can be 
interpreted in relation to the globalizing effect on the political systems of functional 
differentiation (Moeller, 2013, p. 53). 
Whereas for the theory of social systems, the distinction between the state as an 
organization and the political system as a function system is structural, the semantics 
of the modern-state did not recognize this fact. In Luhmann’s opinion, globalization 
evidences this point and helps to reveal: 
“the secret premise of modern state thought: that of being the biggest and most 
efficient social organization and, together, the self-description formula of the 
political system. With the semantics of the state, a step was taken to put politics 
in the position to refer not only to the city or to the domestic context. The state 
recovers the expectation, included in the concept of civil society and res 
publica… […], to realize the unity of social order vis-à-vis the multiplicity of 
individual interests. When Carl Schmitt speaks of the end of statehood, […] he 
refers to the impossibility to maintain such pretension” (Luhmann, 2009, p. 234).  
 
These theoretical elements on the concept of the state have a number of 
implications. A. The idea of the state as an autopoietic, operationally closed 
organization implies the possibility of immense differences in the particular strategies, 
characteristics and capacities that each one develops within complex and diversified 
regional system-environment configurations. B. They imply that, in order to be able to 
produce collectively-binding decisions, every state has developed a particular mix of 
strategies that combine both deterring/threatening measures and 
encouraging/supportive ones. C. The idea of the state as a dominating, leading actor 
within society is abandoned. As happens for all the other components of society, also 
the state relates to its environment through irritation/resonance relations. D. While the 
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irritations coming from the social environment, e.g. economic interests, humanitarian 
claims, mass-media pressures, public opinion, certainly resonate with its structures, 
the state operates and modulates its actions only in relation to its own functional 
imperatives (see, Boswell, 2007). E. Since they are the biggest and most complex 
social organizations, states are internally differentiated into a myriad of smaller 
structures and institutions. The relationship among the internal structures follows the 
irritation/resonance model. 
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3.3. Irregular migration as a structural phenomenon of world society 
3.3.1. Migration in World Society 
In the conception of modern society offered by social systems theory, 
international migration, intended as the movement of people (migration) across state 
borders (international), appears as an inevitable, expected, structural phenomenon 
(Bommes, 2012c). Two elements concur to explain this fact. On the one hand, the rise 
of functional differentiation as the main type of social differentiation has determined 
the globalization of societal communications and the development of a unified world 
society. This has implied an increasing pressure on individuals to follow the inclusion 
opportunities offered by the different social systems (economy, education, family, 
science, religion, etc.) wherever they emerge. On the other hand, the particular form 
of differentiation adopted by the political system, i.e. the segmentation into territorial 
clusters, and the rise of states as the main form of political organization, have 
determined the enclosure of such societal opportunities within the sealed borders that 
divide each territory (Bommes & Sciortino, 2011a, p. 214). This has determined that, 
in order to access such opportunities, individuals need to cross political borders. 
The particular configuration of modern society shows, then, a structural 
contradiction: while function systems are all-inclusive and foster human mobility 
across the world, the characteristics of the political system, namely states’ territorial 
borders and exclusive membership, limit such mobility. In this sense, while 
international migration appears as an inevitable feature of world society, its existence 
is, nevertheless, problematic. As pointed out by Bommes: 
“…migration is, on the one hand, probable as an attempt to take advantage of 
opportunities for inclusion. In terms of the economy, the law, education or health, 
and of modern organizations, migration is something individuals can be expected 
to do to adjust to the forms of inclusion they offer to them. Migration is therefore 
part of the normal, i.e. socially expected mobility in modern society, which has 
historically been implemented, for example, with the institutionalization of labour 
markets. The case of internal migrations within states’ territories makes this clear. 
They are part of normal events that hardly mobilize social attention. Migration is, 
on the other hand, manifestly treated as improbable and as a problem, particularly 
in those countries with fully developed nation states and welfare states, when 
migration crossing state boundaries is involved” (Bommes, 2012c, p. 27).  
  
This scenario calls into question the specific characteristics of the political system 
and, in particular, of the organization that has monopolized its function, the state. This 
becomes evident, as suggested by Bommes, when we consider internal migrations. 
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Also in this case, people decide to physically move in order to take advantage of 
better social opportunities, yet, since no political border is crossed, the phenomenon is 
unproblematic.  
The state, like all the other organizations, uses a member/non-member distinction 
as a crucial strategy in order to fulfil its own function. In this case, membership helps 
the production of collectively-binding decisions in two main ways. On the one hand, 
it allows the state to register its members and enrol them in institutions, such as, the 
police or the army that factually permit the monopolization of the legitimate means of 
violence (Torpey, 1998). On the other hand, it makes the development of a mutually 
beneficial relationship based on the exchange between loyalty and service possible 
(Bommes & Geddes, 2000b). The state offers a number of different provisions 
(security, rights, assistance, etc.) and in turn receives individuals’ fidelity and 
obedience. If this is the basic idea, a fundamental question needs to be answered: how 
are members selected? On what basis? 
The particular type of political membership developed by the modern state, i.e. 
national citizenship, emerged as an evolutionary solution that was able to link in a 
seemingly natural, immediate and permanent way a single population (the nation), 
with a specific territory and a political sovereign (the state) (Bommes, 2012b; 
Halfmann, 2000). The construction of this link and its stabilization, anything but 
natural, required an immense effort by every state and was the cause behind many of 
the wars and conflicts that characterized modernity. This effort involved historians 
and politicians, soldiers and teachers, artists and businessmen, who help to develop a 
national sentiment among otherwise fragmented and differentiated populations 
(Benedict Anderson, 2006; Hobsbawm, 2012; Smith, 1986). Notwithstanding the 
difficulties, this conception of membership was able to develop, in a relatively short 
time, into a “particular universalism that envisages the inclusion of every individual 
into one, but only one state” (Bommes, 2012c, p. 27).  
The flipside of this process was the creation of the figure of “the foreigner” as the 
natural counterpart of “the national”. While the latter had the right to access the 
services offered by the state and to freely circulate in and out of its territory, the 
former was in principle excluded from every benefit and banned from entering the 
national borders without a valid permit. Thanks to these configurations, as suggested 
by Bommes and Geddes, states evolved into “thresholds of inequalities”, since the 
communicational possibilities available within their borders became accessible, at 
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least ideally, only to their citizens (Bommes & Geddes, 2000b). This tendency 
became more and more marked as states evolved into welfare states and the services 
and opportunities offered to their members constantly increased. To be a citizen of a 
rich state and not of a poor one, allowed incomparable access opportunities to 
function systems, such as, the economy, law, science, education, health, etc. 
Yet, the all-inclusive character of functionally-differentiated social systems 
severely questioned the idea of immobile, confined populations, which was alleged 
within the nationalist conception. The “sedentary bias” (see chapter two) proved to be 
unrealistic and the figure of “the migrant” emerged in the very same moment in which 
territorial borders were drawn. Individuals, along with the development of world 
society, were increasingly stimulated to follow inclusion opportunities beyond the 
regulations and borders established by states. In this sense, migration can be 
interpreted as an effort made by individuals to achieve social inclusion, as a way to 
achieve social mobility through spatial mobility (Bommes & Sciortino, 2011b). 
 
3.3.2. States and migrants 
Against this backdrop, the structural contradiction between migrants and states 
becomes evident. On the one hand, migrants try to “achieve inclusion and 
participation in the various social systems – and with them, access to the relevant 
social and economic resources – by means of geographical and border-crossing 
mobility” (Bommes & Sciortino, 2011b, p. 214). On the other hand, states try to 
reaffirm the basic mechanism of their functioning, i.e. the distinction between 
members and non-members which allows the loyalty/service exchange.  
This contradiction, however, should not be interpreted in absolute, unconditional 
terms. While it is true that membership is the core feature of the state as an 
organization and that foregoing this could undermine its very existence, it should be 
borne in mind that the main function of the political system is not the distinction 
between members and non-members, but the production of collectively-binding 
decisions. In relation to this function, the membership strategy is certainly useful, but 
it is not the only one. In particular, if it is true that society is functionally 
differentiated, and that individuals seek inclusion in the different systems, the political 
system, in order to fulfil its own function, cannot impede the functioning of the other 
systems. If that were the case and other communications of other systems became 
obstructed, the possibility to produce collectively-binding decisions could be seriously 
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undermined. Individuals would have strong incentives not to follow the decisions of a 
system that precludes all other communications. For this reason, states are pushed to 
develop ecological equilibriums with other systems through irritation/resonance 
relations (Sciortino, 2000). The same, of course, is valid for every system: each has to 
fulfil its own function but, in so doing, it observes and resonates in the relations with 
the others. 
With regard to migration, while states use and defend the member/non-member 
distinction, and thus enact policies to control and limit the arrival and residence of 
foreigners or their access to the services, they must, at the same time, take into 
consideration the functioning of other systems, for instance, the economy, the law, the 
family, etc. If an economic sector requires unqualified workers who are not available 
in the internal market, for example, the political system could decide to amend its 
principles and admit migrants. 
As becomes apparent, the relation between migrants and states is much more 
complex than the idea of a forthright contraposition might suggest. The perspective 
offered by the theory of social systems suggests that this relation embodies in a 
variety of national settings (Bommes & Geddes, 2000b). Each state, on the basis of its 
own particular political characteristics, organizational infrastructure, and public 
opinion, and in relation to both its intra-social (the other function systems) and extra-
social environment (the effective migration process) develops a specific, historically- 
influenced approach to migration. The wide variety of policies analysed in the first 
chapter, that range from external and internal controls to migrant labelling and 
categorization, from legalizations to expulsions, can be understood within this 
framework. States can be viewed as “political filters” (Bommes & Geddes, 2000c, p. 
2) which mediate not only migrants’ efforts to take advantage of their chances for 
social participation, but also other system demands for migrants. 
The different approaches taken by states in relation to migration can also be 
related to their greater or lesser desire (and capacity) to penetrate their society. As 
pointed out by Bommes: “nations-states cannot renounce their right to control access 
to and residence to their territories. This right is implemented very differently: from 
states’ wide-ranging, deep social penetration to lighter and more limited approaches” 
(Bommes, 2012a, p. 166). In relation to this issue, the development of the modern 
welfare state is particularly relevant (Bommes, 2012d; Bommes & Geddes, 2000b; 
Halfmann, 2000; Sciortino, 2004b). The increased services offered to their citizens, in 
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connection to the evolution of the conception of rights (from political to civil, to 
social), implied a continuous expansion of the state’s influence within society. 
Although this development took diverse paths in the different areas of the world, it 
has been possible to identify certain patterns and to produce welfare-state typologies 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1996a; Ferrera, 1996; Ferrera, Hemerijck, & Rhodes, 2000; 
Hemerijck, 2012). In all cases, the involvement of the state in more and more social 
sectors (education, healthcare, pensions, unemployment support, etc.) and the 
provision of increasingly-sophisticated and costly services required the extension of 
the member/non-member logic to each of the new domains of state intervention. It is 
precisely this latter aspect that further complicates the relation between states and 
migrants. As pointed out by Sciortino, this occurred in much wider terms than those 
suggested by the welfare magnet thesis (the welfare state attracts migrants) or by the 
welfare dependency debate (do migrants contribute to or exploit welfare?) (see 
Sciortino, 2004b). Recalling Esping-Andersen’s approach, he points out that “the 
welfare structures must be considered as embedded in a matrix of structural 
relationships among households, the state and the economy. It is precisely within this 
framework that the relationships between welfare structures and migratory processes 
may be investigated in full” (Sciortino, 2004b, p. 115). In particular, the extent and 
specific ways in which state intervention alters the functioning of the other social 
systems, and the modes in which the political distinction members/non-members 
penetrates other social realms, can deeply influence the migratory phenomenon. 
Depending on the case and on the sector, this influence can have the effect of 
fostering or discouraging migration, of favouring certain types instead of others, of 
creating better or worse conditions for migrants’ inclusion. The differential analysis of 
welfare regimes is, then, a crucial requirement in order to comprehend not only the 
interaction between migration and the state, but, more in general, between migration 
and society.  
To make the picture even more complex, it is important to consider three 
additional issues. A. States are internally differentiated and each section of their 
enormous apparatus can develop a certain intra-organizational vision of migration. 
This implies that monolithically-coherent, one-directional decisions tend to be the 
exception while diversified, conflictive and multi-levelled ones are the rule. B. Not 
only is states’ internal view on migration fragmented and conflictive, but also that of 
the environment. The various social systems may have very different interests 
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concerning migration; therefore, the state is usually confronted by a large number of 
often un-reconcilable demands (Boswell, 2007). C. While the modern state semantics 
offers the idea of the political system as a regulator of society, as a predominant actor 
capable of controlling and steering every social process, this is only a self-description. 
In relation to migration, this means that no state, not even the most developed and 
determined one, is able to perfectly manage population movements (Cvajner & 
Sciortino, 2010b, p. 394). 	  
3.3.3. Irregular migration as a structural phenomenon of world society 
Irregular migration is probably the social phenomenon that best highlights world 
society’s structural contradiction between the global, all-inclusive, functional 
characteristics of all the other social systems and the territorially-bounded, exclusive, 
segmented characteristics of the political system (Bommes, 2012a, 2012c; Bommes & 
Sciortino, 2011a; Cvajner & Sciortino, 2010a, 2010b). From the perspective of the 
theory of social systems, the emergence of irregular migration must be understood as 
a logical outcome, embedded in the structure of contemporary society. 
“At the root of the contemporary migration system is a structural mismatch 
between the huge demand for entry to the most developed regions and the 
comparatively small supply of opportunities to enter these areas legally. It can 
consequently be described as a social system – a structured nexus of 
interdependencies – where there is an embedded tension within the cultural and 
social goals prescribed by an increasingly shared global culture and the means 
available to pursue these goals” (Bommes & Sciortino, 2011b, p. 215). 
 
Within this context, migrants are faced with two contradictory communications. 
On the one hand, function systems, such as, the economy, education, family, etc., 
which do not recognize the national/foreigner distinction, offer opportunities that 
attract them. On the other hand, the political system and its main organization, the 
state, demand membership to allow entry, and therefore discourage their movement. 
Confronted by this double message, “come/do not come”, the migrants’ decision is 
the result of a complex evaluation of pros and cons. The political limitations imposed 
by states, although important, are only one of the issues at stake. If the opportunities 
are great enough and there are no regular channels available, the option to migrate 
irregularly becomes a valid and sometimes unavoidable alternative. 
The birth and development of irregular migration systems is contingent upon the 
existence of a structural mismatch between the social and the political conditions for 
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migration. As pointed out by Sciortino, such mismatch involves both sending and 
receiving contexts, and it has both an external and an internal dimension. “Externally, 
there must be a mismatch between the demand for entry, and the supply of entry slots 
by the political systems” in the receiving context. In the sending one, “there must be a 
mismatch between widespread social expectations (usually called “push factors”) and 
the state capacity to satisfy them or repress them”. In the receiving context, “there 
must be a mismatch between the internal pre-conditions for migration (usually called 
“pull factors”) and their interpretation within the political system. Irregular migrations 
are in fact an adaptive answer to these unbalances” (Sciortino, 2004a, p. 23)  
The existence of such mismatches and the emergence of irregular migration have 
been interpreted by Bommes and Sciortino in connection to Merton’s concept of 
“structural anomie” (Merton, 1968). As they underline:  
“…an emphasis on social structures as regulators of individual behaviour does 
not imply that social structures are not also involved in determining the 
circumstances in which the violation of established social norms is ‘normal’ – 
that is, predictable in terms of their contradictory device”. “…both conformity 
and various types of deviance should be seen as adaptive strategies to deal with 
the structural mismatch between prescribed goals and institutionalized means in a 
society prizing economic success and social mobility as attainable by all its 
members. If we apply Merton’s framework to the current world migratory 
situation, we can conclude that irregular migration is actually a specific form of 
innovative behaviour. It represents a creative solution to the structural 
mismatches inherent in modern society – i.e. the demand for labour and the 
available supply of workers or the demand for social mobility and the supply of 
opportunities for advancement. It is a strategy that implies breaking away from 
the use of institutionally prescribed (but obstructed) means in order to keep a 
communal faith and commitment to the culturally and socially prescribed goals 
increasingly shared in sending and receiving areas” (Bommes & Sciortino, 
2011b, p. 216). 
 
This conception helps to understand a particular feature of irregular migration, 
otherwise interpretable only in paradoxical or conspiracy terms. From a logical 
perspective, it could be said that it is the state itself that, by establishing entry criteria 
and distinguishing between regular and irregular migrants, creates the problem that it 
later tries to solve. Yet, here it is important to bear in mind that when a system 
irritates its environment on the basis of its own logic and seeking its own purposes, 
the environment resonates on its own terms, according to its own logic and in relation 
to its own purposes. In this sense, while the concept of “legal production of 
irregularity” may be factually true, its interpretation in terms of a state’s intention or 
hidden strategy supposes a capacity to control its environment that is unrealistic.  
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This does not mean denying that state actions may create the conditions for 
irregularity to develop and evolve. The goal is to warn against simplistic, lineal, 
cause/effect conclusions. As pointed out by Bommes, for irregular migrants:  
“…opportunities to participate arise in labour markets, families and elsewhere, 
and gain greater permanency because there is a receptive context for them, one 
which is in part politically and legally constituted by the same welfare states 
which seek to control and prevent these migrations. This is not meant only in the 
trivial sense that everything which is illegal about illegal immigration is only 
illegal because there are corresponding laws which limit or prohibit residence or 
work, but more particularly in the sense that motives arise in labour markets, in 
private households, in housing markets or in welfare organizations themselves to 
disregard such limitations or to use them as boundary conditions for establishing 
employment relations and tenancies, for starting families, providing services or 
setting up aid organizations which would scarcely come about otherwise” 
(Bommes, 2012a, p. 160).  
 
The structural character of the irregular migration phenomenon does not imply 
that it occurs in a smooth, non-conflictive way, but quite the contrary. On the one 
hand, state efforts and capacity to control irregular migration have increased 
enormously in the last decades. States’ knowledge of the phenomenon has constantly 
increased, allowing the adoption of more sophisticated strategies. Yet, these efforts, as 
the theory of social systems suggests, have never been able to fully regulate the other 
social processes. “States’ claim of control over a territory is just a claim within 
various, but never with complete degrees of implementation. Strong mechanisms of 
control fail when the opportunities to be gained through migration are strong and the 
social pre-condition for migration amply fulfilled” (Sciortino, 2004a, p. 22). On the 
other hand, also migrants develop their strategies, increment their knowledge, and 
build up their infrastructures. This allows them to circumvent state controls, although 
at very high costs. 
 
3.3.4. Irregular migration as a differentiated sociological phenomenon 
To understand how an irregular migration phenomenon initiates and develops, 
which resources it mobilizes and what structures and interactions it establishes, it is 
necessary to consider the dynamic interplay not only between states and migrants, but 
also between these and all the other social systems. Each actor needs to be considered 
as internally differentiated, self-referential and, yet, deeply interrelated with its 
environment through irritation/resonance relations. The main consequence of this 
radically differential perspective is that the particular phenomenology of each 
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“irregular migration reality” cannot be theoretically or legally deduced, but it must be 
empirically researched. In this sense, whereas in legal terms it may be possible to talk 
about irregular migration as a single category, from a sociological perspective, it is 
more accurate to talk about irregularities. In each context, the systemic interactions 
among states, migrants and the other social systems set the conditions for the 
emergence and evolution of differentiated irregular migration realities. This approach 
has a number of theoretical and methodological implications. 
 
A. Irregular migration as a status 
The irregular status, attached to migrants by the political system, does not 
describe their whole social position. “From the point of view of systems theory, 
individuals are not part of society and therefore also not integrated or ‘incorporated’ 
into society” (Bommes, 2012c, p. 25). The relationship between individuals and 
society based on the concept of differential functional inclusion makes the question 
about the opportunities of irregular migrants empirical. The questions, then, become: 
How are irregular migrants included in the different social systems? How does the 
exclusion from political membership affect other inclusions? As stressed by Bommes 
and Sciortino: “in modern society there is no full total identity, the status is only one 
piece of the puzzle that is composed by a variety of statuses variously significant in 
different contexts” (Bommes & Sciortino, 2011b, p. 219). This condition may imply 
that irregular status, usually interpreted only as excluding, can turn out to be a 
condition for inclusion. In certain contexts, for instance, the irregular status may 
favour the inclusion in the economic system. This evidences how the exclusion from 
state membership does not necessarily prevent irregular migrants from participating in 
the other social systems.  
 
B. Irregular migration and states 
The relation between politics and irregular migration cannot be interpreted in 
linear, straightforward, oppositional terms (the state vs. irregular migrants). There are 
different reasons for why this is so. Firstly, states must be considered as internally 
diversified “organization complexes” (Bommes, 2012d) composed of a wide variety 
of institutions, agencies, departments, bureaucracies and levels of government. 
Moreover, the political functioning must be considered in terms of a “power cycle” in 
which politics, administration and the public reciprocally influence and legitimate 
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each other. Therefore, as happens for most political issues, also for irregular 
migration, a single, coherent, stand is not available; each component develops a 
pragmatic approach in an attempt to fulfil its own particular duty and to remain 
legitimate. This may imply phenomena like the coexistence of policies that favour and 
disfavour irregular migration, the development of legal loopholes, policy 
inconsistency along the decision chain, etc. Secondly, it should be borne in mind that, 
while the member/non-member distinction is an important element of the functioning 
of states, their core function is the attainment of politically-binding decisions. In this 
sense, although the control of irregular migration is, in principle, of great importance, 
the fulfilment of the function is even more relevant. Accordingly, depending on the 
specific context, the historic moment, the effective capacity to implement policies and 
the demands coming from the other systems, states may decide to be flexible as 
regards the membership principle and choose pragmatic approaches that may include: 
turning a blind eye, the use of symbolic policies, mass-legalizations, etc. Thirdly, 
whereas states are powerful organizations and the political system plays an important 
role within social communications, neither of them is capable of dominating society 
and of completely controlling other system transactions. Adopting a differential 
perspective, a state’s degree of social penetration and policy implementation capacity 
becomes an empirical question that has to be answered after analysing each case. 
Depending, for instance, on the different political traditions and regimes, the type of 
welfare, the administration’s degrees of development and cultures, public positions 
and levels of concern, state policies may be very different, and likewise their impact 
on irregular migration. As pointed out by Bommes and Sciortino, the amount and 
types of transactions where legitimate residence is considered significant, and the 
capacity by states to effectively check it, can dramatically change the meaning of 
being irregular (Bommes & Sciortino, 2011b, p. 217). 
 
C. Irregular migration and society 
The systemic understanding of society not only excludes the possibility of 
political systems to dominate social transactions; it also excludes that of every other 
system. Accordingly, neither the economic system nor the legal one, neither the 
familial nor the educational one, just to mention some, can exert control over society 
and impose their logic. The reality of irregular migration can be interpreted as the 
result of the dynamic interplay among the different approaches, interests, and 
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concerns of each system. In this sense, while each system produces its own 
interpretation, the phenomenon cannot be fully understood only on the basis of one of 
these. 
 
D. Irregular migrants 
Even within a single country, the irregular migration phenomenon must be 
considered as dynamic and internally differentiated. Migrants’ interactions with states 
and with the other systems produce a myriad of different migration trajectories 
(Sciortino, 2004a, p. 38). This can be related to a number of factors. Firstly, it may be 
linked to the enormous differences existing between different groups of migrants and 
between individuals within each group. The availability of human, social and 
economic capital can make a paramount difference, especially with regard to irregular 
migrants, since their effort is more complex and cannot count on the support of states. 
Secondly, the time factor plays a crucial role. The success of an irregular migration 
trajectory is related to the ability of migrants to analyse the environment and to 
develop strategies and counter-strategies to deal with problems. These strategies are 
necessary, for instance, to avoid controls, discover and take advantage of possible 
legal loopholes or to develop specific social structures. Since there is no instruction 
booklet available and the social environment continuously changes, irregular migrants 
need to rely on a learning-by-doing approach and on the development of a trusted 
network. In both cases, time makes a big difference. The concept of “migratory 
career” proposed by Cvajner and Sciortino, and derived from Luhmann’s theory 
offers an adequate tool to analyse irregular migrants’ trajectories. Intended as “a 
sequence of steps, marked by events defined as significant within the structure of 
actors’ narratives and publicly recognized as such by various audiences” (Cvajner & 
Sciortino, 2010a), the notion makes it possible to follow the experience of individual 
irregular migrants and to identify possible common patterns within a similar 
migratory context. 
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3.4. Conclusion. A systemic analytical framework for irregular 
migration 
 
Irregular migration has usually been interpreted either through the lenses of states 
or through the lenses of migrants. This has generated two main perspectives on the 
phenomenon: the first understands it as a problem that may signal an erosion of states’ 
prerogatives; the second understands it as a form of exploitation, which signals states’ 
enduring capacity to seek their goals. Although they contrast each other, both 
perspectives are based on a similar, problematic, conception of society, social actors 
and social relations. This conception, based on the semantics of modern states, 
understands society as subsumed within the concept of the state. The latter is 
conceptualized as a predominant actor that is able to control (or lose control over) the 
former. Social actors are intended as monolithic, single-minded, and time-stable 
players. Finally, social relations are interpreted through an input/output model that, 
accordingly, presupposes the possibility to establish clear-cut, cause/effect 
interactions. Irregularity, from this standpoint, is understood as a rather 
undifferentiated phenomenon that, depending on the case, signals either a state 
effective strategy or failure. 
Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory proposes a radical critique of the 
semantics of modern states. Society, in this conception, regains a central, all-
embracing role. The political system and the state, although important, are considered 
as only two among the numerous systems and organizations constituting the complex 
galaxy of social relations. On the basis of this notion, irregular migration should be 
understood as a complex, differentiated, structural phenomenon of modern world 
society. The development of this phenomenon is related to the existing structural 
mismatch between the dominant form of social differentiation (functional) and the 
specific form of internal differentiation (segmentary) into territorial states of the 
political system. This creates a fundamental conflict between two logics: on the one 
hand, the all-inclusive logic of most social systems (economic, legal, educational, 
familial, etc.) that foster human mobility across geographic space; on the other, the 
exclusive logic of states that insist on regulating human mobility on the basis of a 
membership principle. Against this backdrop, irregular migration emerges as an 
adaptive solution to the mismatch existing between the high demand for entry into 
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certain states and the limited number of legal entry slots available. 
If, in abstract and theoretical terms, irregular migration is explained as a 
structural feature of world society, the concrete, sociological manifestations embodied 
in the phenomenon within each context cannot be theoretically deduced. Instead, 
irregular migration realities must be empirically researched and understood as the 
result of a context-specific, dynamic, evolutionary interplay among: A. functional 
social systems; B. states; and C. migrants. As suggested by the theory of social 
systems, each actor needs to be considered as autopoietic, self-referential and 
internally differentiated; social relations must be interpreted through an 
irritation/resonance model instead of an input/output model. 
Irregular migration realities can be understood, then, as the result of a complex 
“equation of irregularity” (Arango, 1992, 2005b; Arango & Finotelli, 2009, p. 16) that 
ponders the role of different actors involved and the many variables at stake. Table 
No.4. presents a non-exhaustive analytical framework of the relevant actors and 
variables affecting the generation of irregular migration realities. In every context, the 
specific “weight” of every actor, the value of every “variable” and the particular 
relation among all these factors produce a different result. This transforms into a 
different ecological positioning of irregularity with regard to the rest of society and 
into a number of different irregular migration careers developed by migrants. 
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Table No.4 – Systemic analytical framework for irregular migration realities 
Actors Variables 
STRUCTURAL 
CONTEXT 
Political 
System 
States 
Politics • Type of political regime 
• Type and levels of services (welfare 
regime) 
• Political and migration culture  
• Geographical accessibility and proximity 
of migration sources 
Administration • Extension and efficiency 
• Administrative culture and tradition 
• Internal differentiation and level of 
government 
Public • Ideologies 
• Civic and migration culture 
• Concern versus migrations 
Other political 
organizations 
Political Parties 
Organizations 
Syndicates 
• Ideologies 
• Civic and migration culture 
• Concern versus migrations 
International 
organizations 
EU, UN, IOM, 
UNHCR, ILO, 
etc. 
• International agreements, decision 
structures, provisions 
Economic 
System  
Productive structure 
• Main economic sectors 
• Labour market structure 
• Underground economy 
Economic dynamics 
• General economic trends 
• Sectorial economic trends 
Legal 
System 
Internal  
• Legislation regarding migrations (entry, 
residency, naturalization, regularization, 
labour market, welfare services 
entitlements and access, territory control, 
etc.) 
• Structure and functioning of legal systems 
External  
• International legislation 
• Structure and functioning of international 
legal system 
Family System • Family structure and distribution 
• Familial ties and supportive structure 
Education System 
• Educational levels and accessibility in 
origin and destiny 
• Role of the public institutions and 
existence of alternatives 
Health System 
• Health care levels and accessibility in 
origin and destiny 
• Role of the public institutions and 
existence of alternatives. 
Mass Media System 
• Culture transmission 
• Transmission of opportunities and options 
• Communication on migration (concerned, 
indifferent, positive) 
Religion System • Religious view of migration 
• Religious support structures 
Migrants’ social structures • Network structures and activities 
• Illegal network structures and activities 
MIGRANTS  
Migrants’ 
capital 
Social  • Networks (types, extension, functioning) 
Cultural • Languages, professions, communication abilities, etc. 
Economic • Money 
Numbers • Irregular migrant numbers 
Time • Migration length 
Type of migration • Permanent, circular.. 
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3.4.1. What advantages? 
As pointed out in the conclusions of the second chapter, the theoretical 
understanding of irregular migration presents two main problems: the treatment of 
irregular migration as an undifferentiated phenomenon and the use of mono-causal 
explanations. The proposed explanations, moreover, appeared difficult to reconcile, 
and were even quite contradictory. These problems were connected to three crucial 
theoretical flaws common to the majority of the analysed theories, in particular: A. the 
state-centric conception of society; B. the limited conception of the different social 
actors; C. the inadequate understanding of social interactions. 
The theoretical elements gathered from Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social 
systems, offer interesting, possible improvements to the three theoretical problems 
pointed out. In connection with these improvements, the resulting understanding of 
irregular migration appears more complex but, arguably, more consistent with reality.  
A number of theoretical and methodological advantages can be suggested: 
a) Irregular migration is not understood as a state strategy, as a migrant’s tactic, or 
as an economic advantage, but it is understood as a social product resulting from 
the complex and dynamic interaction between all social systems. Whereas all 
social actors create their own perspective of the phenomenon and display their 
own interests, approaches and concerns, the overall social significance of 
irregularity results cannot be deduced only from one of them. 
b) Irregular migration is understood in a radically differentiated way. Its concrete 
forms, structures, social relevance, evolution, externalities are determined by the 
context-specific configuration that the phenomenon adopts. From a systemic 
sociological perspective, therefore, it is not possible to understand irregularity as 
a single phenomenon, but rather as a multiplicity of irregular migration realities.   
c) The role of the state in relation to irregular migration is understood in a less 
deterministic way. Since states are not able to fully control and determine social 
transactions, they are neither omnipotent nor helpless. Each state, depending on a 
number of variables, is more or less able to enforce its decisions. The way in 
which these decisions resonate with the other social systems and with migrants is 
not in its hands and must be empirically researched. 
d) State policies are not considered as necessarily and coherently against irregular 
migration. This responds to two factors. A. The very complex forms of states’ 
internal differentiation, which entail the possibility of phenomena like the 
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coexistence of policies that favour and disfavour irregular migration, the 
development of legal loopholes, policy inconsistency along the decision chain, 
etc. B. States are organizations that use the member/non-member principle in 
order to better fulfil the political system’s function. Yet, this function, namely the 
production of collectively-binding decisions, in certain cases or thanks to the 
interaction with other social systems, can be better fulfilled with a flexible 
understanding of the membership principle. Pragmatic solutions, that may include 
turning a blind eye, the use of symbolic policies, mass-legalizations, etc., can be 
understood in relation to the resonance relations of the state with the other social 
systems. The orthodox application of the membership principle could determine 
heavy externalities on the other systems, which may in turn have negative effects 
on the states’ capacity to fulfil their own function. 
e) Irregular migration is understood as internally differentiated also within a 
national context. A number of factors, such as, migrants’ origin, social, cultural 
and economic capital, migration duration, availability of migrant supportive 
(legal or illegal) structures, etc., may determine very different irregular migration 
careers. These can differ in terms of: A. the amount and type of inclusions within 
the different social systems (economy, education, health, family, religion, politics 
etc.); B. the type of irregularity (for instance, permanent or circular); C. the 
duration of the irregularity condition; d. the social conditions. 
f) The irregular status is not understood as describing the whole social position of a 
migrant. The relationship between individuals and society is understood through 
the concept of differential functional inclusion. While irregularity describes the 
relation between migrants and the state as an organization, their inclusions in the 
other systems and the way in which that is affected by the political status is not 
politically determined. 
	  
A systemic theory of irregular migration allows one to understand the 
phenomenon as a radically differentiated, structural outcome of modern world society. 
Once the idea is disregarded that any actor or institution can control all social 
transactions, the whole focus changes. The query is no longer about actors’ real 
intentions or covert plans, failure or success, domination or irrelevance; instead, it is 
about actors’ decision-making processes and compromises, degrees of success or 
disappointment, and complex and dynamic interactions. While this hermeneutic 
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approach would certainly offer less deterministic and clear-cut accounts of irregular 
migration, its multi-causal and differentiated explanations would certainly reach the 
aim of being more congruous with social reality.  
This approach suggests the need to research irregular migration realities within 
each context. The possibility to discover common patterns and trends requires then an 
effort of comparative analysis. Only comparing the way in which irregular migration 
realities are conformed, develop and interact with their contexts, it will be possible to 
reach a deeper understanding of the phenomenon. As suggested by Bommes, 
discovering the specific role and significance of irregularity within a context, it is also 
a way to better understand that context (Bommes, 2012a). 	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PART II – EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
ECUADORIAN IRREGULAR MIGRANTS IN 
AMSTERDAM AND MADRID  
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4. METHODOLOGICAL NOTE 
 
The second part of this research work will present the results of an empirical 
study of the experience of Ecuadorian irregular migrants in the cities of Amsterdam 
and Madrid. While the general overview of the methodological conceptualization that 
is the backbone of the whole research work has already been outlined in the 
introduction, in this brief chapter we will focus on the specific methodological issues 
concerning the empirical study. 
 
4.1. Research design and research questions 
In the first part of this study a number of critical aspects that have affected the 
theoretical understating of irregular migration came to light. Here we would like to 
refer to two of these: a tendency towards non-differentiation and then a tendency to 
the use of mono-causal explanation.  
Regarding the first issue, there has been a tendency to treat irregular migration as 
if it were a single, undifferentiated phenomenon across different countries and 
historical phases. In chapter 2, a wide number of possible explanations of this 
problem were discussed, especially from a conceptual/theoretical perspective. The 
theoretical framework derived from social systems theory in chapter 3 attempted to 
conceptualize irregular migration as a differentiated phenomenon that develops 
specific characteristics and different forms, depending on the social context in which 
it develops. Yet, the problem of non-differentiation has not only derived from the 
theoretical (mis-)understanding of irregular migration. The problem has also been a 
consequence of the methodology used to empirically study the phenomenon. While a 
great number of studies have meticulously discerned all the aspects and characteristics 
of irregular migration within a single national context, the studies that have attempted 
to systematically compare two or more cases have been practically non-existent. This 
has had the effect of reducing the possibility to recognize the existing differences.  
Following the intuitions suggested by the theoretical framework developed in the 
first part of the study and the path opened up by a number pioneer works (for 
instance: Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012; Van Meeteren, 2010; Van Nieuwenhuyze, 2009), 
the design of our empirical research has been explicitly comparative. As pointed out 
by Sartori, while every study that uses non-ideographic analytical categories, and 
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therefore refers to some general theory or generalizing framework, is implicitly 
comparative, “the power of comparison and its usefulness is the highest and the most 
reliable when it is based on explicit and systematic comparisons” (Sartori, 1991a, p. 
27). 
Yet, what is the advantage of comparison and why can it be useful to understand 
more in depth the phenomenon of irregular migration? If there has been a problem of 
non-differentiation and of “uncontrolled” generalization of the findings gathered in a 
single context of the whole phenomenon, comparative research can offer an effective 
remedy. Comparative research allows us to explain because it allows us to control 
(Sartori, 1991a, 1991b). Only through assessing different cases is it possible to 
produce law-like statements or, in Sartori’s words, “generalizations, with explicative 
power, that capture regularities” (Sartori, 1991a, p. 27). As put by Garcés-
Mascareñas: 
“Only by comparing and, even more, by comparing what some would call the 
‘incomparable’ (Detienne 2000), is it possible to formulate questions that 
otherwise would have never been considered and, by so doing, trace relationships 
and deconstruct categories that are all too often taken for granted in particular 
historical and national contexts (see Green 1997). As Block (1953, p. 501) well 
puts it: ‘[C]omparison is a “powerful magic wand” that allowed historians to see 
beyond local conditions to develop more comprehensive explanations’” (Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2012, p. 42) 
 
Then, also for the study of irregular migration, the comparative methodology can 
be a valuable instrument. The comparative analysis of irregular migration phenomena 
in different contexts can help to establish differences and similarities, to assess the 
role of the contextual features in determining specific characteristics, to construct 
preliminary theoretical frameworks that explain both regularities and peculiarities. 
This type of approach can help to overcome that lack of theoretical ambition that has 
been denounced (Bommes, 2012a). 
Of course, the advantages of comparison are not without a price. “Case studies 
sacrifice generality to depth and thickness of understanding, indeed to Verstehen: one 
knows more and better about less (less in extensions). Conversely, comparative 
studies sacrifice understanding-in-context and of context- to inclusiveness: one knows 
less about more” (Sartori, 1991b, p. 253). The important thing, as always occurs when 
choosing a methodology, is to keep in mind the inevitable, related, trade-offs.  
Also concerning the second critique of the current understanding of irregular 
migration, namely the use of mono-casual explanations, it seems possible to recognize 
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the effects of the mentioned methodological orientation. The vast majority of studies 
on irregular migration have researched the phenomenon within a single geographical 
context and using a one-sided theoretical lens, for instance, that of migrant’s agency 
or that of social structures. If this has been the case, it is not surprising that there has 
been a tendency to produce mono-causal explanations. In particular, as 
comprehensively discussed in chapter 2, when the focus has been centred on the role 
of structures (policies, implementation, the economy, culture, etc.), the role of the 
migrants’ agency and the capacity of migrants to react and adapt to it have been 
understated. In contrast, when the focus has centred on the migrants’ agency 
(strategies, networks, aspirations, intentions, etc.), the role of structures has been 
downplayed. Both approaches have missed focusing on “the heart of social life”, 
which is precisely the “interconnections between social agency and systems elements” 
(Layder, 1998, p. 48). 
For this reason, with the awareness of increasing the complexity of the task and 
the connected risks, we considered that it was not enough to simply adopt a 
comparative perspective, but that such comparison needed to include an analysis 
capable of addressing both social structures and migrants’ agency, and their 
interactions. In this respect, the methodological approach proposed by Derek Layder, 
which he called “adaptive theory” (Layder, 1998), was of great help and allowed us to 
establish a permanent dialogue between the theoretical and empirical parts of this 
study. In his perspective: 
“Adaptive theory focuses on the construction of novel theory by utilizing 
elements of prior theory (general and substantive) in conjunction with theory that 
emerges from data collection and analysis. It is the interchange and dialogue 
between prior theory (models, concepts, conceptual clustering) and emergent 
theory that forms the dynamic of adaptive theory”. Moreover,  “[M]oving away 
from empiricism allows the theoretical registering of the systems elements of 
social life rather than simply those to do with the lifeworld. The empirical focus 
of the adaptive approach centres on the lifeworld-system linkages that 
characterize the structure of social reality in general and which are also principal 
defining features of that area of social life which is currently the research focus”. 
 
Following this approach, therefore:  
“Both actor’s meanings, activities and intentions (lifeworld), and culture, 
institutions, power, reproduced practices and social relation (system elements) 
must be taken in account” […]. The acceptance of both lifeworld and systems 
features as part of a comprehensive, interconnected and stratified social ontology, 
also enables a proper treatment of issues of power, control, and domination, and 
the resources that underpin them (ideologies and cultures). The pervasive 
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influence of power (and control) and the manner in which it manifest itself in 
different domains of social life cannot be understood properly if its systemic (or 
structural) aspects are not recognized or registered in the first place” (Layder, 
1998, p. 48). 
 
With these points in mind, our choice has been to compare the irregular migration 
phenomenon in two different countries and to use a double research strategy. On the 
one hand, a context study was developed. This was assembled using secondary 
literature and the available statistical data and was aimed at assessing the main 
structural characteristics affecting irregular migration in the two contexts. On the 
other hand, an original empirical study was developed which aimed at retracing the 
life experiences of irregular migrants within the selected contexts. The systematic 
comparison between both the contextual characteristics and concrete experience of 
irregular migrants in the two countries pointed at establishing similarities and 
differences and at producing a hypothesis capable of explaining them.  
The main research questions that backed the empirical study were: A. How do the 
contextual characteristics affecting irregular migration of the two countries differ? In 
what aspects and to what degree? B. Are the irregular migration experiences in the 
two countries different? In what aspects and to what degree? C. How may the 
different contextual characteristics affect the irregular migration experiences? 
A number of secondary, more concrete, questions guided the research of both 
contexts and migrants’ experiences. Regarding the first aspect, and following the 
scheme elaborated in the theoretical part of the study, the questions were: A. What 
was the migratory history of the country? B. What have been the main policies 
affecting irregular migrants? C. What have been the main characteristics and trends of 
the economic system and the labour market? D. What have been the main 
characteristics of the welfare state? E. What have been the attitudes of the political 
and public opinion? 
Regarding the second aspect, since the aim was to assess the experience of 
irregular migrants, four main questions were posed: A. What has been the legal 
trajectory (residence and possible regularization) in the host country? What have been 
the related problems and solutions? B. What has been the labour trajectory? What 
problems and what solutions? C. What was the migrants’ experience of internal 
controls? What problems and solutions? D. How have other issues, such as healthcare 
and housing been dealt with?	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4.2. Selection of the cases 
As pointed out by Sartori, the choice of the cases to be compared entails a 
number of problematic issues and possible risks (Sartori, 1991a, 1991b). Obviously, 
comparison makes sense when there are differences between the selected objects. Yet, 
similarities are needed too, otherwise the danger is to end up comparing “apples and 
oranges”. When comparing then, the crucial question that needs to be raised is: 
“comparable with respect to which properties or characteristics and incomparable (i.e. 
too dissimilar) with respect to which other properties or characteristics?” (Sartori, 
1991b, p. 246). 
Once the existence of a minimum number of communalities has been established 
between potential objects of comparison, it is possible to choose between two main 
strategies (Sartori, 1991b). On the one hand, it is possible to compare “the most likely 
cases” (Broeders, 2009, p. 20), to use the “most similar system design” (Sartori, 
1991b, p. 250). When the objects of comparison are countries, for instance, this 
means: “choosing for the homogenization of the sample of countries on key aspects 
considered important” (Broeders, 2009, p. 21). This strategy is especially useful when 
a particular, very well defined phenomenon that is present in the two contexts needs 
to be researched. With the contextual similarity, the systemic, contextual features (for 
these the ceteris paribus criteria is used) can be left in the background and the focus is 
the analysis of the specificities of the phenomenon. This may be helpful to learn more 
and to discover further characteristics or to fine-tune an existing theory. The other 
option is to compare “the most different cases” (Broeders, 2009, p. 20), with the 
“most different system design” (Sartori, 1991b, p. 250). In this case, the choice of the 
cases is more disparate. This strategy is particularly useful when the researched 
phenomenon is more wide-ranging and still not precisely defined. The radical 
differences between the cases allows us to assess the extension of the researched 
phenomenon, to control the validity of an early conceptual framework and, most 
importantly, to observe the effects of the systemic, contextual features on its 
characteristics (Sartori, 1991b, p. 250). 
Given the existing limitations in the theoretical understanding of irregular 
migration and our interest in assessing the systemic character of the phenomenon, our 
choice was to adopt the research design of “the most different cases”. In particular, 
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what was chosen was to comparatively research the irregular migration phenomenon 
in the Netherlands and Spain.  
The two countries share a number of similarities that validate the possibility of 
comparison. They are both western, highly developed, liberal-democratic nation-
states. Yet, within this broad group, they also show many important differences, for 
instance, in their economies, welfare states or social structures. It is especially in 
relation to the field of our interest, i.e. irregular migration, that the two countries 
could be considered, somehow, opposite cases.  
The Netherlands is an old country of immigration, which has received consistent 
numbers of migrants since the 1960s. This long experience has translated into a very 
developed set of policies directed at governing the phenomenon in all its facets. 
Especially since the 1990s, the efforts by the Dutch government have become 
increasingly restrictive and today the country has one of the toughest and most 
efficient policies against irregular migration. As pointed out by Engbersen and 
Broeders, within “fortress Europe”, the Netherlands can be considered as “the heart of 
the fortress” (Engbersen & Broeders, 2009, p. 870).  
Spain, in contrast, is a recent country of emigration, which started receiving 
consistent numbers of migrants only in the late 1990s. Because of the weak border 
controls and the recurrent adoption of massive regularization of irregular migrants, 
like in countries, such as Italy, Greece or Portugal, Spain has been considered as part 
of the “European soft underbelly” (Pastore, Monzini, & Sciortino, 2006).  
As pointed out by Finotelli, the idea of a sharp north/south divide between 
countries regarding the management of irregular migration should not be uncritically 
taken, since reality is usually much more complex and nuanced (Finotelli, 2009). Yet, 
the cases of Spain and the Netherlands can certainly be considered quite different. If 
our objective was to inquire into the variety and extension of the irregular migration 
phenomenon, then the comparison of these two cases, precisely because of their 
differences, appeared particularly stimulating and promising. 
If the idea to compare the irregular migration phenomenon within two national 
contexts seemed promising, the extension and complexity of the task required 
adopting strategies to reduce the object of analysis. In this respect, there were three 
main choices.  
 
	   169 
Firstly, it was decided to focus on one national group of migrants. This allowed 
us to significantly reduce those variables concerning the different origins of the 
migrants. The selected national group was that of Ecuadorian migrants. There were 
two main reasons for this choice. The first had to do with the characteristics of the 
Ecuadorian migration. Though small numbers of migrants had been leaving Ecuador 
since the 1980s, it was in relation to the deep economic crisis that hit the Andean 
country at the end of the 1990s, that almost one fifth of the population emigrated in 
the following decade (Herrera, 2008). At the end of the 2000s, given the economic 
recovery of the national economy, the migratory trends returned to the pre-crisis 
standards. With all the necessary caution, then, Ecuadorian emigration can be 
considered as a relatively time-limited, “one shot” phenomenon, which had basically 
an economic justification. The second reason had to do with my own Ecuadorian 
nationality. Besides the obvious personal interest, this fact entailed some potential 
research advantages. The sharing not only of a common language but also of a 
number of cultural and communicative codes between the researcher and the people 
researched, especially in such a sensitive case as that of irregular migrants, may be an 
element that helps to overcome inevitable barriers and reticence.  
Secondly, it was decided to geographically limit the area of consideration to the 
cities of Amsterdam and Madrid. This not only meant making the fieldwork more 
feasible in practical terms, but it also allowed for the comparison of two similar 
settings. Both cities are the biggest urban areas in their countries, they host important 
immigrant communities, and have developed services and industrial economies. 
Thirdly, given the dynamic character of migrants’ status and the possibility that 
both former irregular migrants had regularized or that formerly regular migrants had 
become irregular, I decided to interview migrants who had been irregular for at least 
two or more years during their migratory trajectory. 
 	    
	   170 
4.3. Fieldwork methodology, strategies and limitations 
The fieldwork research in the cities of Amsterdam and Madrid was mainly 
developed in 2013.  
The fieldwork in Amsterdam was realized between November 2012 and July 
2013. In order to develop this part of the research, I moved to Amsterdam for 7 
months. I was hosted by an Ecuadorian migrant who had a house in the Bijlmermeer 
neighbourhood in the Amsterdam Zuidoost borough of Amsterdam. The fieldwork in 
Madrid, my home city, was realized between August 2013 and February 2014.  
The adopted research strategy did not orthodoxly follow any methodological 
paradigm. On the contrary, it combined a number of strategies and approaches derived 
from different qualitative methodologies. The main methodological reference, though, 
was offered by Layder’s “adaptive theory” (Layder, 1998). The crucial suggestion of 
this perspective is to maintain a continuous, bidirectional dialogue between the results 
of the theoretical reflection and bibliographical analysis, and the results of the 
empirical research. This flexible strategy allows us to combine both inductive and 
deductive approaches instead of being limited to just one of them. Practically, this 
translates into a process that does not separate the theoretical and empirical phases of 
the research, or, in metaphorical terms, the library from the street. Instead, the 
researcher permanently brings the results of his/her readings to the field to test their 
validity and plausibility and takes the evidence emerged from the field to the library 
in order to validate, modify or reject the existing theories.  
The main research tools used throughout the fieldwork were key informant 
interviews, participant observation and in-depth interviews with migrants. 
 
4.3.1. Key informant interviews 
The first step of my fieldwork was the collection of a small number of interviews 
with key informants. These interviews helped me to establish the general contours of 
the phenomenon I was going to research. Moreover, they offered a number of 
indications about possible contacts with migrants and locations where I could 
encounter them. I collected 6 interviews in the city of Amsterdam (2 with NGO 
volunteers who help irregular migrants, 2 with spiritual leaders of the Amsterdam 
catholic church, 1 with the Ecuadorian consul in the Netherlands, 1 with the leader of 
an Ecuadorian migrants’ association) and 5 interviews in the city of Madrid (2 with 
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NGO volunteers, 1 with the Ecuadorian consul in Spain, 2 with leaders of the 
Ecuadorian migrants’ association).  
  
4.3.2. Participant observation 
One of the main objectives of the fieldwork was to directly observe the daily 
activities of irregular migrants in the two cities. To this end, I adopted two strategies. 
Firstly, I tried to get invited to and participate in a wide variety of social activities 
such as: reunions, parties, festivities, religious events, sports gatherings, etc. I have 
always been clear with the migrants about my aim. I told them that I was a researcher 
and that I was trying to understand how irregular migrants live, what problems they 
have and how they solve them. During the events in which I had the chance to 
participate, the main objective was to observe people’s behaviour, to listen to 
conversations, to collect personal impressions and ideas. These were also 
opportunities to chat with people, to establish relations and to find potential 
candidates for the in-depth interviews. At the end of the day, I always elaborated field 
notes in which I compiled all the collected impressions and information. Then, as I 
started to develop closer relations with certain migrants, I asked them if I could meet 
their families, go to their houses or go with them to work. Also in these cases, I had 
the chance to develop many friendship relations. I always bore in mind my aim and 
asked for permission if I wanted to use information or to quote a certain conversation 
in my field notes. 
 
4.3.3. In depth-interviews 
During the first phases of the fieldwork and in particular during the participant 
observation, I was able to identify possible interesting candidates for in-depth 
interviews. On those occasions I asked these people if they wanted to take part in my 
research and I explained my goals and the procedure to them. I generally received 
enthusiastic replies to my request. The interviews were realized in different places 
such as the migrants’ houses (the majority), bars, parks, public libraries, train stations. 
The average length of the interviews was about two hours, the shortest was 30 
minutes and the longest 7 hours. In Amsterdam I collected 32 interviews, and in 
Madrid 31. 
During the interviews I used a one page general scheme that helped me to keep in 
mind the main topics I wanted to discuss and some key questions. My aim, however, 
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was to maintain, as much as possible, a conversational, free approach. The idea was to 
introduce issues and then to allow other topics to emerge and develop along with the 
flow of the conversation. In many cases, this strategy not only determined a temporal 
extension of the interviews but also the discussion of topics not necessarily pertaining 
to the research goals. It is my conviction, nevertheless, that this strategy made it 
possible to somehow break the rigidity of the interviewer/interviewed roles and 
therefore to produce a richer exchange and more useful information. 
 
4.3.4. Study limitations 
Both the selection of cases and the chosen methodological strategies entail a 
number of possible problems and limitations that it important to make explicit and to 
reflect upon. 
Regarding the first aspect it seams important to discuss two issues. Firstly, the 
choice to study the experience of Ecuadorians, and therefore of my co-ethnics, as 
previously discussed, may certainly offer certain advantages but also some 
limitations. While the share of a common language and of a common cultural 
background can be a useful tool for instance to “break the ice” or to better understand 
certain meanings and expressions during the research, this can also imply many 
downsides. The presence of culturally structured and codified elements in the relation 
between the researcher and the researched may importantly influence both sides. For 
the former, for instance, this may translate into prejudices, preconceptions or “taking 
for granted” forms of biases; for the latter, into reluctance, hesitancy or the desire to 
appear in a certain way instead of another. Although, every research relation, i.e. one 
between co-ethnics or one between people of a different origin, necessarily implies 
specific problems, what seams important is to keep them in mind, to reflect upon 
them, and, if possible, to develop strategies to limit their effects. In my case, I tried to 
combine, on the one hand, mental openness and a questioning attitude towards my 
subjective impressions and conclusions, on the other hand, discretion and a certain 
restrain in the expression of my opinions, personal history or social background. The 
first attitude helped me to limit the role of preconceptions or “giving for granted” 
assumptions; the second helped to reduce the possible influence of my subjectivity 
upon the interviewed. 
Secondly, when choosing the two countries to study, the option for “the most 
different cases”, as mentioned, has the advantage of offering a great variance, which 
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can be useful to search for the extension of a phenomenon. Yet, a connected risk to 
this strategy is that the enormous difference between the cases may end up resulting in 
an unproductive comparison. What we attempted, to avoid such risks is to select two 
cases that, being very different, present yet sufficient commonalities in order to allow 
a fruitful contrast. 
Regarding the chosen methodologies and in particular the option for in-depth 
interviews and ethnography, as more in general occurs with qualitative approaches, a 
number of issues may be raised concerning the validity of the collected data. Firstly, it 
is important to remember the lack of statistical validity given the limitation of the 
sample and the research techniques. Secondly, the relay on personal assessments, 
memories and anecdotes, the bulk of the interviews material, implies the potential 
interference subjective not only psychological but also “environmental” distortive 
elements. These two important limitations require a pondered use of the possible 
findings. In particular, on the one hand, given the lack of statistical validity, the 
elements that emerge from the fieldwork must be used not as definitive indicators or 
as conclusive demonstrations but rather as elements able to suggests hypothesis, 
contest convictions, open interpretative possibilities. On the other hand, the use of 
“personal material”, requires an extra effort of material analysis, comparison and 
cross-check both between the different interviews but also with other research 
material such as statistics, previous studies, etc. 
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5. ECUADORIAN IRREGULAR MIGRATION TO 
AMSTERDAM AND MADRID: THE STRUCTURAL 
CONTEXTS 
 
The scope of this chapter is to outline the main characteristics of the two contexts 
that were the scenario of the phenomenon that is the object of this research. We will 
therefore centre our analysis on those structural features of the cities of Amsterdam 
and Madrid and, more in general, of the Netherlands and Spain, that may have had an 
influence on the experience of Ecuadorian irregular migrants. 
The chapter will be divided into two parts. In the first, we will briefly describe 
the main features of the Ecuadorian emigration phenomenon. In the second part, we 
will present a comparative analysis of the structural characteristics of the two 
receiving contexts. Following the systemic approach introduced in the first part of this 
study, we will attempt to sketch, although in very general terms, some of the features 
exhibited by the different social systems in Amsterdam and Madrid. To accomplish 
this goal, we will discuss more in general about the Netherlands and Spain and focus 
on five areas that are especially significant to the irregular migration phenomenon: A. 
migration history and contemporary trends; B. the migration regime; C. the economy 
and labour market; D. the welfare state; E. the political and public opinion in relation 
to migration. 
Since the Ecuadorian emigration phenomenon has followed a characteristic 
temporal pattern, with massive outflows condensing between 1999 and 2006, our 
analysis of the two destination contexts will focus on the period 1998-2013. The 
migrants interviewed during the fieldwork, realized in 2013, were all part of the 
mentioned flux, with few limited exceptions.  
Although for both Amsterdam and Madrid, and more in general for the 
Netherlands and Spain, a vast and extremely valuable literature is available on 
migration and specifically on irregular migration, in this chapter we will not get 
involved in a systematic discussion of it. This choice does not mean underestimating 
the importance of the previous works and their results but, rather, it is intended as part 
of a strategy aimed at limiting, as much as possible, the introduction of “external”, 
pre-constructed interpretative frameworks at this stage. The aim is to allow a more 
spontaneous and “in-mediate” analysis of the relation between the structural contexts 
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and the results of the empirical research presented in chapter 6. For this reason, while 
references to the existing literature will be offered, the discussion will focus mainly 
on data and figures offered by datasets, official reports and empirical research. 
Regarding the use of statistical data, given the ample variety of sources available, 
what was chosen was to privilege the international sources (OECD, Eurostat, World 
Bank) over the national ones (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek and Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística), when not possible otherwise. Although this option has some 
disadvantages, because national statistics are usually more precise and disaggregated, 
the advantages lie in the easier and more direct comparability of the international data.  
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5.1. Ecuadorian emigration 
 
Although Ecuadorian emigration has been going on in small numbers since the 
1970s, the phenomenon reached massive proportions at the end of the past-century. 
After 1999, and within a matter of a few years, almost an eighth of the entire 
population (Herrera, 2008; Herrera, Moncayo, & Escobar, 2012; INEC, 2013) left the 
country in search of a better future abroad. This dramatic change in the migratory 
pattern of the country was mostly determined by the serious economic and financial 
crisis that hit the country and culminated with the freeze of private bank accounts in 
1999 and the dollarization of the economy in 2000. These outcomes were the result of 
a long-term process of social and political conflict characterized by corruption, 
economic inefficiency and the slow but continuous erosion of the political system 
(Acosta, 1998; J. Echeverría, 1997; Ramírez & Ramírez, 2005). 
Probably the most noticeable effect of the systemic crisis was precisely the 
sudden and massive migratory outflow. Until 1998, emigration had been relatively 
limited and registered numbers that were inferior to a thousand per year. Things 
changed in 1999 when the flux reached hundreds of thousands (Boccagni, 2007). 
From this moment on, and for the next decade, the outflows presented unprecedented 
figures (see Figure 5.1). In the years 2000 and 2002 fluxes peaked above 150,000 
people per year. The remittances sent by migrants soon became the second source of 
national income, passing from 794 million USD in 1998 to 2,318 in 2005 (Herrera, 
2007; Herrera et al., 2012). The magnitude of the phenomenon changed the social and 
political understanding of migration; those that once had been considered betrayers 
started to be considered heroes. The expatriate community was designated officially 
as the Fifth Region of the country (in addition to the traditional four) and its 
participation in domestic political life was strongly encouraged (G. Echeverría, 
2014a). 
The three most important destinations of Ecuadorian migration were Spain, the 
United States and Italy (Herrera, 2008). However, Spain received by far the largest 
part of the flux. This has been related to a number of factors, such as: the common 
language, the cultural affinity, the visa-free entry and the booming economy at 
destination (Gómez Ciriano, Tornos Cubillo, & Colectivo IOE, 2007; Herrera et al., 
2012). In 2005, Ecuadorian-born immigrants living in Spain reached a peak of 
487,239 but slightly decreased in the following years (Eurostat). The other European 
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countries received smaller numbers of Ecuadorian migrants. The Netherlands reached 
a peak of 3,028 Ecuadorian-born people in 2014 (Eurostat). 
It was only in 2007 and 2008, as a result of both the improved economic 
conditions in Ecuador and the beginning of the economic crisis in the US and Europe, 
that the fluxes went back to the pre-crisis standards. In 2009, and in the following 
years, since a return-migration phenomenon emerged, net migration registered 
negative values for the first time in recent Ecuadorian history. The magnitude of these 
flows, however, never reached the level of those of the previous phase. Although a 
growing number of those who had left considered the option to return, a large 
majority decided to remain abroad (Herrera et al., 2012). 
 
Figure No. 5.1 – Ecuadorian emigration 
Data from: FLACSO-UNFPA 2008 and INEC 2013. 
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5.2. The Netherlands as irregular migration context 
5.2.1. Migration history and contemporary trends 
After the end of WWII and for the next decade, the Netherlands was a country of 
emigration. This pattern radically changed in the early 1960s. From that moment on, 
and regardless of the self-perception of its political leaders, which continued to 
officially refuse that reality until the 1990s, the country has constantly been an 
important migration destiny. 
Migration researchers have identified a number of important, successive 
migratory waves in the recent history of the Netherlands (Broeders, 2009; Leerkes, 
2009; L. Lucassen, 2001; Van Meeteren, Van de Pol, Dekker, Engbersen, & Snel, 
2013). The first one took place between the early 1960s and the oil crisis of 1973. 
This wave involved labour migrants arriving in the Netherlands as guest workers from 
Mediterranean countries, such as Spain, Italy, Portugal, Turkey and Morocco. In the 
intentions of the Dutch government, these migrants were expected to stay only 
temporarily and leave the country once their labour contracts had ended. Yet, this plan 
turned out to be wrong; the vast majority of migrants, and especially those from 
Turkey and Morocco, decided to stay, establishing significant communities in the 
main cities.  
The second migratory wave was very much related to the first one. Contrary to 
political prediction, not only did former guest workers not leave after the recruitment 
ban but, thanks to the existing legal framework, they were able to bring their families 
to the Netherlands. Moreover, as second generations started to develop, many young 
males brought spouses from their origin countries. Since the mid-1970s and until our 
days, these channels have allowed a continuous flux of new emigrants, especially 
from Turkey and Morocco. 
A third important migratory wave involved migrants arriving from former Dutch 
colonies. These fluxes started in 1975 after the independence of Suriname. In the 
following years, almost one third of the entire population left the South American 
country. Furthermore, in the late 1980s, a new stream of immigrants started to arrive 
in the Netherlands from the Dutch Antilles. 
A fourth wave of immigration emerged in the late 1980s and involved asylum 
seekers (see Figure No. 5.2). This flux became particularly relevant in the 1990s when 
a number of wars and humanitarian crises in Europe and in neighbouring areas 
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determined a sharp increase in asylum requests. Given the generosity of the existing 
legal framework, the Dutch government had its hands tied once a request was issued 
and the rate of acceptance was very high. This phenomenon contributed to the so-
called “migration crisis” of the 1990s and a political backlash that fostered a serious 
revision of the migratory and asylum regime in the years to follow. 
 
Figure No. 5.2 – Asylum seeker requests 
Data from: Eurostat. 
 
Finally, a fifth wave of immigration emerged in the 2000s. This flux involved 
mainly labour migrants from Western countries and in particular from Eastern 
European countries such as Poland, Bulgaria and Romania. 
In 2012, of a total population of 16,730,348 individuals, the foreign-born 
population in the Netherlands counted 1,927,700 individuals, which represented 
11.5% (OECD). The population with a foreign background counted 3,494,193 
individuals and represented 20.9% (CBS). This outcome was the result of more than 
50 years of continued migration inflows (see Figure No. 5.3). 
 
Figure 5.3 – Foreign-born population 
Data from: OECD. 
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As regards the yearly inflow of new migrants during the 1999-2012 lapse (see 
Figure No. 5.4), a mixed picture emerges. Between 1998 and 2001, the fluxes slightly 
grew to reach almost 100,000 new arrivals in 2001; from 2001 to 2005, a significant 
decrease was observable, with a minimum of 60,000 new entries in 2005; from 2005 
on, fluxes started to grow again and reached a maximum of almost 120,000 in 2011. 
 
Figure 5.4 – Annual migration inflow 
Data from: OECD. 
 
5.2.2. Irregular migration estimations 
A number of estimations of irregular migrants residing in the Netherlands have 
been produced in the last decade (Engbersen et al., 2002; Hoogteijling, 2002; Leerkes, 
van San, Engbersen, Cruijff, & van der Heijden, 2004; van der Heijden, Cruyff, & van 
Gils, 2011; van der Heijden, Gils, Cruijff, & Hessen, 2006). Van der Leun and Illes 
have comprehensively discussed the different methodologies and approximations used 
by researchers, as well as the main pros and cons of their works. As they pointed out: 
“methods have been fine-tuned and the quality of available data has gradually 
improved as a result of increased co-ordination between different government 
branches and on-going computerization” (Van Der Leun & Ilies, 2008, p. 13).  
As can be observed (see Figure No. 5.5 and Figure No. 5.6), the first data 
available estimated a population of approximately 200,000 irregular migrants in 1997. 
This figure represented more than 25% of the total foreign population. In the next two 
years, numbers slightly fell to start growing again in the year 2000. The rising trend 
lasted for the next two years. In 2002, the irregular-migrant population in the 
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NCP & Diepenhorst, 2012, p. 83), which represented more that 30% of the foreign 
population. Since that year, an opposite and prolonged decreasing trend has been 
registered. 
 
Figure 5.5 – Irregular migration estimation 
Data from: INDIAC – NL EMN NCP (2012). 
 
As underlined by the 2012 Report, Practical measures for reducing irregular 
migration in the Netherlands, an important part of the explanation for this reduction is 
related to the European Union’s enlargements in 2004 and 2007, which determined 
the automatic regularization of Bulgarian and Rumanian citizens (INDIAC – NL 
EMN NCP & Diepenhorst, 2012, p. 84). The last available data show for the year 
2009 an irregular-migrant population of nearly 100,000 individuals, which 
represented 15% of the total foreign population. 
 
Figure 5.6 – Irregular-migrant percentage of total foreign population 
Own elaboration, data from: INDIAC – NL EMN NCP (2012) and Eurostat. 
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As summarized by Leerkes, a number of general features characterize the 
irregular population in the Netherlands. The phenomenon is concentrated in certain 
agricultural areas and in deprived urban neighbourhoods where irregularity can reach 
6% or 8%; irregular migrants originate from more than 200 countries and the largest 
groups are Turks, Moroccans, Algerians and Surinamese; refused asylum seekers are 
estimated to constitute 15% of the irregular population (Leerkes, 2009, p. 16).    
 
5.2.3. Migration Regime 
Migration scholars have distinguished three phases in the ways in which the 
Dutch society has dealt with the arrival and residence of irregular migrants (Broeders, 
2009; Engbersen, 2001). 
The first, corresponding to the decade of the 1960s, was characterized by the 
“welcoming of ‘spontaneous migrants’ who could easily be legalized and employed in 
factory work and agriculture” (Engbersen, 2001, p. 241). The second phase, from 
1970 to 1991, was that of  “the silent toleration of ‘illegal workers’, which enabled 
them to gain access to the formal labour market and take care of themselves” 
(Engbersen, 2001, p. 241). Irregular migrants during those years “were duly 
regularized as they found a job” (Kloosterman, Van Der Leun, & Rath, 1999). 
Broeders has described this phase as characterized by the application of the traditional 
Dutch principle of gedogen (Broeders, 2009, p. 63). This principle, of which he 
proposes a translation into English using the term toleration, implied an intentionally 
weak application of the formal legal framework.  
“Irregular migrants, once established, are able to find work even in the formal 
labour market. They can still obtain Social-Fiscal numbers (so-called SoFi 
numbers), which allow them to hold tax-paying jobs. The enforcement regime on 
irregular labour is lax and in a number of sectors such as agriculture and 
horticulture, where despite the high unemployment figures employers find it 
difficult to fill the vacancies, the authorities often turned a blind eye” (Broeders, 
2009, p. 63)  
 
The third phase, which started in 1991 and is currently on-going, has been 
characterized by a radical change in the political and legal approach towards irregular 
migration. Engbersen has summarized the new paradigm as directed at “excluding and 
deporting ‘illegal aliens’” (Engbersen, 2001, p. 241). A number of consecutive legal 
reforms and new administrative regulations have been approved with the objective of 
reducing the irregular migration population. Several research works have analysed the 
scope, evolution and consequences of these interventions (Broeders, 2009; Broeders 
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& Engbersen, 2007a; Engbersen & Broeders, 2009; Engbersen & Van Der Leun, 
2001; Engbersen et al., 2004; Kloosterman et al., 1999; Leerkes, 2009; Van Der Leun, 
2003, 2006; Van Der Leun & Ilies, 2008; Van Meeteren, 2010; Van Meeteren et al., 
2013).  
The strategy adopted by the Dutch government has been threefold (see for 
instance: Broeders, 2009; Leerkes, 2009). A first group of measures had the objective 
of limiting the entry of new irregular migrants. Crucial actions in this area, often 
adopted in coordination with the European Union partners, have been: A. the 
enforcement of stronger and more sophisticated border control systems; B. the 
tightening of visa policy both for tourist and workers (tougher conditions, extension 
of the list of countries with visa obligation); C. the limitation of family reunification 
and stricter marriage policies; D. the fight against human trafficking; E. the 
sharpening of asylum policy; F. the adoption of limited regularization processes 
directed towards long-term asylum seekers. 
A second group of interventions has focused on making residence for irregular 
migrants more difficult and costly. The two pillars of this policy were: the exclusion 
of irregular migrants from important institutions of the welfare state and the fight 
against irregular employment. As regards the first objective, the most important step 
was taken with the adoption of the Linking Act (Koppelingswet) in 1998. This 
provision established a link between the possibility to access public services, such as, 
social security, health care, education or public housing, and the holding of a valid 
residence permit. Concerning the second objective, numerous actions have been 
adopted since the early 1990s, for instance: A. the denial of social security and tax 
numbers to irregular migrants; B. the obligation for employers to check employees’ 
documentation; C. the increase of fines for dishonest employers; D. the allocation of 
more resources and personnel to the labour inspection service. The implementation of 
all these policies required fundamental and recurrent improvements to the database 
and information exchange systems at all the administration levels.  
A third group of policies was aimed at making the apprehension, identification 
and expulsion of irregular migrants more efficient. The actions taken to achieve this 
goal included: A. tighter policy on individuals’ identification obligation; B. stricter 
controls of employment places; C. the implementation of sophisticated identification 
technologies; D. improvement of the detention policy (new facilities and longer 
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detention times); E. readmission agreements with third countries; F. improvement of 
database and information exchange systems at a European level. 
 
5.2.4. Economics, labour market and underground economy 
As can be observed in Figure No. 5.7, the Dutch Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
used here as a general indicator of the economic trends, shows a fluctuating picture 
within the considered lapse of years. Between 1998 and 2001, the economy markedly 
grew, with a peak in the year 1999 with an over 4% variation. Years 2002 and 2003 
were characterized by stagnation. In the next 5 years, until 2008, the economy grew 
again, especially in 2006 and 2007 when the variation was over 3%. The effects of the 
economic crisis hit the Dutch economy severely in the year 2009, when the GDP 
registered a -3.7% fall. A slight recovery was observable in 2010 and 2011, when the 
GDP averaged a 1% annual growth. Nevertheless, the economy contracted again in 
2012, registering a -1.2% variation. 
Concerning the labour market and in particular total employment, a growing 
trend has been observable. In the year 1998, the number of employed people was 
7,347,100. After fourteen years, in 2012, the number rose to 8,254,100. The number 
of jobs created in this lapse of time was 907,000. It is possible to witness a direct, 
however slightly delayed, correlation between the GDP and the jobs created. The 
years when the economy grew were those when also the labour market expanded. On 
the contrary, a contraction of the GDP, like the one that occurred in 2009, determined 
a significant destruction of jobs. A year later, in 2010, the labour market had lost 
216,500 jobs. 
Figure No. 5.7 – GDP variation, employment, unemployment, migration 
Data from: Eurostat. Foreigners, Employed and Unemployed are in millions per year. 
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As regards the unemployment, an inverse, slightly delayed, correlation with the 
GDP has been observable. In general (see Figure No. 5.8), very low numbers have 
been registered. The peak was reached in 2012, when 460,000 people were 
unemployed; they represented 5.57% of the active population.  
 
Figure No. 5.8 – Labour market structure 
 
Data from: Eurostat 
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Figure No. 5.9 – Main occupations 
Data from: Eurostat. 
 
 
Figure 5.10 – Shadow Economy 
Data from: (Schneider et al., 2010, 2015). 
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its original conception was based on the Bismarckian tradition. Following the social 
insurance model, “a tight link between work position and/or family status and social 
entitlements” (Hemerijck et al., 2013, p. 21) was established. As pointed out by 
Hemerijck and his colleagues, the influence of the Christian tradition and, in 
particular, of Calvinism was strong behind this conception. “The Calvinist emphasis 
on individual responsibility makes Calvinism rather suspicious of establishing poor 
relief programs without enforcing work discipline, next to only meagre relief” 
(Hemerijck et al., 2013, p. 21).  
The insurance model was functional to “the status maintenance and the support of 
traditional male breadwinner nuclear family structures” (Hemerijck et al., 2013, p. 
21). Accordingly, the labour market was strongly regulated and focused on enabling 
the possibility of long, stable, remunerative careers. Women were discouraged from 
participating in the labour market, they received “indirect social protection though 
derived male breadwinner stable employment, social insurance and passive familiar 
benefits” (Hemerijck et al., 2013, p. 21). Within this model, those who were unable to 
follow the job-insurance path had to rely on a network of local social assistance 
organizations. 
While the Bismarckian tradition was at the base of the Dutch welfare state, a 
number of features indicated a certain distance from orthodoxy. In particular, the 
provision of basic public pension, the tax-financed minimum social assistance and the 
public financing of elderly care services clearly signalled a departure from a strict 
insurance model (Hemerijck et al., 2013, pp. 21–22). 
The Dutch welfare state has undergone a process of radical reforms since the 
1980s and increasingly in the 1990s and 2000s. These reforms implied “an explicit U-
turn away from the Continental pathology of “welfare without work” towards 
embracing a more inclusive and activating welfare state” (Hemerijck et al., 2013, p. 
27). Similarly to what occurred in the rest of Europe, welfare state recalibration was 
largely motivated by the deep and complex structural changes affecting societies and 
states (Esping-Andersen, 1996a; Ferrera, 2008; Ferrera et al., 2000; Hemerijck, 2012). 
Within the new demographic, productive and competitive conditions, the very 
sustainability of the welfare state was at stake. 
The changes introduced by the successive reforms in the Netherlands implied the 
gradual move away from Bismarckian employment-related social insurance towards a 
basic universal income support based on general taxation. “Fighting poverty has 
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become a new distributive priority, that implied a shift in attention from insiders 
(male breadwinners, their dependents and societal representatives) to outsiders 
(women, low-skill groups and others)” (Hemerijck et al., 2013, p. 28). This shift was 
complemented by a comprehensive reform of the labour market policy. The emphasis 
in this area was now placed on the activation and increasing insertion of previously- 
excluded sectors of the population (women, the elderly the unemployed, low-skilled 
workers and migrants) in the labour market. The new paradigm was captured by the 
concept of “flexicurity”. The agreement between the government, the trade unions 
and the employers, in 1995, allowed a flexibilization and diversification of the types 
of contracts in exchange for a universal protection system. Successive reforms (2000, 
2002) further extended the labour rights and protections connected to flexible 
contracts, leading to a de facto equalization with those granted by permanent 
contracts. In the field of activation, a number of measures were taken through the late 
1990s and 2000s, and the objective was to incentivize work at all levels. The 
measures included: A. the implementation of counselling and permanent training 
systems for the unemployed; B. the discouragement of early pensions and the 
reduction of disability benefits; C. the implementation of policies to reconcile work 
and family life through parental leave incentives, subsidies, tax deductions. 
These important transformations of the Dutch welfare state required 
“strengthening the role of the central government and local authorities, at the expense 
of the social partners” (Hemerijck et al., 2013, p. 28). Moreover, both the promotion 
of active labour market policies and the development of more sophisticated systems to 
provide social services required a continuous modernization of the administrative 
apparatus. All in all, as pointed out by Broeders, the Netherlands has an “elaborate 
welfare state with a high level of social protection, which requires a keen eye for 
matters of eligibility. Most sectors of public and semi-public life are highly regulated 
and subject to registration and documentary requirements by a professional and well-
staffed bureaucracy” (Broeders, 2009, p. 40).  
 
5.2.6. Politics, public opinion, migration 
After three decades of sustained migrations and the development of important 
communities of emigrants in the main cities, in the early 1990s the Dutch government 
still refused to officially recognize the Netherlands as a country of immigration (Van 
Meeteren et al., 2013). A historic step was taken in 1998, when the role of migration 
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was officially acknowledged as central to the Dutch society. Yet, this step, which 
caused heated debates in the Parliament, was nothing more than an act of self-
conscience or self-recognition.  
While the reality of immigration had been officially understated, the Dutch 
government had been actively dealing with it since the 1970s. In those years 
migration had been generally welcomed. As pointed out by Kloosterman and his 
colleagues: “only three decades ago, the Dutch government welcomed undocumented 
immigrants who were represented as ‘spontaneous guestworker’. They were duly 
regularized as soon as they found a job” (Kloosterman et al., 1999, p. 252). As regards 
the integration of the newcomers, a multiculturalist approach was adopted (Entzinger, 
2006; Van Meeteren et al., 2013). Migrants should integrate while preserving their 
ethnic identity: “the emphasis was on self-organization and arrangements for 
education in minorities’ own languages. […] The immigrant integration policy aimed 
at mutual adaptation and equal opportunities for Dutch people and ethnic minorities” 
(Van Meeteren et al., 2013, p. 118). 
The multiculturalist perspective became criticized in the 1990s. Migrant 
communities showed significantly higher levels of unemployment, welfare 
dependency and marginalization. The new approach, then, focused on the socio-
economic integration of migrants. “Integration was interpreted as equal participation 
in the major social institutions of society” (Van Meeteren et al., 2013, p. 119). 
In the early 2000s, the government’s approach towards migrations underwent 
another transformation. While the political and social attitude towards migration had 
been deteriorating since the 1990s, in connection to the increasingly conflictual 
relations with the immigrant communities and the sustained arrival of new flows, the 
first years of the new millennium meant a turning point. On the one hand, a number of 
dramatic episodes at a national and international level, for instance, the assassination 
of Pim Fortuyn (2002) and Theo Van Gogh (2004) or the 9/11 terrorist attacks, raised 
the alarm about the effective integration and possible “integrability” of the immigrant 
communities and especially of those of Muslim religion. On the other, populist Dutch 
Politicians, such as Pim Fortuyn, Ayaan Hirsi Ali or Geert Wilders, cleverly exploited 
these events to support their claims. Slogans like: “the Netherlands is full” and 
“multiculturalism has failed” became part of a heated public debate (Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2011; Penninx, 2006; Van Meeteren et al., 2013).  
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The changed climate transformed into political action. The new emphasis of 
integration policies was centred “on the individual responsibility […]. Integration 
policies became not only strongly related to issues such as shared norms about the 
rule of law and the obligation to know the Dutch language and culture, but also to 
social problems of public order and crime. Integration policies became more 
assimilistic and immigration policies more selective” (Van Meeteren et al., 2013, p. 
119). The main policy tool within the “new course” has been the civic integration 
tests. Although these tests had already begun in 1998, a number of successive 
modifications (2006, 2007, 2008) extended their scope and considerably increased 
their difficulty. Migrants willing to travel to the Netherlands for family reunification, 
family formation (marriage), labour or other reasons, were obliged to pass a paid test 
in the Dutch embassy of their countries; a minimum knowledge of the Dutch language 
and Dutch society were necessary. With the 2007 modification, the same 
requirements were extended to migrants already in the national territory. They had to 
pay for their own integration courses and were given a certain time to pass the tests. 
In case of failure, administrative fines were applicable. As has been pointed out, these 
tests have become powerful tools to restrict migration (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2011). 
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5.3. Spain as an irregular migration context 
5.3.1. Migration history and contemporary trends  
The transformation of Spain into an immigration country took place in the mid-
1980s, after centuries of emigration history. This important event passed somewhat 
unnoticed by the public opinion and the government in those years (Izquierdo, 1996). 
When the Spanish government had to negotiate the conditions to join the European 
Union, a major concern at the bargaining table was the risk of a heavy outflow of 
workers towards the richer partners of the North. For this reason, the final agreement 
included a transitory norm that limited the circulation of Spaniards for some years. 
Contrary to all expectation, the entry of Spain into the European Union, on the first of 
January, 1986, did not mean an increase in emigration. Ironically enough, it was that 
year that the net flows changed sign and the inflows surpassed the outflows. 
From that moment on, and for the next decade, Spain would experience a slow 
but continuous increase in migration numbers. These, nevertheless, would be far 
lower than those experienced by traditional European migration countries (Arango, 
2010). It was in the last years of the past century, and especially in the first of the new 
one, that migration to Spain reached truly spectacular volumes, determining a radical 
and far-reaching change to the demographic structure of the receiving society.  
The arrival of migrants was mainly sustained by a powerful demand for foreign 
workers which was itself determined by the booming economy (Aja & Arango, 2006; 
Arango, 2005b, 2010; Cachón, 2009; Cebolla & González Ferrer, 2008). Although 
unemployment among nationals was not marginal, especially among young people, 
the segmented character of the labour market permitted a complementary integration 
of   the newcomers. These were especially required in a number of specific sectors, in 
particular: construction, services, agriculture and personal services. 
As regards the origin of migrants, the main fluxes arrived from East-Europe 
(Romania and Bulgaria), Latin America (Ecuador, Bolivia) and North and West 
Africa (Morocco). The main entry channels were visa overstaying and irregular 
border crossing. Asylum-seeker requests played a secondary role in comparison to 
other European countries (see Figure No. 5.11) (González-Enríquez, 2009). Within 
the considered time lapse, the peak was reached in 2001, with 9,489 requests. The 
years to follow, with the partial exception of 2007, saw permanent decrease. 
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Figure No. 5.11 – Asylum-seeker requests 
Data from: OECD 
 
In 2012, of a total population of 46,818,219 individuals, the foreign-born 
population in Spain counted 6,618,200 individuals, which represented 14.3% 
(OECD). In order to have an idea of how fast and sharp the demographic change was, 
all one has to do is to recall that in 1995, less than 20 years before, the foreign-born 
population counted 1,401,200 individuals which represented 2.6% (see figure No. 
5.12). 
 
Figure No. 5.12. – Foreign-born population 
Data from: OECD.  
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in 2007, when a little more than 900,000 new migrants entered the country. The 
second phase, which started in 2008, was characterized by a decreasing trend. While 
the inflows remained sustained and exceeded 300,000 individuals per year, the change 
of sign was evident. In 2011, after 25 years of continuous growth, the immigrant 
population fell slightly, initiating a decreasing trend that persisted in the year to 
follow (Arango, Moya Malapeira, & Oliver Alonso, 2014).  
 
Figure No. 5.13 – Annual migration inflow 
 
Data from: OECD 
 
5.3.2. Irregular migration estimations 
As pointed out by numerous scholars, the Spanish case provides a remarkably 
better possibility to elaborate irregular migration estimations than most of the other 
countries (Cachón, 2009; Cebolla & González Ferrer, 2008; González-Enríquez, 
2009; Recaño & Domingo, 2005). This has been related to the strong incentive that 
irregular migrants have to register in the Municipal Records (Padrón Muncipal). This 
simple registration, which does not have any legal or administrative consequence, 
allows free access to most social services, such as, education for children or health 
care. The comparison between the total number of foreigners in the Municipal 
Register and that of foreigners with a valid resident permit (these include labour, 
study and asylum permits) allows one to obtain a fairly realistic estimation of the 
number of irregular migrants in Spain (G. Echeverría, 2010, 2014b).  
As is possible to observe (see Figure No. 5.14), also regarding the number of 
irregular migrants, two phases can be clearly distinguished. The first, between 2001 
and 2005, was characterized by the sustained growth of the irregular population. The 
peak was reached in 2005, when estimated irregular migrants surpassed 1,400,000 
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individuals. The second phase, from that year on, displayed a sharp decrease in 
irregular population in the first two years, and stabilization with a decreasing 
tendency in the years to follow. The last available data, from year 2010, indicated a 
population of roughly 400,000 irregular migrants (G. Echeverría, 2014b). Two factors 
that contributed to the substantial reduction of the stock of irregular migrants 
registered in 2006 and 2007 were: a. the massive regularization enforced by the 
Spanish government in 2005; and the automatic regularization of Rumanian and 
Bulgarian migrants determined by the admission of both their countries into the 
European Union on the first of January, 2007 (Finotelli & Arango, 2011; González-
Enríquez, 2009). 
 
Figure No. 5.14 – Irregular migrants estimation 
Own elaboration, data from: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) and Ministerio de 
Empleo y Seguridad Social (MESS). 
 
The share of the irregular population over the total foreign population (see Figure 
No 5.15) followed an increasing trend in the first years of the 2000s and reached its 
maximum in 2003, when it slightly exceeded 50%. In 2004 and 2005, the proportion 
decreased somewhat, but remained substantially above 40%. Also in this case, it is 
possible to clearly distinguish the combined effect of the 2005 and 2007 direct and 
indirect regularizations. In 2007, the irregular migration population accounted only 
for 20% of the total foreign population. The decreasing trend persisted in the years to 
follow. The last available data suggest that in 2010 the considered proportion had 
fallen to 12% (G. Echeverría, 2014b). 
A number of studies have inquired into different aspects of the irregular 
migration population in Spain (Godenau, Hernández, & Expósito, 2007; Martínez 
Veiga, 2003; Recaño & Domingo, 2005; Van Nieuwenhuyze, 2009); a general 
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overview of its main socio-demographic characteristics is available in Clandestino 
Report for the case of Spain (González-Enríquez, 2009).  
 
Figure No. 5.15 – Irregular migrant percentage over total foreign population 
 
Own elaboration, data from: INE and MESS. 
 
 
5.3.3. Migration regime 
The Spanish migration regime is relatively short-lived (Aja, 2009b; Aja & 
Arango, 2006; Arango & Finotelli, 2009; Arango & Jachimowicz, 2005; Cachón, 
2007; Cachón, 2009; Cebolla & González Ferrer, 2008). This is not surprising if we 
consider that until 1986 Spain had been one of the main emigration countries in 
Europe.  
The first comprehensive migration regulations were approved in 1984 (Asylum 
and Refugee Law) and in 1985 (Foreigners Bill). Both laws had to be approved as part 
of the agreements contracted by Spain in order to become a member of the European 
Union. This circumstance had a fundamental impact on the regulatory conception that 
informed the two provisions. The main concern of the European partners, which in the 
majority of cases had a long migratory history and a restrictive attitude towards 
migration, was to avoid Spain becoming the new entry-gate for massive inflows. 
Moreover, the high unemployment rates registered in the country suggested that no 
labour migration was needed.  
The 1985’s Foreign Bill (Ley Orgánica 6  No. 7/1985) established a highly 
restrictive entry system for new migrants, the Regímen General (General Regime). 
The basic underlying principle was that before granting an entry permit to a migrant, a 	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labour market check had to be carried out. Only if no native was available for the 
same position, could the migrant be hired and travel to Spain. In 1993, an additional 
mechanism was introduced, the Contigente (Entry Quotas). In this case, the 
administration, in agreement with the employer associations and the trade unions, had 
to establish each year a certain number of permits associated with available positions 
in the labour market to be offered to potential migrants. Neither of these channels ever 
worked properly. On the one hand, the Regímen General procedure was extremely 
complex and would have required a perfect coordination between the consular 
services abroad and the labour offices in Spain. On the other hand, also the Contigente 
required a complicated procedure and the pre-exiting agreement between the Spanish 
government and those of the potential migrants’ countries. For this reason, as pointed 
out by Arango and Finotelli, this channel “never turned into an effective policy 
regulation instrument since it was simply used to legalize irregular migrants already 
living in Spain” (Arango & Finotelli, 2009, p. 18). 
During the 1990s, as the Spanish economy started to grow consistently and the 
demand for foreign labour increased, it became apparent that a migration regime 
“imported” from countries with very different migration histories and labour market 
structures, was to be highly dysfunctional. Although the unemployment rate was high 
among natives, the segmented characteristics of the labour market determined the 
simultaneous existence of a high demand for unskilled foreign work. However, the 
available entry channels were insufficient and could not efficiently meet such 
demand. The combination of narrow channels for legal migration, embryonic 
migration control systems (since immigration was so recent) and an increasing 
demand for migrants exemplarily translated into an “irregular migration model” 
(Izquierdo, 2009). Both for migrants and for employers, it was easier to achieve their 
respective goals independently of the channels enabled by the state. 
As the alarm caused by the growing numbers of irregular migrants rose, a first 
major revision of the Foreigners Bill was approved in 2000 (LO No. 4/2000). The 
reform eliminated the Regímen General, reformed the Contigente and included the 
important decision to extend access to healthcare and basic education to all migrants 
without taking into consideration their administrative status. Despite these 
modifications, the entry regime remained largely ineffective and remained unable to 
satisfy the real necessities of the Spanish labour market (Arango & Finotelli, 2009). 
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The problem was not solved either by the successive reforms approved thereafter, LO 
No. 8/2000 and LO No. 14/2003. 
As had been occurring since the 1980s, the only effective measure to reduce the 
continuously growing stocks of irregular migrants was the implementation of massive 
regularizations. These “extraordinary measures” were “the most useful way to 
“repair” a posteriori, the structural mismatches of the Spanish migration regime in 
which irregularity and informality were constantly feeding each other” (Arango & 
Finotelli, 2009, p. 19). Between 1985 and 2005, the government approved six 
regularization processes (1985, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2001, 2005), which, 
altogether, rectified the administrative condition of 1,.200,.000 irregular migrants. 
The biggest regularization, called Normalisación (normalization), was ratified by the 
Socialist Party in 2005; this process alone involved more than half a million migrants. 
A prolific literature has analysed the characteristics, dimensions and consequences of 
these policy measures. 
The 2005’s regularization, however, was not just another episode of the well-
known story. On this occasion, the measure was intended as part of a wide-ranging 
revision of the whole migratory regime that had started a year before with the 
approval of the Regulation 2393/2004. The new approach comprised four main lines 
of action, which have been thoroughly analysed (Arango & Finotelli, 2009; Cachón, 
2009; Cebolla & González Ferrer, 2008; González-Enríquez, 2009). The first goal 
was to create adequate entry channels for foreign workers. In this respect, the 
Regimén General was re-introduced with a simplified procedure. A Catalogue of 
Hard-to-find-Occupations had to be published by the administration every three 
months in agreement with the trade unions and employer associations. An employer, 
who wished to hire a worker for a job that was included on the list, did not require a 
negative certification as had happened before. Moreover, modifications were 
introduced to Contigente and a new visa for “job search” was introduced. 
The second goal was to create a permanent mechanism to allow irregular 
migrants to regularize on an individual basis. To this end, the Arraigo was introduced. 
This scheme permitted migrants to get a residence permit if they were able to 
demonstrate either a pre-existing labour story (arraigo laboral) in Spain or their social 
integration (arraigo social). 
The third goal was to improve external border control in order to reduce irregular 
entries. A number of measures were taken, in particular: A. tougher rules as regards 
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visa policy (in order to reduce visa overstayers); B. the introduction of sophisticated 
border control systems (in particular the Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Exterior, 
SIVE, in order to control the arrival of boats to the coasts); C. the development of 
bilateral agreements with the main sending countries (readmission and collaboration 
agreements). 
The fourth goal was to reduce the attractiveness of the labour market and to make 
irregular residence more difficult by improving internal control policies. Two 
important measures were taken. On the one hand, the labour inspection agency was 
potentiated with more personnel and new strategies. This meant that the number of 
inspections per year was increased and their implementation was better targeted. On 
the other hand, a new emphasis was given to the repatriation policy. This implied 
more resources, newer and more efficient detention facilities, better identification 
systems, and agreements with origin countries. 
A new reform of the Foreigners Bill was approved in 2009 (LO 2/2009) which 
was complemented by a new Regulation in 2011 (557/2011) (Aja, 2009a; Montilla, 
Rodríguez, & Lancha, 2011). These provisions extended the rights of irregular 
migrants in a number of sectors. In particular, the right to assemble, to associate, to 
demonstrate, to unionize and to strike was recognized. The possibility for irregular 
migrants to obtain free education was extended until they were 18 years of age. It was 
recognized that all foreigners, including those with an irregular status, had a right to 
have free legal protection in the case of need. However, at the same time, new 
restrictions were introduced. The family reunification policy was revised. As for 
irregular migration, a number of provisions were adopted to discourage irregular 
residence and employment and to make expulsions more effective; in particular: new 
infractions; higher fines for employers, traffickers, facilitators and migrants; new 
repatriation procedures; longer administrative detentions (from 40 to 60 days). 
An important change that affected irregular migrants was introduced in 2012. The 
Real Decree 16/2012 excluded the possibility for those migrants without a valid 
residence permit to access healthcare assistance unless in cases of urgency, serious 
illness or accident (Montilla & Rodríguez, 2012).  
 
5.3.4. Economics, labour market and underground economy 
As can be observed in Figure No. 5.16, the Spanish Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), used here as a general indicator of the economic trends, shows two very 
	   200 
different trends within the considered lapse of years. Between 1998 and 2008, on 
which the partial exception in 1999, 2003 and 2008, the economy markedly grew, 
registering positive variations that averaged 3% per year. Between 2009 and 2012, on 
the contrary, the economy underwent a deep recession. In 2009, the GDP variation 
registered -3.8%; in the next two years, it averaged a 0% variation; a new drop 
followed in 2012, with a -1.6% variation.  
 
Figure No. 5.16 – GDP variation, employment, unemployment, migration 
Data from: Eurostat. GDP is expressed in annual variation; Foreigners, Employed and 
Unemployed are presented in millions per year. 
 
The labour market followed a similar trend. Two contrasting, very marked phases 
are distinguishable. Between 1998 and 2007, there was a spectacular increase in total 
employment. In less than ten years, more than 6,500,000 new jobs were created. In 
contrast, between 2009 and 2012, an accelerated destruction of jobs took place. The 
effects of the economic crises determined the loss of almost 3,000,000 jobs in five 
year. Similarly to what was underlined in the discussion of the Dutch case, a direct, 
slightly delayed correlation with the GDP is observable. Yet, in the case of Spain, the 
effects of this relation appear to be much more accentuated. As pointed out by 
Finotelli, this has to do with the high level of elasticity of the Spanish labour market, 
which makes it very sensitive to the GDP variations (Finotelli, 2012, pp. 11–14). 
As regards unemployment, an inverse, slightly delayed, very marked correlation 
with the GDP is observable. In general (see Figure No. 5.17), if compared with its 
European partners, high levels of unemployment have characterized the Spanish 
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labour market. In 1998, almost 20% of the active population was unemployed. The 
effects of the economic boom radically changed this picture in the next 10 years. In 
2007, the unemployment rate had fallen to 8.7%. From that year on, however, the rate 
started to grow again, and progressively very quickly.  In 2012, more than 24% of the 
active population was unemployed. 
 
Figure No. 5.17 – Labour market structure 
Data from: Eurostat. 
 
Concerning the occupation structure within the considered lapse of time (see 
Figure No. 5.18), the Spanish labour market shows again two different phases. In the 
first, between 1998 and 2007, all occupations grew. However, the five sectors that 
created most new jobs were (International Standard Classification of Occupations - 
ISCO): Services and sales workers (+1.3 million), Technicians and associate 
professionals (+1.3 million) Elementary occupations (+1.1 million), Craft and related 
trades workers (+1 million), Professionals (+1 million). In the next five years, while a 
total of almost 3,000,000 jobs were lost, the distribution was uneven. The sectors 
where most jobs were lost were: Craft and related trade workers (-1.4 million) 
Elementary Occupation (-0.8 million), Technicians and associate professionals (-0.6 
million), Plant and machine operators and assemblers (-0.6 million) and Managers (-
0.6 million). The Services and sales sector (+0.7 million) and Professionals sector 
(+0.4 million), on the contrary, continued to create new jobs. This analysis clearly 
shows the great importance played by unskilled sectors in the creation of jobs during 
the economic boom. 
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Figure No. 5.18 – Main occupations 
Data from: Eurostat. 
 
As regards the underground economy (see Figure No. 5.19), the estimation 
provided by Schneider and his colleagues for Spain shows three different phases 
(Schneider et al., 2010, 2015). Between 1999 and 2003, the underground economy 
was stable, slightly above 22%. In the years to follow, until 2008, a decreasing trend 
was observable that led to a fall of almost four points. From 2009 on, the rate has 
remained stable at around 19%. 
 
Figure No. 5.19 – Shadow Economy 
Data from: (Schneider et al., 2010, 2015) 
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5.3.5. The welfare state in Spain 
Within the different welfare state clusters in Europe, the Spanish welfare state is 
usually placed under the heading of the so-called Southern or Mediterranean Model 
(Ferrera, 1996; Ferrera et al., 2000; Gal, 2010; Hemerijck, 2012; Hemerijck et al., 
2006, 2013). Besides the similarity with the Continental Model, the salient traits of 
the countries pertaining to the cluster, which also includes Italy, Portugal and Greece, 
model, are: the development of national health services; an acute insider/outsider 
distinction when it comes to social benefits; an emphasis on pension transfer in 
detriment to other social services; a stronger emphasis on the male breadwinner model 
combined with high levels of familiarism; weak or non-existent safety nets (Ferrera, 
1996).  
Beyond its intellectual interest, the long and on-going debate over the plausibility 
and usefulness of this fourth typology of welfare regime (Ferrera, 2008; Guillén, 
2010; Guillén & León, 2011; L. Moreno, 2001), in addition to the three originally 
proposed by Esping-Andersen (Esping-Andersen, 1990), evidences two issues: on the 
one hand, the mixed nature of welfare regimes usually included within the Southern 
Model and, on the other, the continuous and deep transformations that these regimes 
have undergone in the last few decades.  
These two issues perfectly apply to Spain. The Spanish welfare regime has been 
defined as a “hybrid of models” (Rodríguez Cabrero, 2011, p. 33). Its orientation 
appears Bismarckian, in relation to the income transfers and the emphasis on 
pensions, and Beveridgean, in relation to its universal national healthcare system. 
Moreover, the continuous procedure of reforms that the regime has undergone since 
its first development in the 1970s, makes it even more difficult to use a single label. 
In its origins, the Spanish welfare regime was strongly influenced by the 
characteristics of its traditional society and the country’s late modernization. This 
signified that it had a number of distinctive features (Hemerijck et al., 2013, pp. 33–
34). First, there existed a pronounced insider/outsider cleavage between workers in 
the “core/regular” sectors and workers in the “peripheral/irregular” sectors, the 
unemployed, family dependents or the poor. The former could rely on a generous 
system of social insurance, especially centred on pensions, while the latter were 
largely unprotected. Second, there was the paramount importance of families as the 
primary location of welfare production and economic redistribution (between 
generations and gender). In this context, the role of women was fundamental, 
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determining a low level of female participation in the labour force. Third, there 
existed a highly regulated labour market, which fostered a marked dualism between 
permanent and temporary contracts. Fourth, social assistance programs were 
underdeveloped and weak which meant that there were comparatively higher levels of 
poverty (Rodríguez Cabrero, 2011, p. 33).  
In the 1980s and the early 1990s, the Spanish welfare regime underwent a 
number of reforms that substantially modified its structure and scope. The Social-
democratic model inspired the orientation of these interventions. The leading idea was 
that “subjective rights to health and education, financed through taxation” would  
“contribute to lessening inequalities and enhancing female access to the labour 
market” (Rodríguez Cabrero, 2011, p. 22). The main advancements were: the 
introduction of a universal education system (1985, 1990); the institution of a 
universal health care service (1985, 1990); the universalization of the pension system 
(1990); the introduction of regional minimum income schemes (1989-1994). 
Nevertheless, the economic crisis and the rapid rise in unemployment in the early 
1990s, put the state budget under heavy pressure and forced the initiation of a process 
of welfare recalibration that, through a number of successive waves, has lasted until 
today. What has also contributed to this process was the concurrent Europeanization 
of social policy that implied the necessity to extend certain rights and to restrain 
expenditure.  
In the important Toledo Pact (1995) “it was agreed that pensions and 
unemployment insurance benefits were to remain financed out of social contribution, 
but all the other non-contributory and social assistance benefits would come to be 
financed out of taxation” (Hemerijck et al., 2013, p. 35). The main lines of 
intervention in the years to follow have been four. A. Several measures were 
introduced to make the labour market more flexible and to balance the social 
protection between permanent and temporary workers. B. The social spending went 
through a process of rationalization and general reduction. A means-tested social 
assistance scheme (Renta Activa de Inserción) was implemented as well as the 
activation and formation of programs for the unemployed. Moreover, selective 
outsourcings and privatizations took place in the public welfare services. C. On the 
institutional level, the welfare services, including healthcare, education, care services 
were increasingly decentralized. D. Important measures were implemented to favour 
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gender equality and the reconciliation of work and family life (Rodríguez Cabrero, 
2011).  
The effort to modernize and recalibrate the Spanish welfare state has been 
severely affected by the economic crisis that has affected the country since late 2007. 
The general budgetary cuts imposed by the economic situation signified a reduction of 
social expenditure, the termination of many social programs, a further flexibilization 
of the labour market, and a revision of the pension schemes (Hemerijck et al., 2013, 
pp. 34–37).  
Three features characterize the contemporary Spanish welfare regime: first, the 
importance of the social security contributory system and the redistributive pension 
scheme; second, the existence of a universal system of education and healthcare not 
linked to labour participation; third, the still uneven and fragmentary development of 
the social assistance service. On the whole, then, as pointed out by Rodriguéz 
Cabrero, the Spanish welfare state has become “a consolidated medium-sized mixed 
welfare state with social spending levels below the EU-15 mean” (Rodríguez Cabrero, 
2011, p. 25). Notwithstanding the important advancements in the last two decades, “it 
is the Bismarckian strand that still dominates the system as a whole; that is to say, 
what position in the labour market still counts more than citizenship, need or 
exclusion” (Rodríguez Cabrero, 2011, p. 34).  
For the immigrant population, these characteristics of the Spanish welfare state 
have produced ambivalent results (J. Moreno & Bruquetas, 2012). On the one hand, 
universal access to education, healthcare and other social services for migrants, 
including those with an irregular status, has been exceptionally inclusive. Yet, access 
to healthcare was eliminated in 2012. On the other, the importance of the social 
security model and the fragmentary development of social assistance programs, have 
certainly be an element of weakness, especially if we consider the high levels of 
immigrant unemployment. 
 
5.3.6. Politics, public opinion, migration 
Although definitely recent in the history of Spain, the migration phenomenon has 
strongly impacted its society. Statistics allow us to clearly measure the magnitude and 
speed of this change. In the lapse of two decades, the country passed from being a net 
emigration sender to being the second largest recipient of immigrants in the world, 
just behind the United States. In the decade of the 2000s, new arrivals reached 
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extraordinary numbers. In ten years the foreign population gained over 5 million 
individuals and their share of the total population grew from just under 4% to more 
than 14%. 
While this spectacular transformation has certainly raised the attention of the 
public opinion and has materially changed the social landscape in many areas of the 
country, it has not led to significant anxiety or backlash.  As pointed out by Arango: 
“Immigration was seen as a requirement of the labour market, an outcome of the 
economic progress, and perhaps even a sign of modernity” (Arango, 2013, p. 3). In 
his analysis, three arguments are proposed to support this claim. On the one hand, 
public opinion surveys have generally shown low, although slowly rising, levels of 
concern (Cea D’Ancona, 2011; Cea D’Ancona & Valles Martínez, 2013). There have 
been punctual moments in which the attention has risen, like during the Cayucos 
crisis (Cayucos are the small boats used by irregular migrants to reach the Spanish 
coasts) in 2006, but these have been rather exceptional. On the other hand, there has 
been no politicization of the issue. In Spain, until this day, no xenophobic or anti-
immigration political party has obtained noteworthy consensus either at a national or 
at a regional level. The only exception, Plataforma for Catalunya, has not had any 
representatives at provincial, regional or national level. More in general, no party has 
used the anti-immigration discourse as part of its electoral strategy. Finally, and in 
connection to the previous point, “immigration policies have tended to be open, and 
integration efforts sustained and comprehensive” (Arango, 2013, p. 4). The efforts of 
the Spanish government, in contrast to what has been the general trend at a European 
level, have not included shutting down entry channels for migration. Instead, they 
have tried to improve the legal channels for immigrant workers and to establish 
permanent mechanisms for individual regularization (Arango, 2013, pp. 3–5).  
As for integration policies, the Spanish government has shown strong 
commitment to immigrant integration (for a discussion of the different stands of the 
integration policy, see: Aja, Arango, & Oliver Alonso, 2012). Integration plans have 
been gradually developed at a national, regional and municipal level since the 1990s. 
Important consultative institutions, such as the Permanent Observatory for 
Immigration and the Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants, have been 
created. In particular, the Forum, composed of nongovernmental organizations, 
immigrant associations, trade unions, employers’ federations and the administration, 
has played a key role in orientating integration policies. The general orientation of 
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integration policies has focused on the social and labour inclusion of the newcomers. 
Although there have been debates on the issue, until this day the Spanish approach 
has not followed the expanding trend to ask immigrants to pass language or civic 
knowledge tests.  
Many observers expected that the positive attitude towards migration would have 
been negatively affected by the economic crisis. The impact of the economic crisis 
was indeed especially severe in Spain, and affected dramatically the immigrant 
population. Yet, as underlined by Arango, this circumstance “has not significantly 
altered social attitudes towards immigration, and immigration and integration policies 
have remained basically unchanged until now” (Arango, 2013, p. 6). Modifications to 
the migration regime (2009 and 2011), have not significantly altered liberal admission 
policies. Integration policies have been severely affected by the budgetary cuts 
introduced by the government at all levels; however, there have not been ideological 
reorientations or restrictive attitudes (Arango et al., 2014). An important exception to 
this generally preservative trend, was the approval in 2012 of a legislative decree 
which excluded irregular migrants, with certain exceptions (minors, pregnant women 
and emergency cases) from having the possibility to access public healthcare. 
Nevertheless, the application of this modification has encountered widespread social 
opposition and many regions have refused to operate it. 
Arango has proposed three explanations for this generally positive attitude of the 
public and of the political world towards migration (Arango, 2013, pp. 9–12). On the 
one hand, the relative novelty of immigration to Spain and its high rate of labour 
participation have, for the moment, limited social conflicts. On the other, the peculiar 
historical and political evolution of Spain and, in particular, the recent regaining of 
democracy in the late 1970s, has contributed to generating a majoritarian political 
culture strongly influenced by democratic, egalitarian and universalist values. Finally, 
the absence of a militant national identity, motivated both by the multinational 
character of the country and the negative association of nationalism with the Franco 
regime, has inhibited ideas or feelings of immigration as a cultural threat.  
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5.4. Conclusion: assessing contextual differences 
5.4.1. Migration history and contemporary trends 
Figure No. 5.20 shows an important difference between the Netherlands and 
Spain with regard to their immigration history. While the former is considered an old 
country of immigration, where second and third generations of migrants have grown 
up, the latter has a recent, although faster, migration history.  
The Netherlands had a consistent immigrant population already in the 1960s, 
when it represented 4% of the total population. After a slight reduction in the 1970s, 
the share started to rapidly grow. In 1990, 8% of the population was born abroad. 
From that moment on, this share constantly rose, yet at a slower rate. In 2012, this 
was slightly below 12%.  
In Spain, instead, the immigrant population remained under 2% until the 1990s. 
From that moment on, and especially after 1998, however, a spectacular increase took 
place. In ten years, between 2000 and 2010, the immigrant population passed from 
5% to above 14%. 
 
Figure No. 5.20 – Share of immigrant population over total population 
Data from: OECD. 
 
Also regarding the recent immigration trends, the Netherlands and Spain display 
a very different picture (see Figure No. 5.22). While fluxes to the former have 
maintained relatively stable averaging 90,000-100,000 new entries per year, the latter 
has experienced a “prodigious decade” (Arango, 2010, p. 54) of immigration. 
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Figure No. 5.22 – Inflow of foreign population (1998-2012) 
Data from: OECD. 
 
5.4.2. Irregular migration estimations and trends 
The available estimations of irregular migration for the Netherlands and Spain in 
the decade of the 2000s display important differences regarding both their magnitude 
and trend. The maximum share of irregular migrants over the total foreign population 
was reached in the Netherlands in 2002 when it represented 30%. From that year on, a 
gradual but continuous reduction has taken place, and, in 2009, irregularity counted 
only for 15%. In Spain, it is possible to distinguish two different phases. Until 2005, 
irregular migration had a growing trend and was a huge phenomenon. The peak was 
touched in 2003 when the share rounded 50%, just like in the next two years. Between 
2005 and 2007, there was a reduction of the stock of irregular migrants of almost 30 
points, certainly the effect of the regularization of 2005 and the automatic 
regularization of Rumanians and Bulgarians in 2007. In years to follow, irregular 
migration in Spain has stabilized and appears to be slowly falling. 
 
Figure No. 5.24 – Irregular migration share over total foreigners 
 Own elaboration, data from: INDIAC – NL EMN NCP (2012), Eurostat, INE, MESS.  
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5.4.3. Migration Regime 
In Table No. 5, a synoptic comparison of the actual migration regimes in the 
Netherlands and Spain is presented, with a specific focus on those elements that 
directly or indirectly affect the irregular migration phenomenon. Although in both 
countries legislation regarding migration has been continuously evolving, it is 
important to make a distinction as regards the extent of the changes in the period of 
our concern (1998-2013). While in the Netherlands, a number of modifications were 
introduced, it is possible to say that the basic normative model has been the same. In 
Spain, on the contrary, a crucial revision of the normative model took place in 2004, 
so a clear distinction is possible between the period before and after that year. 
As regards the actual migration regimes, at least as they appear on paper, and 
focusing on those aspects especially important in relation to irregular migration, three 
fundamental differences stand out between the Netherlands and Spain. 
Firstly, there is an important difference concerning the available channels for 
legal entry. Considering labour migration for unskilled-workers, the Netherlands has a 
generally (there are limited exceptions) very strict, labour-check based, language and 
civic test limited admission policy. Spain has a flexible, labour-demand based 
admission policy. As for asylum policy, the Netherland has historically had generous, 
open policies with high degrees of demand acceptance (yet, this policy has become 
increasingly strict since the 2000s); Spain has historically had a very restrictive 
asylum policy with low numbers of demand acceptance.   
Secondly, the Netherlands has had an exceptionally limited extraordinary 
regularization policy and has no permanent regularization schemes; Spain adopted 
recurrent, massive extraordinary regularization processes until 2005 and since 2004 it 
has had a permanent regularization scheme at an individual level. 
Thirdly, the two countries have had very different approaches to internal 
migration control policies. In this respect, however, especially since 2005, Spain has 
been gradually moving in a direction closer to the Dutch one. In the Netherlands, 
since the late 1990s, there has been a comprehensive policy to dissuade irregular 
residence and work, and to enhance repatriations. The three pillars of this strategy 
have been: the exclusion of irregular migrants from social services and, in particular, 
from healthcare; tougher labour market controls (more inspections, assessing control 
responsibility to employers, higher fines); the improvement of identification 
technologies, detention facilities and re-admission agreements to improve expulsions. 
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In Spain, a wide-ranging policy to dissuade irregular residence and work through 
internal controls has been incrementally constructed only since 2004. The pillars of 
Table No. 5 – Synoptic comparison: migration regime and irregular migration (until 2013) 
 Netherlands Spain 
Irregular migration status • Not a criminal offence • Not a criminal offence 
Legal Entry 
Channels 
Labour 
migration 
a. Only if a Dutch or EU job 
seeker is not available. 
• Temporary work permit + 
temporary residence permits 
required before leaving home 
country. 
b. Special schemes for large 
companies. 
c. Special rules for highly-skilled 
migrants. 
 
 
 
• Civic and language test 
required. 
a. Individual. If the job is included in 
a shortage list, an employer can 
directly make an offer and the job 
seeker can apply for a visa 
(Regimen General). 
b. Collective. Group recruitment, for 
specific jobs, from countries with a 
bilateral agreement (Contigente). 
c. Job search visa. Visas are granted 
to job seekers for specific sectors. 
d. Special rules for highly-skilled 
migrants. 
 
• No civic and language tests 
required. 
Asylum seekers • Generous policy, high 
numbers. 
• Limited policy, low numbers.  
Regularization  
Policy 
Extraordinary 
/ Massive 
• 1975 (15,000);  
• 1979 (1,800);  
• 1991 (2,000);  
• 1999 (1,800);  
• 2007 (27,.500) 
• 1985-86 (23,000);  
• 1991 (110,000);  
• 1996 (22,000);  
• 2000 (152,207) 
• 2000 re-examination (36,013); 
• 2001 (24,352); 
• 2001 (157,883); 
• 2005 (578,375). 
Total: 48,100 Total: 1,103,830 
Permanent / 
Individual 
• Not available • Available (Arraigo) 
Naturalization Through 
residence 
• 5 years of legal residence, 
proficiency in Dutch, 
knowledge of Dutch society 
(citizenship tests) 
• 10 years of legal residence. 
• 2 years of legal residence for 
citizens of Latin American 
countries, Andorra, the 
Philippines, Equatorial Guinea or 
Portugal 
Through 
marriage 
• With a Dutch citizen. 
• With a EU-country citizen 
• With a Spanish citizen. 
• With a EU-country citizen. 
Internal 
Control 
Policies 
Access to social 
services for 
illegal migrants 
• Education: free until 18 years 
of age. 
• Healthcare: free only for 
emergency cases. 
• Education: free until 18 years of 
age. 
• Healthcare: free for irregular 
migrants until 2012. 
• Other social services. 
Labour 
Inspection 
• Strict since 1998 • Moderately strict since 2005. 
Expulsions • Increasingly since the 2000s • Increasingly effective since 2005. 
Random 
checks for 
documentation 
purposes 
• Not available. • Sporadic. 
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this strategy have been: the toughening of labour market controls and the 
improvement of expulsions policies. Contrary to the Dutch case, no exclusion policy 
was enforced until 2012 and irregular migrants were able to freely access the public 
healthcare system and other social services. 
Focusing on the effectiveness of the expulsion policy, the available data (see 
Figure No. 5.25), show similar trends between the two countries and moderately 
higher numbers for Spain. If we consider the number of expulsions and the estimated 
irregular migrant population, with the available data, a direct comparison is only 
possible for years 2005 and 2009. In 2005, the expulsion rate was 6.9% in the 
Netherlands, and 0.7% in Spain; in 2009, 7.4% and 2.0% respectively. 
 
Figure No. 5.25 – Expulsions 
Data from: NL (Data for Netherlands: 2005-2007, Leerkes and Broeders 2010, 2013; 2008-
2013, Ministry of the Interior. Data for Spain: Ministerio de Interior). 
 
5.4.4. Economics, labour market and underground economy 
As one can observe (see Figure No. 5.26), the GDP of the two countries, between 
1998 and 2013, shows different trends in the first years, until 2006, and a more similar 
picture in the years after that. In particular, the Spanish economy had an outstanding 
performance between 1997 and 2007 with yearly increases constantly above 3%. In 
the same years, the Dutch economy had a much more ambivalent performance, 
especially in 2002 and 2003, when the GDP stagnated. The effects of the economic 
crisis struck the two economies severely in 2009. From that year on, the Netherlands 
had a slight recovery in 2010 and 2011, but the economy receded again in 2012 and 
2013; the Spanish GDP, in contrast, never turned positive and was strongly affected 
by the new recession in 2012. 
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Figure No. 5.26 – GDP annual variation 
 
 Data from: OECD. 
 
Considering the labour market (see Figure No. 5.27), the pictures of the two 
countries are very different. The Netherland had a very stable tendency. Employment 
grew slightly, while unemployment had little variations. Spain, on the contrary, 
created more than 6.5 million new jobs between 1998 and 2008. Almost half of those, 
however, were destroyed during the years of the economic crisis. Unemployment 
followed a similar trend, yet the effects of the crisis were even more marked. Between 
2007 and 2013, almost 4 million individuals were registered on the unemployment 
lists. 
 
Figure No. 5.27 – Total employment and total unemployment 
Data from: OECD 
-5% 
-4% 
-3% 
-2% 
-1% 
0% 
1% 
2% 
3% 
4% 
5% 
6% 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
20
11
 
20
12
 
20
13
 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
16 
18 
20 
22 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
20
11
 
20
12
 
20
13
 
M
ill
io
ns
 
	   214 
In Figure No. 5.28 it is possible to observe the significant relevance that 
foreigners played in the expansion of the Spanish labour market. While in the 
Netherland the share of foreign workers remained stable, in Spain between 1999 and 
2009 it passed from around 1% to more than 10%.  
 
Figure No. 5.28 – Stocks of foreign-born labour 
 Data from: OECD.  
 
The shadow economy followed a similar slowly-decreasing trend in both 
countries (see Figure No. 5.29). The size of the phenomenon, nevertheless, is 
significantly different. In Spain the shadow economy on average was 10% greater 
than in the Netherlands. 
   
Figure No. 5.29  – Shadow economy 
 Data from: (Schneider et al., 2010, 2015) 
 
These data (GDP trends, employment and unemployment, foreigners in the 
labour market, shadow economy size) combined with those previously analysed on 
the different sectorial structure of the two labour markets (with a marked low-skilled 
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orientation of the Spanish one) reasonably suggest that the Spanish economy has been 
much more attractive for irregular migrants that the Dutch one. 
 
5.4.5. Welfare state 
The Dutch and Spanish welfare states were both originally placed under the 
heading of the so-called Conservative welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990). It was 
in relation to the important differences existing between the northern and southern 
European countries pertaining to this cluster, of which the Netherlands and Spain are 
each paradigmatic examples, that Ferrera, in 1996, proposed the need of a fourth 
cluster of welfare states, the Southern or Mediterranean one. What the interesting and 
on-going scholarly debate about the pertinence of this new category indicates is that 
the existing differences are all but marginal. 
Comparing the Dutch and Spanish welfare states, a first element of difference is 
purely quantitative. As one can observe (see Figures No. 5.30 and 5.31), considering 
both the total expenditure per head and this as a percentage of the GDP, the 
Netherlands spent constantly and considerably more than Spain did, although there 
was a slow process of convergence. 
 
Figure No. 5.30  – Social expenditure per head at constant prices in US dollars 
 Data from: Eurostat.  
 
Figure No. 5.31 – Social expenditure as percentage of the GDP 
Data from: Eurostat 
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Figure No. 5.32 – Sickness and healthcare spending as percentage of the GDP
Data from: Eurostat 
Figure No. 5.33 – Spending of old-age pensioners as percentage of the GDP
Data from: Eurostat 
Figure No. 5.34 – Unemployment as percentage of the GDP 
 
Data from: Eurostat 
 
Figure No. 5.35 – Social exclusion spending as percentage of the GDP 
 
Data from: Eurostat 
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In Figures No. 5.32, 5.33, 5.34, 5.35, it is possible to observe the social spending 
in the two countries in disaggregated terms. Each sector follows the general trend of 
the total figures. The only sector in which Spain spent more than the Netherlands is 
for the unemployment benefits. This is easily related to the different numerical 
relevance of the unemployed population. Noteworthy is also the case of Social 
Exclusion spending (Figure No. 5.35) where a huge distance is observable between 
the two countries. 
Hemerijck and his colleagues, more so on a qualitative level, have recently 
compared the welfare policies of the Netherlands and Spain (Hemerijck et al., 2013, 
pp. 8–9). In Table No. 5, it is possible to see the result of their comparison.  
 
Table No. 5 – Core principles of welfare regimes (Hemerijck et al. 2013)  
 Netherlands Spain 
Welfare regime 
type 
• Continental • Southern 
Core values • Status preservation (equivalence 
principle) 
• Status preservation and 
differentiation 
Objective • Income maintenance • Income maintenance 
Social rights • Employment based entitlements • Insider biased entitlements. 
Employment • Ambiguous work ethic 
(differences between 
Catholicism, Lutheranism and 
Calvinism) 
• Full male employment 
• Weak work ethic 
 
 
 
• Full male employment 
Gender • Nuclear family as cornerstone of 
society 
• Extended family as core welfare 
provider 
Basis of entitlement • Work/family needs • Insider/family needs 
Responsibility • Collective • Collective 
Policy legacies, institutions and instruments of welfare regimes 
Social security • Social insurance financed high 
(contribution contingent) 
transfers (long duration) 
 
• Separate public social assistance 
• Social insurance financed 
fragmented transfers (long 
duration) 
 
• No additional safety net 
Labour market 
policy / regulation  
• Strong job protection, no active 
market labour policy 
• Strong job protection, no active 
labour market policy 
Family support • Passive, but generous • Passive, but limited 
Beneficiaries • Male breadwinners • Labour market insiders 
Actors in provision • State secondary to the social 
partners (tripartims) and nuclear 
family (subsidiary) 
• Intermediary groups 
• Central role extended family 
(state rudimentary) 
• Voluntary (church) organizations 
Industrial relation • Sectorial-inclusive labour 
relation (wide coverage) 
• Politicized sector- and firm-
based labour relations 
(fragmented coverage) 
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As can be observed, many relevant differences have been pinpointed. Whereas 
both welfare states have undergone processes of recalibration in recent decades, the 
Dutch government has been more effective in moving away from the limitations of 
the conservative model. In this respect, a number of important reforms have been 
introduced with the double objective of more efficient and universal social services, 
and a more flexible, yet supported, labour market (flexsecurity). In Spain, while 
important efforts have been made and noteworthy results have been attained, for 
instance, in the inclusion of women in the labour market, there is still “the 
Bismarckian strand that still dominates the system as a whole; that is to say, what 
position in the labour market still counts more than citizenship, need or exclusion” 
(Rodríguez Cabrero, 2011, p. 34). 
 
5.4.6. Politics, public opinion, migration 
Concerning the relation between politics, public opinion and migration, and given 
the complexity and sensitivity of the issue, it is certainly not easy to produce a concise 
comparison between the Netherlands and Spain. We will therefore limit ourselves to 
advancing an impressionistic evaluation of the general trends based on the elements 
that emerged in the analysis previously advanced. 
Following the analysis proposed by Arango, and using three elements (the public 
concern over migration, the politicization of immigration and the success of eventual 
populist parties and the orientation of recent policy reforms and interventions in the 
immigration field) as a criterion to assess the general socio-political attitude towards 
migration, the Netherlands and Spain present a different picture. 
Although the Netherlands had been a destination country beginning in the 1960s, 
migration became an issue of public and political concern in the 1990s. Since then 
and also in connection with a number of dramatic episodes at an international and 
national level, the social and political attitude towards migration has been increasingly 
complicated. The emergence of populist anti-immigration parties and their political 
success throughout the 2000s, whether they are interpreted as a response to social 
anxiety or as its cause, certainly indicate a changed climate. Also considering the 
policies adopted since the 1990s, an increasingly restrictive attitude is evident. This 
has affected both migration control policies and integration policies. The former have 
been improved in a number of sectors. The objectives have been: to curtail entry 
channels both for legal and illegal migration, to discourage irregular residence and 
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work, and to make expulsions an effective policy. As regards integration policies, 
both a discursive and practical departure from the multiculturalist paradigm has taken 
place. The new direction puts emphasis on civic and cultural integration and the 
acceptance of Dutch values as a necessary requirement for current and future 
immigrants. 
The case of Spain has provided a different picture. It is certainly important to 
remember that the years in which migration emerged as a social problem in the 
Netherlands were the years in which it appeared as a social phenomenon in Spain. 
Yet, although conflictive episodes and moments of public concern over migration 
have existed, the general social climate towards migration can be judged as positive. 
No populist, anti-immigration parties or discourses have emerged. This has translated 
into an open policy towards migration, which has centred on creating legal channels 
for labour migration and fostering the integration of the newcomers.  
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Table No.6 – Synoptic comparison: the Netherlands and Spain 
 Netherlands Spain 
Migration 
trends 
Historical • Old country of migration (first, 
second and third generations) 
• Recent country of migration (first, 
forming second generation) 
1998-2013 • Average 90,000 per year. • Average 476,000 per year. 
Irregularity • Moderate until 2002, low 
afterwards. 
• Very high until 2005, moderate 
until 2007, low afterwards. 
Ecuadorians • Very small community (3,000) • Very big community (400,000) 
Migration 
Regime 
Legal channels • Narrow labour migration channels.  
 
 
• Broad asylum seeker channels. 
• Narrow labour migration channels 
(until 2004); Flexible labour 
migration channels (from 2005). 
 
• Narrow asylum seeker channels. 
Regularization • Very sporadic and limited 
regularizations 
• No permanent regularization 
schemes. 
• Recurrent, massive regularizations 
 
• Available permanent regularization 
schemes. 
Internal 
controls 
• Strict after 1998 
• Irregular migrants excluded from 
healthcare and other social services 
since 1998. 
• Increasingly strict after 2005 
• Irregular migrants excluded from 
healthcare since 2012. 
Economy, 
labour 
market, 
shadow 
economy 
GDP • Booming economy 1994-2000 and 
2006-2007 (GDP over 2.5%). 
• Mild economic crisis since 2009.  
• Booming economy1995-2007 
(GDP over 2.5%) 
 
• Deep economic crisis since 2009. 
Labour market • Slow growth of total employment. 
 
 
 
 
• Unemployment: stable, very low 
unemployment  
• Huge creation of jobs between 1998 
and 2007 (+6.5 millions). Huge 
destruction of jobs between 2008 
and 2013 (-3.4 millions) 
 
• Unemployment: significantly 
decreasing until 2007; steeply rising 
in the years to follow. 
Sectors • Limited low-skilled sectors • Important low-skilled sectors. 
Shadow 
economy 
• 14% to 9% • 24% to 19%. 
Welfare 
state 
Type • Conservative • Southern/Mediterranean 
Main 
principles 
• Social insurance + Social assistance • Social insurance 
% of GDP • Between 25% and  30% • Between 20% and  25% 
Main universal 
services  
• Education, Healthcare, Old age 
pensions, Old age assistance 
• Education, Healthcare, Old age 
pensions 
Politics, 
public 
opinion, 
migration 
Anti-
immigration 
discourses and 
political parties 
• Increasing importance of anti-
immigration discourses in public 
and political debates. 
• Anti-immigration parties in the 
Parliament and in the Government. 
• No anti-immigrant discourses at a 
national level. 
• No anti-immigrant parties.  
Public concern 
over migration 
• High to moderate. • Low to moderate. 
Restrictive 
integration 
policies 
• Increasingly restrictive policies 
since 1990s. 
• Liberal policies until 2012; then 
increasingly restrictive. 	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6. ECUADORIAN IRREGULAR MIGRANTS IN AMSTERDAM 
AND MADRID 
 
In this chapter we will present the results of the fieldwork realized in Amsterdam 
and Madrid. In particular, using the stories and information collected with the 
methodologies described in chapter 4, we will comparatively analyse the experience 
of Ecuadorian irregular migrants in the two cities.  
The objective of the fieldwork was to present the main characteristics of the 
social experience of Ecuadorian irregular migrants in the two cities. In this respect, 
we analysed the collected material in each context and looked for possible 
regularities, behavioural patterns, and common experiences among migrants. Then we 
systematically compared these results and tried to identify differences and similarities. 
The analysis of the experience of irregular migrants was divided into two parts. 
Firstly, we tried to identify the main “legal trajectories” irregular migrants followed in 
the two contexts. In particular, we tried to find recurring patterns regarding both the 
length of the irregular status condition within the migratory trajectories and channels 
and strategies adopted by migrants to regularize. Secondly, we tried to figure out what 
the living conditions of the migrants were when their status was irregular, and what 
the main related problems and the possible solutions were. Our analysis has focused 
on four areas: A. regularization strategies; B. work; C. internal control experience; C. 
housing and healthcare. In the conclusion, through a systematic and comparative 
analysis of the collected information, we proposed a general characterization of the 
irregular migration experience in the two cities. 
Given the great amount of information collected, and its extreme richness, we had 
to carefully select it. Inevitably, this process implied discarding interesting material 
and avoiding the discussion of many issues that emerged from the fieldwork. The 
selection was guided by two principles. On the one hand, we privileged the material 
that was closely related to the phenomenon of our interest. On the other hand, we put 
emphasis on those issues that could be compared more easily.  
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6.1. Legal trajectories and regularization channels 
In this section we will devote our attention to the legal trajectories followed by 
Ecuadorian migrants in the two cities and to the available regularization channels. The 
concept of “legal trajectories” places the evolution of the migratory experience of 
migrants in relation to the administrative status allocated to them by the receiving 
states. We asked the migrants interviewed to recall their migratory stories, taking into 
consideration the evolution of their legal status and the main legal transitions they had 
gone through. Our goal was to identify recurrent patterns concerning the length of the 
irregular condition, the channels used to regularize and the relevance of irregularity in 
their migratory trajectories. 
 
6.1.1. Legal trajectories and regularization channels in Amsterdam 
Among the 30 Ecuadorian migrants interviewed in the city of Amsterdam, it was 
possible to identify 6 different legal trajectories (see Figure No. 6.1). Two of these (A, 
B) were largely predominant; the other 2 represented minor, exceptional cases (C, D). 
 
A. Never Regular 
The first legal trajectory concerned the highest number of the interviewed 
migrants: 15 cases out of a total of 30. Although having resided, on average, 13 years 
in Amsterdam, the migrants of this group were not able to find any effective channel 
to regularize their status. In the majority of cases, they had implemented different 
strategies on numerous occasions to attain their goal, but their efforts were fruitless. 
Consequently, their administrative status has been irregular all along their migratory 
experience. 
 
B. Regularized through marriage or cohabitation agreements 
In numerical terms, this group counted 11 cases out of a total of 30. This 
trajectory sharply differs from the previous one; all migrants of this group were able 
to regularize at some point of their migratory experience. On average, the time needed 
to get a residence permit was approximately 8 years. The regularization channels used 
by this group of migrants were marriage (7) or cohabitation agreements 
(samenwonen) (4). In three cases, the migrants were eventually able to get a Dutch 
passport. 
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C. Regularized under exceptional circumstances  
One migrant was able to regularize thanks to having legally worked for 8 years. 
After having overstayed her visa and lived irregularly for one year, in 1992, Marta 
(24NW) was hired by an oil production company to work as a hostess in their 
offshore platforms in the North Sea. The working contract offered her the possibility 
to eventually get a permanent residence permit after 8 years. 
Another migrant was part of a group of almost 20 Ecuadorian indigenous 
musicians who obtained a permanent residence permit because they were involved in 
the “El Al Flight 1862” airplane accident. On 4 October 1992, a cargo aircraft crashed 
into a residential building in the Bijlmermeer neighbourhood. The great number of 
irregularly residing migrants involved in the accident, pushed the Dutch authorities to 
concede a residence permit on a humanitarian basis to all the migrants affected by the 
accident. 
 
D. Children of irregular migrants who become of age 
A slightly different trajectory involved two of the interviewed migrants. They 
were both children of Ecuadorian irregular migrants. One of them was born in the 
Netherlands. Since their parents did not have a residence permit, also their status was 
irregular. However, until their 18th birthday, while they did not have a residence 
permit, they could access public education and their lives were very similar to those 
of their schoolmates. The day after, they became “fully irregular”, in the sense that 
they had to quit their studies and face all the difficulties connected with the lack of a 
permit. 
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Figure No. 6.1 – Legal trajectories and regularization channels in Amsterdam 
 
Legend: on the left the code and gender of the interviewed (light blue - men, rose – women), in 
parenthesis the age; in yellow the years in Ecuador; in red the years with irregular status in 
Amsterdam; in green the years with regular status in Amsterdam; in blue and white lines the 
years with Dutch citizenship. The red line indicated the introduction of visa request for 
Ecuadorians. 
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6.1.2. Legal trajectories and regularization channels in Madrid  
Among the 30 Ecuadorian migrants interviewed in the city of Madrid, it was 
possible to identify 3 different legal trajectories (See Figure No. 6.2). The first of 
these was largely predominant (A), the second represented a minor, yet relevant case 
(B), and the third was rather exceptional (C) (see Figure No. 6.2). 
 
A. Regularized using legal channels 
The migrants who followed the first trajectory were the large majority of the 
sample; they were 21 out of 30. The common character of their trajectory was the 
effective and lasting regularization of their status using the ad-hoc legal channels. On 
average, the time needed to get a residence permit was 4 years. Regarding the type of 
channels, there were three available options: A. Extraordinary massive regularizations 
(14 cases); B. Regularization through work quotas (Contigente) (5 cases); C. 
Regularization through rootedness (Arraigo) (5 cases). 13 migrants within this group 
obtained Spanish citizenship. 
 
B. Befallen irregularity 
The second trajectory, which concerned 6 migrants out of 30, was characterized 
by an initial phase of irregularity, a subsequent regularization through one of the 
available channels, and, finally, a return to irregularity. In all six cases, the return to 
the irregular status was determined by the impossibility of the migrants to renew their 
residence permit. The causes of such impossibility differed. In 4 cases, the migrants 
committed a crime after their regularization and when they had to renew their permit, 
they could not fulfil the clean police record requirement (the felonies were: assault on 
a public officer, driving under the influence (2) and domestic violence). In the other 
two cases, the migrants could not renew their permit because they did not have the 
required job offer. 
 
C. Never regular 
Three interviewed migrants were never able to regularize their administrative 
status. In one case, the migrant could not fulfil the clean police record requirement 
when he tried to regularize. In the other two cases, the migrants arrived in Spain after 
the last extraordinary regularization and they were never able to get a job offer that 
allowed them to use the arraigo channel. 
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Figure No. 6.2 – Legal trajectories and regularization channels in Madrid 
 
Legend: on the left the code and gender of the interviewed (light blue - men, rose – women), in 
parenthesis the age; in yellow the years in Ecuador; in red the years with irregular status in 
Madrid; in green the years with regular status in Madrid; in yellow and red lines the years with 
Spanish citizenship. The red line indicates the introduction of visa request for Ecuadorians. The 
black lines the regularization processes of 2000 and 2005. 
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6.1.3. Comparison 
As can be observed, the legal trajectories followed by the interviewed Ecuadorian 
migrants in the cities of Amsterdam and Madrid display a number of significant 
differences. 
Firstly, the number of migrants who were never able to regularize their status 
sharply differs. In Amsterdam more than one half of the interviewed migrants (17) 
were never able to regularize their status. In Madrid, in contrast, almost all the 
interviewed migrants (27) were able to regularize their status at some point.  
Secondly, considering the length of the irregular phase within the whole 
migratory experience of the interviewed migrants, this averaged 12 years in 
Amsterdam and 5 in Madrid. For those who were able to regularize, the average time 
needed before getting papers was 8 years in Amsterdam and 4 in Madrid. 
Thirdly, regarding the naturalization of former irregular migrants, in Amsterdam 
this was the case for 3 migrants, while in Madrid for 13 migrants. 
Fourthly, excluding the exceptional cases, both in Amsterdam and Madrid, yet in 
very different proportions, it was possible to identify the never regular and the 
regularization trajectories. However, in the case of Madrid, a third relevant trajectory, 
not present in the Amsterdam case, appeared, i.e. the befallen irregularity trajectory. 
Fifthly, fundamental differences emerged also in relation to the available 
regularization channels. In Amsterdam, excluding the two-mentioned exceptional 
cases, all migrants used the marriage or the cohabitation channels to regularize. It is 
interesting to point out, that, while these paths are perfectly legal, they were not, at 
least in the Dutch-state intentions, intended as regularization channels. Instead, in 
Madrid, three, ad-hoc, regularization channels were available. All the interviewed 
migrants consolidated their administrative status using one of these. 
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6.2. Regularization strategies 
Generally, regularization is not the first priority among migrants. For the vast 
majority of the interviewed, both in Amsterdam and Madrid, the initial idea when 
they travelled was to “make money” and go back to their country after a couple of 
years. The “issue of the papers” was either absent in their minds or openly considered 
irrelevant.  
“I didn’t know about the papers, I didn’t care about the papers.. The only thing I 
wanted was to pay back the money of the loan, to earn enough to build a house in 
Ecuador and go back..”7 
 
“A friend of mine told me about the papers.. He said: I can help you to get the 
papers. I said: I do not want the papers, I have my job, I have my money, I will 
go back soon. What do I want the papers for?”8 
 
However, as the complexities of migration were revealed and it became apparent 
that return was not around the corner, all the migrants, although with different degrees 
of interest and determination, started to think about finding a way to regularize. 
Different reasons motivated this change of perspective. 
“I started to think about the papers and then the visa for Ecuadorians was 
introduced. I felt as if I was in a cage. I could not travel or go back to Ecuador 
because, if I left the Netherlands, I was not going to be able to come back. Then, I 
said to myself: I have to get the papers at all costs!”9. 
 
“When I saw that the time in the Netherlands was stretching, I said: I need the 
papers to bring my children. I expected to go back in two years but after that, I 
had not yet obtained what I wanted. I could not stay any longer without my 
children.”10 
 
“I need to get papers because our children are growing up. Now they can go to 
school, but I heard that when they turn 18, they will not be able to go to school 
anymore. We don’t want that; their education is the most important thing.. and 
they cannot go to Ecuador, they are Dutch, they don’t speak Spanish well.. I am 
desperately trying to find a way, but here it is not easy..”11 
 
“I cannot go back without the papers.. If you had children abroad.. your children 
were not born in Ecuador, they were raised here, Sooner or later they will need to 
go out.. If one day I want to go back to Ecuador and the kids want to stay here, I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Interview with Marco (13SM). Names are invented. The translation from Spanish is mine (the same if 
true for all the other cited interviews). For age and migratory history of each migrant check Figure 6.1 
and 6.2. 
8 Interview with Elisabeth (4NW). 
9 Interview with Mauricio (18NM).  
10 Interview with Soledad (9NW). 
11 Interview with Lucía (14NW). 
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don’t want to force them to go. I want to prevent them from having to live what 
we had to. Going to a country where you do not belong, is tough. If I have a 
European passport I can go, I know I like Ecuador, it is my country! But if they 
don’t like it, they can come back; they can study for career, you know, with a 
paper there is a guarantee.12 
 
“For me the most important limitation of not having papers is that you cannot 
study, you cannot progress. I don’t want to clean houses all my life.. It is 
frustrating to know that you have no future, that your ambitions are blocked 
there.. you want but you can’t. Then, for me the priority has always been to get 
the papers”. 
 
Once the papers become a priority, the role of family members, friends or other 
migrants, in providing the information about the options for regularization is 
fundamental. As a matter of fact, regularization channels, whether designed with that 
explicit purpose or not, in order to be effective, require a number of steps and 
fulfilments. Depending on the case, these can be relatively easy to accomplish or 
extremely difficult.  
In this section, we will focus on the main strategies developed by migrants to 
overcome the difficulties in order to regularize their status in Amsterdam and Madrid. 
 
6.2.1. Regularization strategies in Amsterdam 
As pointed out by Lucy (24NW), in the Netherlands, it is very difficult for a 
migrant to regularize his/her status.  
“The papers.. that is more than a problem in the Netherlands.. that is impossible 
here.. it is very difficult.. the only way is to get married, there is no other way. 
And also that is very hard, because they ask you hundreds of requirements. And 
now it is not even here, you have to go back and wait in your country. You have 
to pass an exam of the Dutch language that is very difficult. After all the years I 
have been here [22 years] I have not yet finished learning the language. Then, 
yes, to get papers is tough”13. 
 
“Here in the Netherlands you can do well.. The only thing that you can’t get are 
the papers.. that no! It is a question of the state.. of the law. They [the Dutch] 
don’t know the word legalization.. They did it, but a long time ago.. those who 
benefited were the Muslims.. a lot of them. But now they [the Muslim] don’t 
behave well, they want their traditions and are rebelling.. So, the Dutch said: No! 
No more! They stopped there.. now the laws are very tough.. Not because I have 
a Dutch passport, can I marry when I want and give papers to whoever I want.. 
The moment I decide to do that I have to fulfil a lot of requirements..”14 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Interview with Patricia (6NW). 
13 Interview with Lucy (24NW). 
14 Interview with Luis (28NM). 
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Excluding the exceptional cases, the only effective regularization channel has 
been through a recognized form of union (marriage or cohabitation agreements) with 
a Dutch or a European-Union citizen. The two options implied a number of complex 
procedures and specific requirements. In both cases, the citizenship holder had to earn 
enough to be able to support the new companion and to have a house with adequate 
space for two; the migrant had to live in the same house as the companion; both had 
to be unmarried and the new relationship had to be considered plausible by the 
authorities. 
According to the opinion of many migrants, the option to marry or sign a 
cohabitation agreement with a Dutch citizen has always been the most difficult one 
because the requirements were higher and strictly monitored. Moreover, it was 
necessary to go back to Ecuador and wait there for the approval of the process. Since 
the end of the 2000s, this option has become even harder because the migrants were 
required to pass a language exam before getting the residence permit. 
“The only way to get papers here is doing samenwonen [cohabitation 
agreement].., you cohabitate with someone and you get the papers.. But if you do 
it with a Dutch person, they send you to Ecuador to learn the language. No! Now 
the key to get papers here, the Dutch papers, is to find an Italian, a Spanish 
person or an Ecuadorian or Colombian who has Dutch papers.. I mean, that has a 
Dutch passport.. then you get married.. Not married, you do a samenwonen, as if 
you live together, they examine your case.. and ta, ta, ta you show that you live 
together.. you don’t need to get married, nothing, and they don’t send you to 
Ecuador..”15 
  
The best option, then, has always been to marry or sign a cohabitation agreement 
with a European citizen. The main advantage of this option was that it was not 
necessary to go back to Ecuador to wait for the visa. Another benefit was that the 
marriage could be contracted in another country, where the checks on salaries, houses, 
and veracity of the relationship were not so strict. Three of the interviewed migrants, 
for instance, travelled illegally to Spain to arrange the marriage there. Once the 
irregular migrant got the residence permit, it was enough to ask for recognition back 
in Amsterdam. 
“It is difficult to find a Dutch citizen willing to arrange a bogus marriage. Those 
who accept are always in bad conditions.. I mean, they are in drugs or have debts 
or are a bit crazy.. Dutch people in their right mind would not do that.. They are 
very serious. Those who can do that are Europeans. A lot of Spaniards, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Interview with José (22NM). 
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majority, Italians, French. But the majority are Spaniards. The majority of those 
who got papers here was because of relationships with Spaniards. Perhaps it is 
also because of the language or because in Spain there are a lot of Ecuadorians 
and it is easier to get contacts. Moreover, if you make a deal with a Dutch person, 
it is much more complicated.. You have to go back to Ecuador and that is a loss 
of time and money. Imagine. You have to go there, it can happen that you stay 2 
years, and that means 2 years not working. When you get back, you have lost all 
your work, you are at zero. In contrast, if you arrange with a European, as long as 
the bureaucratic process goes on, you can work, you keep producing”16.  
  
For few migrants (2) this type of union arrived as the coronation of a love story; 
for the majority of the interviewed (9), it was merely a regularization strategy. In this 
second case, the unions were arranged on the basis of solidarity (usually with friends 
or family members) (3) or, more often, as part of an economic transaction with the 
counterpart (6).  
The development of a “marriage market” emerged as an adaptive solution to the 
narrow regularization channels and the high demand for them. On the one hand, the 
necessity for migrants to regularize at all costs, makes it reasonable for them to 
“invest” significant amounts of money in order to achieve their goal. On the other 
hand, for citizenship holders, the option to make some “easy money” without much 
risk could be attractive. 
“Considering all costs, until now, I have spent almost 10,000 euro. Only to the 
girl I had to pay 8,000 euro, the rest has been for the lawyers.. Yet, I am happy 
now, I think it was a good investment”17. 
 
“It is not easy but you find someone. There are many girls and kids available. 
They used to charge you 5,000 but now it is 8,000, 9,000 euro. Right now for less 
than 9,000 you don’t find Dutch papers. If you have Dutch papers and you want 
to sell them to a girl, you know you have 10,000 euro..”18 
 
Yet, such transactions did not necessarily guarantee a good result. In many cases, 
the requirements were not met or the authorities suspected the veracity of the union. 
In those cases, new documents could be asked for or the permits could be simply 
denied. For the migrants, this could mean the beginning of a painful and costly Via 
Crucis of appeals and rejections that usually did not help them very much. Of course, 
once the deal was closed and the money paid, the outcome of the process was not a 
business of the vendor; for the migrants it was therefore impossible to get the money 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Interview with Maria (4NW). 
17 Interview with Manuel (20NM). 
18 Interview with José (22NM). 
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back or to retaliate somehow. In this type of transaction, the condition of legal 
weakness of the irregular migrants created the conditions for frauds.  
 
6.2.2. Regularization strategies in Madrid 
In Madrid, the availability of a number of effective ad-hoc regularization 
channels, made it a lot easier for Ecuadorian migrants to normalize their status. 
“For me it was very easy to regularize. After some three months working for a 
construction company, my boss said to me: do you want papers? I said: yes! I 
went to ask what I had to do at the foreign office. They said that what was needed 
was the registration to the municipal record and work contract and that my boss 
went there. I had already enrolled in the municipal register, because, everyone 
told you to register the day after arriving in Spain. So my boss went with the 
contract and everything was arranged. I had to go to Ecuador to pick up the visa, 
that was the only problem. But everything went well and after three months I 
already had my residence permit”19 
 
“With the extraordinary regularizations, it was super easy to get papers. You did 
not even need to go back to Ecuador. All you needed was the municipal record 
and a job.. The only problem was to get the criminal record from Ecuador.. I 
thought it was not going to arrive in time, my sister helped me in Quito..”20 
 
The three fundamental requirements, common to all the three previously 
mentioned legal schemes, were: the possession of a job offer, the presence in Spain 
before a certain date and the holding of a clean criminal record. 
While these requirements were generally easy to fulfil, something that explains 
the high degree of regularization success, a number of strategies were developed in 
order to overcome possible problems. The requirement of a job offer in order to 
regularize and of a valid working contract in order to renew the residence permit, 
could be tricked with the use of false job offers or fake work contracts. In the latter 
case, the migrant would pay the social security and the contract costs to the employer 
so that he or she could pay them as if the migrant was effectively working. This type 
of strategy became particularly useful after the beginning of the economic crisis. The 
high levels of unemployment among migrants and the reduction of jobs more in 
general made it more difficult for migrants to satisfy the requests related to work. This 
affected both the regular migrants who had to renew their residence permit but no 
longer had a job, determining cases of befallen irregularity, and the irregular migrants 
who wanted to regularize using the rootedness channel (arraigo). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Interview with Juan (4SM). 
20 Interview with Lorena (25SW). 
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A distinction must be made regarding the criminal record issue. One of the main 
requirements needed to regularize through the extraordinary regularization processes 
was to present a document that certified that the migrant had not committed crimes in 
his origin country. If that was not the case, an option was to pay in Ecuador for a 
falsified criminal record. In the case of the renewal of a residence permit, instead, the 
requirement was not to have committed criminal offences in Spain. As we saw in the 
situations of the 4 cases of befallen irregularity for criminal precedents, for migrants 
who could not fulfil this requirement, there was no strategy available. 
“My residence permit expired three year ago.. Everything went well, until the 
third renewal. I went there with all my documentations, I was relaxed, I didn’t 
expect anything. Then they said that the permit was refused, that I had a problem 
because I had a criminal record. I was found driving under the influence of 
substances.. I could not believe it.. What happened was that once I was driving 
back home.. I had been drinking a few beers with my friends and the Civil Guard 
stopped me. We are talking about 2 years ago.. I had to do the alcohol test and I 
was above the limit. In that moment, I only had to pay a fine.. but they did not tell 
me that it would affect the papers.. but of course these things affect us.. At that 
point I could not do anything”21. 
 
6.2.3. Comparison 
A fundamental difference is observable between the strategies developed in 
Amsterdam and in Madrid.  
In Amsterdam, where no ad-hoc channels are available, the majority of migrants 
who wanted to regularize their status had to find alternative ways. This situation 
triggered the elaboration of complex and risky strategies. Migrants’ efforts focused on 
exploiting possible legal loopholes or finding ways to (mis-)use channels designed for 
other aims. The best example of this tendency was the use of marriage and 
cohabitation agreements as regularization channels. To this end, the strategies ranged 
from false unions with family members or friends, on a solidarity basis, to bogus 
unions with strangers, under payment. Another possibility was to travel illegally to 
countries where union requirements were softer and then to return to Amsterdam. A 
side effect, then, was the development of an underground business related to the 
papers and also the proliferations of frauds. 
In Madrid, the vast majority of migrants could regularize without much effort 
thanks to the existing ad-hoc channels. Particular strategies had to be developed only 
by those who could not fulfil the requirements of those channels. This was, for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Interview with Ricardo (30SM). 
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instance, the case for the migrants without a job offer or a work contract, or for those 
who had a criminal record. In the first case, the solution was fake contracts, in the 
second, the falsification of the documentation. However, certainly noteworthy, the 
adoption of this type of strategies involved just a minority of migrants. 
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6.3. Work 
In this section we will focus on the work experience of Ecuadorian irregular 
migrants in Amsterdam and Madrid. Given the fact that many migrants were able to 
regularize, we will focus our attention on their experience during the irregular phases 
of their migration trajectory. 
Three main aspects will be analysed: A. the sectors where they were able to find 
work and the working conditions; B. the working conditions; C. the experience of 
controls on the worksites and the possible strategies to avoid them. 
 
6.3.1. Work in Amsterdam 
Sectors 
Regarding the employment sectors of Ecuadorian irregular migrants in 
Amsterdam, a crucial element emerged from the fieldwork. If until the first years of 
the 2000s, both men and women had been able to find work in a relatively wide 
number of sectors, with the passing of time this number drastically fell to practically 
one sector. In 2013, among the 15 migrants who still had an irregular status, 12 
worked cleaning private houses, 2 worked in the construction sector and one worked 
as a domestic help in a private house taking care of children. 
During the 1990s and the early 2000s, Ecuadorian irregular migrants were able to 
find opportunities in numerous sectors. Even though it is not too marked, a certain 
gender distinction was observable. The interviewed men had been employed in: 
hotels, cleaning rooms; restaurants, as dishwashers or cooking assistants; the 
construction sector, mainly as labourers and painters; the cleaning sector, both in 
offices and private houses; the port, as loaders; on the streets, playing musical 
instruments and selling handcraft products. Women had been employed in: hotels, 
cleaning rooms; restaurants, as dishwashers or cooking assistants; the cleaning sector, 
both in offices and private houses; as domestic help in private houses; on the streets, 
selling handcraft products. In many cases, the migrants had more than one job. A 
recurrent practice, especially among those who had a job with shifts, for instance, in 
restaurants or hotels, was to supplement their income by going to clean private houses 
in their free time. 
From the early 2000s, the employment opportunities for irregular migrants started 
to fall. In many sectors, it became increasingly difficult to find work. Employers were 
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no longer eager to employ migrants with an irregular status. For those migrants who 
had been working for a long time with the same employer, it was easier to keep their 
occupation. For those who had been fired and had to find a new employment the 
doors once open were now closed. This phenomenon was particularly evident in the 
service sector, for instance, in restaurants and hotels, and in the construction sector. 
By the end of the 2000s, almost no irregular migrant was employed outside the 
private house cleaning sector. 
Asked about their opinion about the reasons for this change, the migrants offered 
two main explanations. The first was that, from a certain moment onwards, most 
employers stopped hiring irregular migrants. This was due to the increased fear of 
possible controls on the work sites and the risk of getting a fine. 
“The work in the hotel slowly reduced. A lot of people were looking for jobs and 
the employers preferred to hire those with papers. Maybe in the high season they 
would still take you on, but only because they really needed workers . The city is 
full of people, a lot of tourists, so they need you. But now it is difficult because 
you have to have papers, even during the high season.. Additionally, now that it is 
even harder, you are exploited.. As time passes, the situation becomes more 
demanding, as everything does.. Everything has changed.. A lot! What can I say? 
I think that for more than 50% of us, almost 80%, 90%, things have changed. 
Even in restaurants now they don’t hire you if you don’t have papers. In hotels 
the situation is even worse. The market is dead, dead, dead.. The only thing 
possible to survive now, because we still survive [the irregular migrants], is to 
work in houses.. Why? Because they are private.. it is private people that want 
you. There papers are not required, and there nobody stops you.. The only thing 
that can stop you is if you don’t have references, but nothing else..”22. 
 
“Now it is not as easy as before. Now nobody wants an illegal employee.. In the 
past years many, many illegal worked here.. In hotels, restaurants, in agriculture, 
picking tomatoes, but now nothing.. Now you can only clean.. clean, clean and 
clean.. Nothing else. No company wants an illegal migrant..”23 
 
“Now the laws are very strict, nobody will expose himself/herself to hire a person 
without papers, nobody would risk the controls”24 
 
“There was a lot of work.. there is a lot of work! What happens, though, is that 
now the government is checking a lot.. Before, they hired you “under the table”, 
but now they don’t. Now the situation is carefully controlled. Now you have to 
have papers, you have to have a working permit. So now the possibilities have 
reduced a lot, a lot! But, the possibility to work “under the table” is still available, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Interview with Lucía (14NW). 
23 Interview with Roberta (19NW). 
24 Interview with Johanna (27NW). 
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for instance working in houses.. It is not possible to work in restaurants and 
hotels anymore..”25  
 
“I had been working in that company for almost two years.. We cleaned the 
windows of the big buildings.. One day the inspections were made.. I still thank 
the Lord because that day I was off.. But the day after, I went to work, and my 
boss told me that I had to leave.. that he was sorry, but I had to stop coming”26. 
 
“When I arrived here I could work in many places.. they did not check.. but that 
time has passed and that situation does not exist anymore.. Today there is no 
employer that hires you if you have no papers. You need to be legal. The 
employer prefers to have legal workers, it does not matter if you are a migrant 
worker, but you have to be legal. The fines the employers get are very high.. 
super high. So I stopped searching for jobs in other sectors. It was easier to work 
cleaning houses. It was also easier work because in the hotel I had to make 40 
beds in the house 4.. I quit in time, thankfully, because many flew to Ecuador 
because [she means deported] they were caught there working..”27 
 
Also those who worked in the streets playing musical instruments or selling 
handicrafts experienced the effects of a changed attitude by the authorities regarding 
informal work. They were unable to continue their activities without high risks. 
“We worked playing musical instruments in the squares of the cities.. We simply 
took out our musical instruments and played. We sold our cds and the handicrafts 
in the street.. the police didn’t say anything. Now the situation is fucked up! They 
stop you, they check you, they deport you. We have to run.. Before we could 
travel around Europe, nobody asked us for our passports.. Now it is 
impossible”28. 
 
The second reason given by the migrants was that new groups of migrants who 
had papers started to fill the labour market and take the jobs they used to get before. 
“The first to come were people from the East.. they have papers, they started to 
work where we worked before. Then a lot of migrants from Southern Europe 
started to come.. They go where the economy is still good. Many Spanish 
Ecuadorians [Ecuadorians with Spanish nationality] are coming, because they 
have papers and find work..”29 
 
“Now there are a lot of people coming.. people that were in other countries. A lot 
of people from Spain, because of the situation there.. But the situation for work 
became difficult when the European Union integrated.. when those countries, 
those that are economically bad, where there is no work.. So now, here there are 
more Polish than in Poland.. They offer their work, they come to do it.. There are 
Bulgarians.. there are people from everywhere.. So now, since a lot of people that 	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come to work have papers, for those who are illegal it is more complicated.. right 
now there are plenty of workers with papers”30.  
 
Yet, the shift towards the cleaning service in private houses was also part of a 
strategic option of the migrants themselves. Working in private houses offered a 
number of advantages in terms of salaries, flexibility of hours, security and work 
necessity. 
“When the controls started to become tougher, I was scared. I said: no! I won’t 
look for jobs in hotels and restaurants anymore.. In houses it is much better.. 
There the people know you, they give you the keys, you go, you respect your 
schedule.. the hours you have to work and you leave.. You don’t see anybody and 
it is impossible that they come to check you. Moreover, they pay you more.. a lot 
more. In the hotels and restaurants they used to exploit me. So much, so much! 
Imagine, in the hotel Arena.. They paid me 6 euro, in my houses I don’t get less 
than 10.. Can you imagine the difference?”31 
 
“I had always worked in construction, at least for three years.. But the problem 
with construction is that I had to work 10 hours per day, from Monday to 
Saturday. Of course it was good money.. I used to get 600 euro per week, but it 
was only for short periods. I mean, all those jobs were temporary. It could happen 
that you stayed 3 or 4 months without a job.. Then I got the first job cleaning in a 
private house. If you were able to find enough houses, it was much better.. Much 
more stable.. In construction it was always a problem, I worked for 2 or 3 months 
and then over.. So I said: cleaning is much better, it is more stable and it is not so 
tough.. You work inside.. In construction you often have to work outside, in this 
ice-cold weather [it was February]..”32. 
 
“I used to work cleaning offices and cafeterias in the morning.. But then I decided 
to quit and take more houses.. Yes, because cleaning houses you earn the same or 
even more.. you have to work less and have free time..”33 
 
“Once we were playing music with a friend in the square.. At one point the police 
arrived and asked for our passports.. My friend had papers, so he started to talk to 
the policeman. He said a lot of things, that we were only musicians, that they 
should go in search of criminals.. He distracted the police.. I had the chance to 
run away.. It was the second time in two months that I had to run away.. So I 
talked to my wife, and we decided that it was better that I stopped working in the 
streets. The best thing was that I went with her to clean houses..”34. 
 
“The advantage of cleaning houses is that it is impossible that they check you. 
You can go to the houses, clean and that’s it. No, no, no.. I never had problems, 
nobody ever has problems in the houses. Nobody has been caught working in a 	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house and kicked out of the country. And many illegal people live even better 
cleaning houses.. Yes, because it is safer..”35 
 
“In that restaurant there were three illegal people working. My brother, a Turkish 
man and me. It was very hard.. they really exploited you. The other workers with 
papers started to abuse.. More work, more work and the same money. And you 
are not free to get ill, or to have a problem with your family.. you have to be there 
always, 7 solid days there.. They don’t let you rest.. and if you can’t work they 
get angry. ‘And you know what: I’ll find someone else ’. So at one point it was 
me who decided to quit. I had been helping sometimes my wife with the houses.. 
I didn’t like it because I thought it was a ladies’ job, cleaning houses, ironing.. I 
had some friends that did that job and earned their unfailing money.. Sometimes I 
made fun of them.. hahaha. I laughed.. Now that is what I do! I have been doing it 
for more than five years.. And now I have more work than my wife, I don’t have 
enough time to get more houses. With this job I earn 2,000, 2,200 euro per 
month..”36 
 
“The advantage of working in houses is that it is safer, quieter, easier, healthier.. 
It is more relaxed, and the working hours are more flexible. If you have children, 
and one morning they wake up ill, you can call and say that you will go the day 
after.. I mean, that possibility to suit your life.. That for us who have children is 
crucial.”37 
 
Conditions 
Notwithstanding the gradual reduction of sectors and increasing controls, 
Ecuadorian irregular migrants have generally judged their working conditions and 
opportunities in Amsterdam as good. 
“At the beginning it is hard, you don’t know anyone.. and it is hard. But then you 
start to know people, to make friends.. They talk to you, they help you. Here there 
is a lot of work.. once you start, you find more and more. There is plenty of work. 
And you can make money. Here the problems are others, the house, the papers, 
but there is work for everybody”38 
 
“Working in the hotel, me and my husband, we really made money. We had to 
work like mules.. Maybe, now I think we were a bit exploited.. Sometimes my 
husband started at 6 in the morning and finished at midnight.. But we were able 
to save a lot and buy two houses in Ecuador..”39 
 
“I think that the Netherlands gave us a lot.. It has not been easy.. you know.. 
Because it is a very different country from ours.. the language, the weather.. the 
way the people are here. But we were able to work and send money back.. Even 
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though there is an economic crisis, I have a lot of work, sometimes I have to say 
no..”40 
 
Many migrants, both regular and irregular, at the moment of the interview, agreed 
on the fact that, from the work perspective, the papers, paradoxically, may be a 
problem. 
“I think that we who live here without papers live better.. Those who have papers 
are all the time paying for something. Paying, paying, paying.. In contrast, we 
who work under the table, let’s say, we ‘see’ our money.. Those who have 
documents, all their money goes away in payments. If we want to work, I mean, 
from Monday to Saturday, we can earn a lot more.. What happens also is that 
those who get the papers kind of relax.. They don’t better themselves.. they don’t 
care anymore.. It is also because when you are legal, the more you work, the 
more you pay to the social security. All our friends who have papers are always 
complaining that they have to pay too much..”41 
 
“When I finally got papers, the state helped me to find a job.. It was in a storage 
centre.. The pay was not bad, I don’t remember, I think it was 1,200 euro. One 
day the boss asked me if I wanted to double the hours.. I said: yes! I thought, if I 
earn 1,200 now, next month I would get 2,400 euro. The next month arrived I got 
1,800 euro.. I said: what?? You know.. to work legally is a robbery.. But the 
problem is that when you are legal they check everything.. You cannot have more 
money.. They want to know where you got it. For me, it was much better not to 
have papers..”42 
 
“For a long time we didn’t even want the papers. You didn’t need them. You had 
work, the kids could go to school and the people who had been able to get the 
papers said that they were in a better situation before.. Because when they didn’t 
have papers they had money and time, they could do everything.. except 
traveling. With papers you don’t have money, you don’t have time and you 
cannot travel, because you don’t have money and you don’t have time..”43 
 
“Look, when you work here with papers, you get a basic salary that is enough for 
the basics. If you want to earn more here.. you have to have some kind of 
qualification, you have to speak Dutch.. Yet, if you work like us [he means 
irregularly] the more you work, the more you make. If you work from 8 to 8, let’s 
say at 10 euro per hour, it is 120 per day.. 5, 6, or even 7 days per week”44 
 
“They say that when you are legal there is the advantage that if you lose your job 
you have unemployment benefit.. But the truth is that if you have that.. you are 
fucked!! They check everything about you. You have to study. You cannot miss a 
single day without a good reason. If you miss one day you are in troubles. You 
know, I am a musician. So if I go to work in the streets then I have coins. If you 	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go with the coins to the bank they ask you: where did you get them? Did you 
work? If you spend a little more they check, if you spend a little less they check.. 
In contrast, when I had my job under the table I could do whatever I wanted..”45   
 
Controls and strategies 
Even if labour controls became increasingly severe through the 2000s, both 
migrants and employers in Amsterdam have always been alert to the possibility of 
inspections. For this reason, a number of strategies have been developed both to 
employ irregular migrants and to escape possible inspections. 
Regarding the first aspect, e.g. the irregular employment of migrants, some 
sectors, for instance, port services, industrial cleaning and construction, appeared to 
have more inspections and required specific strategies. The decisive factor seemed to 
be the size of the business. When the employer was a medium-sized or big company, 
a contract was usually needed. The strategies, therefore, were basically aimed at 
bypassing this limitation. The two main options were: for migrants to rent or borrow 
the papers of a regular migrant; for employers, to hire more than one worker with a 
single contract. 
“Once I worked in the port. We had to unload and load Russian ships.. There you 
worked with the name of someone who had papers.. Every morning when you 
arrived they told you: if the police of the port come, you have to say that this is 
your name.. And you tired like hell, had to keep repeating to yourself who you 
were: Juan Charles, Juan Charles, Juan Charles.. Sometimes they asked you just 
to check if you were alert. The “owner” of the job charged you a 
commission..”46. 
 
“Sometimes I went to clean some big offices instead of my cousin.. We were very 
similar, and her boss didn’t say anything..”47 
 
To avoid controls migrants and employers develop specific strategies, which 
depend on the type of work. An important aspect, in all cases, is to try to pass 
unnoticed, especially when working on exposed sites. 
“A lot of friends have been caught because they were working outside. You must 
always work inside because if you are working outside they can always ask you 
for your working permit”48. 
 
“I noticed that Carlos was very relaxed doing his job. He had to clean the stairs of 
a residence building. Yet, when he had to clean the street door of the building, the 	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letterboxes that were outside and sweep the entrance of the building, he was 
nervous, worked at double speed and continually checked around. He said that 
that is the most dangerous part of his job.. That when he is inside, nobody can 
check him.”49 
  
Many migrants agreed on the fact that in Amsterdam it is customary that 
inspections arrive because someone calls the police. Therefore, it is always advisable 
to be as little eye-catching as possible. 
“Many times there were inspections when I was on the building site. I had to 
hide, go to the roof. They first enter and ask, if they don’t see anything weird, 
nothing happens, but if they see something suspicious, they call and more 
inspectors arrive. Many times, they come because there has been a complaint. 
Here [in the Netherlands] there are many complaints. A group of friends of mine, 
they were Brazilian, they were working on a building site in the street and they 
were listening to music that the people here do not listen to. Or examples of 
Ecuadorians listening to salsa or bachata.. Then, they say: these are latino.. For 
instance, when I work outside, on the street, for example painting, I always listen 
to a Dutch radio. If you want to listen to your music, use headphones and that’s it. 
I always say to the new people, don’t talk too loudly, don’t sing.. because here 
the people listen.. I you are showy, to fail! But if you learn to be discreet, there’s 
no problem”50.  
 
“You know, you have to be careful. When you work illegally in construction, 
sometimes the owner of another company or even workers may report on you. 
They don’t like us, because we steal their work and often do the job for lower 
prices. Two friends of mine were deported because they had been painting a 
house. Suddenly, the police came.. A cousin of mine was able to escape because 
he jumped down from the window. He said that he is sure that the guys working 
in the next house called the police..”51 
  
In restaurants and hotels, the owners always told the migrants where to hide in 
case of a labour inspection or gave them other instructions so as not to raise 
suspicions. In certain cases, they had a way to alert the workers back in the kitchen or 
in the corridors, about the arrival of inspectors, so that they had enough time to hide. 
“In that hotel they told me not to wear the uniform, in case of a labour control I 
had to enter one room and pretend to be one of the guests. They also told me not 
to bring the bucket with the water or the trolley with the cleaning products into 
the rooms..”52 
 
“When I worked in that restaurant there were three inspections. They always 
turned on a light and I knew that I had to hide in the container of the dirty sheets.. 	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Once I had to stay there for 2 hours, I almost choked. I thought they had forgotten 
about me..”53 
 
“We knew what to do in case of inspections. In those years [before 2003] it was 
very unusual.. but once we had an inspection. A Moroccan who was the oldest 
worker took me by the hand and we climbed from the stairs up to the roof. He 
told me to be careful because up there it was all greasy since it was where the 
extractors were released.. After a while we heard something like a little bell, it 
was the cook beating with a knife on the metal.. It meant the inspectors had 
gone.. I didn’t even see the guys of the inspection, their faces, what they looked 
like, how many they were. That was the only time, because before there were few 
inspections..”54 
 
 
6.3.2. Work in Madrid 
Sectors 
Two important elements emerged from the fieldwork regarding the working 
sectors of the Ecuadorian irregular migrants in Madrid.  
On the one hand, a drastic difference was noticeable between the years that 
preceded the economic crisis which started in 2008 and the years afterwards. The first 
phase was characterized by the abundance of opportunities in a variety of sectors; the 
second phase by a general and drastic reduction of such opportunities and the virtual 
disappearance of entire sectors.  
On the other hand, the sectorial division between men and women, present also in 
the Dutch case, appeared significantly more marked in Madrid. 
The combination of these two factors generated four slightly different labour- 
market and working opportunities for irregular migrants in Madrid: A. Men pre-crisis; 
B. Women pre-crisis; C. Men during the crisis; D. Women during the crisis. 
Men in the pre-crisis phase were mainly employed in the construction sector. 
Among the 18 interviewed migrants, 14 had work at least temporarily in this sector. 
The other documented occupation sectors included: restaurants, industry, storage, 
transportation, and courier companies. 
Women in the pre-crisis phase were employed in a variety of sectors with a 
certain prevalence of private-house cleaning and care work both for children and the 
elderly. Among the 12 interviewed migrants, 9 had worked mainly in private houses, 
4 cleaning, 2 providing care to children and 4 providing care work for the elderly. The 	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other documented occupation sectors included: restaurants, hotels, and professional 
cleaning.  
While the effects of the crisis affected the whole labour market and, hence, also 
native workers and regular migrants, they were particularly tough for irregular 
migrants. As a matter of fact, the deterioration of the labour market conditions 
coincided with a restrictive turn on the part of the authorities. The combined effect 
was that the number of available positions fell and that for those positions many 
regular migrants were available. 
The changed scenario especially affected men. The most important sector where 
they had found opportunities, e.g. the construction sector, literally collapsed. 
“After one week that I had been here, a friend of mine took me with him to the 
building site. The boss said: perfect, you can start right away. After that, I always 
worked in construction. I had to adapt, to learn all the names, because in Ecuador 
we call the tools with other names.. My boss helped me to get the papers.. The 
first year without a contract I earned 900 euro, then when I got the papers I 
started earning 1200 euro. It was very good. One day, in 2009, the owner of the 
company came and said to us : that’s it. There is no more work. He closed the 
company and that was the end.. Now there is nothing.. for 2 years I have been 
doing little things to survive”55 
 
“I worked for more than 9 years in construction.. At the beginning without papers 
and then with papers. I can tell you.. That was crazy.. we built, built, built.. that 
seemed unstoppable.. But we knew it could not last forever.. we were building 
entire cities but there were no people.. One day the company simply shut down 
and we were fired.. From that moment on, it has been very difficult..”56  
 
For those who were still in an irregular administrative situation or who lost the 
papers, it became increasingly difficult to find opportunities to work. Among the 
interviewed, few had been able to keep their previous jobs in restaurants and in 
transportation; others started to find jobs in a sector that until that moment had been 
exclusively for women, e.g. house cleaning and care, while others relied on small 
occupations such as painting, gardening, electricity, etc. 
“I worked in that discotheque for more than five years.. I had to clean and prepare 
everything for the next day.. In 2007, the things started to go badly.. Two of my 
colleagues were fired.. My boss was very nice to me and he said that I could stay 
for some time. In 2008, they fired my boss and me.. Luckily, I had 
unemployment benefit for more than one year.. Now I basically have not worked 
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for 3 years .. I mean, sometimes a friend calls me for 1 month or little things.. I 
am thinking of going back to Ecuador..”57 
 
“Now with the economic crisis, for me it has become very difficult to find a job.. 
Occasionally I find a couple of rooms to paint, a garden to look after or other 
small jobs like that [the term used is “chapuza” that literally means: ‘work of 
little importance’]. The reality is that now my wife is the one who is the bread 
winner..”.  
 
“When I could not renew the papers I didn’t know what to do.. There were no 
jobs for those with papers, imagine for me in that situation. I asked a friend of 
mine, who had been working for years with families, to help me. She introduced 
me to a woman she knew because she had worked at her house taking care of her 
father. They gave me an opportunity.. I started working there.. Thank god they 
didn’t say anything about the papers.. I think I was lucky, without my friend I 
would still be on the street”58. 
 
“Right now my husband is in a worse situation than me.. At least I have the 
chance to find hours or something [she means cleaning] in houses. He worked in 
construction for years, but now he has been unemployed for two years 
unemployed.. Now it is a lot more difficult for men than for women.”59 
 
“The situation was totally different.. I know it because I was illegal at the 
beginning and I am illegal now. In the first years, I am talking about 2000, 2001, 
2002, 2003.. you just went to the square.. There were queues of people waiting.. 
all Ecuadorians.. A car came and a man said: do you know how to pull cables? 
Yes! Jump in! It was super easy, then they knew you and they started calling 
every day.. I worked in construction for years, I got papers, I earned money, I 
paid my debt back in Ecuador.. When I could not renew my papers it was a cold 
shower.. And so now I am illegal again. And now it is not like before.. Imagine, 
my friends with papers are going back to Ecuador.. Where do I find a job?”60 
 
For women the situation has got worse as well. Yet, the cleaning and care sector 
seemed to be still offering opportunities. 
“Until recently I was working with a cleaning company.. The owner was helping 
me with the papers.. I was there for two years. Two years ago, though, he said to 
me: ‘you had better not work until you have papers’. The people working there 
were legal, but they hired me because my cousins told him about me. He agreed 
to hire me.. But since things have become more difficult, he told me to stay at 
home. Now, I have been unemployed again for 4 months. It is difficult because 
everyone asks you for papers.. For one hour or two that you want to work they 
ask you for papers..”61 
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“Now it is has become very difficult. You have to have papers and you have to 
have references. For working with children or with the elderly, they ask you for 
references or the contact of someone that you have worked with. Before you 
simply went to a church and they gave you two or three telephone numbers of 
people looking for help at home. But now I have been to many churches to ask 
for work, since it is summer and there are a lot of people looking for someone 
who looks after the kids.. But now everything is with papers..”62.  
 
“Because now that the government said they were going to fine those who 
employ without papers, the people do not risk anymore. There is an association 
that helps migrants where they have a job board. You go and every job is with 
papers, with papers, with papers.. I have been there and they say: whoever does 
not have papers, please leave, because all the offers are for people with papers.. 
There is another association in Arturo Soria [an area of Madrid]. There is a girl 
there that helps people to find jobs, she is there every Tuesday and Wednesday. 
There is always a queue of women waiting. She comes out and says: ‘Girls, there 
are opportunities for those with papers, those without must leave’..”63 
 
Conditions 
In the years before the economic crisis, finding a job in Madrid was very easy. 
The vast majority of the interviewed said that it took them only a few weeks to start 
working; that there were many opportunities in different sectors; that nobody asked 
for papers. Regarding the working conditions and the salaries, the picture appeared 
more controversial. While in some sectors, such as construction, industry, transport, 
migrants usually had good salaries, relative stability and the possibility to regularize; 
in others, such as restaurants, private houses and stores, the situation was more 
variable.  
“My boss was very nice, he really helped me a lot. I never felt exploited because I 
did not have papers. I knew how much those who were legal earned and it was 
the same as me.. It was him who told me about the papers. His secretary did all 
the work, I had only to go and get them”64. 
 
“I don’t know how many people “made the papers” thanks to my company.. They 
had many buildings.. We worked a lot.. I would not say it was easy.. But you 
know, if you wanted, you could earn a lot, do extra hours, and everything. They 
helped us with the contract when there was the regularization..”65 
 
“There was a lot of work! A lot! I worked all day, but I made a lot of money. 
Imagine, I was able to send to Ecuador 800 euros per month. That in Ecuador was 
a fortune.. I bought two houses, one for me and the other to rent..”66 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Interview with Romina (8SW). 
63 Interview with Nuria (27SW). 
64 Interview with Daniel (7SM).  
65 Interview with Victor (9SM). 
66 Interview with Alberto (23SM). 
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In general, when the labour relations were more “personal”, the possibility for 
underpayment, exploitation or delays in the papers was more recurrent. In particular, 
the women who worked as domestic help in private houses were those who had a 
higher degree of bad experiences. 
“In that house I worked from 7 in the morning to 10 at night when the kids went 
to bed.. I had to do everything.. Cleaning, cooking, ironing.. everything. They 
gave me 450 euro.. plus the room, but for all that work it was nothing..”67 
 
“What really upset me was that they did not help me with the papers. I did not 
know how to do them very well.. And the woman said to me all the time: don’t 
worry I will take care of them, I will take care of them.. I stayed there for three 
years and they never did anything. All my friends were settling their situation.. I 
don’t’ know why they didn’t want to help me.. maybe they didn’t want to pay me 
more..”68 
 
“The owner of the restaurant was Ecuadorian.. I can tell you.. never work with 
the people of your country.. They are the worst.. I don’t understand.. Maybe it is 
because they come from the same place and now they feel superior.. This guy 
made me work like crazy, every month he said to me : right now I only have this.. 
Next week I’ll give you the rest.. bla, bla, bla.. I left after 4 months.. These people 
think that because you don’t have papers you don’t have dignity..”69 
 
Since the beginning of the economic crisis, the working conditions for irregular 
migrants have severely changed. On the one hand, the opportunities have fallen in 
every sector; on the other, the reduced opportunities have generated phenomena of 
downward competition. 
“Until a few years ago, one used to work and send money to Ecuador. There were 
many who took advantage of their opportunities and made money. There are 
others who did not. But now, we are only surviving. Today there is no chance to 
really progress”70.  
 
“The problem is that the people are desperate to work. So, if you used to get 10 
for one hour.. now there are people who say 9, 8, 7!”71 
 
“Have you noticed how many flyers you find on car windows? How many flyers 
on the letter boxes? Painting, plumbing, gardening, removal, everything.. These 
are people trying to do whatever they can. Every day, I go and post my little 
flyers.. How many people call? You know, I think this is the right moment to 
leave..”72.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Interview with Lucy (15SW).  
68 Interview with Marta (18SW). 
69 Interview with Hernán (24SM) 
70 Interview with Patricia (1SW).  
71 Interview with Luis (30SM). 
72 Interview with Fernando (26SM). 
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Controls and strategies 
Also regarding the labour controls and the strategies developed to avoid them, the 
situation in Madrid displayed two very different phases.  
Until the mid-2000s before the start of the economic crisis, migrants’ descriptions 
reveal a very relaxed situation. The vast majority of these migrants never experienced 
a control on a work site and the employers were not worried about hiring people with 
an irregular status. 
“There was no problem.. You know, everyone was illegal.. so you just went and 
you started working. I think they knew that nobody was going to check, because 
otherwise they would have been more worried..”73. 
 
“In the construction? Never.. never a single control..”74 
 
“In the restaurant where I worked for more than 8 years, we never had a 
control..”75  
 
“In all sectors there was work under the table.., in all sectors: painting, plumbing, 
construction, transport.. And they could not check.. I think it is too difficult. I 
don’t know if they don’t want to or they can’t. For instance, I have always 
worked in the transport and removal sectors. Until recently, there were no checks 
at all.. They should give fines to those you contract the service with.. But they try 
to catch whoever is doing the work.. and that is very difficult. How can you prove 
that they are working, that it is not a private thing..”76. 
 
“Working in houses, the control is impossible.. It is the safest work.. I never 
heard of anyone being checked or anything. Even now that they say controls are 
tougher, it is impossible. It is more dangerous because when you work in houses 
you have to move around the city, with the metro, with buses.. That could be 
dangerous.”77 
 
From the mid-2000s on, and especially in certain sectors, a gradual increase of 
controls was recorded. The employers, who until that moment had been basically 
unconcerned, started to ask more frequently for papers or to develop strategies to 
avoid possible controls. Accordingly, also irregular migrants had to develop their own 
strategies in order to get hired. 
“They kept hiring irregular migrants. It became only a little more difficult. When 
I finally regularized.. My name is Xavier Ramirez, we went to the working site 
and there were three Xavier Ramirez.. My boss said to me: don’t work there.. I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Interview with Jesus (20SM). 
74 Interview with Alberto (23SM). 
75 Interview with Marcelo (6SM). 
76 Interview with Carlos (24SM). 
77 Interview with Lorena (27SW). 
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asked: why? He said: because there are two others with your name. I said: but 
you pay me the day? Yes! Since he had my documentation he could do that.. I 
went back home but he had to pay me the day. Why? Because he had my papers. 
Before, I could not say anything because it was me who was the one working 
with the name of another.. But now..” 
 
“When controls increased, a lot of people made money acting as intermediaries. 
There were Ecuadorians and Peruvians who really made lots of money. They had 
contacts with the construction companies, they provided the workers, but for 
every guy with papers they send three or four workers.. They were paid 10 euros 
and they gave 3 to the worker and kept the rest for themselves.” 78 
 
 
6.3.3. Comparison 
The work experience of Ecuadorian irregular migrants in Amsterdam and Madrid 
has presented a number of differences. 
In both cities, during the considered years, migrants experienced important 
changes in their working opportunities.  
In Amsterdam, it was possible to recognize two very distinct moments. The first, 
that lasted until the early 2000s, was characterized by the abundant availability of jobs 
in numerous sectors (construction, services, industry, cleaning). The second, from the 
mid-2000s on, was characterized by a progressive reduction of the available sectors. 
In particular, for irregular migrants it became increasingly difficult to find working 
opportunities in sectors other than private-house cleaning. As emerged from the 
interviews, this change was largely due to a restrictive turn on the part of the 
authorities. The increased inspections on the working sites and the higher fines in case 
of misconduct made it inconvenient for employers to hire irregular migrants. 
Moreover, the continuous arrival of large numbers of regular migrants from Eastern 
Europe offered them a valid alternative. Partly out of necessity, partly as an adaptive 
solution to the changed scenario, then, irregular migrants progressively moved to the 
private-house cleaning sector where they found a pretty stable, safe and rewarding 
labour niche. 
Also in Madrid, it has been possible to distinguish two very different phases 
regarding irregular migrants’ working opportunities. The first phase, which lasted 
until the end of the 2000s, was characterized by a great availability of working 
opportunities in many sectors. Although this was the case for both men and women, a 
rather marked sectorial division was registered. Men were mostly employed in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Interview with Walter (16SM). 
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construction sector, women in private-house cleaning and the care sectors. The second 
phase, which started in 2008, with the beginning of the economic crisis, was 
characterized by a sharp reduction of the working opportunities that deeply affected 
all migrants. For irregular migrants, in particular, it became extremely difficult to find 
any occupation. The effects of the economic crisis on irregular employment were 
made even worse by a stricter control policy and the availability of workers with a 
regular status. Within this new changed scenario, the opportunities for irregular 
migrants became very limited. The construction sector, which had been the main 
attraction pole for men, simply collapsed. For women, the situation was slightly 
better, because the cleaning and care sectors were less affected by the economic 
downturn. Many migrants decided to move to another country or to go back to 
Ecuador. Those who remained tried to survive doing small jobs in the construction 
sector, transportation, or in services. For men, an option was to switch to the cleaning 
and care sector. 
On the whole, while the double scenario is similar in both Amsterdam and 
Madrid, the underlying reasons for the dichotomy appear different, and likewise the 
consequences. In Amsterdam, the causes of changes experienced by Ecuadorian 
irregular migrants appear to be mainly political, in Madrid mainly economical. In 
Amsterdam, the increasing number of inspections in many economic sectors caused a 
sectorial shift on the part of the migrants. Since working in sectors such as 
construction, services and industry became increasingly difficult and risky, irregular 
migrants moved to the private-house cleaning sector. In Madrid, the effects of the 
economic downturn caused a general reduction of the working opportunities. For 
irregular migrants, it became very difficult to find a job in any sector. The reason in 
this case, was not, or not principally, that there were more controls, but simply that 
there was no work at all. Those migrants who had been able to regularize their status 
and who were also unable to find any employment have confirmed this impression. 
Regarding the working opportunities for irregular migrants, two further 
differences can by underlined. Firstly, in the first phase, Amsterdam displayed a more 
even distribution of irregular migrants in different sectors (construction, services, 
industry, cleaning in private houses) and then, in the second phase, a concentration in 
one (cleaning in private houses). Madrid, instead, displayed a more marked 
concentration in some sectors (construction, cleaning and care) in the first phase and, 
in the second phase, a concentration in two (cleaning and care) but with scarce 
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opportunities even there. Secondly, the cases revealed a different situation concerning 
gender distribution. While in both cases a certain sectorial difference emerged, in the 
case of Madrid this was much more marked. 
An interesting facet regarding the topic under discussion concerns the care sector 
and, in particular, the care service for the elderly. While this sector has had a crucial 
role in Madrid, employing a vast number of irregular migrants and especially women, 
in Amsterdam employment in this sector has been completely absent. As pointed out 
by many migrants, in the Netherlands, the government offers a number of subsidized 
services to the elderly so that no working opportunities “under the table” are available 
in the sector. 
Finally, also regarding the working conditions, the two cases have shown a 
differentiated picture. In Amsterdam, notwithstanding the necessary sectorial shifts, 
the working conditions for irregular migrants have generally and steadily been valued 
as positive. The large majority of the interviewed migrants told stories of relative 
success. They were treated well, were able to save money and to fulfil their economic 
expectations. In Madrid a distinction must be made. The interviewed migrants clearly 
distinguished in their stories between the pre-crisis and the crisis period. The first was 
generally characterized, although with a slightly higher number of exceptions, by a 
great availability of opportunities, good working conditions and economic success; 
the second, by very limited working opportunities, unstable and underpaid jobs.  
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6.4. Internal controls 
In this section, our analysis will be cantered on the experience of internal controls 
that Ecuadorian irregular migrants had in Amsterdam and Madrid. In particular, two 
aspects will be discussed: A. the experience of police (or other authorities) controls 
that migrants had in their daily lives; B. the actual fear that migrants had of being 
deported migrants. 
 
6.4.1. Internal controls in Amsterdam 
All the interviewed migrants agreed on the fact that in Amsterdam there are no 
police raids or other authority controls specifically aimed at apprehending irregular 
migrants. However, they also agree on the fact that every aspect of everyday life, for 
instance, riding a bicycle, walking on the street, taking a bus, is severely regulated and 
closely controlled. A small slip during one of these activities can lead to an identity 
check and, therefore, for an irregular migrant to possible detention and expulsion. 
Going out at night to clubs, bars and discotheques can also be risky because in these 
places there can be controls when there are fights, selling of drugs, etc. 
 “No, no.. in this country there are no controls in the streets.. I mean, there are 
controls in the labour sites, as for all workers, but not for the papers. Then if there 
is something irregular, they can ask you for your papers, but they never come for 
the papers.. Here in the Netherlands, only if there is a complaint or if you made a 
slip, can they check you.. Otherwise no.. they let you live in peace.. Those who 
have been caught, it is because they were in a nightclub, they had been drinking 
too much and they started a fight outside. Others, pitifully, were caught with the 
bicycles.. We had never taken a lesson on how to ride a bicycle.. like those for 
driving a car.. This is a bicycle country, everyone moves with a bike. If you make 
a mistake and you are unlucky, a policeman stops you.. Many of us have fallen 
for a red light, or for other little things.. Those little things betray you.. ”79 
 
“Here you can do whatever you want, unless you break the law.. You can go to a 
nightclub, you can go to a park, you can get together with friends wherever you 
want without problems.. It is not like in other countries that they look at your 
face, they see a stranger and they ask for your papers.. No. This is one of the 
safest countries in that regard. There is no such thing as them checking you, just 
in case.. They say that in other countries you are walking in the street and they 
ask you for the papers.. There were controls here, a couple of times, but they 
were looking for guns. They announce these controls, they say: next week there 
will be controls for guns. They stop you in the metro, check your bag and that’s 
it. They go after guns, they don’t go after illegal people.”80 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Interview with Maria (6NW). 
80 Interview with Juan (10NM). 
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“I know that they know about us.. The Dutch know about all the migrants, legal 
and illegal.. Here everything is controlled.. You think: I am hidden, they cannot 
see me.. But I think that the Dutch are very smart and that here everything is 
checked. They know how many migrants are here.. They know but they don’t do 
anything.. they wait until you fall.. and in that moment.. For instance if you walk 
in the street and you cross a red light, the police come and plin!! They get you. Or 
if you do anything wrong, or make a mistake, any mistake.. they can get you and 
send you to your country. You always need to go around with your eyes wide 
open”81.  
 
Irregular migrants in Amsterdam have generally conducted normal lives as 
regards their free time or their movements around the city. In this sense, no particular 
feelings of threat or pressure on the part of the authorities was described. As pointed 
out by many, the important thing in the Netherlands is to respect the law, to avoid 
committing not only crimes but also “small faults” such as crossing a red light or 
having an expired ticket on the bus. 
“I’ve done everything.. football, shopping, nightclubs.. I have never felt 
inhibited.. Of course, if you don’t do illegal things.. If you start a fight also if you 
are legal, you will have a problem.. Imagine if you are illegal. Then, there is also 
a matter of luck.. If you are in the wrong neighbourhood, at the wrong moment, it 
can happen that there is a raid for drugs and you are checked.. But that is very 
unlikely..” 
 
 “If you compare how the police work here and in Spain, it is very different. Here 
in the Netherlands the police are very tolerant. In Spain it is unbelievable.. If you 
look like a latino, the police ask you for the papers. If you don’t have them.. to 
the jail.. I travelled to Madrid once, to try to regularize my status there.. The 
lawyer that was helping me said to me: I will give you a piece of paper sating that 
you are in the process of getting your papers.. it is not legal, but if they stop you it 
helps. I left his office and took the metro. At the exit, in the underpass, the police 
stopped me: papers!! I gave them the paper I had just received.. They said: ok! 
Pufff.. I could not believe it.. Then, I continued.. That same day, in another metro 
station, another check.. I said to myself: I have to go away right now. You know.. 
here it is very rare that they stop you.. The police do not run after illegal 
migrants. Unless you get into trouble, the police are calm.. In Spain, in contrast, 
with or without problems, the police ask for papers.. I have been here for 13 
years, they have asked me for the papers 2 times.. In Spain two times in one 
day..”82 
 
“Here you need to follow the rules, you need to become responsible, you need to 
become organized. The migrant, the illegal person, cannot go every weekend to 
the nightclub until the morning.. You know, in those places, legal or not legal, the 
police can ask you for your documentation.. You have to be careful.. Especially if 
you have a family.. Look, if they get you, you will be back in Ecuador! Period! 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Interview with Lurdes (25NW). 
82 Interview with Mauricio (18NM). 
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What will your wife do? What will your children do? So, what do you prefer? To 
make a sacrifice for your family or for your friends? For your family!”83 
 
Regarding the perception of the risk of being deported, the experience of the 
Ecuadorian migrants in Amsterdam has revealed an increasingly severe scenario. 
While expulsion has always been a concrete risk for irregular migrants in the 
Netherlands, since the early 2000s it has become almost a certainty for an irregular 
migrant who is caught. 
“There was a change around 1999 or 2000.. Before that, even if they caught you, 
it was rare that they deported you.. But, after that, they started deporting 
everyone.. We were scared, you heard about this and that.. Many people who 
were deported before 2003 were able to come back a week later.. In Ecuador, you 
simply ask for a new passport.. They had a different number each time.. So, there 
was no problem.. But after 2003, they started asking for the visa.. If they sent you 
back, you could not return”84. 
 
“Here there are no controls in the streets. Absolutely none! And I agree, there 
should not be.. If they do that.. we will be going back to the second world war.. to 
Hitler.. He made that kind of controls on the people.. I think that this country 
suffered a lot due to that situation and it is because of that, that today they care a 
lot about human rights.. What I don’t like here is that they deport you for things 
that are not.. not really important. They take as an excuse for instance, if you use 
the tram without a ticket, or if you go by bike with a broken light.. They get you 
and they deport you. They need to justify the deportation.. they need to respect 
the law.. If you are robbing the state, they have a good reason: a migrant cannot 
rob the state! So they find an excuse and they deport you”85. 
 
“Controls have become more intense each day. Every year they change the laws 
because they don’t want people in this country anymore. It is getting harder all 
the time.. I think they are angry because the migrants abused everything they 
gave them, especially the Turks and the Moroccans.. It happened, for instance, 
that they were not working here but since they had social benefits, they could 
maintain the children they had back in their countries.. I think that is what 
offended them.. so now they are doing everything to eliminate migration, to make 
the life of the migrant impossible.. especially that of the illegal migrant.. You 
cannot study, you cannot get your qualifications, you cannot go to the hospital, 
etc. That type of thing..”86 
 
“If they get you and are able to know who you are, they kick you to Ecuador 
100%.. There is no way they will let you go now.. Two nephews of mine have 
been deported.. A friend of mine too.. You know.. It is very tough.. So, you 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Interview with Pablo (29NM). 
84 Interview with Lorena (26NW). 
85 Interview with Gabriela (27NW). 
86 Interview with Javier (23NW). 
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should not carry your documentation.. If they catch you, you have to give the 
name of a legal person..”87  
 
 
6.4.2. Internal controls in Madrid 
The experience of internal controls by the Ecuadorian irregular migrants in 
Madrid can be clearly differentiated into two phases.  
While random identity checks and controls in the streets have always been a 
possibility, until the second half of the 2000s, these were very limited, unsystematic 
and largely inconsequential. A migrant could be stopped, asked for papers, even taken 
to the police station, yet this was very rare and usually did not have major 
consequences.  
“I was always outside.. nothing happened.. When I was illegal, the police stopped 
me on two occasions.. The first time I was waiting for the bus.. A policeman 
came and asked me for papers.. I had only a photocopy of my passport.. I was 
scared, but nothing happened.. He looked at the picture, looked at me.. and said: 
it’s ok! Don’t get into trouble.. And he left.. The other time was the same..”88 
 
“I did not have a residence permit for more than 4 years.. but I was not afraid I 
have to say.. You know, the first months that I was here, I was worried but then I 
realized that there was no problem.. There were no controls, there was nothing.. I 
mean, probably there were controls here and there, just to take a picture and say 
that they were controlling, but c’mon.. They all knew where we were. You just 
had to go to Tetuán or to Casa de Campo [a neighbourhood and a park where 
Ecuadorian migrants used to meet] and you could meet the whole of Quito [the 
Ecuadorian capital] playing football.. If they had wanted, they could have sent 
200 buses, got the people on a plane and sent them home..”89 
 
Since the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008 and, in particular, after the 
change of government in 2011, a marked change has taken place. Controls in the 
streets, metro stations and in gathering places, such as, parks, bars and discotheques 
became much more common, although intermittent. The migrant spoke about “spells 
of controls”: particular months or weeks in which the controls increased. 
“This government that has entered now is always complaining about the 
migrants.. the migrants, the migrants.. The other, instead, Zapatero, I think he was 
in favour of the migrants, but this, this one hates us.. You can see by the controls 
in the streets.. Now the people without papers are afraid.. Now you don’t go out 
even to look for a job..”90 
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“One day I was in the metro.. I was listening to the headphones.. Two guys 
approached me.. I thought they were going to sell me something.. Then they took 
out their badge.. They were policeman in plain clothes.. They said: papers! 
Luckily it was all right.. I had my papers..”91 
 
“A couple of months ago, there were many controls.. it goes in spells. In Metro 
Plaza de Castilla [the name of a metro station], there were those paisanos 
[policemen in plain clothes] as they call them. There were many of them, 
checking for papers. And also in Metro Usera.. I always go there, because one of 
my cousins lives there.. And I saw that they were also stopping women.. they 
were taking them away.. I could not believe it.. Because, before, they used to stop 
only men, but now also women..”92 
 
“Now there are a lot more controls. On two occasions they took me to the police 
station.. In the two cases we were playing football with some friends.. And you 
know, after the football, we always buy some litronas [beers]. After a while, the 
police came and started checking our papers.. I had left my wallet at home.. So 
they took me to the police station.. Luckily that was when I still had the residence 
permit.. But they kept me there from Friday to Monday.. only because I did not 
have the documents with me.. Right now they always come to check us.. to the 
parks, to the little squares.. when they see a group of us, they come and check our 
documentation. Also in the metro, there they are often in plain clothes”93. 
 
“Luckily I got the papers in 2008 because, after that, they started with the raids.. 
In every corner, in every metro station they could stop you. We were paranoid.. I 
think it was in relation to the crisis.. It was in that moment that the pressure 
against the migrants started.. And especially against the migrant without 
documents. What they were trying to do was to scare the people so that they 
wouldn’t come anymore”. 
 
“When the raids started, there were latino radio stations that alerted the places 
where the police were.. They alerted the illegal migrant.. Be careful in that 
station, they are checking for documents there.. It was the people who called to 
say where the controls were..”. 
 
Also regarding the perception of the risk of being deported, the Ecuadorian 
migrants in Madrid have distinguished two phases. Until the beginning of the 
economic crisis, it was very unlikely for an irregular migrant to be deported. Most of 
the interviewed migrants agreed that it was very infrequent that you heard that 
someone had been sent back to Ecuador. After 2008, this situation slightly changed. 
As the controls increased, also the possibility to be deported increased. Yet, if in this 
second phase, those who were still in an irregular situation started to be more worried 
about a possible deportation, all the interviewed migrants agreed on the fact that, in 	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order to be deported, it was generally not enough to simply not possess the residence 
permit. 
“Here in Spain it is not that they get you without papers and they deport you. No! 
You need to have a criminal record.. You need to have been involved in 
something like fights, thefts, vandalism.. Otherwise it is very difficult.. They can 
even take you to jail or the CIEs [administrative detention centres] but they let 
you go after a while..”. 
 
“For them to take you to the CIE, you need to have done something, to have been 
involved in some trouble. A change took place with the beginning of the 
economic crisis. From that moment on, they started to check and deport the 
people. I had been stopped before, but, I swear, it was as if they checked you only 
to check you.. The second time, I think it was two years ago [2011], a policeman 
stopped me. You could see that it was not like before. Now, they stopped the 
people and sent those without papers away. Now they were checking in order to 
deport.”94 
 
“I lost the papers in 2008, 5 years ago.. It was because of a fight I had had with a 
policeman. You know in this country there is a lot of racism.. They never check 
the Spanish kids.. they go to the same park or to other parks.. they drink, do 
drugs, pee on the street.. everything. But if the police arrive, they come directly to 
us.. They see a group of latinos and they come. They treat us very badly, they put 
us against the wall to check our pockets. So I made the mistake of reacting.. The 
policeman pushed me, I pushed him, he gave me a punch, I did the same.. After 
two seconds I had all the policemen over me.. I had a trial and of course I lost, 
there were 15 policemen accusing me.. In that moment I lost the papers.. Since 
that moment it has been hell.. I have been to the CIEs 4 or 5 times.. Every time 
they stop me, they ask me for the papers. I end up in the CIE. They have not 
deported me because my father always sends a lawyer.. If you don’t’ have a 
lawyer that acts within 5 hours and you have a criminal record like me, they put 
you on a plane.. If you don’t have a criminal record and you have someone who 
helps you, they don’t send you”95 
 
“Here the police are very nice.. If you do what you have to do, if you don’t get 
into trouble they don’t do anything to you. Here everybody is complaining about 
the police, but if you pay attention, those who complain are those who have done 
something. I don’t fear the police.. I always think that I am not a criminal, that I 
have nothing to be ashamed of. Many times they have asked for the papers. Many 
times. I tell them that I am in a process, that I am waiting and that everything is 
going to be all right. They always say to me: ok! Good luck! If you are serious 
and explain your situation, nothing happens. They deport the criminals, not those 
who are not doing anything. If they get you with drugs, drunk in a nightclub, in a 
fight, they put you on a plane..”96 
   
 
6.4.3. Comparison 	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95 Interview with (19SM). 
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The results that emerged from the fieldwork have revealed two different 
situations regarding internal controls in Amsterdam and Madrid. 
In Amsterdam, there have not been ad-hoc controls on irregular migrants in the 
streets or in public places. Migrants, therefore, did not feel under direct threat and did 
not usually feel scared about moving around and carrying out their normal activities. 
However, the rigid checks regarding respect for the rules that regulate most social 
activities, such as, walking in the street, riding a bike, using public transportation, 
have been an indirect form of control. Irregular migrants know that a simple mistake, 
an administrative fault of any kind, can lead to an identity check, to administrative 
detention. For these reasons, these people are usually very alert to the situation around 
them at all times and very self-controlled in their public activities. Regarding the 
possibility of being deported, the impression gathered is that in Amsterdam this has 
become in the last decade a very realistic one among irregular migrants. In other 
words, most migrants seem to know that if they get caught, the most probable 
consequence is that they are going to be deported.  
In Madrid, there has always been the possibility of ad-hoc controls on irregular 
migrants. Until the second half of the 2000s, though, these were very limited, 
unsystematic and largely without any consequences. Migrants, therefore, described a 
very relaxed situation and a negligible possibility to be deported. After the start of the 
economic crisis, this scenario changed. The controls on irregular migrants became 
more frequent and systematic. Every street, metro station or public place could be the 
place for a potential raid. These controls, however, were rather intermittent. They 
increased in particular months or weeks and diminished afterwards. While the fear of 
being deported certainly increased in the second phase, for the interviewed migrants, 
this possibility remains rather unlikely. As pointed out by many, in order to be 
actually deported, it is usually not enough to simply not possess a residence permit; 
the irregular migrant has to have a criminal record.  
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6.5. Housing and Healthcare 
In this section we will analyse the experience of Ecuadorian irregular migrants in 
Amsterdam and Madrid regarding three important aspects of their daily lives: 
housing, healthcare and education for the children. 
 
6.5.1. Amsterdam 
Housing 
Finding a house to live in and stay for a relatively stable period has been one of 
the most difficult tasks for irregular migrants in Amsterdam. All the interviewed 
migrants, with no exception, indicated housing as the biggest problem they had to 
deal with in Amsterdam. The difficulty was related to the general scarcity of houses 
and to the existence of a very controlled system of public houses. The main available 
option for irregular migrants was to sublet rooms or entire houses from people who 
get the houses from the public service. This option, however, was usually very 
unstable because this type of houses is greatly controlled by the authorities. If a 
control came, the migrants had to depart in that moment, many times leaving their 
belongings behind, or losing the money they had paid to get the house.  
“The house is the biggest problem here in Amsterdam. Imagine: there is no house 
for the Dutch, so what do you expect for irregular migrants? I have changed more 
than 10 houses in the last number of years.. It is really bad”97 
 
“Here it is very difficult. If you don’t have someone who knows you, it is very 
difficult to get a good house. You cannot go and say: I want a room or a house. 
They ask you for your residence permit. The other option is to sublet a room in a 
government house, but in that case you never know if a control may come. Those 
houses are very much controlled. They come to check if the owner is really living 
there or if he is subletting. That is very common here in Amsterdam, someone 
gets a house from the government, but they don’t live there, they go to live with 
their girlfriend or boyfriend, and rent the house under the table.. You are always 
scared in that situation.. Unless the owner lives there as well, you’d better be 
careful..”98 
 
“Every Ecuadorian here has struggled for the house.. everyone. It is horrible, 
horrible! I have lived in 15 different places.. I think the only district where I have 
not lived in is Amsterdam-Noord; otherwise I have lived everywhere. The 
problem is that the country is small and there are a lot of people. Even for the 
Dutch, it is difficult to get a house. They have to wait 7, 8, 15 years in order to 
have a house [she means a public house]. The houses are very small and 
expensive. So, if you rent a house or a room, you have to pay the deposit, one 	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98 Interview with Marco (11NM). 
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month in advance and the first month. After one month they can tell you: Out!. 
And you cannot do anything. The money is lost!”99 
 
“If you have money it is easier to find a house. Here, there are a lot of people who 
work as intermediaries. The risk of fraud is high. Once we lost 2,000 euro in 10 
minutes. They tell you: today I have three clients that want this house. They know 
you are illegal.. If you get the house, when they want, they can come and say: get 
out or I’ll call the police.. If you are lucky you can stay in the house for 2, 3 
years..”100  
 
“The house is the most difficult thing here.. I have been here for 13 years and I 
think I have changed 24 houses. That is because I have always found a house 
with people that have a government house and those are the people that are 
checked most by the police. So, every minute a control can arrive. We have been 
in a house for 3 months and out, three months and out! Sometimes you don’t 
know what to do.. With my husband we have slept in the park.. Once, with my 
child, we had to sleep in a taxi. A guy from Suriname was very kind and he let us 
sleep in his taxi.. The guy where we used to live let us the room for 600 euro.. He 
rented the other room as well. He occupied the living room. I think for the whole 
house he had to pay 400 euro.. Do you understand? He made a lot of money. For 
sure someone told the police he was subletting. We always had to leave the 
houses for this kind of situation.. people who were living on public benefits or 
who had some kind of trouble. If a letter arrived that the control was coming, we 
had to leave.”101 
 
Healthcare 
The access to healthcare for Ecuadorian irregular migrants in Amsterdam has 
been another problematic issue. If, until 1998, they had been able to freely access the 
public service, from that year on, the residence permit became a necessary 
requirement to be treated for free. As a matter of fact, no healthcare insurance could 
be stipulated without a valid residence permit and, without insurance, the people had 
to pay all medical assistance. For irregular migrants, consequently, the only option in 
order to access the public medical assistance was to pay. Many migrants had medical 
problems, they all went to hospital and paid. 
“For more or less 10 years now, things have been very difficult. We were not 50 
or 60 who went to the hospital.. We were 500.. Each time that you go to the 
hospital it costs at least 300-400 euros.. So that was a debt that the government 
has. I think it was for that reason that they changed the law. Now you cannot buy 
a medical insurance, you need the residence permit. There is a fund that the 
hospitals can use in cases of emergency for us.. [by “us” she means irregular 
migrants]. So now, what we have to do is to hope not to get ill, otherwise you 	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have to go and pay the bill.. Sofia, that friend of mine, broke her leg.. I think she 
has 15,000 euro of debt with the hospital..”102 
 
“We solved the healthcare issue by eating well, so that we don’t get ill.. If we get 
ill we use “home medicine”.. The hospital is too expensive and since we have no 
medical insurance it is also a bit difficult.. Once I broke my elbow.. I went to the 
hospital and I needed x-rays and a head scanner, because I had fallen down the 
stairs the stairs. They thought I could have something in my head.. It happened 
while I was working in a house. The woman said to me: are you ok? I am sorry!! 
She didn’t say anything else.. She didn’t ask how much I had to pay in the 
hospital… When you don’t have papers, you have no rights.. So I went to the 
hospital.. In the end, a social worker came and said to me: you have to pay, what 
do you want to do? She told me that I could pay in monthly instalments. For the 
whole thing it was 2,800 euro. I had to pay, because there are others who don’t 
pay, they use the fund that the hospital has for irregular migrants.. The problem is 
that if you do not pay , the next time they don’t see you. Now they have a file 
with my information. If I go again they know everything, even my form of 
payment.. Now, for instance, I will have to go to give birth [Luisa is pregnant at 
the moment of the interview], I don’t know how much I will have to pay..”103. 
 
Some migrants have internalized this situation and act accordingly. Mauricio, for 
instance, has a very pragmatic understanding of the irregular migrants’ relations with 
the state and the public services. If you have a residence permit, you can use the 
insurance system; if you do not have insurance, you have to save the money and be 
prepared to pay. 
“When you are illegal, you have the advantage that you earn more.. If you work 
legally, you have to pay a lot of taxes; they take out 400 euro, 500 euro per 
month. But, if you think logically, when you get ill you don’t have insurance, 
when you are old you will not have a pension. So the extra money you get now, 
you have to save it. You have to build your own insurance under the 
mattress..”104 
 
A number of alternative strategies have been elaborated to avoid the high costs of 
the public healthcare. Some migrants have been able to use the insurance number and 
the documents of other people. Others, in the case of small problems, have gone to the 
Red Cross, which provided a basic service for irregular migrants under the payment of 
5 euro. Another option was to go to private “unofficial” doctors who worked under 
the table. Finally, an interesting case was that of Gabriela, who, to avoid the costs of 
giving birth in Amsterdam, decided to travel clandestinely to Spain.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Interview with Maria (6NW). 
103 Interview with Luisa (29NW). 
104 Interview with Mauricio (18NM). 
	   262 
“Luckily I never had problem, so I didn’t need to go to the hospital. I discovered 
how expensive it was when I had to give birth. One echography costs 200 euro.. 
Here they don’t give you anything, absolutely anything if you are illegal. Now I 
am legal and I pay insurance, so I can go whenever I want. But when I was illegal 
I could not. I mean, I could but I had to pay. You can go and give birth but it can 
cost 7,000 – 9,000 euro. When you are a first-time-mother you often have 
complications.. and the price rises. I had complications!! I thank the Lord I went 
to Spain to give birth, because here it would have been 10,000 euro. I would now 
have a debt.. My mother used to live in Spain, she told me to come here to give 
birth. I decided to go. I have to say that they often say that people are racist in 
Spain, but I think that, regarding healthcare, they are very humanitarian. I went, I 
gave birth, they treated me, they cured me. I stayed in hospital for 5 days. Can 
you imagine how much that costs here? Moreover, here they treat you very 
badly.. They kick you out of the hospital the same day.. If you have a 
complication, you stay 5 hours, not like in Spain or Ecuador where you stay 5 
days”105. 
 
6.5.2. Madrid 
Housing 
Finding a house in Madrid was a problem for an irregular migrant only in the 
very first years of the Ecuadorian migration. As pointed out by many of those who 
were part of the first wave of migrants, at the end of the 1990s, there were not many 
houses and it was not easy to find accommodation. In this early stage, the most 
common solution was to rent a room or even a bed in a room from people who were 
making money from this kind of business. The conditions were usually very bad and 
the prices relatively high. 
“When I had just arrived [1997] I didn’t know anybody.. I had a cousin who told 
me that there was a Peruvian woman renting rooms.. I remember that I went to 
talk to her and she told me the price.. I don’t remember because it was in pesetas.. 
I think it was something like 190 euro.. The room was big.. And so, I asked if the 
people who owned all the luggage that was in the room were coming to pick it 
up. She looked at me as if I was crazy.. I thought the room was all for me.. 
[laughs]. There were 8 of us in that room, can you believe that?”106 
 
“At the beginning it was difficult. The Spaniards didn’t want to rent you a house 
without the nomina [a working contract] and you could not have a contract 
without the papers.. So the only option was to rent rooms.. You know, in Ecuador 
there is a lot of space.. we were not accustomed to renting rooms, to living with 
other people that you don’t know.. It was hard.”107 
 
“A friend helped me when I first arrived.. They had a small house, because he 
had already got papers.. I had to sleep on the couch.. the problem was that they 	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rented the other couch to another women from Ecuador and they had a big dog.. I 
was crazy! After one day I said: I cannot stay here.. They helped me to find 
another place with a friend of theirs.. it was on another couch.. That was at the 
beginning.. Then you start making contacts.. knowing people and it becomes 
easier. The next place was an entire room for me in a house with other 
migrants..”108 
  
As the first migrants started to regularize their status and were able to rent entire 
houses, the renting market rapidly expanded. Already in the first years of the 2000s, 
the issue of the house had become a lot easier for irregular migrants. A great number 
of Ecuadorians, moreover, helped the newly arrived to rent from family or friends.  
“For me the house has not been a problem.. When I arrived I stayed at my 
sisters’, I think for 2 years.. Then my boss told me he had a flat.. You know.. they 
were building entire neighbourhoods.. For whom do you think they were building 
all those houses?? For the migrants who were arriving in hordes!! So I went to 
live in that house.. My boss did not ask for papers, of course, he knew I did not 
have them, but then when I got them, he gave me a contract. And do you know 
what I did with the other room in the house? I started renting the other room to a 
friend of mine..”109 
 
“In the first years the housing situation was not easy.. I think it was because the 
Spaniards did not trust the Ecuadorians.. Then I think they started to know us 
better, to see that we were good workers. As soon as I got the papers, I was able 
to rent this house. I have been living here for more than 11 years.. The owners are 
very happy with us because we never missed a payment and we don’t create 
problems. My house has been like the gate to Spain for the Ecuadorians.. I have 
hosted all my family, friends, friends of friends..”110 
 
Healthcare 
Healthcare has not been a problematic issue for Ecuadorian irregular migrants in 
Madrid. As established by the law, all the migrants registered on the municipal record, 
with no regard to their administrative status, were allowed to freely access the public 
healthcare system. All the interviewed migrants have confirmed the correct 
implementation of this provision; none of them has had any problem in accessing the 
service. 
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6.5.3. Comparison 
The access to housing and healthcare for Ecuadorian irregular migrants in 
Amsterdam and Madrid has presented a number of important differences. 
Regarding the first issue, the access to housing in Amsterdam has been generally 
much more difficult than it is in Madrid. This has been due to two main factors: A. the 
lower supply of housing opportunities; B. the existence of a strictly regulated and 
controlled system of public housing. The combination of these factors determined a 
very precarious situation for irregular migrants’ housing. The available options were 
generally unstable, expensive and at risk of frauds. In contrast, in Madrid, after a first 
moment in which the housing opportunities had been relatively scarce, the situation 
rapidly improved. As many Ecuadorians and migrants from other countries started to 
get their status regularized, they were able to rent entire houses or flats and sublet 
rooms to the newly arrived. This determined a quick expansion of the housing 
opportunities and, therefore, the availability of relatively cheap, stable and safe 
housing for the irregular migrants. 
As far as the second issue is concerned, a similar situation has been found. In 
Amsterdam, access to healthcare has been much more problematic for irregular 
migrants than in Madrid. In this case, the determining factor was the different 
regulations regarding access to the public healthcare system. Whereas in Amsterdam, 
irregular migrants have been excluded from non-emergency care since 1998, in 
Madrid they could freely access the public system until 2012. Hence, while for 
irregular migrants in Madrid, the issue of healthcare was basically not a problem, in 
Amsterdam they had to find ways to overcome the existing limitations. The most 
common option, in case of serious medical problems, was to go to the public hospitals 
and pay the costs at market prices. For minor problems, there was the option of 
medical support offered by humanitarian associations or by private unofficial doctors. 
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6.6. Irregular migration realities in Amsterdam and Madrid 
The first and most important conclusion stemming from the fieldwork realized in 
Amsterdam and Madrid, is that the experience of Ecuadorian irregular migrants in the 
two cities has been radically different. The diverse combination of possibilities, 
limitations, opportunities, resources, etc., present in the different spheres of social life 
in the two contexts determined a set of very different conditions for irregular migrants 
in order to develop their lives and fulfil their objectives. This result seems to confirm 
the hypothesis which emerged in the theoretical part of this study: the existence of 
different “irregular migration realities”. While in legal terms, the lack of a residence 
permit generates, in principle, a similar condition, the “social translation” of this 
condition sharply differs, depending on where such translation takes place. 
While this conclusion may seem rather obvious or predictable, the truth is that it 
is not. As we extensively discussed in the first part of this work, one of the main 
limitations in the current understanding and study of irregular migration has been the 
tendency to treat it as an undifferentiated phenomenon. We also saw, how this 
problem had both a theoretical and an empirical origin. On the one hand, irregular 
migration had been studied using unsophisticated theoretical tools; on the other hand, 
there has been a lack of comparative analysis of the phenomenon. If in the theoretical 
chapters we tried to challenge this problem in analytical, logical terms, producing the 
hypothesis of differentiated, systemic contingent “irregular migration realities”. Here 
we tried to go to the field and discover if such hypothesis was realistic. 
In the next chapter we will attempt to assess possible systemic relations between 
the structural characteristics of the two contexts, analysed in chapter 5, and the 
irregular migration realties, which emerged from the fieldwork. Before that, then, in 
this final section, we will attempt to produce a general characterization of the irregular 
migration realties in Amsterdam and Madrid. 
Not only has the experience of Ecuadorian irregular migrants been different in 
Amsterdam and Madrid, but it has also gone through different phases within each of 
the two contexts during the considered period of time (1997-2013). This reveals how 
the irregular migration phenomenon differentiates across space but also across time. 
In Table No.7 it is possible to observe a summary of the main findings of the 
fieldwork.  
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Table No.7 – Irregular lives Amsterdam and Madrid 
 Amsterdam Madrid 
Legal 
trajectories and 
regularization 
channels 
Main 
trajectories 
• Never regular (17/39) 
• Regularized through marriage or 
cohabitation agreement (11/30) 
• Regularized under exceptional 
circumstances (2/30) 
• Regularized using ad-hoc channels 
(21/30) 
• Befallen irregularity (6/30) 
• Never regular (3/30). 
Irreg. years  • 12 years • 5 years 
Channels • Indirect: (1) marriage and 
cohabitation agreements 
• Direct: (1) extraordinary 
regularization programs, (2) through 
labour quotas; (3) through rootedness. 
Regularization strategies • Bogus marriage or cohabitation 
agreement with a Dutch citizen – 
very difficult 
• Bogus marriage or cohabitation 
agreement with a EU citizen – 
difficult 
• False contracts to apply for 
regularization 
• False police record to apply for 
regularization 
Work Sectors • Before mid2000s, men: hotels, 
restaurant, construction, port, and 
industry. 
• Before mid2000s, women: hotels, 
restaurants, office cleaning, private-
house cleaning. 
• After mid2000s, men: private-house 
cleaning and construction. 
• After early 2000s: private house 
cleaning. 
• Before 2008, men: construction, 
restaurants, industry, storage, 
transportation, and couriering. 
• Before 2008, women: private-house 
cleaning, office cleaning, care work 
with children and the elderly. 
• After 2008, men: “little jobs” in 
construction, transportation, care 
work with the elderly. 
• After 2008, women: care work with 
children and the elderly, private-
house cleaning 
Conditions • Work availability: 
o Before mid2000s: high 
o After mid2000s: medium 
• Working conditions: generally 
medium to good. 
 
• Wages: generally high 
• Work availability: 
o Before 2008: very high 
o After 2008: very limited 
• Working conditions: generally 
medium to good, some cases of 
exploitation.  
• Wages:  
o Before 2008: high in certain 
sectors, medium in others. 
o After 2008: medium in certain 
sectors, low in others. 
Controls  • Before mid2000s: medium 
• After mid2000s: high 
• Before mid2000s: very low 
• After mid2000s: medium 
Internal 
Controls 
Street 
controls 
• No street ad-hoc controls for 
irregular migrants 
• Before 2008: limited, unsystematic, 
inconsequential 
• After 2008: in spells, systematic, with 
consequences 
Fear of 
deportation 
• Before 2000s: medium 
• Until mid2000s: high 
• After mid2000s: very high 
• Who can be deported? Everyone 
• Before mid2000s: very low 
• After mid 2000s: medium 
• Who can be deported? Those who 
have a criminal record or precedents. 
Housing • Very difficult, unstable and 
expensive 
• Before 2000/2001: difficult and 
expensive 
• After 2000/2002: increasingly easy 
and inexpensive 
Healthcare • Until 1998: free access to healthcare 
• After 1998: access under payment 
with the exception of emergencies. 
• Until 2012: free access to healthcare 
• After 2012: access under payment (no 
cases in my sample) 
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The experience of Ecuadorian irregular migrants has offered many insights into 
the irregular migration realities in Amsterdam and Madrid. Let’s see them in detail. 
 
6.6.1. Amsterdam 
In Amsterdam, the experience of Ecuadorian irregular migrants became 
increasingly difficult along the considered period of time. The policy changes adopted 
since the end of the 1990s, appear, in this sense, to have been effective in restraining 
the living opportunities of irregular migrants. This has influenced both the size and 
the conditions of the irregular migrant community. While numbers have never been 
big, it seems that the increasing restrictiveness has determined an effective 
disincentive on new arrivals. 
Irregularity has appeared as a long term, hard to change condition for migrants in 
the Netherlands. The lack of ad-hoc regularization channels and the strict control over 
possible alternative regularization strategies, such as, marriage and cohabitation 
agreements, have made it very difficult for irregular migrants to obtain a residence 
permit. It was, then, normal to find migrants with more than 10 years of irregular 
residence in the Netherlands. Those few who were able to regularize, achieved this 
result after different attempts and after investing important quantities of money. 
Regarding the experience of internal controls, the scenario has been contrasting. 
On the one hand, the absence of ad-hoc police controls of irregular migrants in the 
public spaces has generated among irregular migrants a feeling of relative tranquillity 
and sense of freedom. On the other hand, the strict control over the respect for the 
rules regulating many social activities, such as, work, house rental, car driving, 
bicycle riding, street circulation, public transportation use, as well as the strict 
application of the deportation policy, generated among migrants an ever present sense 
of vulnerability and a highly developed sense of alert and self-control. 
The working opportunities and conditions for irregular migrants in Amsterdam, 
have been evidently affected by the restrictive turn adopted by the government since 
the end of the 1990s. The most evident result of this change has been the reduction of 
sectors where irregular migrants were able to find employment. In the last few years, 
private-house cleaning has been the niche where most migrants have found stable and 
remunerative opportunities. That being said, the economic success has been one of the 
most valued aspects of irregular migrants in the Netherlands. Notwithstanding the 
difficulties related to the language, the high levels of controls, the risk of deportation, 
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and, in the last few years, the reduction of working opportunities, migrants were 
generally able to find jobs, to earn and save money and to send money back to 
Ecuador. 
Regarding the access to vital resources, such as, housing and healthcare, the 
experience of irregular migrants in Amsterdam has been very problematic. As for 
housing, the particular characteristics of the Dutch housing market and, especially, the 
limited supply of opportunities and the strictly controlled system of public housing, 
has determined very precarious, unstable and expensive conditions for irregular 
migrants. Moreover, the combination of a low supply of and a high demand for 
houses has fostered cases of frauds and abuses. In the case of healthcare, the 
impossibility to freely access public healthcare since 1998, severely complicated the 
situation for irregular migrants. The requirement to pay for the services in public 
hospitals, implied for migrants the search for alternatives, such as, the help of private 
doctors or humanitarian associations, the accumulation of debts and, in certain cases, 
the neglect or mistreatment of dangerous illnesses. 
The combination of all these conditions has created an increasingly difficult 
environment for irregular migrants. As an adaptive solution, migrants have been 
obliged to develop sophisticated strategies to overcome limitations and barriers or to 
recur to the services and options offered by underground or even criminal 
organizations. While the possibilities to regularize have been very limited and many 
spheres of daily life quite problematic, the economic opportunities have been a sort of 
counterweight. Although the indirect police pressure is high and the risk of being 
deported is tangible, Ecuadorian irregular migrants have been quite effective in 
adapting to the environment and in developing reasonably serene and successful 
trajectories. Once they learn how to deal with the main problems and to behave in a 
discreet way, it is possible for them to conduct a parallel existence to that of the 
“regular” citizens. Paradoxically, in purely economic terms, their options may be even 
better. At least in the short, medium term, then, most migrants considered their 
experience as successful. The issue of the papers becomes truly critical for irregular 
migrants only when their children approach legally adult age and face the possibility 
of having to abandon their studies and start working with them. 
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6.6.2. Madrid 
In Madrid, the experience of Ecuadorian irregular migrants went through two 
very different phases in the considered period of time: the first, between the end of the 
1990s and 2008, and the second, afterwards. The first phase was characterized by the 
massive arrival of irregular migrants, the abundance of working opportunities and the 
possibility for the irregular migrants to easily regularize their status. A sharp 
reduction or even the inversion of the fluxes, the collapse of the job market and the 
reduction of the regularization opportunities characterized the second phase. Although 
a number of political reforms implemented by the authorities through the 2000s may 
have certainly effected the situation, the decisive factor in determining the change of 
scenario in 2008 was the start of a serious economic crisis in Spain. 
Irregularity has appeared as a transitory condition for migrants in Spain. The 
existence of a number of ad-hoc regularization channels has made it easy for irregular 
migrants to obtain a residence permit. The crucial role of holding a working contract 
or a job offer in all the regularization schemes, however, made it a lot more difficult 
for irregular migrants to get a residence permit after 2008. Notwithstanding this, at 
least among Ecuadorians, it has been very difficult to find migrants with more than 5 
years of irregular status. 
Regarding the experience of internal controls, the scenario has been very different 
in the two described phases. While police controls on irregular migrants in the public 
spaces have always been carried out, until 2008 these were very limited, unsystematic 
and usually inconsequential. After 2008, this type of control was implemented in 
spells, but in a much more extensive, systematic and determined way. In connection 
with this development, the perception of the possibility of being deported, which until 
2008 had been negligible, definitely increased. Yet, as underlined by most migrants, 
even during the apex of police raids and deportations in 2011 and 2012, the common 
perception was that in order to be expelled, it was necessary to have a criminal record 
or a recurrent story of detentions. As for other types of controls, such as those on the 
working sites, house rental and other social activities, although migrants have 
perceived a restrictive trend, especially in the second part of the 2000s, these controls 
have not been a reason for major concern. On the whole, then, it is possible to say that 
Ecuadorian irregular migrants in Madrid had a very serene and carefree experience of 
controls until the end of the 2000s. After that, the concern increased and, in particular, 
during certain periods, it created a concrete sense of vulnerability. 
	   270 
The working opportunities and conditions for irregular migrants in Madrid, have 
been evidently affected by the economic crisis which started in 2008. If, until then, 
both men and women had been able to find plenty of opportunities in a number of 
sectors, after that, especially for men, it became truly difficult to find an occupation. 
This dramatic change severely affected the economic situation of all migrants and 
particularly of those without a residence permit. The sharp increase in unemployment 
among the general population, made it very difficult for irregular migrants to get a job 
offer. The only sectors where they were still able to find relatively stable and 
remunerative jobs were private-house cleaning and the care sector. The assessment of 
the economic experience of Ecuadorian irregular migrants in Madrid can be 
considered as twofold. Until 2008, these irregular migrants were successful because 
they were able to work, earn and save money, and also send money back to Ecuador. 
After 2008, these people were unsuccessful and in most cases had to limit themselves 
to basically surviving. 
Regarding access to vital resources, such as housing and healthcare, the 
experience of irregular migrants in Madrid has been relatively easy. As for housing, 
the rapid expansion of the market and the low level of controls in the sector meant 
good, inexpensive and stable opportunities for these migrants. As regards healthcare, 
the possibility for irregular migrants to freely access the public healthcare system 
generated a very convenient and unproblematic situation. 
The picture that emerges from this overview once again is twofold. Ecuadorian 
irregular migrants in Madrid experienced two very different phases. Although each 
phase was characterized by a number of specificities, the most decisive, discerning 
element appears to have been the difference in the working opportunities. After 2008, 
the deterioration of the economy severely affected all the population. However, the 
effects of the lack of work were particularly relevant for irregular migrants since this 
not only affected their economy, but also their possibility to regularize or maintain a 
temporary residence permit. 
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7. ASSESING THE RELATION BETWEEN CONTEXTS AND 
“IRREGULAR MIGRATION REALITIES” 
 
The result of the empirical study was twofold. On the one hand, in chapter 5, it 
was possible to observe how the structural characteristics affecting migrations in the 
cities of Amsterdam and Madrid were sharply different from a number of viewpoints. 
On the other hand, in chapter 6, the fieldwork revealed how also the lived experience 
of Ecuadorian irregular migrants in the two cities had been very different. Now, what 
relationship can be established between contexts and “irregular migration realities”? 
How may the contextual differences help to explain the differences of the irregular 
migration phenomenon? 
The discovery of important differences with regard to both contexts and the shape 
that irregular migration takes within them may appear rather obvious or somehow 
meaningless. It is not; indeed, it forces us to assume social complexity and difference 
as the starting point when approaching the irregular migration phenomenon. No 
context is equal to another; no irregular migrant lives under the same conditions as 
another. Yet, assuming complexity and difference as the starting point, does not 
automatically mean that comparisons and generalizations are not possible, that we 
have to simply accept that everything is unique and therefore not comparable to the 
rest. Nor does it mean that, since the whole context is different, the only possible 
explanation for the characteristics of a certain phenomenon is the difference of the 
whole context. What it does mean is that comparisons and generalizations, in order to 
effectively offer elements of analysis, can only work at a high level of abstraction. 
Therefore, for instance, it makes sense to compare the average length of the irregular 
phase of migrants within a certain context, even more than the specific experience of 
a single migrant. What it also means is that linear cause-effect explanations must be 
abandoned in favour of systemic explanations that are still able to weight the different 
influence of each factor. In this sense, the practice of searching for explanations for a 
specific social phenomenon becomes a hermeneutic exercise, perhaps less definitive 
in its conclusions, but certainly closer to the complexity of reality.  
Bearing this in mind, in this brief chapter that concludes the empirical study we 
will attempt to establish possible connections between the characteristics of the 
structural contexts and the irregular migration realities that emerged from the 
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fieldwork. The first step in order to achieve this goal will be to “distil” the results of 
both the context analysis and the fieldwork in order to produce more abstract 
comparable results. Once with these more abstract results in hand, in the final section, 
we will proceed with the proper exercise.  
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7.1. Abstraction  
7.1.1. Contexts 
At the end of chapter 5, we presented a synoptic comparison of a number of 
important structural characteristics affecting the irregular migration phenomenon in 
the cities of Amsterdam and Madrid. In particular, we compared: the historical trends 
of migration, the migration regimes, the economies, the states structures and 
capacities, the public opinion and political stance regarding migration. In Table No. 8, 
it is possible to observe the results of the context analysis and an attempt at 
abstraction of them. By distilling and combining the role of the different elements, it 
seems possible to locate three main abstract comparable structural features that have 
affected, although in dissimilar ways, irregular migration both in Amsterdam and 
Madrid. Each of these general features can be understood as the result of a 
combination of the effects of a number of others and can vary along a continuum 
between two poles. 
 
A. The social demand for unskilled labour. This feature combines the effects of 
the economic trends (GDP variation), the labour market structure and the size of 
the shadow economy. It can vary between a high demand, usually discernible in 
connection to growing economic trends, segmented labour markets and sizable 
shadow economies, and a low demand, often associated to stable or decreasing 
economic trends, unified and regulated labour markets and reduced shadow 
economies. 	  
B. The migration regime. This feature combines the effects the public opinion and 
political attitude towards irregular migration, migration history, political culture, 
external influences (international institutions) and the existence of political 
vectors of anti-immigrant discourses. This feature can vary between a restrictive 
and non-restrictive configuration. The first pole is usually associated to long or 
complicated migration histories, strict political cultures, to possible restrictive 
imperatives from partners or supra-national institutions and to the presence within 
society of active and successful vectors of anti-immigrant discourses. The second 
pole can be connected to recent or relatively non-conflictive migration histories, 
flexible or more relaxed political cultures, no external restrictive pressures and 
the absence in society of anti-immigration vectors. 
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C. The political system’s capacity to regulate and influence social transactions in 
relation to the other social systems (economy, law, religion, communication, 
etc.). This feature combined the effects of: history, political culture, and the 
extension, efficiency and culture of administration. This feature can vary between 
a preponderant and a subordinate political system. The first pole is usually 
associated to a longer and more successful history of the political system’s 
organizations, to stricter, more legalistic and statistic political cultures, to older, 
more efficient and strict administration cultures. The second pole is more often 
discernible in cases of more recent and less developed political system’s 
organizations, more fragmented and “private” political cultures and to younger, 
less efficient and more flexible administration cultures. 
  
In Amsterdam, the social demand for unskilled labour appears to have been 
moderate in the 1990s and slightly diminishing from then on. This can be related to 
the relatively stable economic trends, the limited low-skilled sectors, the size of the 
shadow economy. The reduction in recent years can be linked to a further reduction of 
the underground economy and the effects of the economic crisis. Regarding the 
migration regime, a clearly restrictionist trend has been observable. The legal 
channels have been reduced and tightly controlled, the internal control policy has 
been reinforced and a policy of exclusion of irregular migrants has been enforced. 
This can be related to anxieties within the public opinion and the political attitude 
towards migration, which can also be connected to the migration history and the crisis 
of the Dutch integration model. Finally, concerning the capacity of the political 
system, it seems possible to consider this as medium to high. A number of elements 
support this claim: the level of intervention in the social transactions (sectors, level of 
expenditure, regulation of the labour market), the level and continuous reduction of 
the shadow economy, the increasing effectiveness in the expulsion policy. 
In Madrid, the social demand for unskilled labour appears to have been very high 
until 2008 and very low afterwards. This can be related to the combination of: the 
economic trends, extremely positive in the first phase and the very opposite in the 
second one; the structure of the labour market and the importance of sectors such as 
construction, care work and private house cleaning; the weight of the shadow 
economy. Regarding the migration regime, although with some internal contradictions 
and a slightly restrictive trend, this has been characterized by the availability of 
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regularization channels, the low levels of internal controls and the inclusion of 
irregular migrants. Finally, concerning the capacity of the political system, it seems 
possible to consider this as low to medium. This can be related to the lower level of 
intervention in the social transactions (sectors, level of expenditure, regulation of the 
labour market), the importance of the shadow economy, the lower efficiency in 
internal control policies. 
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7.1.2. Irregular migration realities 
At the end of chapter 6, a synoptic comparison of the results of the fieldwork was 
presented. We comparatively analysed the main features of the experience of 
Ecuadorian irregular migrants in Amsterdam and Madrid, in particular: the legal 
trajectories and regularization channels, the experience regarding work, internal 
controls, housing and healthcare. In Table No. 9, it is possible to observe the results of 
the analysis of irregular migration realities and an attempt at abstraction. Distilling 
and combining the role of all the elements it appears possible to locate three main 
abstract features that can be compared and that have characterized the experience of 
irregular migrants, although in different ways both in Amsterdam and Madrid. Each 
of these characteristics combines the effect of others and can vary along a continuum 
between two poles. 
 
A. The size of the irregular migration population. This feature can vary between a 
large or small irregular migration population. 	  
B. The average length of the irregular migration experience. This feature is 
determined by: the availability of ad-hoc regularization channels, the availability 
of alternative channels and the elaboration of strategies to regularize. It can vary 
between long-term irregular migration and short-term irregular migration. 	  
C. The life conditions of irregular migrants, determined by: the availability and 
conditions of working opportunities, the experience of internal controls and the 
fear of deportation, the accessibility to housing and to healthcare assistance. This 
feature can vary between good and bad living conditions. 
 
In Amsterdam, the size of the irregular migration population appears to have been 
relatively significant at the end of 1990s, when it represented almost 30% of the total 
foreign population. Down through the 2000s, this proportion substantially fell; the last 
available data for year 2009 showed that the irregular migration population 
represented less than 15%. It is important to recall that this reduction occurred without 
the adoption of massive regularization processes. Regarding the average length of the 
irregular migration experience, this can be considered as long-term. The data that 
emerged from the fieldwork showed that most migrants could not find ways to 
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regularize their status and that they had been living irregularly for an average of 12 
years. Concerning the living conditions of the irregular migration population, this can 
be considered as increasingly tough since the end of the 1990s. Although the working 
conditions have been generally good, the availability of opportunities has fallen. 
Controls have become stricter and stricter in the working sites and the fear of 
deportation has substantially increased. Housing remains one of the most complex 
problems for irregular migrants in Amsterdam, the accessible options being usually 
expensive and unstable. Finally, the access to healthcare has become severely 
restricted to irregular migrants since 1998. 
In Madrid, the size of the irregular migration population was very substantial in 
the first years of the 2000s, when it represented more that 40%. This proportion 
sharply fell after 2005, and has maintained a decreasing trend since then. Regarding 
the average length of the irregular migration experience, this can be considered as 
short-term. The data that emerged from the fieldwork showed that most migrants were 
able to regularize their status thanks to the existence of many ad-hoc channels, and 
had lived irregularly for an average of 5 years. Concerning the living conditions of the 
irregular migration population, this can be considered as good until 2008 and 
increasingly hard afterwards. The working conditions and the availability of 
opportunities were very positive until 2008. From that year on, the circumstances 
abruptly changed: it became very difficult to find employment (especially for men), 
wages fell and options were usually unstable. Controls were very limited until the 
second half of the 2000s. After 2008 and especially during certain periods, there were 
raids in public spaces, like metro stations, buses, parks and bars. Except for the very 
first years, housing has not been a major problem for Ecuadorian irregular migrants in 
Madrid. Access to healthcare was free for irregular migrants until 2012.  
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7.2. Assessing systemic relations  
Adopting a systemic perspective, the relation between contexts and irregular 
migration realities appear complex, dynamic and multi-causal. The specific 
characteristics that the experience of Ecuadorian irregular migrants had in Amsterdam 
and Madrid appear as difficult to be deduced from a single factor. On the contrary, 
what emerges is the existence of eco-systems made of different components, which 
interact and influence each other, creating the condition for the irregular migration 
phenomenon to appear and evolve. In Table No.10 it is possible to observe the 
parallel evolution of contexts and irregular migration realities in the two cities.  
The most evident relation that has surfaced from the analysis of the Amsterdam 
case is the one between the implementation of an increasingly restrictive migration 
regime since the end of the 2000s and the toughening of the conditions for irregular 
migrants. As discussed, such change can be understood as part of anxieties within the 
public opinion and the political attitudes towards migration. The reduction of entry 
channels, exclusion of irregular migrants from healthcare and other social services, 
the stricter controls on labour and the implementation of a more efficient exclusion 
policy may have certainly contributed to the reduction of the irregular migration 
population. Yet, this result may have not been attained without a political system that 
was able to efficiently implement its policies and deeply penetrate different spheres of 
the social life (labour market, housing market, identification and expulsion policy). At 
the same time, the relatively low demand for unskilled labour, resulting from the 
sectorial structure of the labour market and the reduction of the shadow economy, 
have certainly been relevant as well. In this sense, it is possible to say that the 
restrictive effects that polices have evidently had on the lives of irregular migrants, 
have been possible within the context of a more general systemic structure that has 
favoured this outcome. 
The most evident relation that emerged from the analysis of the Madrid case is 
the one between the sharp change in the social demand for unskilled labour after the 
start of the economic crisis at the end of 2007. Even if a number of reforms to the 
migration regime in 2004 and the adoption of massive regularization had certainly 
contributed to the reduction of the stock of irregular migrants, the effect of the sudden 
and deep change in the labour market had a deep impact on the conditions of irregular 
migrants. In the space of one year, the working opportunities became very limited, 
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especially for men, salaries decreased and the jobs became extremely precarious. 
Interestingly, the modification in the labour market affected also the possibility of 
irregular migrants to regularize their status or to renew their residence permit in the 
case they had already got one. In this sense, the dynamics of the economic system 
reverberated through other important aspects of migrants’ lives. Moreover, it is 
possible that the adoption of very “spectacular” control measures, such as the raids in 
public spaces and the amendment to the free healthcare-access policy may have also 
been a result of the economic downturn. The reduction of the administration budget 
may have favoured the adoption of a less organic and less costly control policy and 
the attempt to reduce the budget by reducing rights. Also in the case of Madrid, then, 
it seems possible to recognize a sort of systemic reaction that, originating from one of 
the systems, the economic one, has determined a reaction that has involved the other 
systems. 
 
Table No. 10 – Accessing systemic relations  
Amsterdam Madrid 
Context Irregular migration reality 
Irregular 
migration reality Context 
Social 
demand 
for 
unskilled 
labour 
Moderate 
To 
Low 
Medium 
To 
Small 
Irregular 
population 
size 
Irregular 
population 
size 
Big 
To 
Small 
Very high 
To Low 
Social 
demand 
for 
unskilled 
labour 
Migration 
regime 
Restrictive 
To 
Highly 
restrictive 
Long-
term Length Length 
Short 
term 
Inconsistently 
restrictive 
To 
Selectively 
open 
Migration 
regime 
Political 
system 
capacity 
Medium 
To 
High 
Medium 
To 
Hard 
Conditions Conditions 
Easy 
To 
Hard 
Low 
To  
Medium 
Political 
system 
capacity 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Two driving forces have sustained and fostered this research work: the curiosity 
about the phenomenon of irregular migration, that is emblematic of the contradictions 
and complexities of the age of globalization and then, the dissatisfaction with most of 
the available explanations. 
My curiosity was not so much aroused by the scenes of the overcrowded boats 
trying to cross the Mediterranean or of the people jumping over the fences in Tijuana, 
in order to achieve their “American dream”. After all, a great deal of human history 
has been about people trying to overcome barriers, no matter whether they are 
geographical or political, in order to improve their living conditions. What really 
intrigued me was on the other side of those barriers. Why were the rich states that 
cried against the “invasion”, with all their armies, resources and technologies, still 
unable to stop these hordes of miserable people? Was it possible that after four 
centuries of adjustments and rethinking, the epitome of modern politics had not yet 
been able to solve the most elemental problem, that of populations coming and going? 
How could irregular migrants live, work and fulfil their dreams within societies that, 
at least in principle, refused their presence? Irregular migration appeared to me as a 
captivating phenomenon because it evidenced the incongruence between the idea of 
states as the all-embracing, all-mighty controllers of socio-political interactions, and a 
much more complex and thriving reality made up of conflicts, ambivalences and 
uncertainty. Reflecting and researching on irregular migration, from this point of 
view, seems to me not simply a way to elucidate the particular aspects of a specific 
social phenomenon, but rather to reveal a viewpoint from which to observe the 
structure and dynamics of contemporary society as a whole. 
A preliminary review of the literature on irregular migration provided me with a 
large number of different, often contrasting, answers. Depending on the point of view, 
scholars and researchers had explained the phenomenon as the results of disparate 
causes, such as: the weaknesses of states, the ability of migrants, the interests of 
capitalists, the support of criminal networks, etc. As I proceeded in the exploration, I 
found myself in the paradoxical situation of becoming more and more fascinated by 
the new approach I found, and, at the same time, more frustrated by the incongruence 
of the complex puzzle that was emerging. Furthermore, it appeared that each 
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theorization effort usually emerged from the analysis of a particular national case. 
Thus, for instance, if in a certain place, the role of efficient smuggler networks had 
been crucial, irregular migration had to be explained everywhere as the result of 
smuggler networks. Besides, since the studied cases were rather limited, these mono-
causal, undifferentiated explanations were proposed without a solid empirical control 
base. What seemed to be missing, then, was a broader and more systematic work of 
comparison, in other words, one that made it possible to assess similarities and 
differences between different cases and therefore to offer material for the 
development of a more general and sophisticated understanding of irregular 
migration. 
On the basis of these initial reflections, I decided to start this work with two very 
broad and general research questions in mind: What is irregular migration? How can 
it be explained? A twofold strategy was formulated in order to add a grain of sand to 
the building of a better understanding of irregular migration.  
Firstly, a theoretical study was developed. The objective of this study was to 
critically analyse the different theories that have been proposed to explain irregular 
migration and to prepare an alternative theoretical framework. Building on the 
critiques to the principal theoretical explanations of irregular migration, the study 
focused on the theoretical work of Luhmann in order to search for a better theoretical 
framework. This approach helped to overcome a number of theoretical difficulties 
that have characterized this field of research. For instance, it was possible to go 
beyond a dichotomist understanding of the relation between agency/structure and to 
retrieve a social perspective where a statist one had been clearly dominant. The result 
was the elaboration of an analytical framework that linked the social characteristics of 
the irregular migration phenomenon to the structural features of the considered 
contexts. 
Then an empirical study was developed. The objective of this study was to 
compare the experience of irregular migrants in two different receiving contexts, to 
discover similarities and differences and to assess the possible effects on such 
experiences of the structural characteristics of each context. The chosen case was that 
of Ecuadorian irregular migrants in the cities of Amsterdam and Madrid. The contexts 
were researched mainly through secondary literature and the available statistical data. 
The fieldwork combined ethnography and the collection of 30 in-depth interviews 
with irregular migrants in each context. 
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Although these two studies can be considered as separate entities and each has a 
certain degree of autonomy, they were actually developed together and imagined as 
complementary parts of a single research project. Following the methodology 
proposed by Derek Layder, which he called “adaptive theory” (Layder, 1998), we 
avoided a purely inductive or a purely deductive approach. Instead, we tried to 
establish a permanent dialogue between the theoretical and empirical parts of this 
study. 
“Adaptive theory focuses on the construction of novel theory by utilizing 
elements of prior theory (general and substantive) in conjunction with theory that 
emerges from data collection and analysis. It is the interchange and dialogue 
between prior theory (models, concepts, conceptual clustering) and emergent 
theory that forms the dynamic of adaptive theory” (Layder, 1998, p. 27). 
 
The results that gradually emerged from the empirical work influenced the 
theoretical reflections while, at the same time, the concepts and ideas emerging from 
the theoretical worked helped to orient and recalibrate the empirical work. 
In this final, concluding chapter, we will attempt to put together the pieces of this 
small research puzzle. In the next section, we will present the main results of the two 
studies that compose this work. Finally, in the last section, combining such results, we 
will offer an exploratory theoretical typification of irregular migration realties. 	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Main results 
The theoretical study – Towards a systemic theory of irregular migration 
The objective of this study, developed in chapter 1, 2 and 3, was to critically 
analyse the different theories that have been proposed to explain irregular migration 
and to elaborate an alternative framework. The research questions that led this part 
were: How has irregular migration been explained?  What are the strengths and 
weaknesses of the different theories? Are there theoretical ways to overcome the 
existing limitations and combine the strengths of the different approaches?  
Building on the critical analysis of the existing literature and reconnecting with 
more general sociological and philosophical debates, our attempted to develop a 
better theoretical framework engaged with the theoretical work of Niklas Luhmann. 
The insights offered by his social systems theory, seemed useful to solve many of the 
theoretical difficulties that had been found. For instance, they allowed us to go 
beyond a dichotomist understanding of the relation between agency/structure or to 
retrieve a social perspective there where a statist one had been clearly dominant.  
The result of this study was the elaboration of a systemic analytical framework, 
that on the basis of a radically differentialist understanding of the phenomenon, linked 
the social characteristics of the irregular migration phenomenon to the structural 
features of the considered contexts.  
Irregular migration has usually been interpreted either through the lenses of states 
or through the lenses of migrants. This has generated two main perspectives of the 
phenomenon: the first interprets it as a problem that may signal an erosion of states’ 
prerogatives; the second understands it as a form of exploitation, which signals states’ 
enduring capacity to seek their goals. Although they contrast with each other, both 
perspectives are based on a similar, problematic, conception of society, social actors 
and social relations. This conception, based on the semantics of modern states, 
interprets society as subsumed within the concept of the state. The latter is 
conceptualized as a predominant actor that is able to control (or lose control over) the 
former. Social actors are intended as monolithic, single-minded, and time-stable 
players. Finally, social relations are interpreted through an input/output model that, 
accordingly, presupposes the possibility to establish clear-cut, cause/effect 
interactions. Irregularity, from this standpoint, is understood as a rather 
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undifferentiated phenomenon that, depending on the case, signals either a state 
effective strategy or failure. 
Luhmann’s theory of social systems proposes a radical critique of the semantics 
of modern states. Society, from this viewpoint, regains a central, all-embracing role. 
The political system and the state, although important, are considered as only two 
among the numerous systems and organizations constituting the complex galaxy of 
social relations. On the basis of this notion, irregular migration should be understood 
as a complex, differentiated, structural phenomenon of modern world society. The 
development of this phenomenon is related to the existing structural mismatch 
between the dominant form of social differentiation (functional) and the specific form 
of internal differentiation (segmentary) into territorial states of the political system. 
This creates a fundamental conflict between two logics: on the one hand, the all-
inclusive logic of most social systems (economic, legal, educational, familial, etc.) 
that fosters human mobility across geographic space; on the other, the exclusive logic 
of states that insists on regulating human mobility on the basis of a membership 
principle. Against this backdrop, irregular migration emerges as an adaptive solution 
to the mismatch existing between the high demand for entry into certain states and the 
limited number of legal entry slots available. 
If, in abstract and theoretical terms, irregular migration is explained as a 
structural feature of world society, the concrete, sociological manifestations embodied 
by the phenomenon within each context cannot be theoretically deduced. To 
understand how an irregular migration phenomenon initiates and develops, which 
resources it mobilizes and what structures and interactions it establishes, it is 
necessary to consider the dynamic interplay not only between states and migrants, but 
also between these and all the other social systems. Each actor needs to be considered 
as internally differentiated, autopoietic, self-referential and, yet, deeply interrelated 
with its environment through irritation/resonance relations. The main consequence of 
this radically differential perspective is that the particular phenomenology of each 
“irregular migration reality” must be empirically researched. In this sense, whereas in 
legal terms it may be possible to talk about irregular migration as a single category, 
from a sociological perspective, it is more accurate to talk about irregularities. In 
each context, the systemic interactions among states, migrants and the other social 
systems set the conditions for the emergence and evolution of differentiated irregular 
migration realities. This approach has a number of theoretical and methodological 
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implications. 
A. Irregular migration as a status 
The irregular status, attached to migrants by the political system, does not 
describe their whole social position. “From the point of view of systems theory, 
individuals are not part of society and therefore also not integrated or ‘incorporated’ 
into society” (Bommes, 2012c, p. 25). The relationship between individuals and 
society based on the concept of differential functional inclusion makes the question 
about the opportunities of irregular migrants empirical. The questions, then, become: 
How are irregular migrants included in the different social systems? How does the 
exclusion from political membership affect other inclusions? As stressed by Bommes 
and Sciortino: “in modern society there is no full total identity, the status is only one 
piece of the puzzle that is composed by a variety of statuses variously significant in 
different contexts” (Bommes & Sciortino, 2011b, p. 219). This condition may imply 
that irregular status, usually interpreted only as excluding, can turn out to be a 
condition for inclusion. In certain contexts, for instance, the irregular status may 
favour the inclusion in the economic system. This evidences how the exclusion from 
state membership does not necessarily prevent irregular migrants from participating in 
the other social systems.  
B. Irregular migration and states 
The relation between politics and irregular migration cannot be interpreted in 
linear, straightforward, oppositional terms (the state vs. irregular migrants). There are 
different reasons for why this is so. Firstly, states must be considered as internally 
diversified “organization complexes” (Bommes, 2012d) composed of a wide variety 
of institutions, agencies, departments, bureaucracies and levels of government. 
Moreover, the political functioning must be considered in terms of a “power cycle” in 
which politics, administration and the public reciprocally influence and legitimate 
each other. Therefore, as happens for most political issues, also for irregular 
migration, a single, coherent, stand is not available; each component develops a 
pragmatic approach in an attempt to fulfil its own particular duty and to remain 
legitimate. This may imply phenomena like the coexistence of policies that favour and 
disfavour irregular migration, the development of legal loopholes, policy 
inconsistency along the decision chain, etc. Secondly, it should be borne in mind that, 
while the member/non-member distinction is an important element of the functioning 
of states, their core function is the attainment of politically-binding decisions. In this 
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sense, although the control of irregular migration is, in principle, of great importance, 
the fulfilment of the function is even more relevant. Accordingly, depending on the 
specific context, the historic moment, the effective capacity to implement policies and 
the demands coming from the other systems, states may decide to be flexible as 
regards the membership principle and choose pragmatic approaches that may include: 
turning a blind eye, the use of symbolic policies, mass-legalizations, etc. Thirdly, 
whereas states are powerful organizations and the political system plays an important 
role within social communications, neither of them is capable of dominating society 
and of completely controlling other system transactions. Adopting a differential 
perspective, a state’s degree of social penetration and policy implementation capacity 
becomes an empirical question that has to be answered after analysing each case. 
Depending, for instance, on the different political traditions and regimes, the type of 
welfare, the administration’s degrees of development and cultures, public positions 
and levels of concern, state policies may be very different, and likewise their impact 
on irregular migration. As pointed out by Bommes and Sciortino, the amount and 
types of transactions where legitimate residence is considered significant, and the 
capacity by states to effectively check it, can dramatically change the meaning of 
being irregular (Bommes & Sciortino, 2011b, p. 217). 
C. Irregular migration and society 
The systemic understanding of society not only excludes the possibility of 
political systems to dominate social transactions; it also excludes that of every other 
system. Accordingly, neither the economic system nor the legal one, neither the 
familial nor the educational one, just to mention some, can exert control over society 
and impose their logic. The reality of irregular migration can be interpreted as the 
result of the dynamic interplay among the different approaches, interests, and 
concerns of each system. In this sense, while each system produces its own 
interpretation, the phenomenon cannot be fully understood only on the basis of one of 
these. 
D. Irregular migrants 
Even within a single country, the irregular migration phenomenon must be 
considered as dynamic and internally differentiated. Migrants’ interactions with states 
and with the other systems produce a myriad of different migration trajectories 
(Sciortino, 2004a, p. 38). This can be related to a number of factors. Firstly, it may be 
linked to the enormous differences existing between different groups of migrants and 
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between individuals within each group. The availability of human, social and 
economic capital can make a paramount difference, especially with regard to irregular 
migrants, since their effort is more complex and cannot count on the support of states. 
Secondly, the time factor plays a crucial role. The success of an irregular migration 
trajectory is related to the ability of migrants to analyse the environment and to 
develop strategies and counter-strategies to deal with problems. These strategies are 
necessary, for instance, to avoid controls, discover and take advantage of possible 
legal loopholes or to develop specific social structures. Since there is no instruction 
booklet available and the social environment continuously changes, irregular migrants 
need to rely on a learning-by-doing approach and on the development of a trusted 
network. In both cases, time makes a big difference. The concept of “migratory 
career” proposed by Cvajner and Sciortino, and derived from Luhmann’s theory 
offers an adequate tool to analyse irregular migrants’ trajectories. Intended as “a 
sequence of steps, marked by events defined as significant within the structure of 
actors’ narratives and publicly recognized as such by various audiences” (Cvajner & 
Sciortino, 2010a), the notion makes it possible to follow the experience of individual 
irregular migrants and to identify possible common patterns within a similar 
migratory context. 
Irregular migration realities can be understood, then, as the result of a complex 
“equation of irregularity” (Arango, 1992, 2005b; Arango & Finotelli, 2009, p. 16) that 
ponders the role of different actors involved and the many variables at stake. Table 
No.11. presents a non-exhaustive analytical framework of the relevant actors and 
variables affecting the generation of irregular migration realities. In every context, the 
specific “weight” of every actor, the value of every “variable” and the particular 
relationship between all these factors produce a different result. This translates into a 
different ecological positioning of irregularity with regard to the rest of society and 
into different irregular migration trajectories developed by migrants. 
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Table No.11 – Systemic analytical framework for irregular migration realities 
Actors Variables 
STRUCTURAL 
CONTEXT 
Political 
System 
States 
Politics • Type of political regime 
• Type and levels of services (welfare 
regime) 
• Political and migration culture  
• Geographical accessibility and proximity 
of migration sources 
Administration • Extension and efficiency 
• Administrative culture and tradition 
• Internal differentiation and level of 
government 
Public • Ideologies 
• Civic and migration culture 
• Concern versus migrations 
Other political 
organizations 
Political Parties 
Organizations 
Syndicates 
• Ideologies 
• Civic and migration culture 
• Concern versus migrations 
International 
organizations 
EU, UN, IOM, 
UNHCR, ILO, 
etc. 
• International agreements, decision 
structures, provisions 
Economic 
System  
Productive structure 
• Main economic sectors 
• Labour market structure 
• Underground economy 
Economic dynamics 
• General economic trends 
• Sectorial economic trends 
Legal 
System 
Internal  
• Legislation regarding migrations (entry, 
residency, naturalization, regularization, 
labour market, welfare services 
entitlements and access, territory control, 
etc.) 
• Structure and functioning of legal systems 
External  
• International legislation 
• Structure and functioning of international 
legal system 
Family System • Family structure and distribution 
• Familial ties and supportive structure 
Education System 
• Educational levels and accessibility in 
origin and destiny 
• Role of the public institutions and 
existence of alternatives 
Health System 
• Health care levels and accessibility in 
origin and destiny 
• Role of the public institutions and 
existence of alternatives. 
Mass Media System 
• Culture transmission 
• Transmission of opportunities and options 
• Communication on migration (concerned, 
indifferent, positive) 
Religion System • Religious view of migration 
• Religious support structures 
Migrants’ social structures • Network structures and activities 
• Illegal network structures and activities 
MIGRANTS  
Migrants’ 
capital 
Social  • Networks (types, extension, functioning) 
Cultural • Languages, professions, communication abilities, etc. 
Economic • Money 
Numbers • Irregular migrant numbers 
Time • Migration length 
Type of migration • Permanent, circular.. 
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The empirical study – Ecuadorian irregular migrants in Amsterdam and Madrid  
The objective of this study, developed in chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7, was to compare 
the experience of irregular migrants within two different receiving contexts and to 
establish possible connections between their experience and the characteristics of 
each structural context. The aim was to produce empirical data that could help to 
answer three very simple research questions: Does the irregular migration 
phenomenon have the same characteristics everywhere? What are the main 
differences and similarities? How can these be explained?  
The first and most important conclusion stemming from this study is that both the 
two structural contexts in Amsterdam and Madrid and the experience of Ecuadorian 
irregular migrants in the two cities were radically different. The diverse combination 
of possibilities, limitations, opportunities, resources, etc., present in the different 
spheres of social life in the two cities determined a set of very different conditions for 
irregular migrants to develop their lives and fulfil their objectives. This result 
confirmed the hypothesis that had emerged in the theoretical part of this study: the 
existence of different “irregular migration realities”. While in legal terms, the lack of 
a residence permit generates in principle a similar condition, the “social translation” 
of this condition sharply differs depending on where such translation takes place. 
 
Contexts 
Regarding the contexts, Amsterdam and Madrid, and more in general Spain and 
the Netherlands, appeared as a very different destinations for irregular migrants under 
a number of aspects. The main characteristics that were comparatively analysed were: 
migration trends, migration regime, economy, welfare state and, public and political 
opinion over migration. In table No. 12, it is possible to see a synoptic comparison 
showing the differences regarding these aspects. 
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Table No.12 – Synoptic comparison: the Netherlands and Spain 
 Netherlands Spain 
Migration 
trends 
Historical • Old country of migration (first, 
second and third generations) 
• Recent country of migration (first, 
forming second generation) 
1998-2013 • Average 90,000 per year. • Average 476,000 per year. 
Irregularity • Moderate until 2002, low 
afterwards. 
• Very high until 2005, moderate 
until 2007, low afterwards. 
Ecuadorians • Very small community (3,000) • Very big community (400,000) 
Migration 
Regime 
Legal channels • Narrow labour migration channels.  
 
 
• Broad asylum seeker channels. 
• Narrow labour migration channels 
(until 2004); Flexible labour 
migration channels (from 2005). 
 
• Narrow asylum seeker channels. 
Regularization • Very sporadic and limited 
regularizations 
• No permanent regularization 
schemes. 
• Recurrent, massive regularizations 
 
• Available permanent regularization 
schemes. 
Internal 
controls 
• Strict after 1998 
• Irregular migrants excluded from 
healthcare and other social services 
since 1998. 
• Increasingly strict after 2005 
• Irregular migrants excluded from 
healthcare since 2012. 
Economy, 
labour 
market, 
shadow 
economy 
GDP • Booming economy 1994-2000 and 
2006-2007 (GDP over 2.5%). 
• Mild economic crisis since 2009.  
• Booming economy1995-2007 
(GDP over 2.5%) 
 
• Deep economic crisis since 2009. 
Labour market • Slow growth of total employment. 
 
 
 
 
• Unemployment: stable, very low 
unemployment  
• Huge creation of jobs between 1998 
and 2007 (+6.5 millions). Huge 
destruction of jobs between 2008 
and 2013 (-3.4 millions) 
 
• Unemployment: significantly 
decreasing until 2007; steeply rising 
in the years to follow. 
Sectors • Limited low-skilled sectors • Important low-skilled sectors. 
Shadow 
economy 
• 14% to 9% • 24% to 19%. 
Welfare 
state 
Type • Conservative • Southern/Mediterranean 
Main 
principles 
• Social insurance + Social assistance • Social insurance 
% of GDP • Between 25% and  30% • Between 20% and  25% 
Main universal 
services  
• Education, Healthcare, Old age 
pensions, Old age assistance 
• Education, Healthcare, Old age 
pensions 
Politics, 
public 
opinion, 
migration 
Anti-
immigration 
discourses and 
political parties 
• Increasing importance of anti-
immigration discourses in public 
and political debates. 
• Anti-immigration parties in the 
Parliament and in the Government. 
• No anti-immigrant discourses at a 
national level. 
• No anti-immigrant parties.  
Public concern 
over migration 
• High to moderate. • Low to moderate. 
Restrictive 
integration 
policies 
• Increasingly restrictive policies 
since 1990s. 
• Liberal policies until 2012; then 
increasingly restrictive. 
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Irregular migration realities 
Also regarding the experience of Ecuadorian irregular migrants emerged from the 
fieldwork in Amsterdam and Madrid the results show a very different and dynamic 
picture. The main aspects that were analysed were: the legal trajectories and 
regularization channels, the working conditions, the experience of internal controls 
and the access to housing and healthcare.  
In Amsterdam, the experience of Ecuadorian irregular migrants became 
increasingly difficult along the considered period of time. The policy changes adopted 
since the end of the 1990s, appear, in this sense, to have been effective in restraining 
the living opportunities of irregular migrants. This has influenced both the size and 
the conditions of the irregular migrant community. While numbers have never been 
big, it seems that the increasing restrictiveness has determined an effective 
disincentive on new arrivals. 
Irregularity has appeared as a long term, hard to change condition for migrants in 
the Netherlands. The lack of ad-hoc regularization channels and the strict control over 
possible alternative regularization strategies, such as, marriage and cohabitation 
agreements, have made it very difficult for irregular migrants to obtain a residence 
permit. It was, then, normal to find migrants with more than 10 years of irregular 
residence in the Netherlands. Those few who were able to regularize, achieved this 
result after different attempts and after investing important quantities of money. 
Regarding the experience of internal controls, the scenario has been contrasting. 
On the one hand, the absence of ad-hoc police controls of irregular migrants in the 
public spaces has generated among irregular migrants a feeling of relative tranquillity 
and sense of freedom. On the other hand, the strict control over the respect for the 
rules regulating many social activities, such as, work, house rental, car driving, 
bicycle riding, street circulation, public transportation use, as well as the strict 
application of the deportation policy, generated among migrants an ever present sense 
of vulnerability and a highly developed sense of alert and self-control. 
The working opportunities and conditions for irregular migrants in Amsterdam, 
have been evidently affected by the restrictive turn adopted by the government since 
the end of the 1990s. The most evident result of this change has been the reduction of 
sectors where irregular migrants were able to find employment. In the last few years, 
private-house cleaning has been the niche where most migrants have found stable and 
remunerative opportunities. That being said, the economic success has been one of the 
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most valued aspects of irregular migrants in the Netherlands. Notwithstanding the 
difficulties related to the language, the high levels of controls, the risk of deportation, 
and, in the last few years, the reduction of working opportunities, migrants were 
generally able to find jobs, to earn and save money and to send money back to 
Ecuador. 
Regarding the access to vital resources, such as, housing and healthcare, the 
experience of irregular migrants in Amsterdam has been very problematic. As for 
housing, the particular characteristics of the Dutch housing market and, especially, the 
limited supply of opportunities and the strictly controlled system of public housing, 
has determined very precarious, unstable and expensive conditions for irregular 
migrants. Moreover, the combination of a low supply of and a high demand for 
houses has fostered cases of frauds and abuses. In the case of healthcare, the 
impossibility to freely access public healthcare since 1998, severely complicated the 
situation for irregular migrants. The requirement to pay for the services in public 
hospitals, implied for migrants the search for alternatives, such as, the help of private 
doctors or humanitarian associations, the accumulation of debts and, in certain cases, 
the neglect or mistreatment of dangerous illnesses. 
The combination of all these conditions has created an increasingly difficult 
environment for irregular migrants. As an adaptive solution, migrants have been 
obliged to develop sophisticated strategies to overcome limitations and barriers or to 
recur to the services and options offered by underground or even criminal 
organizations. While the possibilities to regularize have been very limited and many 
spheres of daily life quite problematic, the economic opportunities have been a sort of 
counterweight. Although the indirect police pressure is high and the risk of being 
deported is tangible, Ecuadorian irregular migrants have been quite effective in 
adapting to the environment and in developing reasonably serene and successful 
trajectories. Once they learn how to deal with the main problems and to behave in a 
discreet way, it is possible for them to conduct a parallel existence to that of the 
“regular” citizens. Paradoxically, in purely economic terms, their options may be even 
better. At least in the short, medium term, then, most migrants considered their 
experience as successful. The issue of the papers becomes truly critical for irregular 
migrants only when their children approach legally adult age and face the possibility 
of having to abandon their studies and start working with them. 
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In Madrid, the experience of Ecuadorian irregular migrants went through two 
very different phases in the considered period of time: the first, between the end of the 
1990s and 2008, and the second, afterwards. The first phase was characterized by the 
massive arrival of irregular migrants, the abundance of working opportunities and the 
possibility for the irregular migrants to easily regularize their status. A sharp 
reduction or even the inversion of the fluxes, the collapse of the job market and the 
reduction of the regularization opportunities characterized the second phase. Although 
a number of political reforms implemented by the authorities through the 2000s may 
have certainly effected the situation, the decisive factor in determining the change of 
scenario in 2008 was the start of a serious economic crisis in Spain. 
Irregularity has appeared as a transitory condition for migrants in Spain. The 
existence of a number of ad-hoc regularization channels has made it easy for irregular 
migrants to obtain a residence permit. The crucial role of holding a working contract 
or a job offer in all the regularization schemes, however, made it a lot more difficult 
for irregular migrants to get a residence permit after 2008. Notwithstanding this, at 
least among Ecuadorians, it has been very difficult to find migrants with more than 5 
years of irregular status. 
Regarding the experience of internal controls, the scenario has been very 
different in the two described phases. While police controls on irregular migrants in 
the public spaces have always been carried out, until 2008 these were very limited, 
unsystematic and usually inconsequential. After 2008, this type of control was 
implemented in spells, but in a much more extensive, systematic and determined way. 
In connection with this development, the perception of the possibility of being 
deported, which until 2008 had been negligible, definitely increased. Yet, as 
underlined by most migrants, even during the apex of police raids and deportations in 
2011 and 2012, the common perception was that in order to be expelled, it was 
necessary to have a criminal record or a recurrent story of detentions. As for other 
types of controls, such as those on the working sites, house rental and other social 
activities, although migrants have perceived a restrictive trend, especially in the 
second part of the 2000s, these controls have not been a reason for major concern. On 
the whole, then, it is possible to say that Ecuadorian irregular migrants in Madrid had 
a very serene and carefree experience of controls until the end of the 2000s. After 
that, the concern increased and, in particular, during certain periods, it created a 
concrete sense of vulnerability. 
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The working opportunities and conditions for irregular migrants in Madrid, have 
been evidently affected by the economic crisis which started in 2008. If, until then, 
both men and women had been able to find plenty of opportunities in a number of 
sectors, after that, especially for men, it became truly difficult to find an occupation. 
This dramatic change severely affected the economic situation of all migrants and 
particularly of those without a residence permit. The sharp increase in unemployment 
among the general population, made it very difficult for irregular migrants to get a job 
offer. The only sectors where they were still able to find relatively stable and 
remunerative jobs were private-house cleaning and the care sector. The assessment of 
the economic experience of Ecuadorian irregular migrants in Madrid can be 
considered as twofold. Until 2008, these irregular migrants were successful because 
they were able to work, earn and save money, and also send money back to Ecuador. 
After 2008, these people were unsuccessful and in most cases had to limit themselves 
to basically surviving. 
Regarding access to vital resources, such as housing and healthcare, the 
experience of irregular migrants in Madrid has been relatively easy. As for housing, 
the rapid expansion of the market and the low level of controls in the sector meant 
good, inexpensive and stable opportunities for these migrants. As regards healthcare, 
the possibility for irregular migrants to freely access the public healthcare system 
generated a very convenient and unproblematic situation. 
The picture that emerges from this overview once again is twofold. Ecuadorian 
irregular migrants in Madrid experienced two very different phases. Although each 
phase was characterized by a number of specificities, the most decisive, discerning 
element appears to have been the difference in the working opportunities. After 2008, 
the deterioration of the economy severely affected all the population. However, the 
effects of the lack of work were particularly relevant for irregular migrants since this 
not only affected their economy, but also their possibility to regularize or maintain a 
temporary residence permit. 
In table No. 13 is possible to see a synoptic comparison of the experience of 
Ecuadorian irregular migrant in the two cities. 
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Table No.13 – Irregular migration realities in Amsterdam and Madrid 
 Amsterdam Madrid 
Legal 
trajectories and 
regularization 
channels 
Main 
trajectories 
• Never regular (17/39) 
• Regularized through marriage or 
cohabitation agreement (11/30) 
• Regularized under exceptional 
circumstances (2/30) 
• Regularized using ad-hoc channels 
(21/30) 
• Befallen irregularity (6/30) 
• Never regular (3/30). 
Irreg. years  • 12 years • 5 years 
Channels • Indirect: (1) marriage and 
cohabitation agreements 
• Direct: (1) extraordinary 
regularization programs, (2) through 
labour quotas; (3) through rootedness. 
Regularization strategies • Bogus marriage or cohabitation 
agreement with a Dutch citizen – 
very difficult 
• Bogus marriage or cohabitation 
agreement with a EU citizen – 
difficult 
• False contracts to apply for 
regularization 
• False police record to apply for 
regularization 
Work Sectors • Before mid2000s, men: hotels, 
restaurant, construction, port, and 
industry. 
• Before mid2000s, women: hotels, 
restaurants, office cleaning, private-
house cleaning. 
• After mid2000s, men: private-house 
cleaning and construction. 
• After early 2000s: private house 
cleaning. 
• Before 2008, men: construction, 
restaurants, industry, storage, 
transportation, and couriering. 
• Before 2008, women: private-house 
cleaning, office cleaning, care work 
with children and the elderly. 
• After 2008, men: “little jobs” in 
construction, transportation, care 
work with the elderly. 
• After 2008, women: care work with 
children and the elderly, private-
house cleaning 
Conditions • Work availability: 
o Before mid2000s: high 
o After mid2000s: medium 
• Working conditions: generally 
medium to good. 
 
• Wages: generally high 
• Work availability: 
o Before 2008: very high 
o After 2008: very limited 
• Working conditions: generally 
medium to good, some cases of 
exploitation.  
• Wages:  
o Before 2008: high in certain 
sectors, medium in others. 
o After 2008: medium in certain 
sectors, low in others. 
Controls  • Before mid2000s: medium 
• After mid2000s: high 
• Before mid2000s: very low 
• After mid2000s: medium 
Internal 
Controls 
Street 
controls 
• No street ad-hoc controls for 
irregular migrants 
• Before 2008: limited, unsystematic, 
inconsequential 
• After 2008: in spells, systematic, with 
consequences 
Fear of 
deportation 
• Before 2000s: medium 
• Until mid2000s: high 
• After mid2000s: very high 
• Who can be deported? Everyone 
• Before mid2000s: very low 
• After mid 2000s: medium 
• Who can be deported? Those who 
have a criminal record or precedents. 
Housing • Very difficult, unstable and 
expensive 
• Before 2000/2001: difficult and 
expensive 
• After 2000/2002: increasingly easy 
and inexpensive 
Healthcare • Until 1998: free access to healthcare 
• After 1998: access under payment 
with the exception of emergencies. 
• Until 2012: free access to healthcare 
• After 2012: access under payment (no 
cases in my sample) 
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Assessing the relation between context and “irregular migration realities” 
In chapter 7, adopting a systemic perspective, an attempt to assess the relation 
between contexts and irregular migration realities was made. This attempt was 
preceded by an exercise of abstraction of the results emerged from the context study 
and the fieldwork.  
Regarding the contexts, three main abstract, comparable variables were identified: 
A. the social demand for unskilled labour. B. the migration regime. C. the political 
system’s capacity in relation to the others social systems. Regarding the irregular 
migration realities, three main abstract comparable variables were identified: A. the 
size of the irregular migration population. B. the average length of the irregular 
migration experience. C. the life conditions of irregular migrants. 
The relation between these variables in the two cities appeared as complex, 
dynamic and multi-causal. The specific characteristics that the experience of 
Ecuadorian irregular migrants had was difficult to be deduced from a single factor. 
On the contrary, what emerged is the existence of eco-systems made of different 
components, which interact and influence each other, creating the condition for the 
irregular migration phenomenon to appear and evolve. In Table No.12 it is possible to 
observe the parallel evolution of contexts and irregular migration realities in the two 
cities. 
The most evident relation that has surfaced from the analysis of the Amsterdam 
case is the one between the implementation of an increasingly restrictive migration 
regime since the end of the 2000s and the toughening of the conditions for irregular 
migrants. Such change can be understood as part of anxieties within the public 
opinion and the political attitudes towards migration. The reduction of entry channels, 
exclusion of irregular migrants from healthcare and other social services, the stricter 
controls on labour and the implementation of a more efficient exclusion policy may 
have certainly contributed to the reduction of the irregular migration population. Yet, 
this result may have not been attained without a political system that was able to 
efficiently implement its policies and deeply penetrate different spheres of the social 
life (labour market, housing market, identification and expulsion policy). At the same 
time, the relatively low demand for unskilled labour, resulting from the sectorial 
structure of the labour market and the reduction of the shadow economy, have 
certainly been relevant as well. In this sense, it is possible to say that the restrictive 
effects that polices have evidently had on the lives of irregular migrants, have been 
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possible within the context of a more general systemic structure that has favoured this 
outcome. 
The most evident relation that emerged from the analysis of the Madrid case is 
the one between the sharp change in the social demand for unskilled labour after the 
start of the economic crisis at the end of 2007. Even if a number of reforms to the 
migration regime in 2004 and the adoption of massive regularization had certainly 
contributed to the reduction of the stock of irregular migrants, the effect of the sudden 
and deep change in the labour market had a deep impact on the conditions of irregular 
migrants. In the space of one year, the working opportunities became very limited, 
especially for men, salaries decreased and the jobs became extremely precarious. 
Interestingly, the modification in the labour market affected also the possibility of 
irregular migrants to regularize their status or to renew their residence permit in the 
case they had already got one. In this sense, the dynamics of the economic system 
reverberated through other important aspects of migrants’ lives. Moreover, it is 
possible that the adoption of very “spectacular” control measures, such as the raids in 
public spaces and the amendment to the free healthcare-access policy may have also 
been a result of the economic downturn. The reduction of the administration budget 
may have favoured the adoption of a less organic and less costly control policy and 
the attempt to reduce the budget by reducing rights. Also in the case of Madrid, then, 
it seems possible to recognize a sort of systemic reaction that, originating from one of 
the systems, the economic one, has determined a reaction that has involved the other 
systems. 
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Table No. 14 – Accessing systemic relations  
Amsterdam Madrid 
Context Irregular migration reality 
Irregular 
migration reality Context 
Social 
demand 
for 
unskilled 
labour 
Moderate 
To 
Low 
Medium 
To 
Small 
Irregular 
population 
size 
Irregular 
population 
size 
Big 
To 
Small 
Very high 
To Low 
Social 
demand 
for 
unskilled 
labour 
Migration 
regime 
Restrictive 
To 
Highly 
restrictive 
Long-
term Length Length 
Short 
term 
Inconsistently 
restrictive 
To 
Selectively 
open 
Migration 
regime 
Political 
system 
capacity 
Medium 
To 
High 
Medium 
To 
Hard 
Conditions Conditions 
Easy 
To 
Hard 
Low 
To  
Medium 
Political 
system 
capacity 
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Towards an analytic framework for irregular migration 
In this final section, on the basis of the obtained results, we will present a 
hypothetical typology of context/irregular migration reality relations. The objective is 
not to create a fixed structure of relations or a deterministic tool of analysis. The aim 
is to propose an early scheme of analysis, a hypothetical space of ideal-types that 
allows one to organize possible relations between structures and irregular migration 
phenomena. 
The space of the proposed scheme is divided into 8 spaces by three axes (see 
Table  No.7.1). Each axis represents one of the three main structural features affecting 
irregular migration that have been pinpointed. These macro-structural features are 
influenced by other structural characteristics. In Table No.11, there is a 
schematization of the different influences (others may be possible). 
 
Table No. 15 – Context and irregular migration realities 
Direct Indirect 
Social demand for unskilled labour 
• Economic cycle: expansion/contraction. 
• Structure of the labour market: degree of segmentation 
and size of the informal sector 
• Size and networks built by migrants 
• Geographic position of sending and receiving countries 
• Welfare state regime 
Migration regime 
• Migratory history and culture of migration 
• Demographic cycle: percentage of migrant population, 
number of migrant generations, ethnic conflicts 
• Politicization of migration: high/low 
Political system capacity 
• Political culture: statist/non-statist. 
• Implementation capacity: high/low. 
• Regime type: liberal/non-liberal. 
• Administrative culture and tradition 
 
The 8 spaces created by the crossing of the three axes represent different types of 
irregular migration, each characterized by a different combination of the three macro-
structural features. Combining this scheme with the results of the Amsterdam/Madrid 
comparison, it is possible to imagine a typology of 8 types of irregular migration. 
Each of these types of irregular migration represents an ideal-type that links the 
combination of structural conditions to the characteristics of the irregular migration 
reality (see Table No. 7.2). They describe an overall general tendency, the main type 
of irregular migration produced by a certain social configuration. It is clear that 
important exceptions are possible and that to fully describe the experience of each 
migrant, we need to add an analysis of the individual trajectory. 
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Irregular migration appears then as a differentiated phenomenon that emerges 
from the particular configuration that the different social systems maintain within a 
specific context. The irregular status of a migrant, in this sense, by itself, does not tell 
much about the social experience, the lived experience of this migrant. In each 
context, such status translates into a number of opportunities and limitations that can 
be extremely different. At the same time, the analysis of irregular migration realities 
reveals important characteristics of the context where they emerge, the equilibrium 
between different social systems, the existence of a certain systemic coherence that 
affects the evolution of the different social systems.  
 
Figure No. 7.1. – Structures and irregular migration realities 
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Table No. 16 – Irregular migration typology 
 Structural context Irregular migration realities 
1 
Restrictive migration regime 
Low political system capacity 
High social demand for unskilled labour 
Long term 
Big population 
Easy conditions 
2 
Restrictive migration regime 
High political system capacity 
High social demand for unskilled labour 
Long term 
Big population 
Hard conditions 
3 
Restrictive migration regime 
Low political system capacity 
Low social demand for unskilled labour 
Long term 
Small population 
Easy conditions 
4 
Restrictive migratory regime 
High political system capacity 
Low demand for unskilled labour 
Long term 
Small population 
Hard conditions 
5 
Unrestrictive migration regime 
Low political system capacity 
High demand for unskilled labour 
Short Term 
Big population 
Easy conditions 
6 
Unrestrictive migration regime 
High political system capacity 
High demand for unskilled labour 
Short term 
Big population 
Hard conditions 
7 
Unrestrictive migratory regime 
Low political system capacity 
Low demand for unskilled labour 
Short term 
Small population 
Easy conditions 
8 
Unrestrictive migratory regime 
High political system capacity 
Low demand for unskilled labour 
Short term 
Small population 
Hard conditions 
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